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EDITORIAL COMMENT 
This report is one of a series produced by the Industrial Strategy Project. 
The ISP has its origins in the Economic Trends Research Group, a collective of 
economists and other social scientists convened by the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions in 1986. COSATU, under attack for its support for sanctions, initially asked these 
researchers to examine the impact of enforced isolation on the South African economy. It 
soon became clear that sanctions were a small aspect of the problems besetting the South 
African economy, and the work of the Economic Trends Research Group expanded into a 
full-blown analysis of South Africa's economic crisis. 
The poor performance of South Africa's manufacturing sector loomed large in the litany 
of problems bedeviling the South African economy. The 1980s had been, in economic 
terms, something of a lost decade. The manufacturing sector was particularly conspicuous 
by its inability to create jobs, and to produce commodities that satisfied the divergent 
requirements of the domestic and international markets. A range of factors contributed to 
this malaise — apartheid's impact on the skills profile of the workforce, repressive and 
outmoded industrial relations systems and work organisation, a highly concentrated 
industrial structure and a concomitantly weak and repressed SME and micro-enterprise 
sector, and a highly inward oriented trade regime, were the most obvious sources of the 
crisis in manufacturing. 
However, the solutions were less obvious than the problems, and in 1990, again at 
COSATU's initiation, the ISP was conceived. From the outset, the political environment 
ensured that the ISP would not be an ordinary research project. The unbanning of the ANC 
and the certainty of the immediate accession to power of COSATU's political ally, 
coupled with the union federation's increasingly direct role in policy formulation, ensured 
that the ISP focus closely on policy, contributing to the development of the industrial 
policy that would address the poor performance of South African manufacturing. 
To this end, the ISP engaged a range of researchers with the purpose of undertaking 
detailed examinations of the key sub-sectors of South African manufacturing. The fruits of 
the ISP are to be found in the reports, such as this one, most of which are to be published 
by the UCT Press. The authors of the reports were assigned, generally for a period of 14 
months, to the study of a particular sector. The researchers were required to study the local 
sector and the factors promoting and restraining its development. They were required to 
assess its prospects in the light of the likely global trajectory of the industry. Detailed 
examination of local firms were complemented by international visits that enabled the 
researchers to consult with international experts and visit factories to enable them to 
situate South African firms in a comparative perspective. 
In addition to the sectoral studies, the ISP also engaged researchers to examine key cross- 
cutting issues. Those selected for study were human resource development and industrial 
relations, technology development, market and ownership structures, trade performance 
and policies, and regional industrial strategies. 
Industrial policy is not a plan easily contained between the covers of a single document. It 
is a process, a process of engagement between the key industrial stakeholders. South 
Africa's peculiar transition has given concrete expression to this credo, with the tripartite 
National Economic Forum and the various sectoral task groups the key institutions and 
processes within which an evolving industrial policy is being developed. COSATU has 
played the leading role in this process. The ISP has, in turn, made a significant 
contribution to COSATU's capacities. It has done this by constant dialogue between the 
ISP and the COSATU leadership, and by a traineeship programme which saw a number of 
union leaders seconded to the ISP for its duration. 
In addition the research process has engaged a range of key actors. Individual researchers 
have engaged with union and business leaders and experts within government. The ISP 
was punctuated by a series of intensive workshop attended by the researchers, COSATU 
and ANC leaders, and other local and international experts. The work-in-progress was 
thoroughly discussed and critiqued at these workshops and it is appropriate to see each 
report as owing a great deal to the ISP collective. 
A number of researchers are continuing their work from within the industry task forces, 
the unions, and the structures of the new government. The ISP itself is moving into a 
second phase, taking up questions still unanswered, re-examining conclusions of the first 
phase and continuing the unending process of developing industrial policy. It is in this 
spirit that these reports should be read: they are not final plans, but simply attempts to start 
a vital process, one that will of necessity be taken forward by all of the major industry 
participants. 
The Industrial Strategy Project was funded by generous grants from the Humanistisch 
Instituut Voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (HIVOS) of The Netherlands, the 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Ottawa, Canada, and the Olof Palme 
International Centre of Sweden. We benefitted not only from the financial resources of 
these institutions, but also from the wide-ranging experience of their staff members and 
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Foreword 
In the late eighties COSATU commissioned a group of economists to prepare a report 
analysing the impact of sanctions on the South African economy. We commissioned this 
work in response to criticism in the media and elsewhere that held us — through our support 
for sanctions — as responsible for the sorry state of the South African economy, including 
the miserable conditions of our members and others whose interests and aspirations we 
represented. 
The research revealed that the crisis of the South African economy was rooted in the policies 
of the apartheid era and our commission to the economists was transformed into a full-scale 
critique of the economics of apartheid. A key consequence of the failures of apartheid's 
social and economic policies was its unproductive manufacturing sector. It was unable to 
produce basic goods of a suitable quality and at an affordable price; it was unable to 
produce goods that successfully penetrated international markets; it relied on low-paid, 
poorly-trained workers, and harsh, authoritarian shop-floor supervision; above all, it proved 
incapable of generating desperately-needed employment. While manufacturing's 
contribution to the global economy escalated, South Africa relied increasingly on its natural 
resource base and the cheap labour that mined and farmed it. 
Appreciation of these problems inspired COSATU to request its research collective to 
undertake research in support of our attempt to formulate a new industrial policy. This 
request flowered into the Industrial Strategy Project whose output is represented in these 
reports. 
The research process has been characterised by considerable dialogue between COSATU, its 
affiliates and the researchers. We have learnt much from this interaction; we are confident 
that we have taught the researchers much. However this work is the output of an 
independent research collective. As is to be expected in an arms length relationship of this 
kind, we do not agree with every line of each report, we do not accept every 
recommendation. But with regard to its major findings, we do agree that there is a real 
potential for building an efficient manufacturing base, rooted in well-paid, productive 
workers. Above all we believe, and this is endorsed by the ISP, that an independent trade 
union movement actively and aggressively pursuing its interest is not merely compatible 
with rapid and sustainable industrial development — it is a precondition. p4 
John Gomomo 
President, Congress of South African Trade Unions 
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Preface 
The following report is the result of 15 months' research into South Africa's household 
electrical durables (HED) industry, conducted for the Industrial Strategy Project (ISP) on 
behalf of COSATU. This was not an easy task, and I feel a little defensive as I write the 
preface. I still feel a bit unhappy with what is admittedly an incomplete and fragmented 
study. 
So, before continuing, I'd like, in self-defence, to make a few points about this report. 
Please bear with me, and read on. It might help make sense of what follows. I'll certainly 
feel better knowing that you did. Otherwise at places you might wonder what I'm going on 
about. 
1. Firstly, this report was written under the assumption that neither I nor the ISP will 
be making industrial policy for South Africa. Although the report does propose an 
industrial strategy of sorts, it is not intended to be a blueprint. Instead, I have 
assumed that the country's first popularly elected government and its appointees 
would make policy. I have therefore further assumed that the most important 
contribution the report could make would be to gather together and present the 
information which might be needed for this purpose. For that reason, this report is 
mainly descriptive; it is an attempt to bring together in one place and organise data 
in a new way. That transformation of quantity into (hopefully) quality is in itself is 
a contribution with which I am satisfied. 
2. Secondly, the South African HED industry has been pretty difficult to research. 
Discussions with sympathetic listeners in South Africa and abroad have all 
confirmed one fundamental point: this is an industry which traditionally does not 
like to talk about itself. So, when reading, please bear the following in mind: 
2.1. Household electrical durables are defined by their place in households' 
'consumption functions' and their common subjection to key macroeconomic 
variables. They are not a strictly definable grouping in terms of process 
teclmology; they and their components are produced in a variety of 'sectors', 
primarily electronics, electrical machinery, engineering, and chemicals. Unlike 
'mining', 'paper and pulp', or 'metals', therefore, it is a misnomer to speak of 
the small group of firms producing 1-IEDs in South Africa as a 'sector'. Rather, 
it is more appropriate to refer to them as an 'industry' or 'industries', sharing 
as their business the production of electrical appliances for household use. In 
practice, this means that the FLED industry does not correspond to any standard 
industrial or trade classification. Only the South African Manufacturing 
Census includes information on the industry as defined here, but this data is 
from 1985 and generally spotty. 
2.2. The South African HED manufacturing industry is represented by three 
employer's organisations, the Radio and Television Manufacturer's Association 
of South Africa (RTVMSA), and the Domestic Appliance Manufacturer's 
Association of South Africa (DAMSA), and the Small Appliance 
Manufacturer's Association (SAMA). As far as I can tell these are essentially 
lobbying and public relations bodies which undertake little research or 
information gathering except as is necessary in their ongoing battles with the 
BTF. Try as I may, I have been unable to get either organisation to provide 
essential aggregate data on things like turnover, profit, employment levels, 
productivity, and so on. They claim not to have it. SAMA was unfortunately 
not contacted during the research process as I was unaware of their existence. 
2.3. Existing commercial research on this industry is scant and overwhelmingly 
concentrated on its consumer electronics branch. I have been unable to obtain 
consultancy or stock-broker's reports for the usual reasons — they cost money 
and in any case permission from the firms themselves is required in order to 
see them (see below). The one quasi-available source of information, the semi- 
annual Business Marketing Intelligence (BMI) Report on the Electronics 
Industry, is inaccurate, self-contradictory, and superficial. The local press 
seems interested in nothing but the TV sub-branch, which is a favourite 
example of the failure of apartheid economics. 
2.4. These factors mean that, in effect, to get information on the FlED industry one 
has to go to the HEDfinzs themselves. 
3. However: 
3.1. With one exception, all of the firms in this industry are unlisted subsidiaries of 
major conglomerates, and do not publish financial statements. 
3.2. The firms in this industry were notably secretive and unwilling to discuss, let 
alone disclose, information which might be regarded as sensitive, including just 
about everything we ISP researchers had been charged with gathering. Of the 
six producers of domestic appliances and four major producers of consumer 
electronics, only two agreed at head office level to participate in the Industrial 
Strategy Project. The others either refused, or only grudgingly agreed to very 
limited or delayed participation. 
3.3. This reticence was partly due to the exceptional beating they were taking in the 
recessionary conditions of 1991-93. Another problem was the union connection 
of the Industrial Strategy Project, especially after the 1992 tussle between the 
National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUIMSA) and the Steel and 
Engineering Industries Federation (SEIFSA). Research abroad, however, has 
shown that HED firms in other countries behave similarly even in the best of 
times. This is because the BED market is almost always a saturated, 
replacement market, with firms battling for market share. Information about 
individual firms' production methods, capacities, or costs is thus extremely 
sensitive. 
3.4. With some notable exceptions, I found that senior management in HED firms 
were unwilling to schedule multiple interviews which might allow more in- 
depth information gathering. As a result, I found most of my interviews to be 
frustrating. In particular, time-series data on key variables within individual 
firms was nearly impossible to obtain. 
3.5. To this was added the problem that few of the firms gather key production 
information about themselves, or were only just beginning to do so. 
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It occurs to me that one of the fundamental objects of short-term industrial policy should be 
to demand reasonable public access to corporate information necessary for the rest of us to 
make informed decisions about policy. 
A. Methods 
Research was conducted by means of analysis of published and private data, studies of press 
clippings, and interviews and plant visits. Very few academic sources have been consulted 
as there are no works published on the South African HED industry and relatively few on 
the international industry. 
B. Confidentiality 
Every finn which agreed to participate in research, both South African and foreign, did so 
only on condition that they not be identified. Accordingly, I have given false names to the 
firms studied, but left data in its original form. This approach should pose no problems for 
the generalisability of the conclusions, since there are very few firms participating in the 
South African HED market. 
One major but unavoidable problem with this is that some of the key sources of information 
which have been used cannot be referenced. In particular, several internal research reports 
given to me by reasonably sympathetic executives furnished crucial data which was used to 
construct the electrification tables in Chapter Four. Although I have attempted to spell out 
the assumptions and calculations underlying these tables in the text, I can only offer to share 
the raw data in confidence with anyone who wishes to check up on me. 
C. Thanks... 
I would like to thank the project co-directors, Dave Kaplan, Dave Lewis, Avril Joffee, and 
Raphie Kaplinsky for their guidance, support, and patience with my continual harassment; 
the ISP office staff, led by Nomonde Mgumane, for their help and perseverance; Chris Lloyd 
and Alistair Machin, for their help in organising my visit to their country — g'd on ya' 
mates; and all participants in the project in South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, 
especially the Automotive, Metals, and Engineering Union of Australia. 
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A Further Note' 
In late 1993, subsequent to this report having been written and submitted, I was approached 
by participants in the National Electrification Forum (NELF) to undertake further research 
on the South African HED industries. Although at the time I was working in the United 
States, I was asked by one Forum participant to prepare a tender for research on the role of 
the HED industries in the electrification process, which they subsequently submitted. This 
tender was rejected and another report was commissioned and submitted by a Johannesburg 
consulting firm. 
After the consultant's report was submitted, the NELF participant who had asked me to 
write their tender sent me a copy and asked for my comments. I was disturbed by the 
contents, omissions, and implications of that report, and wrote a brief and quite critical 
commentary which was subsequently tabled at the NELF. 
Shortly after my commentary had been tabled early in 1994, I received a letter from Tek 
Corporation, one of the major firms in the South African white goods industry. I am still 
unsure whether this and subsequent letters to myself and to the ISP were sent on behalf of 
Tek or the Domestic Appliance Manufacturer's Association (DAMSA), the employer's 
group in the industry. Anyway, this letter and several which followed were highly critical of 
certain aspects of my report, particularly Chapter Four, and expressed concern about some 
of my research findings, the way I had used data, and about my academic competence and 
professionalism. Tek essentially accused me of misinterpreting data, incompetence, and 
breach of confidentiality. They demanded that I inform all of the groups using the report of 
their concerns, which I have done. 
Tek was quite right in pointing out mathematical errors in the original Chapter Four — 
which had been heavily reworked in the meantime — for which I accept full and sole 
responsibility. I reject their accusation of breach of confidentiality outright. 
At the time they raised their concerns, Tek had had a copy of the original version of the 
report for nearly a year, yet had said nothing. For this reason, I feel that their accusations 
were motivated less by concern for quality research or their business interests than by a 
desire to discredit and/or silence me in reaction to my critical intervention in the NELF — 
an intervention which to my knowledge is still fully supported by the Forum participants to 
whom I have spoken. In any case, my NELF paper has literally nothing to do with the 
subject matter of Tek's objections, a point I have made to them repeatedly but which they 
have yet to acknowledge. 
In response to their requests, I have agreed to include the following in the preface to the 
report: 
1. Tek Corporation has objected strongly to the interpretation of the data contained in 
Chapter Four and to that Chapter's conclusions, and have indicated that they will 
comment further on the matter after publication of this document. 
This section represents the author's own views and is not intended to reflect the position of the 
Industrial Strategy Project or COSATU on the issues discussed hereunder. 
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2. Tek Corporation feel that I have breached confidentiality by including sensitive data 
supplied by their employees in a way which will allow competitors to identify them. 
3. Tek Corporation questions my competence to write this report. 
You can be the judge. If I have made mistakes or misinterpreted data, I can only say that I 
have tried to avoid this and have searched the document for any such errors. I am satisfied 
that this document is a creditable first attempt to describe the South African HED industries. 
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Executive Summary 
A. Introduction: Research Area and Rationale 
1. Industry Studied 
This document examines the industries producing household electrical durables 
(henceforth HEDs) in South Africa. This excludes other consumer durables industries, 
such as automobiles, personal computers, and household furniture, but includes: 
1. Domestic Appliances (or 'white goods') such as stoves, refrigerators, freezers, 
microwaves, washers, dryers, and dishwashers. Included for some purposes but 
excluded from detailed consideration are those items which are typically permanently 
installed, such as air-conditioning, geysers and heating systems. Gas, liquid, and solid- 
fuel powered appliances will be included. 
2. Small Appliances such as hotplates, toasters, kettles, fans, space heaters, hairdryers, 
irons, vacuum cleaners, and food processors. 
3. Consumer Electronics (or 'brown goods') include audio products such as radios, 
music centres, and similar equipment, and video products such as televisions, video 
recorders, and so on. This report will concentrate on televisions, as (i) little production 
of audio products or VCRs occurs, and generally firms are presently withdrawing from 
this, and (ii) policy towards the television is a long-running and contentious issue and 
deserves careful treatment. 
2. Rationale 
These industries were chosen for several reasons: 
1. They produce goods which are similar from the consumer's point of view. These 
goods either help save domestic labour or contribute to leisure time activities, and are 
major — but optional — purchases for most households, often bought on credit in 
South Africa. 
2. They are all metal- and/or plastic-based engineering products, with at least the 
potential for mass production. 
3. There could be a significant increase in demand for these goods if there are mass 
housing and electrification programmes in the near future. 
4. There are significant imports of all three types of goods, contributing to our balance 
of payments problems, especially when consumer spending increases — as may happen 
if there is a mass housing programme. 
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5. With the possible exception of producers of small appliances and some domestic 
appliances, South African HED firms are in trouble and may not survive a 
relaxation of currently high import duties without a coherent set of industrial, 
trade, and macroeconomic policies. 
B. Chapter One: Consumption of HEDs 
1. Macroeconomic Trends 
1. The fortunes of the HED industry are closely linked to the overall economic health of 
the country, particularly movements in personal disposable incomes and private 
consumption expenditure. Sales of HEDs rose dramatically between 1979 and 1983, 
only to fall rapidly in 1984-85. A brief period of moderate growth 1986-1989 has been 
followed by stagnation, punctuated by a brief boost in 1990, turning to subsequent 
severe decline. 
2. The market for white goods shrunk by nearly 9% in 1992. The market for consumer 
electronics products has also suffered. 
3. The stock of consumer durable goods has aged considerably over the last 5-8 years. At 
present the real value of the HED stock is roughly the same level as in 1971. 
4. The fortunes of the industry are linked closely to government policy regarding credit 
terms. Government has consistently intervened to limit growth of hire-purchase sales 
when it has appeared that HED sales have been based on credit and dissaving rather 
than growth in personal disposable incomes. This has resulted in two significant and 
sudden downturns, in 1983-84 and 1988-89. 
2. Income, Electrification and lIED Ownership 
1. Distribution of HEDs remains very unequal in South Africa. In general, black 
ownership of major appliances is severely limited compared to whites, The divergence 
is less with respect to consumer electronics, but still severe. 
2. Electrification has had an impact on urban black household ownership of HEDs, 
but income remains the principal barrier. Ownership of such goods decreases rapidly 
as income falls, even amongst households with access to electricity. 
3. Urban electrified black households remain slow to take up some appliances, 
particularly electric free-standing stoves. The principal reasons for this are the ready 
availability of substitutes (such as coal or wood stoves); threats of electricity supply 
interruption; and lack of income. In other cases, recent growth in ownership has been 
very rapid. For the most part, however, rapid growth has been in areas such as 
consumer electronics where South African manufacturing is very weak and costly. 
4. The fundamental problem afflicting the HED market is the inability of black 
consumers to afford these products. This is a problem both of high cost products 
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and low income consumers. Both must be addressed if the industry is to enjoy a 
sustainable recovery. Policy must begin with this in mind. 
C. Chapter Two: Production of HEDs (Overview) 
1. General Characteristics 
1. The HED industry is a mixture of wholesale and retail activities, and is driven by the 
imperative to maintain market share and brand name/positioning in order to maintain 
brand premium. To an extent, this orientation discourages it from aggressively 
pursuing low-income markets. 
2. Nevertheless, this limitation exists only in the context of inflexible manufacturing 
methods. More flexible methods would allow firms to produce both branded and 
unbranded products in the same factory. 
2. Vital Signs 
1. The HED industry is not especially big, either in the context of the overall economy or 
in the metals sector. On average, it accounts for 0,5% to 1% of most key 
manufacturing variables, measured nationally. 
2. The HED industry has been profitable historically, but mainly in the context of high 
effective rates of protection. It is currently suffering significant losses. These are due 
both to recession and to increased competition from imports, particularly those 
originating in South East Asia and Southern China. 
3. The HED industry has not been a major source of investment or employment growth in 
recent years, and is presently experiencing rapid decline in both respects. 
Retrenchments in the last 12-18 moths have been especially severe. 
3. Competitive Outlook 
1. The HED industry is a technology consumer and costly producer, and is not in a 
position at present to expand effectively into export markets. World HED markets are 
presently saturated, affected by the global recession, and marked by intense competition 
between global giants. Given the South African industry's technological weakness, 
higher cost structures, lack of an adequate component supply chain, and small size, its 
primary initial growth stimulus will come from an expanding domestic and regional 
market, assisted by mass housing and electrification policies. This does not mean that it 
cannot achieve an export orientation in time; but this will occur only on the basis of a 
strong local position. Export growth will probably begin on the basis of subcontracting 
to the global players. 
2. The HED industry is in a good position to supply a growing local market, albeit at a 
premium to consumers. Its location, orientation towards the local market, and unused 
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capacity means that it will be able to respond quickly and effectively to an increase in 
demand. 
3. Yet to survive to do so, it will require continuing nominal protection of 25% ad valorem — possibly more — until such time as it has undergone a process of restructuring 
which would allow it to compete more effectively with imports. 
4. In addition, the HED industry must be encouraged to take a longer-term strategic 
perspective to avoid a repetition of past experience, when it has turned to imports in 
order to earn quick profits in an upswing. 
5. Whatever happens, the prospects for employment growth in the HED industry are 
meagre. The industry is not likely to be a major source of employment even if it is able 
to capitalise on the electrification/housing process. The available manufacturing 
techniques which would allow the industry to be more competitive are significantly 
labour saving and automated. 
D. Chapter Three: Global Trade in HEDs and South 
Africa's Position 
1. Global Trends 
1. Global HED import shares have shifted towards Europe and the Americas. Export 
shares have shifted towards the Pacific Basin, and within it away from Japan, in favour 
of the NICs. 
2. Global markets for HEDs are dominated by large multinationals who are getting larger, 
both through acquisition and merger (white goods) and through concentration of market 
share (consumer electronics). This makes it more difficult for smaller firms to enter 
global markets without links to these larger entities. 
3. Developed country markets for HEDs arc basically saturated. Growth is through 
competition for market share, through aggressive production rationalisation, new 
products, and mergers. This requires significant R&D, marketing, and financial 
resources. 
4. The best approach for smaller-country HED firms may be to form strategic alliances 
with global players to obtain access to their strengths in market access, product design, 
and production technology. This is the only practical route for firms who lack the in- 
house capacities of successful niche marketers. 
a) Domestic Appliances and Small Appliances 
1. The 'developing' countries have increased their share of exports of these goods 
significantly over the last 20 years, on the basis of lower labour costs. 
2. However, recent advances in production technology have enabled developed country 
producers to regain ground by reducing unit labour costs and increasing capital 
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productivity. This means that new entrants will not be able to repeat the experience of 
the Asian players, and must be prepared to deal with best-practice technology and 
organisational practices. 
3. Global HED markets are now more competitive than ever. Local firms wishing to 
compete in these markets — whether as exporters or against imports — will have to 
develop design capability and the capacity to reduce unit costs continuously. This has 
been achieved elsewhere through automation — at a cost in employment growth. 
4. Marketing of domestic appliances in South Africa's closest major market, the EEC, has 
become particularly competitive. Smaller firms are either closing or selling out to 
major international producers such as Swedish giant Electrolux and United States firm 
Whirlpool-Phillips. This trend is due both to market saturation and to the emergence of 
pan-European products, produced and marketed on a larger scale than before. To 
compete in the EEC market or against these firms will require production capacity, 
turnover, and organisational capacity beyond the South African industry's current 
abilities, and aggressive and costly marketing strategies in an already competitive 
environment. 
5. The only viable alternatives are (i) to follow the route of smaller, more flexible firms 
such as New Zealand's Fisher and Paykel, who use flexible automation technology to 
produce a variety of high-quality products on a mixed-model assembly-line basis; (ii) to 
aim for the African and South American markets; or (iii) develop closer, possibly 
equity, linkages with major world producers. None of these routes will be easy. 
6. South African producers are linked via restrictive technology agreements to European 
designs, and do little product research locally. They are already 7-10 years behind 
world leaders and falling further every year. 
7. Domestic appliances are becoming more technological, and South Africa's outdated 
designs will not compete on world markets. Firstly, they are being designed to use 
microchip technology to improve performance. Secondly, they are becoming more 
energy-conserving. This implies a continues 'R&D' effort to keep up with competitors. 
To enter world markets means being able to compete in product design as well as price. 
8. Equity participation or direct investment by foreign firms should be allowed and 
encouraged in order to enhance the competitive environment in the appliance industry, 
but only if policies to encourage the restructuring of local firms are applied. The 
appliance industry is worth preserving. 
b) Consumer Electronics 
1. The world consumer electronics industry is massively dominated by giant Japanese 
firms, whose domination will only grow in the future. The pace of product change, 
level of automation, technological complexity, and scale of organisation and inter- 
firm linkages needed to keep up with these firms is far beyond the capacity of 
independent smaller country industries. 
2. Even as a subcontracting source for products or components to established global 
players, developing country producers must have exceptional technological and 
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organisational capacity in order to participate in what is a fast-paced, highly 
flexible global supply system. Low unit labour costs also remain a factor. 
3. In general, South African producers are not presently capable of achieving these 
characteristics — although there may be significant exceptions. High cost structures, 
small production capacity, and above all, lack of technological expertise and a viable 
component industry imply that further steps to achieve such capacity behind tariff 
barriers would be wasteful and unlikely to succeed. Thus, South Africa should not 
attempt to be a producer of consumer electronics at present. 
4. Most South African firms in the consumer electronics industry, whether in audio or 
television products, will not survive a relaxation of currently high tariffs. Those 
that may will most likely have to concentrate on assembling simple goods for the 
growing segment of the market under license from overseas companies. There may be 
firms, however, who are able to achieve sufficient flexibility to allow them to compete 
successfully as electronic product assemblers more broadly. Such firms can and should 
be encouraged through general investment and reorganisational incentives. 
5. There is no compelling reason not to allow and encourage foreign producers of 
consumer electronics products to invest directly in South Africa. This can only help 
the local electronics sector and existing firms. Such investment, however, must not be 
attracted by retaining presently extremely high rates of protection. 
2. South Africa's Trade in HEDs 
In all three product groups under study, Southern Africa is a minor player in global 
trade, generally importing far more than it exports. It is, however, a major importer of 
some products, particularly consumer electronics. Only in a few areas — generally low 
value-added products such as stoves — is the local market supplied primarily by local 
firms. But even in these cases protected South African products are be significantly 
more expensive than imports, forcing consumers to pay more. 
2. Imports of HEDs have fluctuated considerably and are presently decreasing, but have 
tended to be the main source of supply during periods of upswing such as 1983-84. 
This may suggest (i) rigidity in local production and an inability to react quickly; (ii) 
the impact of exchange rate fluctuations, which hurt domestic producers by cheapening 
imports and raising the cost of imported components; and/or (iii) dumping. 
3. The most likely explanation, however, is a tendency by HED firms — who are 
essentially wholesalers — to turn to imports as a source of quick and profitable supply 
during upswings. Such a tendency can only be encouraged by the unpredictability and 
volatility of the South African HED market. 
4. South African exports of HEDs have been negligible, but have increased recently for a 
number of reasons, most of which do not suggest increased competitiveness. The most 
likely explanation is an attempt to unload excess stock, increase capacity utilisation, 
and take advantage of General Export Incentive Scheme (GElS) subsidies. 
5. Although South Africa is 'self-sufficient' in most of the products covered by this study, 
this is only because of high import duties. Average nominal tariffs for white goods and 
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small appliances are about 30%, whilst those for consumer electronics are in the 90% 
range. Duties on parts are also about 30% for domestic appliances, but in the 2O% 
30% for consumer electronics — implying significantly higher effective rates of 
protection. Surcharges play an important role in protection in some cases. 
6. Tariff protection for some goods is so high, and value-added so low, that in some cases, 
such as TVs, it would cost the economy less to import finished goods than to import the 
parts needed to assemble them locally. The foreign exchange cost per job of television 
manufacture, in particular, means that maintaining this industry simply to preserve jobs 
is unjustified. 
7. Effective rates of protection are high for most HEDs, and are grossly inflated for 
televisions. Domestic resource costs are also higher than desirable, although this may 
be mitigated by externalities. Again, in the case of televisions DRC is extremely high. 
E. Chapter Four: Electrification and HEDs in South 
Africa 
If the current tariff situation remains unchanged local value will constitute 
approximately 18% of additional retail sales, whilst imported value will constitute the 
remaining 72%, This may be altered significantly, however, if tariffs are reduced 
significantly, or if certain products are given over to import supply. 
2. Electrification of urban black households will have a major impact on the market for 
HEDs, raising market values, domestic value added, and import values by 60% to 90%, 
depending on the rate of electrification. 
3. In most cases, however, the demands of electrification should not exceed the capacities 
of the domestic industry to supply. Excess capacity in the industry is presently very 
high. 
4. The primary issue to be addressed is therefore not necessarily investment in new 
capacity as such, but how to avoid the tendency towards excessive imports during boom 
periods. Policies to encourage local market share are needed if potentially devastating 
import bills are to be avoided. 
5. Such policies must start with transparency and consistency in electrification and 
housing policy, which will encourage long-term investment in local supply by HED 
manufacturers. 
6. Policy must also address the possibility of bottlenecks in the supply of variable inputs 
such as materials, components, and labour. 
7. In addition, the boost provided by electrification may present a vital opportunity to 
encourage investment in more competitive manufacturing methods. 
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F. Chapter Five: Manufacture of HEDs in South Africa 
1. The Television Industry 
a) Basic Strengths and Weaknesses 
The South African TV receiver manufacturing industry was founded in the early 1 970s 
to supply the impending local market, and to serve as the basis for a wider electronics 
industry. Extremely high rates of effective protection and restricted entry were 
allowed to encourage the industry to develop. 
2. Two decades later, the industry remains essentially unchanged. Most importantly, 
it still cannot survive without very high protection and at a great cost to consumers 
and the economy. Its net contribution to the economy is heavily negative; its products 
are uncompetitive with imports; and it is still a net importer of components. It has also 
failed to serve as the basis for a wider electronics industry, since assembly of imported 
components is a simple procedure which generates few skills and requires little local 
input. 
3. The television industry's net contribution to the economy is strongly negative. The 
import content of televisions is so high, and the price of component kits so close to the 
price of finished products, that domestic value cannot be added without protection. In 
short, the real site of value added is in component manufacture, which is located 
primarily offshore. 
4. Perhaps most importantly, therefore, the television industry lacks an adequate local 
component sector. There are insufficient economies of scale to produce major 
components such as CTV picture tubes locally. As a result the industry must import 
such higher value-added components, sourcing only simple items such as cabinets and 
basic electronic items locally. Moreover, most local components remain significantly 
more expensive than imports, and of lower quality. Licensing agreements with foreign 
technology partners which the government encouraged in the earJy 197 Os have led to a 
situation in which component suppliers are faced with a proliferation of items required 
by the local market. This has further prevented them from achieving competitive 
volumes in specific components. 
5. A related problem is that offshore component suppliers charge a 15-18% premium 
on proprietary parts required for branded units. The local industry lacks the skilled 
personnel and R&D infrastructure to move into manufacture of original equipment, 
which might liberate it from this problem. 
6. Overhead costs are higher than those for comparable plants overseas due to lower 
volumes. As we have seen, however, his may be a secondary problem, and may be due 
primarily to the high marketing and administrative costs associated with the corporate 
structures involved, as well as attempts to increase margins to compensate for low 
volumes. 
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7. Major existing firms are oriented towards production of branded products, and 
cannot compete with low-cost domestic assemblers who have sprung up recently. 
The latter are probably aiming for a more realistic market, however, and may be serving 
an important purpose by posing this problem for the major finns. 
8. Manufacturers have not yet seriously moved in the direction of skills-based 
manufacturing flexibility, which might allow a more viable television industry. TV 
production in South Africa will only survive if it is seen as a part of electronics 
production more broadly, since the local market is not large enough to support dedicated 
television plants. This implies that to survive, producer firms must develop the 
capacity to produce a variety of products in their plants — not just televisions. 
9. In general, the television industry has served (until recently) as a source of abnormal 
profits for a few manufacturer/distributors. The net cost to the economy over the 
next five years of television supply as presently constituted would be enormous. 
This must be the prime consideration when looking at policy for the industry's future. 
b) Assessment of Past Policy 
The Board of Tariff and Trade's traditional approach to the television industry has 
been to attempt to use the threat of lower tariff protection to force it to increase its 
use of local components. It was hoped that this would increase 'real' local value 
added in order to reduce the industry's net drain on the economy. The initial attempt 
of the early 80s, which involved rebates on the use of local components, was not 
successful. Neither was the misguided attempt to develop a standardised 
monochrome chassis. The current structural adjustment programme, which seeks to 
penalise net foreign exchange usage and encourage more competitive pricing, has 
succeeded mainly in forcing less efficient producers to close down, and in flooding 
the market with cheap imported sets and kits. In addition, the current recession has 
hurt manufacturers' financial performance, leading to a situation of terminal-threat 
to the industry. 
2. In retrospect, therefore, it can be seen that the BTT's approach has been misguided: 
2.1. The initial ground rules and conditions for the industry were extremely 
protective, and investment plans were naturally based on them. This did more 
to shape subsequent industry development than anything else. 
2.2. Moreover, these rules explicitly tied local manufacturers to foreign technology 
partners — who now charge them a large premium to buy the proprietary 
components needed for the branded products the local television industry 
produces. Under these conditions, it was unrealistic of the BIT to expect 
manufacturers to develop into competitive firms. 
2.3. Waiting 10 years to re-examine the situation only made it worse. 
2.4. It is evident that the problem of low local content cannot be solved by changing 
market signals only. It makes no sense to penalise local manufacturers for not 
using local components which are either more expensive and of a lower quality, 
or not available at all — and then to criticise them for not exporting. 
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2.5. Finally, BiT policy towards the television industry has been so unstable and 
unpredictable that manufacturers hesitate to invest for fear of subsequent 
changes. 
3. In the final analysis, the television industry is not uncompetitive in what it does — 
assemble televisions — but it cannot be price competitive as long as the key links in 
the value added chain — component manufacture and research and design — are 
located offshore. Under such circumstances, the local television industry cannot 
hope to make a positive contribution to the economy. 
c) An Alternative Approach 
The BiT has never addressed the possibility of looking at the television industry 
within the context of a group of products which could be manufactured in flexible 
plants, thus reducing the overhead recovery burden on televisions. There has been a 
tendency to see television manufacture as a separate industry, when in fact it is a 
single product within the electronics industry. This has led to a tendency to see 
production volumes as the main problem. 
2. Yet the problem of production volumes in the television industry is only a mediate 
problem. The proximate problem is overhead recovery. It is true that it is not 
possible to recover overheads on television manufacture alone, since the market is 
not big enough. But this is taking the wrong approach. The problem is not the 
product, its market, or volume. The problem is overhead recovery in a factory. The 
basic processes used to produce TVs are adaptable to a variety of electronic 
products. If a variety of products could be produced on them, overhead recovery 
could be spread across a greater number of units. This in turn would solve the basic 
factory problem and obviate the product problem. 
3. Rather than focus on volume, then, an alternative policy goal should be to facilitate 
the attainment of flexibility sufficient to allow production of a variety of products on 
a small batch basis, at a competitive cost. This would require 
3.1. Training of workers in flexible, multiple skills. This is the basic prerequisite 
for any restructuring of the industry. 
3.2. Reduction in change-over times on automated equipment such as auto- 
insertion machines to allow maximum flexibility. 
3.3. Access to competent, motivated, innovative factory management. 
3.4. Integration of production engineering, operations management, and basic 
product marketing functions olfactory level, to allow maximum effective 
product diversification. 
3.5. Treating the factory as the basic unit of business instead of the wholesaling 
division. The present philosophy is a product of the brand orientation of the 
companies in question. Their brand price premium — in other words, the 
addition to ex-factory plus excise price which results from wholesaling 
operations — is about 25%. Low-cost producers sell direct from the factory 
xv 
INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY PROJECT 
with out bloated marketing and administrative divisions, which enables them to 
sell at rock-bottom price. 
3.6. This is not to say that branded, quality products should be abandoned, only that 
factories should be free to produce whatever they can sell. Manufacturing 
should be treated as the source of value added, not the 'rent' deriving from 
owning a brand name. Only the former is a developable source of 
competitiveness in the long run. 
3.7. The traditional focus on volume in the television industry is misleading. 
Dedicated equipment is not necessary in this industry. Overhead recovery 
should be possible through product diversification. This is only possible, 
however, by freeing the manufacturing division to pursue profitable 
alternative product lines, training workers to be flexible and innovative, 
and by committing financial and management resources to achieving this 
goal. 
3.8. Commitment of financial and management resources by upper 
management to the process of flexibility achievement and product 
diversification is required to make such a restructuring process work. 
4. Any continued protection for this industiy should be a temporary measure 
predicated on a commitment by managements to do just this. Otherwise the 
volume/price/protection linkage will never be broken. It is the opinion of this report, 
however, that success in this respect is unlikely. 
2. The Small Appliance Industry 
The South African small appliance industry is very small, and is effectively comprised 
of just two manufacturing firms. 
2. It is not a significant exporter. Its products are not competitive globally, but are closer 
to competitiveness than the television industry. 
3. When the cost-raising impact of tariffs on its inputs are considered, it is evident that the 
industry is not actually 'protected' at all. Average duties on finished goods arc 25-30%, 
as are duties on most components and raw materials, which comprise 50-80% of ex- 
factory cost. 
4. The small appliance firm studied for this report is competitive with a comparable 
Australian plant studied in terms of its ability to convert physical inputs into physical 
outputs, but is uncompetitive in terms of its overall cost structure and lead time. This is 
due to three factors: (i) higher input costs; (ii) unreliable suppliers and the need to 
maintain large stocks; (iii) high overheads due to inability to achieve economies on 
inflexible machinery. 
5. The South African small appliance firm studied is headed in the right direction in its use 
of flexible work cells and just-in-time principles in order to manufacture a variety of 
products for a mass market. It major task is to achieve greater flexibility by investment 
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in more flexible fabrication equipment, in order to allow it to overcome the problem of 
high overheads by spreading them across more products. 
6. This would be preferable to the alternative of flexibility in fabrication through increased 
subcontracting, which seems to be the case, at least potentially. As long as the South 
African economy remains in deep recession, however, the subcontracting option will be 
hard for firms to resist. 
7. The firm studied has yet to make a definite commitment to a restructuring partnership 
with its workforce. Labour relations are essentially paternal, and little progress has yet 
been made in harnessing workers' tacit skills in. order to move towards a fuller use of 
this resource. Although skills levels are low, the Australian case study suggests that 
formal skills are not as important as the development of a sense of quality- 
responsibility. This can only be achieved and sustained when workers are in fact 
responsible for the products of their labour. 
a) Issues for Policy 
1. The South African small appliance industry can be restructured successfully. It 
already possesses sufficient capacity to serve the South African market, and would 
do so profitably under a restructuring programme similar to that followed by the 
Australian firm studied. The key issues to be addressed by policy are 
1.1. the cost of inputs, including duties, and the efficiency of suppliers; 
1.2. the quality and capability of management; 
1.3. the role of labour in restructuring; and 
1.4. incentives for it to invest in a flexible future. 
3. The White Goods Industry 
1. White goods manufacturing in South Africa has historically been based on a mass- 
production model, suited to the needs of an urbanising white population who were 
mainly first-time buyers. 
2. This encouraged investment in dedicated production machinery and standardised models 
for mass production. This approach is no longer suitable in conditions of significant 
market fragmentation between low-, middle-, and high-income buyers. 
3. South African white goods producers suffer a major disadvantage in terms of overhead 
costs, based primarily on very low per-product production volumes relative to overseas 
plants. 
4. This does not mean that the problem with the South African white goods industry is 
volume, however. High overheads are rather the symptom of a manufacturing process 
designed for mass production in a society which does not have a mass market for the 
kind of products for which it is suited. 
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5. The white goods industry does suffer significant cost disadvantages which make it 
uncompetitive internationally. The question is whether they can be solved, and whether 
the solutions are to be found inside manufacturing finns or in the external environment. 
6. In nearly every product category, excess material costs are the largest single factor 
contributing to the price disadvantage of South African white goods versus imports. 
7. Partly as a result, South African white goods are uncompetitive with imports even with 
duties. Nevertheless, if their value added, import savings, and cost-raising impact is 
taken into account, most white goods products provide a reasonable net contribution to 
the economy. 
8. White goods firms' strategy is driven largely by the need to maintain wholesale 
margins, not manufacturing competitiveness as such. Manufacturing philosophy is one 
of 'break even'; value added is seen to arise primarily in the market as 'brand 
premium'. 
9. The experience of the New Zealand firm visited suggests that it is possible to achieve 
export competitiveness on the basis of flexible production technology and a consultative 
approach to management, coupled with access to sufficient technological expertise to 
design and develop original products and processes. 
10. This may be a tall order for South African firms, however — the social and political 
context in South Africa is radically different to New Zealand. The favourability of this 
context was stressed repeatedly by interviewees in the New Zealand firm. 
G. Chapter Six: Policy Proposals 
1. Core Opportunities 
1. The present poor state of the HED industry is due to a number of factors which do not 
appear to be intrinsic to the products it produces or the technologies and techniques 
used to produce them. There is no reason, in other words, why South African cannot be 
competitive producers of HEDs. 
2. South Africa has a relatively highly developed light engineering sector presently 
oriented towards the mining and agricultural sectors and to an extent the defence 
establishment. This industry is invaluable to further development of the manufacturing 
sector. A vibrant HED industry can help this industry to develop towards consumer 
needs. 
3. South Africa does not require a high-tech HED industry. Instead, it requires an 
industry which is capable of flexibly producing low-cost, reliable goods appropriate to 
a developing country with a massive backlog in housing and urban amenities. 
4. South and Southern Africa is a potentially huge market with nearly unlimited need for 
the products of the HED industry. Moreover, it is almost certain the a future 
government will undertake large-scale housing and electrification programmes which 
will spur market growth considerably. 
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5, The industry is owned by large, well-financed conglomerates which could readily afford 
to re-equip the industry were this warranted by market conditions. 
2. Major Constraints 
1. The South African HED industry is unlikely to become a major exporter in the near 
future. 
2. The South African economy is in the midst of its worst recession since World War Two. 
3. Moreover, political uncertainty will make it difficult for capital owners to justify 
investment in the South African market for some time to come. 
4. The input supply chain of the industry is a substantial barrier to competitiveness in final 
product manufacture. 
5. State policy towards the HED industry has been inconsistent and contradictory. 
6. Unpredictable inflation and exchange rates will continue to wreak havoc with export 
attempts and import-intensive manufacturers. This may be one of the most serious — 
and least controllable — barriers to competitiveness. 
3. Strengths 
1. The HED industry is here, which gives it an advantage in terms of lead time, 
suitability to the local market, and service. 
2. It has faced an historical imperative for flexible production and multi-product lines 
in the small local market. 
3. It has established brand names, and linkages to overseas technology partners. 
4. It has achieved some success in local design. 
5. In the cases of small appliance and white goods, local products are not so 
uncompetitive that they cannot conceivably become exportable. 
6. Physical labour productivity is on a par with plants elsewhere in the world in some 
cases, indicating that South African firms are able to manufacture efficiently; 
whether they can do so competitively in a context of high input costs, price 
inflation, and long lead times is another question. 
4. Weaknesses 
1. The ownership 'culture' of the major producers of HEDs is probably a significant 
constraint to a strategic reorientation of this industry. A short-term focus on quarterly 
returns is sadly misplaced in a rapidly changing competitive environment. This is 
perhaps the most important issue determining the success of efforts to restructure this 
industry. 
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2. South Africa lacks the human resources base to move immediately into sophisticated 
manufacturing of complex products, either for local consumption or export. Skills are 
lacking particularly in production technology and product research and design. 
3. The HED industry is a technology consumer in a market where original technology is 
the key to competitive success. 
H. What Is Worth Saving? 
1. Consumer Electronics 
a) Audio 
1. Should foreign companies wish to invest here, they should be allowed to do so, but the 
protection afforded audio products should be abolished. The local industry does not 
have the right ingredients to achieve competitiveness, and represents a significant cost 
to the economy. 
b) Television 
1. Present levels of labour and capital employment do not justify continued protection of 
the television industry, which by its own admission cannot survive without it. As we 
have seen, the foreign exchange costs of imported television parts will be enormous 
over the course of a 5-year electrification programme. This report recommends the 
responsible withdrawal of protective duties for the television industry. 
2. It may turn out that some firms will be able to produce televisions successfully as part 
of a flexible, multi-product manufacturing process in which capital costs are spread 
over a variety of other goods, as well. If so, then so be it; but given the situation with 
respect to import component pricing, this is unlikely. Ultimately, value added in the 
electronics filiere, television included, is located at the level of component manufacture. 
2. White Goods and Small Appliances 
1. The white goods and small appliances branches will probably be able to survive in the 
long term, but will require nominal protection to support a period of restructuring. This 
is a reasonable goal and should be adopted as policy. 
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I. Policy Issues and Proposals 
1. The focus of industrial policy towards the HED industry, 
therefore, should be two-fold: 
1. To ease the loss of the consumer electronics branch, and 
2. To facilitate the survival and restructuring of the white goods and small appliances 
branches. 
Further specific proposals in this regard are presented in Chapter Six. 
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Introduction 
A. Research Area and Rationale 
1. Area of Study 
This study considers the industry producing household electrical durables (HEDs)' in 
South Africa. For the purposes of this study, HEDs will be defined as electronic and 
electro-mechanical household appliances and recreational goods. This definition excludes 
other consumer durables, such as automobiles, household furniture, and personal computers. 
The definition includes: 
• Domestic Appliances (or 'white goods') such as stoves, refrigerators, freezers, 
microwaves, washers, dryers, and dishwashers. Included for some statistical purposes 
but excluded from detailed consideration are permanent installations, such as air- 
conditioning, geysers and heating systems. Although the focus of the study is on 
electrical products, gas, liquid, and solid-fuel powered appliances will be included for 
some purposes. 
• Small Appliances such as hotplates, toasters, kettles, fans, space heaters, hairdryers, 
irons, vacuum cleaners, food processors, and so on. 
• Consumer Electronics (or 'brown goods'), which are divided into two groups: 
1. audio products such as radios, players of recorded media such as cassette or CD 
players, amplifiers, and combinations of these; and 
2. video products such as televisions, video recorders, and so on. 
• Portable devices have been included but automotive audio equipment has been 
excluded.2 
2. Rationale 
The household electrical durables industry was chosen for study because of its centrality in 
current discussions of a redistributive 'demand-led' growth path for South Africa. Many 
I have tried to be consistent in using the acronymic 'HED' in this document, However, the reader 
should note that the terms 'durables', 'durable goods', and 'household durables' may also be used. In 
most cases, however, these terms are used to refer to categories more general than HEDs. I have 
referred to the industry under study as the 'HED industry' in the singular, and to the manufacturers of 
specific products, such as televisions, as 'branches'. 
2 
Portables are often used in South Africa for household purposes. Automotive audio is the least 'basic 
need' product I can think of, and essentially an automotive component. 
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participants in this debate have tended assume that industries producing durable consumer 
products will be significant sites of employment growth and capital accumulation in a 
demand-led recovery. This is based on a number of unstated assumptions, however: 
1. That a redistribution of income will result in increased purchases of durable goods. 
2. That domestic durables manufacturers will be the main beneficiaries of such increased 
consumption. 
3, That increased domestic production of durables will result in significantly increased 
employment and further investment. 
4. That any costs associated with increased domestic durables production (i.e. increased 
imports of parts) will not negate the positive impact. 
Such assumptions, however, lack empirical grounding. It was accordingly felt that a 
detailed study of consumer durables industries would help to clarify redistributive policies 
by providing them with macroeconomic and microeconomic foundations. 
'Consumer durables', however, is too general an area of study, including as it does a wide 
range of products, from automobiles to aeroplanes. Initial research resulted in a narrowing 
of the field of study to the HED industry, for several reasons: 
• HEDs are the class or durable good most likely to be purchased by members of the 
economically marginalised majority in South Africa. This is especially true now that 
ESKOM is proceeding with plans to electrify millions of South African households.3 
• HEDs are similar from the consumer's point of view. These goods either help save 
domestic labour or contribute to leisure time activities. They are also usually major but 
optional purchases for most households, often made on credit. Accordingly, the 
markets for these goods are subject to similar macroeconomic influences and behave in 
similar ways. 
• HEDs are all metal- andlor plastic-based engineering products, with the potential for 
mass consumption and production. As such they share similarities in terms of 
production methods. The primary raw materials inputs utilised by this industry, 
moreover, are locally abundant. Similarly, in many cases the South African engineering 
sector is well-placed to supply HED components. 
• There are significant imports of all three types of HEDs, contributing to the economy's 
balance of payments problems, especially at times of buoyant consumer demand. 
• In general, South African producers of HEDs are in serious trouble because of slack 
consumer demand. Moreover, their products are internationally uncompetitive. As 
presently structured, HED producers would not survive the sort of relaxation of current 
import duties envisaged under the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement of Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT). 
This demarcation is not without its difficulties, however, as will be discussed below. 
Cape Times, December 13, 1992. 
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B. What is the Point of Industrial Policy? 
Before continuing, it is important to clarify the approach to 'industrial policy' taken in this 
document. The first issue to address is what industrial policy is about, for this situates the 
questions asked and the 'policies' suggested. 
Public industrial policy is not about strengthening industries or firms for its own sake 
or for the sake of the latter's owners or employees. Rather, it is about stimulating 
growth, employment, real income, domestic capital accumulation, foreign exchange 
earnings or savings, knowledge, and dynamism for the economy as a whole, for the 
express benefit of the people who depend on it. If on balance an industry cannot 
contribute positively in this regard, then it should go, no matter how old, impressive, or 
well-connected it is. Moreover, assessment of such a balance should be holistic. For 
example, the simple fact that an industry employs people is not sufficient grounds for 
protecting it, if its higher prices cost consumers on balance more than the income 
earned by those employees. Otherwise policy is simply redistributing income and 
expenditure. This does not mean that employment is not a central concern of industrial 
policy, only that the employment of specific people should not be. 
• Nor is industrial policy concerned with providing goods needed by the population; it is 
about saving foreign exchange from being used to purchase those goods abroad, and 
employing residents to produce them locally if this can be done 'efficiently', by adding 
real net value to them. If not, I assume that the goods in question should be purchased 
abroad and that the resources employed should be used elsewhere in the economy, This 
is not acceptance of the doctrine of comparative advantage, however, since it is 
accepted that efficiencies can be achieved and comparative advantages created. 
• Finally, industrial policy is about seeing to it that these goals are met as equitably as is 
possible within the framework of a capitalist economy and society. In the case of our 
country this perforce means redressing past iniquities as well as avoiding future ones. 
The demand for industrial policy is thus a derived demand, just as the need for industries 
and firms is a derived need (for things and leisure). The existence or non-existence of 
particular sectors or firms is of no inherent concern, no matter how difficult the political and 
social choices to be made. 
This shapes the approach taken in this document. In particular, it prompts enquiry to 
proceed in terms of the following general questions: 
• How good has the HED industry been as a provider of the things mentioned above to 
the South African economy and people? Alternatively, would it have been missed 
sorely had if not existed? 
• How good is it liable to be at this task in the future, especially a future in which the 
environment of domestic demand and external trade is likely to change significantly? 
Alternatively, would it be sorely missed if it ceased to exist? 
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If the answer to these questions is positive, then the practice of industrial policy should be to 
leave well enough alone, or at least to provide what the industry says it needs to carry on its 
good work.4 If not, then we must ask: 
• How likely are the existing firms in this industry to improve of their own accord, under 
obtaining circumstances and especially in a changing future? 
Again, if the answer to this last question is positive, then the function of industrial policy 
should be to devise and implement appropriately supportive, rather than interventionist, 
measures. If not, then we ask: 
• Is the industry worth saving? 
If the answer is yes, then we need to ask what policies are required to force the industry to 
get its house in order, and whether they are likely to succeed. If the answer is no, then we 
seek policies which will smooth the demise of the industry, and in particular which will 
encourage the efficient transfer of resources employed therein to other sectors. 
Of course answers are unlikely to be cut-and-dried, and industries must be disaggregated. 
But they serve as a useful general framework for discussion. Obviously in this approach a 
great deal turns on an inherently subjective question: how likely are existing firms to change 
on their own? There is no way around this question, which is inevitable once one rejects the 
neo-classical market-will-solve-it-by-definition approach. I have tried to get to know firms 
well enough to answer it intelligently, and to use other indicators where possible, but in the 
end the answer will remain, unavoidably, an opinion — albeit a very important one. 
C. Brief Background 
The following two chapters will present an extensive overview of the South African HED 
industry. Here we will describe its history and its present situation in order to familiarise the 
reader with the subject of the report. 
1. History to the Mid-1970s5 
a) White Goods And Small Appliances 
The production of household durables in South Africa goes back to the early 19th century, 
with the manufacture of coal- and wood-fired stoves by firms such as Falkirk Industries in 
Durban. Such firms were essentially foundries which produced a range of cast-iron 
products. The stoves produced in these firms were simple heating and/or cooking devices 
with a low technology content, and could be made using local designs. Hand-powered 
washing machines were also manufactured. The low value and high weight of such products 
made replacement of imports from Europe a simple and logical step. Many such products 
Bearing in mind, of course, that they are more than likely to be rent-seekers. 
This section is based entirely on interviews and scattered infonnation gleaned from company reports and 
profiles. This would make a very interesting topic for postgraduate research, albeit a difficult one. 
HOUSEHOLD ELECTRICAL DURABLES INDUSTRIES 5 
are still in use today throughout South Africa on farms, in rural towns, and urban black 
townships. Large-scale manufacture of such goods has recently ceased with the demise of 
Falkirk, the country's only remaining commercial producer (Argus, February 1, 1992). 
Towards the end of the 19th century, some local foundries began to make the transition to 
electrically-powered stoves, and later, fridges. At first these were imported as additional 
product lines, but as the local market grew, local manufacturing began as well. Generally 
speaking products were manufactured under license to the US and European firms with 
whom import licenses had been concluded, such as General Electric, Westinghouse, 
Electrolux, Maytag, and Kelvinator. Prior to World War One, such products had not yet 
attained the status of mass production commodities overseas, and existing local artisanal 
production methods were adapted successfully. Accordingly, high tariff protection was not 
necessary. 
After World War One, producers in the US and Europe began to make the transition to what 
we know today as the 'white goods' industry. This industry was destined to become a prime 
'heartland' of economic growth during the boom periods from 1922-1929 and 1948-1973. 
As with automobiles, the manufacture of white goods (and pan passu of small appliances) 
was based on mass production for mass consumption. This implied the adoption of 
standardised products, dedicated production machinery, and competitiveness through 
economies of scale. The white goods industry went from strength to strength throughout 
these periods, both contributing to and benefiting from advances in mass production 
techniques during World War Two. Indeed, many white goods plants began as armaments 
plants during the War.6 
South African producers of these products began to feel significant pressure from US and 
European competitors in the early 192 Os. As was the case with the automobile industry, 
South Africa's smaller domestic market meant that local producers could neither afford to 
invest in dedicated mass-production technology nor spread overhead costs as widely as their 
foreign counterparts. This raised their production costs and made them vulnerable to lower- 
price imports, even at South Africa's great distance from northern markets. Coupled with 
this was South Africa's inegalitarian income distribution and the continued popularity of 
solid-fuel cooking products, both of which served to limit the size of the domestic market. 
This period saw the consolidation of South Africa's white goods producers, resulting in the 
establishment of several still-prominent names, such as Barlows Appliance Company, Defy, 
Ocean, and Univa. 
Along with many other industries, South Africa's white goods industry benefited from the 
protectionist policies initiated under the Pact government of 1924 and maintained by 
subsequent governments. Under this protective trade régime, South Africa's white goods 
producers began to evolve many of the characteristics which they retain today: 
• Manufacturing was based on a mass-production model, with dedicated machinery 
geared towards long runs of similar parts. 
6 As in the case of one Australian firm visited. 
6 INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY PROJECT 
• Product designs were largely imported from technology partners or licensors in the US 
and Europe. Although certain local market characteristics (e.g. single-door fridges) 
emerged, little or no design was undertaken locally. 
• Local products were geared towards the growing market of lower- to middle-income 
white urban-dwellers, while the smaller upper-income white market was served by 
imports of sophisticated products from technology partners. Lower-income black 
consumers were not directly served by local firms. 
• Because of firms' origins as importers, and continuing import activities, strategy was 
driven by the need to maintain wholesale margins, not manufacturing competitiveness 
as such. Manufacturing philosophy was one of 'break even'; it was not uncommon for 
local production to be subsidised by margins on imported products. 
• The finite size of the target market meant that once a situation of relative saturation had 
been reached, firms were unable to expand production to achieve internationally 
competitive economies of scale. Instead, they came to rely on continued tariff 
protection against import competition. Unlike firms in comparably-sized markets,7 
manufacturing firms did not move seriously into exports in an attempt to increase 
throughput. This placed an upper limit on revenue and profitability and discouraged 
innovative investment and marketing strategies. 
Effectively, by the mid-i 970s South African white goods and small appliance producers 
were structured into production for a small, saturated market and lacked the cost 
competitiveness to survive without protection. This is not to say that they were structurally 
'locked' into this situation, as comparative experience has shown that it is possible for 
small-country white goods firms to break out of this orientation, as Fisher and Paykel in 
New Zealand have done. Instead, resources and imagination which elsewhere had been 
applied to innovative product and process engineering for increased exports were rather 
devoted maintaining the protective trade régime. 
b) Television 
Perhaps the best-known instance of 'overprotection' in the HED industry is that of 
televisions. Remarkably, South Africa only developed a national TV broadcasting system in 
the mid-1970s. Test transmissions began in 1974, while the system only became fully 
operational in 1982.8 This delay relative to other countries was due only to reluctance on the 
part of the Nationalist government; and, when it was announced in 1971 that a TV system 
was to be developed, it was unsurprisingly to be under strict state control. Household TV 
use grew rapidly after 1976, with television license issues steady throughout the late 70s and 
early 80s at about i,5m per year (BTI, l984). 
From the beginning the manufacturing industry, too, was under strict government control. 
Most significantly, the industry 'ground rules' set out by the government in 1971 limited the 
E.g. Fisher and Paykel in New Zealand. 
8 TV One was introduced in that year, whilst TV Two was introduced in 1982. 
This understates the number of sets in use, however, since only one license is required per household, 
not per set. 
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number of manufacturers within the Southern African Customs Union to four, "in the 
interests of stability". One reason given for this was to ensure system standardisation. The 
second reason, however, was perhaps a bit far-fetched: to ensure that the industiy would 
serve as a training ground for technically-skilled labour for a domestic electronics sector. To 
support these goals, the government stipulated a number of tight conditions for the receiver 
manufacturing industry, to be discussed in Chapter Four. 
A study of tariff protection for the infant industry had been initiated in 1971 in anticipation 
of the launch of the system. The Board of Trade and Industries had recommended very high 
nominal levels of protection for domestically-produced sets — in excess of 100%. These 
proposals were implemented in early 1972. The BTI stated explicitly at the time that they 
were "exceedingly high and... intended simply to prevent imports of television sets 
temporarily", until local manufacturers had had a chance to equip themselves. As such, they 
"should be subject to review at short notice", and furthermore, "no claim could be made for 
any assistance for a local industry established on the basis of these duties". Subsequently an 
additional 35% ad valorem excise duty was imposed, for budgetary reasons, on all TV sets 
sold. This reduced the net level of protection to 65%, still very high. 
The subsequent history of the television manufacturing branch is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Four. In general, it is a history of the failure of the branch to develop to the point 
where it could move away from the high levels of protection afforded it, or to become the 
skills and technology generator envisaged by the government. The reasons for this will be 
discussed below, but in outline they are similar to those advanced above for the white goods 
and small appliance branches, with one important difference. Television manufacturing in 
South Africa has also catered primarily for a small middle-income market, and has suffered 
from lack of internationally-competitive scale economies and technology dependence as a 
result. But in addition, it is in the unfortunate position of having to import its components in 
kit form for only slightly less than the cost of a fully-assembled imported set. This means 
that locally-added value can only arise under conditions of tariff protection. Added to this is 
the fact that the single most expensive component, the picture tube, cannot be manufactured 
profitably at the scale offered by the South African market. This has led to a series of ill- 
designed attempts to increase local content, all of which have been stymied by the small size 
of the local market and the technological dependence of South African firms. 
2. The Present Situaflon 
This situation was reasonably comfortable for producers and consumers in the period up to 
the early 1 980s, since rising real disposable incomes encouraged rapid replacement of HEDs 
and reasonable turnover for the industry. A last spectacular boom during 1984 saw massive 
growth in sales!° This was followed by an equally spectacular collapse of the market during 
1985, followed by a brief upturn from late 1986. By late 1989, however, the market for 
HEDs had entered a period of prolonged stagnation which rapidly exposed the structural 
weaknesses of the industry: dependence on a narrow market of middle-income white 
'° 
Discussed in more detail below. 
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consumers; uncompetitive costs structures; and a resulting inability to expand into the 
lower-income black market or to export. 
Specific government intervention in the HED industry has been limited to general tariff 
policy, with the exception of the television branch, which, as a 'strategic industry', has been 
the subject of nearly continuous official attempts at rejuvenation. The essential thrust of all 
government policies towards this industry has been the same: to encourage greater local 
content by means of rebates on duties paid on imports of components. These have generally 
been calculated in terms of formulae which reward low net foreign exchange usage. At the 
same time, attempts have been made to reduce tariffs, which each time have been met by 
successful industry protest. The underlying problem identified in this report — the need to 
adopt leaner, more flexible manufacturing techniques and to move into production for the 
mass Southern African market and for export — has yet to be addressed. Simply 
attempting to increase local content without addressing the reasons for the smallness of the 
local market has not and will not suffice. 
D. What Follows 
The remainder of this report analyses the causes and consequences of this situation and 
suggests a set of policies to address it. Chapter One assesses the domestic market for 
HEDs, the macroeconomic conditions influencing it, and its prospects. Chapter Two 
surveys the HED manufacturing industry in South Africa, the general contribution of the 
industry to the South African economy; and its contemporary problems. Chapter Three 
surveys recent developments in the world market for HEDs, and South Africa's position in 
it. Chapter Four looks at the issues surrounding mass electrification and housing and the 
role of HEDs in this process. Chapter Five is devoted to the manufacturing industry. 
Chapter Six concludes with a set of policy proposals based on the analysis presented in the 
preceding chapters. 
Chapter One: The Market for Household Electrical 
Durables in South Africa 
This chapter consists of an overview of the domestic market for household electrical 
durables, and the macro and microeconomic conditions influencing it. It goes into relatively 
great detail owing to the importance placed on this factor in the conclusions and 
recommendations of this report. 
A. Macroeconomic and Microeconomic Influences on 
The Market for HEDs in South Africa 
1. Consumer Spending and the Role of Disposable Income in the 
Demand for HEDs 
a) HEDs in the Macroeconomy 
Dependent as it is on real household spending power, the HED industry has been critically 
affected by the decline in South Africa's economic performance. Indeed, of all subgroups, 
production of durable goods has been most severely affected by the crisis of South African 
manufacturing (SACOB, 1991: 16). Why? Let us consider briefly the role of household 
electrical durables in the macroeconomy. 
Two broad macroeconomic elements shape the demand trend within which the HED industry 
operates:'the absolute level of real income available to households, and the proportion of 
A brief description of the National Accounts may provide some background. If we take Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) at market prices and subtract net'indirect taxes, we are left with GDP at factor cost — 
what factors of production in South Africa receive for their use. If from this we subtract depreciation 
and net factor payments to the rest of the world, and add foreign interest, dividends, and other receipts 
by South Africans, we have Net National Disposable Income (NNDI) at factor cost — the amount of 
GDP which is available for use by South Africans, including households, businesses, and the 
government. If we then subtract from NNDI earnings of incorporated businesses and general 
government, we are left with the net national disposable income of households. To this we can then add 
transfers to households from the government, incorporated businesses, and abroad, to give a figure for 
the current personal income of South Africans — the amount households receive before direct (i.e. 
income) taxes. After subtracting income taxes, we are left with Personal Disposable Income — PD!. 
Some PDI is spent by households on transfers to government and abroad. Some goes to personal 
savings. Because what remains is, by this definition, spent, it is called Private Consumption 
Expenditure, or PCE. PCE is the amount actually spent on goods and services by households. If we 
More... 
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this real income which is available to be spent on purchases of durable goods. Amongst the 
most important factors which influence the latter proportion are (i) the demand for and 
remuneration of the factor of production produced and sold by households, labour, as well 
as the relative importance of other sources of household income, including interest and 
dividends; (ii) the proportion of household income going to pay direct and indirect taxes; (iii) 
the proportion of personal savings in personal disposable income; and (iv) the relative prices 
of durable goods and other goods, since these determine the amount of personal consumption 
expenditure (PCE) left for durable goods. 
Such a macroeconomic framework is essential to understand the adverse conditions facing 
the HED industry. Using it, one can see that the net effect of declining real labour 
remuneration, high rates of taxation, and declining business incomes would be to squeeze 
personal disposable incomes (PD!). This is in fact what has happened since the early 1980s. 
And falling PD! has meant that in order to maintain their accustomed levels of private 
consumption expenditure (PCE), South African households have had to decrease their real 
savings and rely increasingly on credit. But as many such households have learnt to their 
cost, this is an approach which can only be taken so far: the drop in their 'PCE' is 
permanent, and increasing credit purchases only makes subsequent income vulnerable to 
interest rate hikes. For many, the most obvious problem is that high rates of inflation for 
non-durable goods (such as food and petrol) have meant that less and less PCE has been 
available to buy durable goods. Indeed, as will be argued below, this macroeconomic 
dilemma is probably the single most important short-term problem faced by the HED 
industry. 
b) HEDs as Household 'Capital Goods' 
Whereas the macroeconomic perspective outlined above can help to explain the forces 
influencing the income available to households to purchase HEDs, a microeconomic 
perspective is needed to understand why households demand such goods at all. 
Unlike other goods consumed by households, such as food or clothing, some durable goods 
are purchased because they reduce the amount of time required to 'produce' the labour 
which is a household's principal product. For example, microwave ovens or washing 
machines help to save both time and energy, thus releasing more labour for earning an 
income outside the household. Moreover, because such goods are durable, they provide 
such services over time, saving a little time and energy every day. In this respect, the 
consumption of durable goods by households is analogous to the consumption of machinery 
and equipment by firms, which are purchased to help save labour in the production of 
commodities, again over time. 
The purchase of such durable goods can therefore be seen as 'investment' by households, 
and as subject to influences analogous to those faced by firms. Both household durables and 
capital goods are purchased in order to provide a stream of services over time. These 
deduct expenditure on services from PCE, we are left with private expenditure on goods. This can be 
divided into expenditure on durable goods (such as cars, stoves, and TVs), semi-durable goods (such as 
clothing and footwear), and non-durable goods (such as food or cleaning materials). 
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services consist in the facilitation of other processes: in the case of the firm, the production 
of commodities; in the case of the household, the 'production' of labour. 
In both cases, the demand for durables/capital goods is to a large extent derived from the 
existing and projected demand for the goods or services they are used to produce. Just as a 
capitalist would not buy a machine if s/he did not foresee enough future demand for the 
product to cover interest, depreciation, and profit, so a household would not purchase a 
labour-saving HED if the labour time and energy saved were not expected to earn a 
sufficient return. Otherwise it would be more rational to continue using labour to perform 
the tasks in question. 
From this follow several corollaries. 
• Firsllv, just as deficient demand for final product contributes to a decline in fixed 
investment by firms, so too should a decline in the demand for labour — and a relative 
decline in the real value of labour remuneration — contribute to a falling demand for 
durable goods by consumers. 
• Secondly, in most cases labour-saving durable goods, like capital goods,2 are 
interchangeable with labour. As firms tend to do with respect to capital equipment, 
households can substitute labour for domestic appliances such as washing machines or 
floor polishers. Where household labour is inexpensive, as in South Africa, we would 
expect the demand for labour-saving durables to be restricted. Conversely, a rise in the 
cost of household labour — say by minimum-wage legislation for domestic workers — 
might lead to an increase in demand for these types of durable goods. 
• Thirdly, as the absolute level of real income ('living standards') rises, we should expect 
expenditure on durable goods to rise as a proportion of private expenditure on goods. 
This is because demand for non- and semi-durable goods is relatively income-inelastic 
— once households can afford enough of the kinds of clothes and food they want, 
further increases in income do not lead to increased purchases of these goods. Instead 
(as firms do when the rate of profit rises beyond a certain level) a rising proportion of 
income is 'invested' by households in durable goods such as automobiles, domestic 
appliances, entertainment goods, and so on. Although there is also a limit to the 
demand for specific durable goods, the variety of goods available — particularly 
entertainment goods — means that households can easily continue to 'invest' in durable 
goods as real incomes rise. 
• Fourthiy, given the importance of hire-purchase arrangements in South Africa, high 
interest rates and credit restrictions can be expected to influence consumer demand, just 
as higher interest rates depress the demand for capital goods by firms. This is because 
in both cases higher interest costs raise the required rate of return associated with 
economical employment of the capital/durable good. 
• Fzfihly, as firms do with respect to capital equipment, households can be expected to 
weigh up the costs and benefits of purchasing durable goods, particularly those which 
are labour-saving, against the option of postponing those purchases. In particular, 
2 Labour saving durahies are even more perfectly substitutable. 
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when there is significant uncertainty about the future demand for or price of labour, or 
when interest rates, taxes, or prices arc expected to change, households can be expected 
to put off purchases of durable goods — at least until such time as their existing 
appliances are no longer serviceable. 
Finally, when there is uncertainty about the general political climate, we can expect 
households to increase the proportion of their PD! going to savings, as firms tend to do 
with profits in such circumstances. This reduces the amount of PD! remaining for 
purchases of durable goods. 
The point of this analogy is to understand that demand for some household durables is 
subject to a set of influences which is distinctly different from other types of consumer 
goods. This allows us to place the development of the HED industry within the context of 
key economic and political trends. In particular, it helps to understand that the difficulties 
facing the South African BED industry parallell those facing South African manufacturing 
more broadly: economic depression and political uncertainty discourage investment, whether 
by firms or households. As we shall see, however, amore fundamental problem is that a 
majority of the South African population does not live at an income level sufficient to allow 
such 'investment' even under more favourable conditions. 
B. HEDs in South Africa: A Macroeconomic 
Perspectives 
The recent history of the South African market for durable goods is literally one of boom to 
bust. Sales of consumer durables have risen and fallen sharply over the last decade (BMR, 
1992: 16). This section will look at the broader macroeconomic conditions which have 
shaped the final market for consumer durables during the late 1970s, 1980s and early 90s. 
1. Market Size and Shares 
The HED market in 199 1/92 is summarised in Table B-i. The market is evenly divided 
between domestic appliances and consumer electronics products. White goods are the 
predominant product overall. The consumer electronics market is evenly divided between 
audio and video products. 
Based on SARB, 1981-1992; SARB I 992; and annual reports from Rusfurn, Morkels, Tedelex, and 
Picapli. 
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Table B-i: RED Market Breakdown: i992 
Item Retail Value Wholesale 
Value 
Local Production Local Production 
Share 
White Goods R1,6bn R1,21bn4 R850m5 (53%) 
Small Apps R338,7m R256m6 R117m7 (34,5%) 
Total Domestic 
Appliances 
R1,93bn R1,47bn R967m (50%) 
Audio R850m8 R446m R174m (20%) 
R951m9 R609m R447m (47%)1) 
Total Consumer 
Electronics" 
R1,8bn R1,O5bn R621m (34,5%) 
Total R3,73bn R2,53bn R1,59bn (42,6%) 
VAT Paid R370m 
VAT md. R4,lbri 
2. Size in the Context of the Broader Economy 
In 1990 (a peak year), the South African retail market for non-motor durable goods 
(including furniture) stood at approximately Rllbn (Business Day, July 9, 199 1).12 This 
was 20% of total household consumption expenditure on manufactures for that year, and an 
estimated 70% of consumer spending on durables.'3 At approximately R3,45bn, the market 
for domestic appliances and consumer electronics was 31% of the total for non-motor 
durables, and 6,5% of private consumption expenditure on manufactured goods. The 
market for HEDs is thus an important force in consumer spending. It is also a key economic 
indicator, traditionally used to monitor the health of the economy. 
In 1991, private expenditure on goods in South Africa was R134 391m, or 45,3% of GDP.'4 
Private expenditure on durable goods was 9,4% of private expenditure on goods — R12 
This and previous figure based on data supplied by TEK Corp. 
Calculated by subtracting the FOB value of white goods imports (from Customs & Excise) plus 30% 




TEK Corp. estimate. 
Estimate based on figures supplied by the Retailer Liaison Committee. '° 
Much higher if video recorders and cameras are excluded. 
Consumer electronics figures are from BMI 1992 Electronics Report and must be regarded as 
approximate. 
12 
This figure includes furniture. 
I.e., including automobiles and non-mechanical or electrical furnishings. 
At market prices. 
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095m, or just over 4% of GDP. Private expenditure on furniture and household 
appliances, at R5 503m, was 4,1% of private expenditure on goods, 45,5% of private 
expenditure on durable goods", and 1,7% of GDP. Private expenditure on HEDs, at 
R3,73m, was thus 2,8% of private expenditure on goods, 30,8% of private expenditure on 
durable goods, and 1,3% of GDP. 
The proportion of durable goods in private _________________________________ 
expenditure on goods has declined from over 
13% in the early 1980s to 9,4% at present 
(see Figure B-3). This has been due to a 
declining level of real consumer income. As 
we shall see below, consumer demand for 
HEDs has recently declined very steeply. 
3. Overall Trends 1970-1990 
As we have seen, demand trends for HEDs in 
South Africa are closely linked to broader 
macroeconomic patterns. As Figure B-2 
indicates, private consumption expenditure 
(PCE) on International Standard Industrial Classification levels 3829, 3832, and 3833 — 
which include the goods with which this study is concerned — has increased over the last 20 
years, both absolutely and as a share of PCE on manufactures (Figure B-3). This increase, 
Figure B-i 







Private Consumption Expenditure 










1976 1978 1980 1 
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 
Source: DC, 1992 
1985 1987 1989 
SIC 3829 —4-— ISIC 3832 —-- ISIC 38 
" 
Which also includes personal transport equipment, boats, and similar items. 
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however, was massively concentrated in the 1978-82 period, and within ISIC 3929, which 
includes white goods. Subsequently PCE has fallen from its 1982-84 peak, most 
dramatically in the 1984-86 period, again due largely to falling PCE on ISIC 3829. PCE 
for ISIC 3832 and 3833, on the other hand, has risen more steadily, reflecting the rapid 
introduction of lower-cost consumer electronics and small appliances. 
The share of the durables sectors in total PCE on manufactures has risen by nearly 50% 
over the last two decades (Figure B-3). After rising during the 1978-84 period, the share of 
ISIC 3829 fell, and is now little higher than its 1972 level of just over 1% of total PCE. 
Thus the overall increase in the durables share of total PCE over the 1 980s can be attributed 
to increasing relative expenditure on ISIC 3832 (including consumer electronics) and ISIC 
3833 (small appliances). As we have seen, this was due to a general shift over the period 
towards increased consumer electronics and small appliance purchases, reflecting the 
introduction of television to South Africa and the emergence of new, low-cost consumer 
electronics and products and small appliances. 
4. Durable Goods in the Economy, 1976-1992 
After falling from over R2bn to less than R 1 ,5bn16 during 1976, PCE on durable goods 
remained stable until the second quarter of 1978, when it rose sharply (see Figure B-2). The 
following quarter saw an even sharper decline in PCE, however, and the levels of March 
1978 were not reached again until late 1979. By that time PCE on durable goods had 
entered a significant upswing, which was to remain uninterrupted until late 1980, when PCE 
topped R2,5bn. That the underlying demand for durable goods remained strong, however, 
was shown by the fact that the late- 1980 slowdown was due primarily to shortages of 
Figure B-3 
Private Consumption Exp. on Durables 
As a Share of Manufacturing Total 
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durable goods and new restrictions on consumer credit. 
The steep rise in PCE on durable goods from 1977-80 was based primarily on rising real 
incomes during the period, but also on an expansion of credit purchases. In 1981, however, 
a decline in PDI began, as a result of increased real rates of taxation, inflation, and 
employment stagnation. This led in turn to a decrease in PCE on durable goods, which 
Figure B-4 
Composition of PCE 
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declined steadily until the second quarter of 1982, when it again began to rise. 
a) The 'Mini-Boom' 
The second quarter of 1983 saw a sharp upturn in the South African economy — the 'mini- 
boom'. PCE on durable goods rose rapidly, reaching an annualised rate of increase of 12% 
by the second quarter of 1984. Overall, the increase in PCE on durables was 7% during the 
upturn. 
This burst of consumption was partly due to the vigorous nature of the upswing, but was 
also to be explained by a number of underlying changes in consumer behaviour. Taken 
together these suggest the underlying weakness of the economy in the early I 980s: an 
attempt by households to maintain living standards in the face of a long-term decline in their 
economic position." 
Firstly, per capita disposable income declined by over 3% during 1983-84, but per capita PCE 
increased by 4,5%. This implied a significant a decline in personal savings and/or expansion of credit 
purchases. A credit expansion had in fact begun during the 1981-83 downturn; overall, outstanding 
consumer credit grew at an annual average of 33,5% between 1979-1984. Secondly, inflationary 
More... 
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Overall, the 1983-4 consumer boom was driven not by rising real incomes, but by dissaving, 
credit, and inflationary expectations. Such a process could not be sustained, as such 
expectations became self-fulfilling and overheated the economy. As is well-known, the mini- 
boom came to an abrupt end in mid-1984, as 'monetarist' policies were implemented to curb 
inflation and correct external imbalances. These included punitive increases in HP deposits 
and rates. Widespread popular resistance to the state had also emerged by this time, 
accompanied by a variety of economic repercussions, including a massive depreciation of 
the Rand and a drop in consumer confidence. 
As a result, PCE abruptly fell by an annualised rate of over 20% in the third quarter of 
1984. The fall continued to mid-1985, resulting in a 7% overall decline in PCE for the year. 
For its part, PCE on durable goods fell extraordinarily steeply: by 16,5% from the second 
quarter of 1984 to the same period in 1985. This decline was only partly to be explained by 
the end of the mini-boom, however. Undoubtedly, the abovementioned factors served as a 
catalyst, but more fundamentally, credit-driven consumer demand had run out of steam. 
Figure B-5 
Composition of PCE on Durable Goods 
6 1971-91, 1985 Prices -______________ 
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1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 
Source; SA Reserve Bank Data 
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Inflation, 'bracket creep', and rising real interest rates bit hard into real disposable incomes, 
whilst controls over HP terms were at overkill levels. 
Households' credit-led defense against their declining living standards could therefore no 
longer continue. By 1986 it was clear that the rate of growth of real PCE had been in long- 
term slowdown. Overall, between 1973 and 1981 PCE had increased at an annual average 
rate of 4%. Between 1981 and 1986, however, PCE grew at an average of only 1% p.a. 
expectations encouraged consumers to increase their expenditures on durable goods more than 
proportionately during the upswing of 1983-4. Also significant in this respect was the impending 
increase in GST from 7% to 10% on 1 July 1984. Finally, negative real interest rates discouraged bank 
savings; the ratio of personal savings to disposable income declined from 12% in 1979 to 2,5% in 1984. 
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b) Recovery, 1986-1989 
From early 1985 to 1986, PCE rose only 1,5%. Growing uncertainly at the political 
climate, however, resulted in a sharp decline in PCE on durable goods into the first half of 
1985. This trend was reversed from mid- 1985, however, resulting in an 8% overall rise in 
PCE on durable goods from mid-1985 to mid-1986. This turnaround was partly to be 
explained by inflation-induced expectations of price increases in early 1986, but also by a 
continued decline in the real rate of interest and an overall firming of the economy. 
The slight recovery of 1985-86 strengthened into 1987. Real incomes rose slightly, and 
PCE saw an increase of 4% between early 1986 and early 1987. As in earlier periods, 
however, this rate of increase was greater than that of PD!. Unlike the pre-1984 period, 
however, this disjuncture was not due to increased credit spending, since the ratio of 
outstanding consumer credit to PD! continued to fall, from 32,5% to 25% 1985-1987. 
Instead, consumers dug more deeply into bank savings: the personal savings ratio declined 
from 2,5% to 1,5%. This can be explained as a tendency to 'monetise' assets in the face of 
rampant inflation and a declining real interest rate. As might be expected in circumstances 
of dissaving for this purpose, PCE on durable goods increased more rapidly than other 
forms of consumer expenditure during 1986-87. 
The tendency for PCE to rise more rapidly than PD! continued into 1988. There was also a 
marked return to debt financing of durable purchases, as real interest rates continued to fall. 
Taken together, these factors resulted in a 14% rise in PCE on durable goods from the third 
quarter of 1986 to the second quarter of 1988. Particularly strong consumer demand growth 
of 30% (annualised) was experienced between October 1987 and April 1988, and some 
durables suppliers were unable to keep up with demand for certain items. These rates of 
growth were comparable to the increase recorded during the 1983-84 'mini-boom'. The 
1987-88 increase was from a much lower base, however: by mid-1988 PCE on durable 
goods was still 27% lower than it had been at the end of the 1984. 
Nevertheless, this growth in PCE was regarded by government as unsustainable, since real 
PD! had not risen commensurately. On 4 May 1988 the government announced a package 
of measures to reduce consumer demand, including an increase in the minimum deposit for 
HP purchases from 10% to 12%. Additional HP restrictions were introduced on 12 August 
1988, and were regarded by the retail furniture industry as punitive. Import surcharges on 
most appliances were imposed. The OST debtor's allowance'8 was repealed, which forced 
retailers to pay GST on credit sales immediately instead of over the period of the contract. 
These measures were joined by more on 5 May 1989. Taken together, they succeeded in 
restraining credit growth significantly. 
c) The Situation in 1989 
By mid-1989, the South African economy had experienced more than 12 quarters of growth. 
PD! had increased for the first time since the end of the 1983-84 mini-boom. Real interest 
18 Which allowed retailers to defer payment of 50% of GST until the completion of a credit contract. 
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rates were in decline. These factors had contributed to a slow increase in expenditure on 
durable goods, particularly household appliances, audio products, and televisions. 
Nevertheless, overall PCE was only 3,5% higher in mid-1989 than it had been in mid-1984, 
reflecting the severity of the 1984-85 fall. The level of PCE on durable goods was still 26% 
lower than in the second quarter of 1984. Indeed, in mid-1989 PCE on durable goods was 
at 1976 levels. This long-term decline in spending on durable goods was having a major 
impact: the real value of the stock of such goods had fallen by an annual average of 4,5% 
from 1984-89, and stood at approximately its 1980 level. 
This implied not only a secular decline in consumer spendung, but a declining standard of 
living. In spite of this, in 1989 the government and Reserve Bank, under severe pressure to 
achieve equilibrium in the balance of payments, launched an attempt to curb inflation and to 
achieve a positive real interest rate. To that end the Bank rate was increased to 18% and 
prime overdraft to 21% in October 1989. This, coupled with a cyclical downturn from 
March of that year, slowed growth of PCE to an annualised 1% by the third quarter of 1989. 
PCE on durable goods declined at an annual average rate of 6% during the period. This rate 
was smaller than might have been expected, far less than the 28,5% decline in the downturn 
of 1984-86. 
PCE continued to rise slightly, at an annualised rate of 2% for 1990. PCE on durable goods 
dropped sharply after F.W. de Klerk's February 1990 speech unbanning the ANC, SACP, 
and PAC, but unexpectedly rose sharply, brining PCE on durable goods — in particular 
furniture and household appliances — back to the previous peak levels of late 1988. 
d) The 1990 HP Spree 
This sudden increase in PCE on durable goods was in response to the lifting, on 12 March 
1990, of restrictions on HP credit for sales of HEDs.'9 This standardised terms for all HP 
transactions except sales of VCRs. This unleashed a significant replacement demand, built 
up during the restrictive period of 1988-89. HED sales rose considerably -- by an estimated 
20-30% per month (Business Day, March 15, 1991). In real terms audio equipment sales 
grew 36% year-on-year; appliance sales by 16%; and TV and video sales by 8%. From 
early 1988 to late 1990 the share of durables in overall furniture sales had increased by 24% 
— from 55% to 68% (CSS Quarter/v Bulletin of Statistics, various). 
Growth in current terms slowed to about 18% in the latter half of 1990 and into 1991, 
however, producing negative growth in some products, particularly televisions. This was 
due partly to economic downturn, but also to exhaustion of consumer credit and satiation of 
pent-up demand. Sales of some product lines, however, particularly in audio equipment, 
continued to grow at or above the inflation rate, albeit at reduced retail margins (Business 
Day, March 15, 1991, June 14, 1991; Star, June 18, 1991, Business Day, 26 October 
1991). HED sales growth turned strongly negative in 1991, as we shall see below. 
" 
Industry sources speculate that this was politically motivated, in order to boost confidence in the white 
community following de Klerk's February speech. 
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5. Assessment 
In real terms (1985 prices) the market for HEDs grew 19,5% from 1986 to 90, at an 
average annual rate of 3,%. This growth was concentrated in 1986-89 and the first half of 
1990. Although the HED market followed the general fluctuations of the economy, it tended 
to cycle out of phase with the broader economy as consumers used credit and dissavmgs to 
maintain consumption levels into recessionary conditions. By the early 1 990s, this process 
had reached a dead end and the HED market began to experience a decline which was 
relatively more severe than that of the economy as a whole. HED sales experienced a - 
19,5% drop in 1991 anda-11,7%dropin 1992. 
Within this trend, certain areas experienced relatively stronger growth. It is essential to 
distinguish which products were experiencing this growth, and why, as future growth 
patterns may thereby be illuminated. 
a) Sales by Type of Product 
Growth during 1986-92 was strongest in sales of video products, at 60% 1986-90, for an 
annual average of 10,2%. This was largely explained by a massive increase in television 
sales in 1988, as lower-cost monochrome units flooded a market rebounding from a deep 
recession. Next was audio equipment, which grew overall at 9%, for an annual average of 
1,85%. Slowest growth was in was domestic appliances, at 8,%, for an annual average of 
1,7%.20 
Striking is the rate of growth of video product sales. The share of such products in the 
overall furniture market grew from 8% in 1985/6 to 11,5% in 1990. Particularly important 
here was the role of M-Net and TV hire companies, spurring sales of M-Net decoders.2' The 
share of audio equipment also grew to 11,6% of the furniture market over the latter half of 
the 80s. 
Most recent growth has thus been in consumer electronics; white goods sales have held 
steady at 17-20% of the market after peaking in 1988 (Business Day, 9 July, 1991; 'White 
Goods, Black Market', Financial Mail, September 9, 1991). 
Why has sales growth been concentrated in consumer electronics products, as opposed to 
white goods? Several factors help to explain this trend: 
• New audio/video products without substitutes, particularly high-tech products such as 
camcorders, compact disc players, etc., tend to generate sales even in a flat market. 
White goods lack such an effect. 
• Aggressive price competition amongst major retailers and grey market imports have 
kept prices of consumer electronics products down (interview sources). Overall price 
inflation for the consumer electronics branch (5% in 1990) has been significantly lower 
20 
From figures supplied by the Furniture Traders' Association. 
2t Now dominated entirely by Teljoy, which bought its only competitor, Empisal, from Tedelex (Argus, 
June 18, 1992). 
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than consumer prices more broadly. This is also to be explained by lower inflation 
rates and falling production costs in countries from whom South Africa imports 
consumer electronics. 
The higher cost, greater durability, and greater sensitivity to HP variations of white 
goods means that purchases can be deferred much more readily during 
recessionary/uncertain periods. 
• New black consumers have been a major force in recent market growth, and tend to 
purchase consumer electronics items — particularly televisions — before domestic 
appliances. 
The importance of this imbalanced growth is that market growth has been strongest in those 
areas in which South Africa is strongly import-oriented (audio and video)23 and weakest 
where we have effective local production capacity (white goods). 
b) Sales by Destination 
What about the growth markets during the late I 980s? It is widely acknowledged within the 
HED industry that the most important factor in the recent past has been increased real 
incomes and home ownership amongst a growing segment of the black population, centred 
around urban areas. For example, the Furniture Traders' Association (FTA) estimates that 
in the January 1989-90 sales year, sales to the black market accounted for 32,5% of growth 
in sales of TV and audio equipment. The same market segment contributed to 22% of 
growth in furniture sales more broadly (The Star, May 15, 1991). Significantly, in the 
generally weak period (for non-electrical furniture) from April 1990 to April 1991 sales of 
'black' chains increased by over 18%, whilst sales at 'white' chains increased by only 2,3% 
(Business Day, June 14 1991). From July 1990 to July 1991 sales to blacks rose 25,8% 
compared to 13,6% for the remainder of the market (Argus, 24 October 1991 )24 
This indicates that a large proportion of sales during the late 80s has gone to the emerging 
black market. This is confirmed by marketing information presented in Table B-2 below 
(AMPS, 1992). This shows that in many cases black buyers are now the single biggest 
consumers of many HEDs. For example, in 1991 black consumers purchased 95 988 
22 
Based on information supplied by the retailer Liaison Committee. 
23 
Although South Africa supplies most of its television needs, such products have a very high import 
content, as we shall see. 
24 One problem in assessing recent demand for FIEDs is that there are one-off variables which may have 
influenced sales during the relatively good growth period of 1986-88 which will probably not be 
repeated. Electrification of black areas will no doubt continue to provide a significant source of market 
growth, as it did in this period. But there is reason to speculate that some growth in this portion of the 
market has been due to the availability of greater disposable income due to rent and utilities boycotts. 
The effect of such variables has not been calculated to my knowledge, but is likely to have been 
significant in some cases, particularly TV and audio. This implies that a move away from boycotts 
and/or a stricter attitude by municipalities and the government may lead to less growth than might be 
expected if the late 80s are taken as a guide (Mohammed, 1992). 
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refrigerators, compared to only 64 155 for whites. Similarly, blacks bought 176 820 
televisions (more than half the yearly total) compared to 95 420 for whites. And black 
households bought 212 184 hi-fl sets, compared to whites' purchases of only 80 605. In 
bigger-ticket, less basic items such as microwaves, deep freezes, VCRs, and washers, 
however, whites continue to make most purchases. 
Clearly, black consumers are the market of the future. Nevertheless, it must again be 
stressed that growth in black purchases has been precisely in those areas in which South 
African HED manufacturers are weakest.25 
6. The Current Situation 
Although the South African economy had been in an official downswing for over 30 months 
by the end of 1991, demand for HEDs had remained reasonably good until that year, helped 
by the 1990 credit relaxation and by unusually high nominal wage increases. Yet spending 
power was coming under pressure from a number of factors. During 1991, average wage 
increases failed to keep up with CPI inflation of 15,6%, unemployment grew, profits shrank, 
small businesses failed in unprecedented numbers, personal income taxes rose, fuel prices 
rose, and VAT was introduced. Together these forces combined to reverse the upward trend 
of HED sales and send the market into a deep decline from which it had not recovered at the 
time of writing (early 1993). 
25 The distribution of HEDs amongst South Africa's population is discussed in greater detail below. 
Figure B-6 
Annual % Change in Retail Sales 
1987-1992 (1985 Prices) 
Source: CSS 
White Goods Audio Television 
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Table B-2: Durable Articles Purchased In 1991 
White 1,6m Blacks 5,05m Asians 181,000 Clrds. 568,000 All 7,45m 
Item % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. 
)eep Freeze 2.1% 34,545 0.3% 15,156 3.1% 5,611 0.8% 4,544 0.8% 59,856 
lectric Ilotplate 0.5% 8,225 0.7% 35,364 0.5% 905 0.4% 2,272 0.6% 46,766 
liFi 4.9% 80,605 4.2% 212,184 3.9% 7,059 2.4% 13,632 42% 313,480 
'Iicrowave 4.2% 69,090 0.1% 5,052 4.0% 7,240 20% 11,360 1.2% 92,742 
efrigerator 3.9% 64,155 1.9% 95,988 4.4% 7,964 3.0% 17,040 2.5% 185,147 
Stove—electric 2.2% 36,190 0.9% 45,468 3.1% 5,611 2.0% 11,360 1.3% 98,629 
Stove—other 0.3% 4,935 0.7% 35,364 0.3% 543 0.5% 2,840 06% 43,682 
[V 5.8% 95,410 3.5% 176,820 6.4% 11,584 4.8% 27,264 4.2% 311,078 
(CR 4.3% 70,735 0.4% 20,208 4.7% 8,507 1.4% 7,952 1.4% 107,402 
(acuum 3.3% 54,285 0.2% 10,104 2.2% 3,982 1.8% 10,224 1.1% 78,595 
Vasher— auto 
— front 
2.6% 42,770 0.1% 5,052 3.0% 5,430 0.5% 2,840 0.8% 56,092 
Vasher—auto 
—top 
1.6% 26,320 0.2% 10,104 0.6% 1,086 1.0% 
— 
1.4% 
5,680 0.6% 43,190 
Vasher—twin 
ub 
1.4% 23,030 0.0% 0 0.1% 181 7.952 
— 
0.4% 31,163 
(NOTE: Figures indicates percentage of households in each 'population group" which 
bought each appliance during 1991, as well as the number of units sold.) 
a) The Current Recession: Endgame? 
By mid-1992, it had become clear that optimism that the downswing would soon end had 
been misplaced. By early 1993, the South African economy had suffered nearly 12 quarters 
of stagnant or declining GDP, Credit-led PCE growth up to early 1991 had been unmatched 
by corresponding domestic investment, as business waited out the political negotiations 
process. In response to rapidly falling consumer demand, there began a significant running 
down of inventories at retail level. These factors had eventually to catch up with consumer 
spending, as jobs disappeared, wages were outstripped by inflation, and precautionary 
savings grew. Added to this was a rising level of consumer debt, which increased from an 
average of 23% of disposable income in 1985-6 to almost 29% in 1990-91. Moreover, real 
interest rates remained positive, falling only recently in the face of moderated inflation. 
As a result of these factors, per capita PDI fell by 6% during 199 1-92. PCE, too, declined 
at -2-3% annualised, and the rate of this decrease has been increasing. Significantly, these 
high rates of decrease in PCE have taken the form of declining sales of durable goods. PCE 
on durable goods fell at an annualised rate of 15% in the fourth quarter of 1991, 10,5% in 
the first quarter of 1992, and 8% in the second quarter. Sales of domestic appliances 
declined by 6%, whilst those of TVs declined by 9% over the course of 1991. Industry 
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estimates suggest that overall, sales of HEDs declined by 9% in fiscal 1992, and would 
continue to decline throughout 1993 (interview sources). 
This situation has resulted in the worst market the HED industry has faced since World War 
Two. The situation was not expected to improve in the short term as of early 1993. On the 
positive side, since expenditure on consumer durables has declined in real terms over the 
course of the 1980s, and the real value of the consumer durables stock has declined 
considerably, postponed purchases were expected eventually to show up in the form of 
strong replacement demand. But the essential stagnation of PDI since 1985, coupled with 
continuing recession and political uncertainty, suggest that purchases would postponed yet 
further. 
Finally, it should be borne in mind that the reasonable growth in sales of HEDs over the late 
80s was achieved by increased debt and substantial dissaving by households. Any likely 
Figure B-7 
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growth in PCE will again probably be financed from credit rather than growing PDI. This 
situation has never been and is not a sustainable basis for growth for the HED industry, and 
has always resulted in government intervention to tighten credit conditions. Effectively a 
sound basis for growth will only be achieved when rising PCE is financed by rising PDI. 
Such a situation does not appear to be in the offing. 
The danger is that the present conjuncture may result in a deterioration of domestic capacity 
to supply HEDs as firms move out of manufacture. Any upsurge in pent-up demand would 
then put intolerable pressure on the balance of payments. This could result in government- 
imposed credit and import controls, once again strangling growth in the market. For this 
reason, it will be argued below that policy towards the HED industry must begin with 
appropriate measures to stimulate consumer demand. Otherwise any attempt to restructure 
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the HED manufacturing industry and/or to liberalise imports is bound to end in disaster, for 
the industry and the economy. 
C. Distribution of HEDs in South Africa 
This section looks at current levels of HED ownership in South Africa, particularly amongst 
those who constitute the major growth market for HED manufacturers: urban black 
households. 
1. Size and Growth of the Stock of HEDs 
A recent estimate of the stock of HEDs (AMPS, 1992) is presented in Table C-i below. It 
shows that for 7,4m South African households surveyed26 in 1991 there were at least27 2,8m 
electric stoves (which were thus owned by 37,7% of South African households); 1 ,9m coal, 
wood, or gas stoves (26%); Im microwaves (14,3%); 3,2m fridges (42,6%); 1,3m deep 
freezers (18,1%); l,9m washing machines (25,1%); 4,lm televisions (55,4%); I,lm VCRs 
(14,9%); and 2,8m hi-fl sets (37,7%). 6,4m or 86,4% of South African households own a 
radio.28 
This stock is being increased at a varying rate. Table B-2 above shows that growth has been 
strongest where black consumers have been the most active force in the retail market: 
consumer electronics. Slow growth was recorded in the stock of more expensive but more 
durable white goods: 59 856 deep freezes were sold in 1991, increasing the national stock29 
by only 3%; 130 445 washers were sold (a 4,8% increase); 185 147 refrigerators (4%); and 
98 629 electric freestanding stoves (2,7%). Conversely, rapid growth was experienced in 
the stock of consumer electronics products: 313 480 hi-fl sets (7,8%); 107 402 VCRs 
(7,7%); 311 078 televisions (6%); and 92 742 microwaves (6%).. 
In most cases (not stoves) this is above the rate of population growth, suggesting the 
penetration of appliances into existing households, through electrification and income 
growth in some sectors. Yet there is room for major growth in HED sales and ownership. 
In more developed economies households spend an average of 10% to 13% of their 
disposable income on non-motor durables. The comparable figure for South Africa is only 
4% to 5% (BMI, 1991). The reason for the discrepancy is simple: the absolute level of 
disposable incomes is lower in South Africa, particularly amongst the black population. 
26 
Surveys are conducted regularly by All-Media Product Survey and Sociomonitor. The former covers 
both urban and rural households, whilst the latter focuses on urban households. Surveys are conducted 
by means of questionnaires administered to a cross-section of households. 
27 This data probably significantly underestimates the stock of certain goods, such as refrigerators, TVs, 
and Hi-fl sets, since many households o more than one unit. 
28 
Implying that investment in media resources should go into SABC radio services, at least in the short- 
term. 
29 
Assuming 30% of purchases are for replacement purposes. 
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This has resulted in a highly skewed distribution of HEDs amongst the South African 
population, to which we will now turn. 
2. Distribution of HEDs 
Almost all white South African households own a television, radio, refrigerator, electric 
stove, and washing machine. They also own tumble dryers, hi-fl sets, microwave ovens, 
video cassette recorders, and vacuum cleaners in large proportions. Asian households are 
slightly behind this except in laundry and some cooking products. Penetration of 'coloured' 
South African households by such products is generally 20-30% lower. 
4.L7. 
1 15.1 





Although black households make up approximately 67,8% of the national total,3° they 
possess only 27,8% of the national stock of electric stoves, 32% of refrigerators, 7% of 
washing machines, 4,7% of microwaves, and 0,6% of tumble dryers. Blacks fare better in 
consumer electronics: they own 65% of radios, 40% of televisions, and 49% of hi-fl sets 
(but only 10% of VCRs and a negligible percentage of M-Net decoders). 
Qualitatively, too, the distribution of appliances is significantly unequal. The majority of 
black households own appliances which are roughly twice as old as those owned by white, 
° 
Please note that the figure refers to households, not to persons. 
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'coloured' and Indian households. Nearly 40% of electric stoves and fndges owned by 
blacks are over 10 years old; 25-30% of televisions and audio products are of this age.3' 
Nor is the situation improving: although it is recognised in the HED industry that the urban32 
black market is its only real growth area, the proportion of such households able to afford 
appliances is declining. Many black urban households own no small electrical appliances at 
all.33 The percentage of such households actually rose from 55% to 62% between 1989 and 
1991. Let us now look more closely urban black household ownership of four basic types of 
product. 
Table C-i below lists the percentage and number of households within each population 
group owning each of 19 key appliances in 1991. The inequality of the distribution of these 
appliances is striking. Although 91% of white households and 94% of Asian households 
own an electric stove, 63% of 'coloured' and only 15,5% of black households own one. 
Almost 30% of black households use a solid-fuel stove. Overall, 37,7% of South African 
households own an electric stove, whilst 26% continue to use a solid-fuel stove. These 
figures are very different for urban black households, however, as the following sections will 
discuss. 
31 Drawn from confidential market reports. 
32 
Approximately 42% of black households nationwide. 
Obviously excluding consumer electronics. 
Figure C-2 
Ownership of Selected Appliances 
1991 
B'acks Asians 
Source: AMPS Trends, Industry Sources 
Fridge Electric stove[J Other Stove 
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Figure C-3 
Ownership of Selected Smalls 
1991 
Blacks Asians 
Source: AMPS Trends, Industry Sources 
Hotplate Microwave Vacuum Floor Polisher 
Figure C-4 
Ownership of Video Equipment 
1991 
Blacks Asians 
Source: AMPS Trends, Industry Sources 
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a) Cooking Appliances 
This section will go into relatively great detail because of the importance of electrical 
cooking appliances — particularly electrical freestanding stoves — as a source of electricity 
consumption. As will be discussed in later chapters, consumption of electricity is vital for 
economic rates of return on ESKOM investments in electrification of new areas. 
Table C-i: DURABLE ITEMS OWNED IN 1991, BY POPULATION 
GROUP 
Whites 1,645,000 Blacks ,052,00 Asians 181,000 Clrds. 568,000 All 
% No. % No. % No. % No. % No. 
)eep Freeze 62.6% 1,029,770 2.9% 
0.1% 
146,508 43.3% 78,373 16.7% 94,856 18.1% 1,349,507 
)ishwasher 192% 315,840 5,052 1.1% 1,991 0.2% 1,136 4.4% 324,019 
)ryer 45.6% 750,120 0.1% 5,052 15.0% 27,150 2.7% 15,336 10.7% 797,658 
lectricHotplate 18.1% 297,745 7.9% 399,108 16.2% 29,322 8.1% 46,008 10.4% 772,183 
loorPolisher 30.9% 508,305 1.8% 90,936 20.0% 36,200 16.1% 91,448 9.8% 726,889 
liFi 68.2% 1,121,890 27.1% 1,369,09 56.9% 102,989 37.0% 210,160 37.7% 2,804,131 
M-Net 26.3% 432,635 — 0 21.4% 38,734 11.7% 66,456 7.2% 537,825 
4icrowave 56.2% 924,490 1.0% 50,520 30.3% 54,843 6.6% 37,488 14.3% 1,067,341 
adio 97.8% 1,608,810 82.6% ,172,95 93.8% 169,778 84.6% 480,528 86.4% 6,432,068 
efrigerator 97.0% 1,595,650 20.4% 
15.5% 
1,030,60 95.3% 172,493 661% 375,448 42.6% 3,174,199 
tove—electric 91.2% 1,500,240 783,060 93.7% 169,597 63.0% 357,840 37.7% 2,810,737 
tove—other 14.5% 238,525 29.6% 1,495,39 15.0% 27,150 32.5% 184,600 26.1% 1,945,667 
['V—B&W 26.5% 435,925 17.9% 904,308 24.7% 44,707 32.5% 184,600 21.1% 1,569,540 
IV—colour 87.4% 1,437,730 14.6% 737,592 77.1% 139,551 429% 243,672 34.4% 2,558,545 
Ut TV 113.9% 1,873,655 32.5% 1,641,90 101.8% 184,258 75.4% 428,272 55.4% 4,128,085 
iCR 49.9% 820,855 2.3% 116,196 55.6% 100,636 12.5% 71,000 14.9% 1,108,687 
iacuum 84.9% 1,396,605 1.6% 80,832 39.7% 71,857 14.4% 81,792 21.9% 1,631,086 
Nasher—auto 
— front 
38.3% 630,035 0.8% 40,416 33.2% 60,092 5.8% 32,944 10.3% 763,487 
Vasher—auto 
—top 
19.5% 320,775 1.5% 
0.3% 
75,780 5.5% 9,955 8.6% 48,848 6.1% 455,358 
Vasher—twin 
ub 
29.1% 478,695 15,156 6.5% 11,765 25.6% 145,408 8.7% 651,024 
UI Washers 86.9% 1,429,505 2.6% 131,352 45.2% 81,812 40.0% 227,200 25.1% 1,869,869 
(Source: All-Media Product Survey Trends, 1986-1991; confidential sources. The figure in 
the first column represents the percentage of households owning that item. The second 
figure represents the number of households.) 
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(1) Type of Cooking Appliance Owned 
69% of urban black households owned a cooking appliance — either a freestanding gas, 
electric or solid-fuel stove or a gas or electrical hotplate — in 1991. The percentage of such 
households owning freestanding stoves (of any kind), however, dropped from 66% to 57% 
from 1989 to 1991. 
Although 60 540 solid-fuel stoves were discarded by urban black households between 1989 
and 1991 (see Table C-2), such stoves remain the main type of appliance owned by such 
households. In 1989, 42% of urban black households had solid-fuel stoves compared to 










Fotal Stoves 69% 1,197,150 59% 1,231,920 
Fotal Freestanding Stoves 66% 1,145,100 57Yo 1,190,160 
Electric f/s 29% 503,150 26% 542,880 
Solid-fuel f/s 42% 728,700 32Yo 668,160 
rotal Built-in Stoves 3% 52,050 3% 62,640 
Electric built-in oven 2% 34,700 2% 41,760 
Electric built-in hob 1% 17,350 1% 20,880 
Fotal Electric Hotplates l8o 312,300 209o 417,600 
29% owning electric 
freestanding (EFS) 
stoves. By 1990 
this gap had closed 
to 32% and 26%, 
respectively. Note 
that the percentage 
of urban black 
households owning 
EFS stoves thus 
dropped from 29% 
to 26% 1989-1991. 
Although a greater 
number of EFS 
stoves were owned 
in 1991 (542 880 
compared to 503 
150 in 1989), the 
penetration of this 
Source: Confidential industry report. 
appliance had not kept up with urban population growth. There are three reasons for this. 
• Firstly, 39 730 EFS stoves were sold to urban black households 1989-1991 — a 7,8% 
increase, about 3,9% p.a. — but the number of black urban households increased by 
20% during the same period. The rate of migration to urban areas thus outstrips the 
rate of uptake of EFS stoves by a considerable amount. 
• Secondly, of total industry sales of 178 200 EFS stoves 1989-1991, only 39 370 or 
22% went to the urban black market. This suggests that unlike consumer electronics 
products, EFS stoves remain unaffordable to black households. 
• Thirdly, however, 35 000 gas Stoves were purchased by urban black households during 
the same period — a 50% overall increase. 6 000 of these gas stoves went into 
electrified urban black households. Particularly amongst those earning R 1 100 — R2 
000 p.m., solid-fuel stoves seem to be shed in favour of gas stoves rather than EFS 
stoves. This may be due to fears of electricity supply interruption, the cost of EFS 
stoves, and serviceability problems. 
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(2) Income and Cooking Appliance Ownership 
417 600 or 20% of urban black households earn more than Ri 000 a month. 563 650 or 
27% earn between Ri 100 and R2 000 p.m. 522 000 or 25% of such households earn 
between R700 and Ri 099 p.m., whilst 584 640 or 28% survive on less than R699.M Taking 
the 1991 Institute of Race Relations Minimum Living Level of Ri 217 as a guide, 52% of 
urban black households (1155 440) are trying to survive on less than the amount needed to 
provide for basic urban needs. 
45% of urban black households in the >R2 000 income group own EFS stoves, whilst 5% 
own gas and 26% solid-fuel stoves. 34% of households in the Ri 100 — Ri 000 income 
group own an EFS stove, whilst 7% own gas and 32% solid-fuel stoves. 20% of households 
in the R700-R1 099 group own an EFS stove, whilst 4% own gas and 29% a solid-fuel 
stove; only 10% of households in the <R699 group own an EFS stove, whilst 4% own gas 
and 38% solid-fuel stoves. 
70% of EFS stoves are thus owned by the 47% of urban black households in the >R1 100 
group, which owns only 16% of urban black solid fuel stoves. Conversely, 30% of EFS 
stoves are owned by the 53% of urban black households earning less than Ri 100 p.m., 
which own 84% of urban black solid-fuel stoves. This suggests that income levels are a 
strong determinant of EFS stove ownership. 
Table C-3: Cooking Appliance Ownership and Income, Urban Black 
Households, 1991 
Income Group Electric Freestanding Gas Solid Fuel None Other 
R2000+ 45% 5% — 26% 24% 
R1I00-R2000 34% 7% 32% 27% — 
R700-R1099 — 20% 4% 29% 47% 
Ri-R699 10% 4% 38% 48% — 
(Source: Confidential industry report.) 
(3) Electricity and Cooking Appliance Ownership 
The 1 046 088 households with connected and operating electricity make up approximately 
51% of the total of 2 088 000 urban black households. This percentage has not increased 
since 1989, although the absolute number of electrified urban black households has 
increased by 90 000 p.a. from 884 850 to 1 064 880 — a 20,3% increase. 
Although 95% of electrified urban black households have a cooking appliance of some sort 
(reflecting the longer urban residency of such households), only 50% have an EFS stove. 
Adding to this the 6% who own a built-in electric hob or oven and 7% who own an electric 
These household figures are not to be confused with personal income. Only 11% of urban blacks earn 
more than Ri 100 p.m., whilst 54% have no personal income at all. 
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hotplate gives a total of only 63% of electrified urban black households owning an electric 
cooking appliance. 
Conversely, 29% of electrified urban black households own a solid-fuel stove. 3% of such 
households own a gas stove. Looked at the other way, 29% of urban black gas-stove owners 
(25 773), and 46% of solid-fuel stove owners (311 856) have electricity, but no EFS stove. 
This means that 337 629 households, or 32,3% of electritled urban black households have 
yet to make the transition to electrical cooking. 62% of these households are in the 
Ri 100+ income group. 
Adding to this the 4,7% of electrified households who have no cooking appliances gives a 
total of 387 052 or 37% electrified urban black households without an electric cooking 
appliance. It should be noted that this number is almost quadruple the number of EFS 
stoves sold during 1991 (108 200). 
(4) Income or Electricitp? 
319 197 or 76,4% of urban black households earning >R2 000 p.m. have connected 
electricity. 358 300 or 63,6% such households in the Ri 100 — R2 000 bracket have 
electricity. 215 924 or 4 1,4% of households in the R700 — Ri 099 slot are connected, 
whilst only 164 837 or 28% of households earning less than R699 p.m. are. 
Within the 677 497 urban black 
households earning more than 
Ri 100 p.m. who have electricity 
(69% of this income group), a total 
of 195 237 do not own an electrical 
cooking appliance. This represents 
_______________________ ______________ 29% of Ri 100+ households overall 
(i.e. electrified and non-electrified). 
Even amongst those electrified 
households earning more than 
R2 000 p.m., only 58,9% own an 
EFS stove. Thus, more than 1/3 of 
________________________ _______________ the best-off electrified households in 
South Africa black urban areas 
still do not have an EFS stove. 
23,5% of electrified households in 
this income bracket still use a solid- 
The figures get worse as one moves down the income groups. As Table C-5 shows, amongst 
those electrified households earning Rl 100 — R2 000 p.m., 53,5% own an EFS stove and 
33,5% a solid-fuel stove. Amongst electrified households earning R700 — Ri 099 p.m., 
only 48,4% own an EFS stove, and 25,5% own a solid-fuel stove. Amongst electrified 
households earning less than R699 p.m., the EFS stove figure drops to 35,5%, and that for 
solid-fuel stoves rises to 36,4%. 
Table C-4: Electricity and Cooking 
Appliance Ownership, Urban 
Black Households, 1991 
Appliance Percentage of 
Electrified 
UBH Owning 
All Cooking 95% 
Electric Freestanding stove 50% 
Built-in hob or oven 6% 
Hotplate 7% 
Gas stove 3% 
Solid Fuel stove 29% 
(Source: Confidential Industry Report.) 
fuel stove. 
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It should be noted from this chart that the percentage of households using a solid-fuel stove 
does not differ significantly between electrified and non-electrified households except at the 
R2 000+ p.m. level. At the under Ri 100 p.m. level the percentage of electrified 
households using solid-fuel stoves is actually higher than for unelectrified households. 
Above it was pointed out that between 1989-1991, the number of electrified urban black 
households grew by 180 030, a 20,3% increase. During the same period, the stock of EFS 
stoves owned by urban black households increased by only 39 730, representing a 7,9%. 
growth. On the other hand, the stock of electric hotplates owned by urban black households 
grew by 33,7% over the same period, by 105 300. 
Table C-5: Cooking Appliance Distribution by Income and Electrification, 
Urban Black Households, 1991 
Income Group R2000+: 417, 600 households R1100-R2000: 563, 650 households 
Electricity No Electricity Electricity No Electricity 
± TotaiHouseholds 319,197 76.4% 98,403 23.6% 358,300 63.6% 205,350 36.4% 
Appliance No. % No. % No. % No. % 
2 Electric f/s 187,920 58.9% 0 0.0% 191,641 53.5% 0 0.0% 
3 Gas 20,000 6.3% 880 0.9% 18,000 5.0% 21,455 10.4% 
4 Solid-fue' 75,000 23.5% 33,576 34.1% 120,000 33.5% 60,368 29.4% 
5 Otherornone 36,277 11.4% 63,947 65.0% 28,659 8.0% 123,527 60.2% 
Income Group R700-R 1199: 522,000 households R1-R699: 584,640 households 
Elect ricity No Electricity Electricity No Electricity 
1 TotaiHouseholds 215,924 41.4% 306,076 58.6% 164,837 28.2% 419,803 71.8% 
Appliance No. % No. % No. % No. % 
2 Electric f/s 104,400 48.4% 0 0.0% 58,464 35.5% 0 0.0% F Gas 5,000 2.3% 15,880 5.2% 10,000 6.1% 13,385 3.2% 
4 Solid-fuel 55,000 25.5% 96,380 31.5% 60,000 36.4% 162,163 38.6% F Otherornone 51,524 23.9% 193,816 63.3% 36,373 22.1% 244,255 58.2% 
Source: Own caculations based on confidential industry report. 
Note: Row I lists the number and percentage of black urban households in each income 
group with and without electricity. Rows 1 — 4 list the number and percentage of 
households with and without electricity, within each income group, owning that 
appliance. 
Lack of access to the underlying data has precluded a formal statistical analysis. 
Nevertheless, it seems fairly clear that access to electricity in and of itself does not 
guarantee use of major electrical appliances such as EFS stoves. Instead, takeup of such 
appliances is strongly linked to income levels. As one industry study argues, 
The significant decrease in total stoves...and in total freestanding stoves can be ascribed 
to the current macro economics (sic) of this country, the increasing influx of rural people 
coming to the cities, the ongoing electrification saga PLUS the lack of affordability of a 
conventional electric stove to an increasing proportion of black urban households... .the 
purchase of a gas stove is not exclusively driven by lack of electrification. ..there is no 
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conventional electric stove on the market which is affordable to an increasing, proportion 
of urban black households and takes into account the possibility of less amperage being 
supplied to these households by ESKOM compared to white areas." 
In addition, however, factors other than access to electricity must be taken into account: 
• The feasibility of electrical cooking appliance usage. Some urban black households 
may not be able to use such appliances because of space problems. This may be 
particularly true of households which have recently migrated to urban areas and who 
are living in backrooms, shacks, squatter camps, and huts. This is approximately 18% 
of urban black households. From 1989 to 1991 the number of adults living in 
inadequate accommodation in urban areas increased by 600 000. The number of adults 
living in squatter camps alone grew by 128 000 from 98 000 to 226 000 (a 30,6% 
increase). In the PWV area, 43% of the urban black population is living in informal 
housing. 69% of those in the Durban Functional Region live in such housing. 
Overall, the shortage of housing in South Africa is approximately 1,2m units.36 
Table C-6: Electrification and EFS Stove Penetration, Urban Black 
Households, 1989-1991 
1989 1991 Increase %Change 
Electrified Hshds. 884 850 1 064 880 180 030 20,3% 
EFS Stoves 503 150 542 880 39 730 7,9% 
Hotplates 312300 417 600 105300 33,7% 
Source: Confidential Industry Report. 
The difficulty of obtaining finance because of insecurity of tenure. Only 46% of 
urban black households owned their own homes in 1991 (up from 36% in 1989). 
Given the income levels involved, home ownership would be a prime means of 
providing security for HP purchases of appliances. As one might expect, the 
percentage of urban black households who own their own homes declines with income. 
70% of the R2 000+ households own their own homes, compared to 50% of the Ri 100 
— R2 000 group, 40% of the R700 — Rl 100 group, and 33% of the RI — R699 
group. 
(5) Key Points 
The fundamental point of this discussion is that access to electricity is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for ownership of an EFS stove, which is a major source of electricity 
consumption. Either black disposable incomes must rise or stove prices must fall, or both, 
in order for the benefits of electrification to be felt. 
White goods manufacturers and industry analysts believe that of all the products of this 
branch, EFS stoves are the least affordable to black households. When urban black 
" From a confidential industry report. Emphasis in the original. 
36 Urban Foundation estimates. 
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households began to make the switch from solid-fuel stoves in the mid-1970s, no 
appropriate, affordable alternative yet existed. To date EFS stoves remain unaffordable to 
the majority of urban black households. The alternative has been electric hotplates, which 
have increased by 37,7% between 1989-199 1. According to an ESKOM report, this is not 
because such appliances 're. . .regarded as satisfying needs but.. .because there is no viable 
alternative"37 This issue will be explored further in later chapters. 
b) Refrigeration Equipment 
The affordability situation is greatly improved with respect to refrigeration products. 
Although 97% of white households and 95% of Asian households own refrigerators, 66% of 
'coloured' households and only 20% of black households own one. Because of the 
numerical preponderance of black households, this brings the national ownership level down 
to 42,6% of households. 
Table C-7: Urban Black Household Ownership of Refrigerators, 1987-1991 
1987 1989 1991 
Households 000's 1,655 1,904 2,222 
Adult Population 000's 
% 
5,574 6,135 7,077 
Units % Units % Units 
Total Fridges 43% 
17% 
711,650 42% 799,680 48% 1,066,560 
Single door—total 281,350 26% 495,040 28% 622,160 
Electric NM NM 19% 361,760 20% 444,400 
Paraffin NM NM 5% 95,200 5% 11,110 
Gas NM NM 2% 38,080 3% 66,660 
Combination NM NM 1% 17,136 0.4% 8,888 
Double door—total 26Yo 430,300 1% 304,640 21% 466,620 
Electric NM NM 15% 285,600 21% 453,420 
Paraffin NM NM 0.3% 5,712 0.3% 6,600 
Gas NM NM 0.2% 3,808 0.3% 6,600 
Source: Confidential industry report. NM = Not measured. 
Between 1989 and 1991, 345 600 refrigerators were sold to the retail trade. Of these, 266 
879 went to the urban black market. This means that over the period this market accounted 
for 77% of sales — again, a radically d[fe rent situation from EFS stoves. 
Electricity is the most common form of power for these appliances, with minimal 
percentages using paraffin or gas. Most electric fridges owned by urban black households 
are under 10 years old. 
' 
Quoted in the industry report used as the basis for this section. 
36 INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY PROJECT 
(1) Electricity and Refrigerator Ownership 
Of the 1 064 880 urban black households with electricity, 76% own an electric refrigerator. 
Only 2% use a non-electric fridge. 12% of households using a paraffin fridge have 
electricity, as do 3% of those using gas fridges. No urban black households with electricity 
has bought a non-electric fridge over the last decade. 191 678 or 18% of electrfled urban 
black households have no fridge, however Again, this compares favourably with the 
situation for electrical cooking products, where 387 052 or 37% of electrified households 
lack an electrical cooking appliance and 50% lack an EFS stove. It should be noted that the 
number of electrified urban black households without a fridge is greater than the total 
refrigerator sales for 1991 (218 100). 











Refrigerators 799 680 1 066 560 266 880 33,3% 
Source: Confidential Industry Report. 
(2) Income and Refrigerator Ownership 
Although information on this issue is not as readily available, what there is supports 
intuition. 65% of electric single-door and 76% of electric double-door fridges owned by 
urban black households are owned by households in the Ri 100+ p.m. income group. 
Overall, 71% of such households own an electric fridge. This means that 284 562 
households earning over RI 100 p.m. have yet to obtain an electric fridge. Conversely, 
64% of paraffin fridges are owned by those earning under Ri 000 p.m. Only 35% of 
electric single-door and 25% of electric double-door fridges are owned by these households. 
(3) Key points 
Fridge penetration of the urban black market is more advanced than for EFS stoves. This is 
due to two factors: 
• Firstly, unlike EFS stoves, no viable substitute good exists. Gas and paraffin fridges are 
no longer manufactured locally. 
• Secondly, the average cost of a new refrigerator is much lower than for an EFS stove. 
This is a more affordable item for urban black households. 
Again, although electrification is necessary to ownership of a refrigerator, income levels and 
access to suitable accommodation are still fundamental determinants. One interesting but 
speculative point is that fridge ownership by urban black households may be less urgent 
because of the well-developed system of informal spazas in black urban areas, which may 
allow cold products to be purchased directly. 
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c) Laundry Products 
87% of white households, 45% of Asian households, 40% of 'coloured' households, and 
2,6% of black households shared the national stock of 1 869 869 washing machines in 1991. 
Overall, the rate of penetration for this product is a low 25%. 
Only 6% of urban black households own washing machines. This percentage has not grown 
since 1987, although the number has grown from 99 330 to 133 320 — a 34% increase. 
56% of this increase was from 1989-1991. As with refrigerators, ownership levels have 
increased less rapidly than electrification. 
Table C-9: Urban Black Household Ownership of Laundry Products, 1987- 
1991 
1987 1989 1991 
Households 000's 1 655 1 904 2 222 
Adult Population 000's 5 574 6 135 7 077 
% Units % Units % Units 
Total Washing Machines 6% 99 300 6% 114 240 6% 113 320 
Single/twin tub 3% 49 650 3% 57 120 2% 44 440 
Automatic — total 3% 49 650 3% 57 120 4% 88 880 
Top Load NM NM NM NM 3% 66660 
Front Load NM NM NM NM 1% 22220 
Tumble Driers 0.4% 6,620 0.3% 5,712 1% 22,220 
Source: Confidential industry report. NM = Not measured. 
Unlike EFS stoves and refrigerators, ownership of a washing machines is limited to urban 
black households with electricity and connected running water. Only about 10% of 
electrified urban black households have a washing machine. 76% of all washing machines 
owned by such households are owned by those who own their own homes. 77% of twin 
tubs, 85% of automatic top loaders and 81 of front loaders are owned by those earning 
Ri 100+ p.m. The number of electrified urban black households without a washing 
machine, 958 392, is over seven times the 1991 annual sales of such appliances of 138 
900. 
Only 22 220 or 1% of urban black households own a tumble dryer. This represents a 235% 
increase since 1987, however. The number of electrified urban black households without a 
tumble dryer 1 042 660, is 27 times the 1992 annual sales of this product of 37 400 units. 
(1) Key Points 
Laundry products are perhaps the best indication of the fact that electrification on its own 
does not guarantee appliance penetration. Although ownership levels amongst urban black 
households have increased dramatically over the last six years, they remain abysmally low 
compared to those for whites. Major factors inhibiting the penetration of such products are 
undoubtedly access to running water and the availability of human labour as a substitute. 
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Table C-1O: Electrification and Laundry Product Penetration, Urban Black 
Households, 1989-1991 
I 
1989 1991 Increase % Change 











Source: Confidential Industry Report. 
d) Television 
The average white South African household owns more than one television. The same is 
true for Asian households. 75% of 'coloured' households own a TV But only 32,5% of 
black households own this basic modem communications device. It is little wonder that 
explicit government policy towards the television industry has always included incentives to 
manufacture cheaply for the black market.38 We will now look more closely at the urban 
black market for televisions. 
(1) Type of Television Owned 
In 1991 58% or 1 288 760 urban black households owned a television. 52% of these were 
monochrome (henceforth MTV) and 48% were colour (henceforth CTV). 
The number of urban black households owning televisions increased from 744 750 in 1987 
to 1 288 760 in 1991 — a 73% increase. Three-quarters of this growth was between 1989 
and 1991. Recent growth was been faster in CTV than MTV, and the percentage of urban 
black households owning CTV has risen whilst that for MTV has fallen. 81% of current 
urban black owners say their set is the first one they have owned. Nearly 70% of televisions 
in urban black households are less than 10 s'ears old. 66% of CTVs have been bought in the 
last five years, compared with 70% of the MTVs. 35% of urban black households with 
television own units less then 2 years old. This implies that an average of 225 533 
televisions have gone into the urban black market each year for the last two years. This 
represented more than 70% of the annual market for televisions in 1991. This confirms 
the point, made above, that most HED growth in recent years has been amongst black 
buyers of consumer electronics products such as televisions. 
80% of urban black households with electricity own a television, but only 70% of urban 
black TV owners have electricity. This is due to the prevalence of using 12-volt batteries to 
run TV and hi-fl sets. CTV ownership is concentrated in electrified homes, however, with 
91% of the total. Only 51% of MTVs are in electrified homes. 
See Chapter Four. 
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Table C-il: Urban Black Household Ownership of Video Products, 1987-1991 
1987 1989 [ 1991 
Households 000's 1 655 1 904 2 222 
Adult Population 000's 5 574 6 135 7 077 




TVinhome 45% 744750 46% 875840 58% 1288760 
NoTV 55% 910250 54% 1028160 42% 933240 
1 TV NM NM 44% 837 760 54% 1199 880 
2 TVs NM NM 2% 38 080 4% 88 880 
ColourTotal 40% 300400 45% 389700 48% 614400 
Black and White Total 62% 465 620 55% 476 300 52% 665 600 
Video Cassette Recorders 
VCR in home 2% 33 100 3% 57 120 8% 177 760 
No VCR in home 98% 1 621 900 97% 1 846 880 92% L2 044 240 
Source: Confidential industry report. NM = Not Measured. 
Table C-12: Electrification and Video Product Penetration, Urban Black 
Households, 1989-1991 
1989 1991 Increase % Change 
Electrified Hshds. 884 850 1 064 880 180 030 20,3% 
Colour Televisions 389 700 614 400 19 080 57,6% 
Mono Televisions 476 300 665 600 189 300 39,7% 
VCRs 57120 177760 120640 211% 
Source: Confidential Industry Report. 
The rate of television and VCR penetration is well in advance of the rate of electrification of 
urban black households. It should be noted that the 212 970 electrified urban black 
households without televisions represent 68% of annual TV sales in 1991. 
(2) Income and Television Ownership 
62% of TVs in urban black households are owned by those earning more than Ri 100 p.m. 
71% of urban black households earning more than R2 000 p.m. have at least one TV, whilst 
11% have two. By contrast, only 32% of those earning less than R699 p.m. have a 
television — still a remarkable percentage. 
(3) VCR ownership 
By contrast, VCR ownership amongst urban black households is relatively low. Only 14% 
or 177 760 households own such a device. 25% of those with CTV, however, also have a 
VCR. Penetration of VCRs has doubled since 1989. 85% of VCRs belong to households 
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earning Ri 100 p.m. or more. 93% of urban black VCR owners have electricity, but only 
19% of urban black households with electricity have a VCR. 96% of those owning CTV 
and a VCR have electricity. The 862 552 electrified urban black households who had no 
VCR represented more than eight times the South African market for such devices. 
(4) Key points 
86% of urban black households with television bought the unit new. Rental is negligible in 
the urban black market, reflecting inability to provide security. Availability of electricity, 
suitable accommodation, and security of tenure is not a barrier to television ownership per 
se, but to a certain extent ownership of expensive CTV and especially VCRs is limited by 
the high risk of theft. Nevertheless growth in both CTV and VCR ownership has been 
dramatic in recent years. 
1. The fortunes of the HED industry are closely linked to overall economic health. 
Movements in personal disposable incomes and private consumption expenditure are 
particularly important. 
2. The fortunes of the industry are also linked closely to government credit policy. 
Government has consistently intervened to limit growth of hire-purchase sales when it 
has appeared that HED sales have been based on unsustainable credit and dissaving 
rather than growth in personal disposable incomes. This has resulted in two significant 
and sudden downturns, in 1983-84 and 1988-89.. 
Figure C-S 
Television Ownership: Black Households 
1989-1991 
Source: AMPS Trends, Industry Sources 
B&W Colourl 
D. Summary 
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3. Sales of HEDs rose strongly dramatically between 1979 and 1983, and dramatically in 
1984-5, only to fall rapidly in 1985-86. A brief period of moderate growth 1986-1989, 
punctuated by a brief boost in 1990, has been followed by stagnation, turning to severe 
decline. 
4. Overall, the market for white goods shrunk by nearly 9% in 1992. The market for 
consumer electronics products has suffered similarly. Sales for 1993 were similarly 
depressed. In real terms, in 1993 the HED market was at roughly the same level as in 
1971. 
5. Falling real expenditure on HEDs has mean that he stock of such goods has aged 
considerably over the last decade years. Significant replacement demand has been built 
up in traditional market sectors. 
6. Distribution of HEDs remains very unequal in South Africa. In general black 
ownership of major appliances is severely limited compared to whites. The divergence 
is less with respect to consumer electronics, but still severe. Nevertheless, black 
consumers are the only major growth market for this industry. 
7. Electrification has had an impact on urban black household ownership of HEDs, but 
income remains the principal barrier. Urban electrified black households remain slow to 
take up some appliances, particularly electric freestanding stoves. 
8. Growth in appliance ownership amongst urban black households has been very rapid in 
the last few years. Nevertheless, even amongst electrified households, overall 
penetration of HEDs remains low. In many cases, the number of electrified households 
without an appliance is many times that product's current annual market in South 
Africa. This indicates that a massive potential growth market exists should the gap 
between income and appliance cost narrow. 
1. Some Concluding Comments 
The fundamental problem afflicting the HED market is the inability of black consumers to 
afford these products as they are presently priced in South Africa. All policy towards this 
industry must begin with this in mind. This raises the question of whether the South African 
HED industry is succeeding in supplying the population's 'basic needs'. At face value, it is 
not. But could any industry profitably supply black South Africans with HEDs at prices 
which the former could afford? Research overseas indicates that comparable products are 
20-50% less expensive on the sales floor. This raises the question of whether or not it 
would be preferable to import such goods, to which Chapter Seven will return, but does not 
necessarily imply that such goods would be substantially more affordable to black 
consumers. If not, this raises another question: is South Africa ready for an HED industry 
at all? 
In many ways, South Africa only has an HED industry because of the import-substitution 
policies of a minority government intent on self-sufficiency and increased white living 
standards. Accordingly, many in South Africa have come to regard HEDs as luxuries rather 
than necessities, compared to food, shelter, and clothing. Certainly that sentiment has been 
raised by some in the course of discussions with interested organisations in South Africa. 
Yet it is doubtful whether televisions and music centres can be regarded as luxuries in an age 
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of advanced media — certainly not by township dwellers, And from the perspective of any 
new government mass access to electronic media will not be a luxury: it will be an integral 
part of the apparatus of government. 
A mass housing and electrification programme seems to present the ideal opportunity to 
provide basic labour-saving, entertainment and information products to black households. 
The essential problem with this project may not be whether the South African HED industry 
can produce the appropriate goods efficiently enough to be import-competitive, but whether 
growth-oriented redistnbutive economic policies can raise disposable incomes to a level at 
which they are affordable to the majority. At present, the HED industry faces a stagnant 
market in a context in which it and its suppliers are already unable to achieve the economies 
of scale which would justify the investment needed to produce competitively. 
As we shall see, it is very difficult to tell whether the HED industry could achieve this 
transformation, were it given the opportunity. It is to the production of HEDs in South 
Africa that we now turn. 
Chapter Two: Production of Household Electrical 
Durables In South Africa 
A. Introduction 
The South African HED industries can be surveyed from any of a number of viewpoints. In 
Chapter One we viewed it from the perspective of the final market for its products. Chapter 
Three will consider its global setting, discussing international trading conditions and imports 
and exports. Chapter Four will develop a basic model of electrification's impact on the 
HED market, on the manufacturing industry, and on trade. 
This chapter is an overview of South Africa's HED manufacturing industries. It asks: what 
do we ned to know about this manufacturing industry in order to develop an industrial 
policy for it? Although Chapter Five also treats these issues, it does so primarily through 
case studies. Here we will present essential descriptive information about the industry as a 
whole, and the issues which shape any approach to industry policy towards it. 
B. The Competitive Context of the South African HED 
Industries 
1. Brand Names, Competition, and Manufacturing 
It is essential to understand what an HED firm actually does, and what defines the 
competitive environment it faces. In South Africa, such a firm usually performs several 
tasks: 
The supply of HED products to the retail trade. This is based on ownership of a 
'brand-name' (or names), which allows the firm to charge a premium above and beyond 
the 'value' of its product. The value of this premium is a determined by consumers' 
assessment of the brand's reputed functionality, quality, and durability relative to cost 
— 'value for money'. In other words, brand-name is the source of product 
differentiation in the HED industry. A strong brand-name allows an HED firm to 
charge more than its competitors for products which may contain fundamentally similar 
manufacturing costs. The development, protection, and management of brand-name(s) 
is thus a fundamental task. 
• The manufacture of HED products. This is usually carried out by a subsidiary 
company which sells all of its output to the parent firm. In most South African cases 
these subsidiaries are wholly-owned by the parent. 
• The importation of HED products which cannot profitably be produced locally. 
The traditions, historical development, and structural-strategic position of South African 
HED firms lead them to devote considerable effort and imagination to brand-name strategy. 
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Brand-name product differentiation, of course, is not specific to the South African I-LED 
industry, and is the principal element of competitive strategy in major HED markets 
throughout the globe. But in such markets brand-name strategy overlays a competitive 
manufacturing environment in which essentially generic product ranges are reconfigured for 
particular national or regional market tastes. To an extent, manufacturing competitiveness 
there has its own dynamic of development, as plants supply a range of branded products to 
various national and regional markets, striving to achieve cost leadership through volume 
and technological superiority. 
In South Africa brand-name strategy is a higher stakes game: South African firms do not 
have the advantage of a high-volume environment, and manufacturing operations are 
subordinated to a much greater extent to marketing imperatives. Indeed, were South African 
HED firms to be forced to compete on a purely cost-leadership basis, nearly all of them 
would be wiped out in short order, either by one another or by low-cost, high-volume Far 
Eastern plants. 
Customer loyalties and preferences give South African firms considerable advantage over 
foreign competitors. The inertial quality of brand loyalty also gives them a leeway to 
experiment — and err — which is absent from industries who compete on a purely cost- 
leadership basis. 
2. Brand-Names and Competition in a Low-Income Market 
Paradoxically, given their association with superficiality, brand-names are particularly 
important to all but the very poorest South Africans. Quality and trustworthiness are highly 
valued attributes in conditions of poverty, uncertainty, and difficulty in obtaining service. 
For such consumers, brand-names serve as reference points in a situation of high-stakes 
uncertainty. Nevertheless, the large number of very poor consumers in South Africa has led 
to the development of non-branded products, often launched by new entrants or importers.' 
This situation imposes a fine balancing act on established HED firms. On the one hand, 
their competitive edge in traditional middle- to upper-income markets depends largely on 
brand-names. To maintain them, they must preserve the perception of quality and value, and 
seem loathe to jeopardise this by entering the non-branded or off-brand market, even under 
different brand-names. On the other hand, they are under intense pressure to keep unit costs 
down, even for their branded products. This depends on their ability to achieve sufficient 
factory throughput — which in turn tempts them to add lower-priced products to increase 
overall volumes. 
Interviewees from established firms were uniformly uncomfortable with this problem, and 
seemed reluctant to commit themselves to a higher-volume, lower-cost model of competition 
if this meant producing 'cheaper' products. It seemed that a logical manufacturing strategy 
was obstructed by marketing imperatives. 
These considerations point to a key conclusion: South African HED firms are essentially 
marketers or wholesalers who own manufacturing plants from which they buy if it is 
Particularly in small appliances, televisions and grey-market consumer electronics more generally. The 
introduction of 'AilvI' microwaves and 'Giant' televisions are cases in point. 
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profitable. Every evidence points to a marketing-driven corporate orientation, which works 
to undermine competitiveness by devaluing strategies which depend on the development of 
manufacturing capability — a risky effort which will perforce take time and resources. 
Were they to go some way to reversing this orientation, HED firms might be able to compete 
more effectively with their overseas counterparts. Yet to do so, they would need to become 
more flexible manufacturers, with the capacity to run both branded and unbranded products 
though the same factory. l'his would require a significant reorientation, as we shall see in 
Chapter Five. 
C. Basic Production data 
In Chapter One we surveyed trends in HED market volumes. Let us look now at production 
data. 
1. Structure of 
Output 
Unit production figures 
____ from the 1985 census 
give an indication of the 
share of local HED 
output for various 
items.2 White goods and 
small appliances took up 
67,9% of HED output in 
that year, whilst 
_________________________________ consumer electronics 
______________________________ accounted for 32,2%. 
Of domestic appliances, 
46% of unit production was of cooking equipment, 35% of refrigeration equipment, 9% of 
domestic laundry equipment, and 10% of domestic heating equipment. Within cooking 
equipment, 30% of unit production was of electric stoves, 23% of coal and wood stoves, 
12% of gas stoves, and 25% of other stoves, hobs, and ovens. 10% of production was of 
hotplates. Within refrigeration equipment, 57,5% of unit production was of electric 
fridge/freezers, 11,6% of non-electric (gas) fridges, 11,6% of electric deep-freezes, and 
16,9% of other freezers. Within laundry equipment, 88% of unit production was of washing 
machines and parts, and 12% of dryers and parts. 
2 
These figures are meant only to indicate the relative importance of particular classes of products in 
South African HED manufacturing. 
Figure C-i: Production Shares, HED Industry, 1985 
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Of consumer electronics, 89,3% of unit production was of televisions, 6,9% of non-hi-fl 
audio equipment, and 2,9% of hi-fi equipment. 1% was of microphones and loudspeakers. 
Within televisions, 19% of production was of monochrome TVs, and 81% of colour TVs. 
Several things bear noting here: 
• In unit terms, lower-technology domestic appliances have been of relatively greater 
importance to the South African HED industry than consumer electronics. 
• Within domestic appliances, the largest proportion of output is accounted for by lower- 
technology cooking appliances. 
• Within cooking products, a surprisingly large proportion of unit output is accounted for 
by low-technology (and low-value) coal and wood stoves. 
D Hotp fates 
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This section looks at _______ 
the HED industry in ____________________________________ 
aggregate terms, in 
comparison to the rest _____ 
of the South African ______________________________________ 
economy and to the 
engineering sector.3 
a) Output 
-a— Fridges —I— EFS Stoves 
— 
Deep Freezes - Washers 
(1) Unit Output 
White goods: 
Unit output of a number of white goods is shown in Figure C-4. After falling slowly from a 
strong peak in the early 1980s, output of many products fell until 1984, when it rose 
slightly. This result may seem surprising given the stress placed on the 'mini-boom' of 
1983-84 in Chapter One, but actually illustrates the way in which the 'marketing' 
orientation of the HED industry may undermine its ability to achieve competitiveness in 
domestic manufacturing. 
The 83-84 upswing was accompanied (and partly based on) a dramatic improvement of 
exchange rates. Whilst domestic unit output of HEDs rose only slightly (with the exception 
of refrigerators), unit imports rocketed, nearly doubling in one year in some cases (see 
Chapter Three). As several industry executives put it, the reason for this was simple: 
margins on imported products during this period were so much better than on domestic 
manufactures — even with significant duties — that managers were left with little choice 
but to increase the import share of their local supply. Lower priced final products and 
upward pressure on components and raw materials made this an obvious step. 
Unit output again slumped until 1988, when local production grew rapidly on the basis of a 
weaker exchange rate and low interest rates. From 1989/90 onwards, domestic output has 
stagnated or declined. 
By 'engineering sector' I mean those sectors manufacturing articles made primarily of metal, from 
structural metal products to automobiles. It does not include base metal producers. 
Figure C-4 










0 I I I I I I I 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 
Source: CSS 
48 INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY PROJECT 
Consumer Electronics: 
Recent unit output of consumer electronics products (Figure C-5) shows a more consistent 
picture. Because of a highly protective duty structure, television production has tended to 
maintain a pro-cyclical trend with respect to the economy. Unit output thus rose during 
1983-84 and fell until 1988-89, when it again began to rise. Its continued rise during this 
recessionary period may be explained in part by the entry of low value-added 'screwdriver' 
assemblers of import-intensive SKD kits.4 
Audio product output shows a steeply declining volume of radio production, as local 
manufacturers fail to keep up with falling production costs in the Far East, even under high 
rates of protection. Output of popular radio-tape combinations rose in 1988, only to fall 
again. 
(2) Market Value 
Estimating the size of the HED industry within the manufacturing sector is rendered difficult 
by lack of accurate data on ex-factory sales. Using the estimates developed table C-i, 
however, it is possible to 
present rough orders of 
magnitude.5 For each 
branch of the HED 
industry, figures are 
presented in comparison to 
the manufacturing sector, 
the engineering sector — 
defmed as all metals 
fabrication and assembly 
sectors — and the 




-.-- Portable radios with tape 
LPortable radios, including auto 
At R850m, ex-factory 
sales of white goods were 
roughly 0,28% of GDP 
and 0,45% of 
manufacturing output. 
Chapter Three will return to the issue of local and import shares of the domestic market. It is worth 
remembering, however, that the marketing orientation of the major HED firms, discussed above, is a 
key variable in determining the mix of domestic and import supply to the South African market. Since 
most imports are supplied by the same firms who manufacture products locally, it is evident that 
wholesale profitability considerations may not necessarily support the objectives of maximised local 
manufacture. Thus local output figures may be less an index of manufacturing vitality than of exchange 
rate fluctuations. 
This table, presented earlier in Chapter One, is based on estimates given by a variety of interview 
sources. It must be treated as a best-guess! 
Figure C-S 
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This was 1,85% of the output of the engineering sector, including motor vehicles, and 2,69% 
of the output of the sector excluding motor vehicles. It was 18% of domestic production in 
ISIC 3829.6 
Small Appliances: 
At Ri 17m, ex-factory sales of small appliances were 0,05% of GDP, 0,08% of 
manufacturing output, 0,5% of engineering sector output, excluding motor vehicles, and 
0,34% of total engineering sector output. 
Consumer Electronics: 
At R621m, ex-factory sales of audio and video products were 0,21% of GDP, 0,32% of 
manufacturing output, 1,97% of engineering sector output, excluding motor vehicles, and 
1,35% of total engineering sector output. 
Table C-i: HED Market Breakdown: 1992 
Item Retail Value Wholesale Value Local Production Local Production 
Share 
White Goods R1,6bn R1,2lbn' R850m5 (53%) 
Small Apps R338,7m R256m9 R117mW (345%) 
Total Domestic 
Appliances 
R1,93bn R1,47bn R967m (50%) 
Audio R850m'1 R446m R174m (20%) 
Video R95lm' R609m R447m (47%)ui 
Total Consumer 
Electronics14 
R1,Sbn R1,O5bn R621m (34,5%) 
Total R3,73bn R2,53bn R1,59bn (42,6%) 
VAT Paid R370m 
VATInc1. R4,lbn 
Total: 
In total, ex-factory sales of HEDs of R967m represented 0,33% of GDP, 0,51% of 
manufacturing output, 3,06% of non-motor engineering sector output, and 2,1 % of total 
6 
Other machinery, except electrical. 
This and previous figure based on data supplied by TEK Corp. 
8 
Calculated by subtracting the FOB value of white goods imports (from Customs & Excise) plus 30% 
average duty from the value of wholesale sales. 
Approximate. '° 
Estimated. 
TEK Corp. estimate. 
12 
Estimate based on figures supplied by the Retailer Liaison Committee. 
13 
Much higher if video recorders and cameras are excluded. 
14 
Consumer electronics figures are from BMI 1992 Electronics Report and must be regarded as 
approximate. 
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engineering sector output. By contrast, production of motor vehicles was 4,8% of GDP, 
7,6% of manufacturing output, and 31,3% of engineering sector output. 
b) Vital signs 
(1) Value Added" 
White Goods: 
At approximately 18%, the 1992 value added from domestic white goods manufacture was 
approximately R150m. This was 0,26% of domestic manufacturing value added, 1,45% of 
engineering sector value added excluding motor vehicles, and 1,05% of total engineering 
sector value added. The share of value added for white goods is thus considerably lower 
than its share of engineering and non-vehicle engineering output. 
Small Appliances: 
1992 small appliances value added of R25,7m was 0,04% of manufacturing value added, 
0,18% of non-motor engineering value added, and 0,24% of total engineering value added. 
Its share of value added is thus also lower than its share of output, but not by as much as 
white goods. 
Consumer Electronics: 
Consumer electronics rate of value added is approximately 20%. This gives a figure of 
R124m, which is 0,2% of manufacturing value added, 1,2% of non-motor engineering value 
added, and 0,86% of total engineering value added. This is again significantly lower than its 
share of output. 
Total: 
Assuming a weighted average value-added rate of 18% (confirmed by most interview 
sources), total manufacturing value added'6 for the HED industry was approximately 
R286m in 1992. This was approximately 0,5% of domestic manufacturing value added, 
2,7% of total non-motor engineering sector value added, and 2% of engineering sector value 
added. 
This is somewhat lower than the HED industry's contribution to comparable output figures. 
This is because its 18% average rate of value added is lower than that for domestic 
manufacturing, which is approximately 30%, or for the engineering sector (31%). It is 
closer to that for motor vehicles, however (24%). 
Unfortunately it has proved impossible to produce accurate time-series figures for value added — even 
those for 1992 are estimates developed from secondary information gleaned from industry sources. 
16 
Excluding value added arising from wholesale and retail operations. 
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(2) Employment'7 
White Goods: 
Industry estimates put total employment in the manufacturing branch of the white goods 
industry at approximately 6 400 persons. This is 0,44% of manufacturing employment and 
2,25% of employment in the engineering sector, excluding motor vehicles. It is 1,6% of 
total engineering sector employment. 
Small Appliances: 
Total employment in the small appliances branch is estimated at 1 800 persons. This is 
0,12% of manufacturing employment, 0,63% of employment in the engineering sector, 
excluding motor vehicles. It is 0,46% of total engineering sector employment. 
Consumer Electronics: 
The 1992 BMI Electronics Report estimates total employment in the audio and video sub- 
industry as 6 800 persons, making it proportionately the same as the white goods branch. 
Total: 
Total employment in the HED manufacturing industry is thus roughly 15 000 persons. This 
is a little over 1% of manufacturing employment, 5,2% of employment in the engineering 
sector, excluding motor vehicles, and 3,9% of total engineering sector employment. 
Employment in the HED industry has dropped considerably since 1990, especially in the 
small appliances and white goods branches (interview sources). This can be explained 
largely by recessionary conditions, but interviewees expressed little hope that even a 
significant turnaround in the industry's fortunes would replace lost jobs, Instead, almost 
any conceivable restructuring of the industry, technological or otherwise, is expected to 
increase output per employee (see below). Thus, in the absence of significant unit output 
growth through expanding domestic or export markets, the HED industry will not be an 
employment generator. And given extremely low levels of capacity utilisation — 30% in 
many cases — even a rapid growth in the domestic market as might be expected to result 
from electrification initiatives will not generate new employment. 
(3) Capital Stock 
Figures for total manufacturing capital stock in the industry are not available.' The most 
recent available aggregate data are from the 1985 manufacturing census. In that year firms 
producing and distributing white goods held a total fixed capital stock of R89,65m; radio 
and television R327,09m (est.); and small appliances R27,99m.'9 Altogether this was 
R444,66m, or 0,45% of total manufacturing capital stock in that year. It was also 3,7% of 
engineering sector capital stock and 6,14% of non-motor engineering capital stock. 
Again, it is difficult to estimate employment in the absence of reliable current data. The following is 
based on various sources and must therefore be treated with caution. 
18 At the very end of the ISP I was told definitively that the industry could not provide such figures. 
Republic of South Africa, 1985 Census of Manufacturing, Pretoria, 1986: 44. Figures converted to 
1990 Rands. 
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IDC figures supported by anecdotal evidence (IDC: 1992) suggest that the HED industry's 
capital stock has been depreciated at an alarming rate over the last five to seven years. No 
new investment was foreseen by interviewees, but the arrival of Powertech may signal 
further investment. Similarly, towards the end of the ISP rumours began to float of a 
Daewoo investment in television tube manufacture in conjunction with Anglo-American. 
This would be a brave step. 
(4) K/L Ratios 
As would be expected the capital/labour ratio is generally lower in this industry than in the 
economy in general. 1985 census figures give capital/labour ratios of RI 1 539 for white 
goods, R20 037 in radio and TV, and RIO 355 for small appliances. 
However, the manufacturing KJL ratio (i.e. excluding import, distribution and financial 
stocks and assets) is even lower. For example, in the TV manufacturing industry it would 
appear that each job involves about RI 5 000 in manufacturing capital stock, compared to 
the manufacturing average of R66 000. In this case this is due primarily to the assembly 
nature of local production. The figure is probably higher for the appliance branches, which 
involve greater fabrication. For one small appliance firm studied, for example, the KIL ratio 
was closer to the manufacturing average at R4 1 600 per employee. This was in fact higher 
than the R3 1 400 average for the engineering sector.2° 
(5) Labour Productivity 
Labour productivity in the HED industry varies considerably between branches and firms. 
For example, Tedelex' Atlantis television factory estimates 4 labour hours per set, compared 
to 2,5 hours in Far East. Yet National Panasonic's Parow plant reports labour productivity 
roughly equal to its competitors — its higher costs come from lack of throughput. 
Amalgamated Appliance reports its labour productivity to be roughly double that of its main 
competition in Southern China, but its wag&rates to be five times higher. This points to the 
problem of unit labour costs and the need for capital investment to improve productivity in 
the industry. 
In aggregate, local output per worker in the HED industry in 1991 can be very roughly 
estimated at: white goods, RI 51 093 per employee; small appliances, R65 000; consumer 
electronics, R91 323. For the entire industry the figure is R106 000 per worker. This may 
be compared to the manufacturing average of Ri 30 263 per employee, and to the 
engineering average of Ri 18 436 and R 111 059 for non-motor engineering. The HED 
industry is thus relatively more labour-intensive than other manufacturing and engineering 
industries. 
(6) Capital Productivity 
Output/capital ratios for the HED industry can be estimated from the 1985 Census of 
Manufacturing as follows: white goods, 2,95; small appliances, 3,2;21 consumer electronics, 
Probably due to the excess capital stock still carried after merger with other companies. 
21 Confirmed for more recent years by interviews. 
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2,46. This compares very favourably to the manufacturing average for that year of 1,79, 
but not as well to the 4,35 total non-motor engineering or 3,7 for total engineering. It was 
about on par with the motor industry total of 2,8. 
c) Summary 
From the foregoing several key points should be noted: 
• The HED industry is a smallish contributor to South African GDP. Its role in the 
broader economy is as a poor second cousin to the auto industry, the major consumer 
durables industry. 
• Output, value added, employment and capital stock figures are consistent in placing the 
HED industry at about 0,5% of South African manufacturing output. The industry 
contributes 5-6% of non-auto engineering sector totals and 3-4% of total engineering. 
This makes it a small but significant part of the broader engineering industry. 
• The rate of value added in the HED manufacturing industry is lower than for the 
economy in general or for the engineering and automotive industries. This implies a 
relatively higher proportion of imported inputs used in local manufacture — and a 
proportionately higher 'cost per job'. 
• Employment and capital stock in the HED industry are small and declining. The 
industry is relatively labour intensive — but probably should not be, given international 
trends towards heavy use of automation in this industry. The HED industry will almost 
certainly not be a source of new manufacturing employment. 
D. South African HED Firms2z 
1. Manufacturing Firms 
The following firms were engaged in the manufacture, importation, and distribution of 
HEDs in South Africa at the time of writing. 
22 Numerous imported brands of HEDs are available locally and that only firms involved in local 
manufacture are listed here. It should be noted someplace (here will do) that several of these firms 
declined to have anything to do with the Industrial Strategy Project and contributed nothing voluntarily 
to this report. In general the official attitude of those companies declining to participate was that the 
information sought by the ISP was too sensitive to disclose. This may have been the case for some types 
of information, but in general this excuse is disingenuous. My impression was that many of these firms 
are strongly conservative, if paternalistic, in their management orientation and business practices, and 
did not relish the thought of trade union-connected researchers asking what were more than once 
described as 'highly pertinent' questions. As one executive put it, 'what does COSATU want with 
industrial policy? That's none of their business. Their role is to represent their members, not to meddle 
in management issues'. Unfortunately, COSATU's members are only too interested in industrial policy, 
as their jobs may depend on it. 
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(1) Amalgamated Appliance Company 
Amalgamated Appliance Company (AMAP) was formed in 1991 through the merger of the 
small appliance interests of Tedelex and South African Breweries subsidiary Lion 
Appliance, who now each hold 50%. Its head offices are in Johannesburg, while its 
manufacturing plant is in New Germany in Pietermaritzburg. AMAP produces and imports 
a variety of small appliances under the names of HAZ, Salton, Tedelex, Lion, and others. It 
is the undisputed market leader in its area. 
(2) Barlows Appliance 
Barlows Appliance Company (BAC), located in Kew, Johannesburg, is 100% owned by 
Barlows Manufacturing Company, itself a holding company controlled by Barlow-Rand 
Ltd., one of the country's top conglomerates. BAC produces white goods products under 
the brand-names Fuchsware (stoves), Kelvinator (washers, fridges), Kelvinator Knight, 
Frigidaire, and Leonard (washers, dryers), National (microwaves) and Barlow (fridges). 
Barlows is one of the two biggest white goods manufacturers in South Africa, along with 
TEK Corporation. 
(3) Hoover 
Hoover's East London plant produces Hoover laundry products and small floor care 
appliances. Although it has the largest share of the laundry product market, this is only so 
by plurality. It has the dubious distinction of having retrenched its entire workforce in East 
London several years ago,only to re-hire non-unionised unemployed local whites, Hoover 
has also recently taken a 50% share in a reTrigeratIón plant in Swaziland. 
(4) KIC 
KIC was until late 1992 owned by Picardi Appliance, which was in turn owned by the 
Pickard group under Jan Pickard. It was recently sold to Altron subsidiary Powertech. Its 
plants in East London and Isitebe, Natal produce Whirlpool (washers, dryers, fridges), 
Hitachi (washers, dryers), Indesit (washers, dryers, fridges), and KIC (fridges). Its KIC 
fridges are probably the most competitive white goods products manufactured in South 
Africa. It has experimented in audio and television, but withdrew hastily, now only 
importing. Its ex-holding company Picapli reported turnover of R 14 361 000 in 1990, 
registering losses of R393m. Its fixed asset base in that year was R24 236 000. The bulk 
of this was to do with white goods operations. 
(5) National Panasonic 
National Panasonic, with plants in Johannesburg and Cape Town and head offices in 
Johannesburg, is another wholly-owned subsidiary of Barlows Manufacturing Company. It 
imports and manufactures consumer electronics products under the names National 
Panasonic (televisions, hi-fl) and Goldstar (hi-fl). Together with BAC it forms the Barlows 
Consumer Electric Products Group. 
(6) Nu-World Industries 
Nu-World produces small appliances under the Ideal name from a plant and head office in 
Johannesburg. It is the second largest South African manufacturer of small appliances after 
AMAP. 
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(7) SA Phillips 
SA Phillips is 100%-owned by Phillips Netherlands, making it an unusual firm in the HED 
industry. Its plant in Johannesburg produces Phillips products (small appliances, laundry 
products, 1'V and audio, and personal care). It is a major importer as well as manufacturer, 
and in 1992 announced its intention to withdraw from television production altogether. 
(8) Tedelex 
Tedelex is a 96%-owned subsidiary of Malbak, the industrial conglomerate. It 
manufactures and imports a range of products, including Sony, Blaupunkt and Tedelex 
(television and audio). Until recently they also manufactured small appliances under the 
HAZ and Tedelex names, and sewing machines under Empisal. This company has been 
under pressure to delist from the JSE, which Malbak announced intentions to do in 1992. 
Its main television plant of interest was in Atlantis until its closing in 1992, with head 
offices in Johannesburg. 
(9) TEK Corporation 
TEK Corporation (TEK), with plants in Durban, East London, and Ezekheni, and head 
offices in Johannesburg, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of SANKORP, which is the industrial 
holding company of SANLAM, the insurance giant, It produces and imports white goods 
and consumer electronics products under the brand-names Ocean (fridges), Defy (stoves and 
laundry products), Telefunken (TV), Pioneer (audio), and Airco (commercial air 
conditioning equipment). TEK's 1992 fixed asset base was R59 151 000. Its turnover was 
R667 469 000, earning R25 109 000 pre-tax, but losing Rl 943 000 after losses associated 
with its sale of subsidiary TEK Industrials are included. Its accumulated losses at the end 
of 1992 amounted to R138 587 000 —20% of turnover. 
(10) Univa 
Univa is involved in the production of kitchen and laundry products under the names Univa 
(gas stoves) and Ariston (washers, dryers, and fridges). 
(11) Others 
In addition, there are several smaller firms active in the television branch, including Etron, 
Rowa, Universal, and Triad. These firms are generally recent entrants which have taken 
advantage of changing trade regulations to assemble SKD (semi knocked-down) kits from 
import (see Chapter Five). 
2. Market Shares and Structure 
The market shares enjoyed by the major firms are jealously guarded secrets. Nevertheless, 
some estimates can be given.23 
23 
Based on the confidential document used in Chapter One. 
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a) White Goods 
Market share differs widely amongst various products, and is generally divided amongst 
TEK Corporation, Barlows Appliance, KIC Ltd., Hoover, and Univa. The information here 
is a partial estimate, based only on urban African-language ('black') households. The 
general picture is of a dominance by local brands in cooking products, but import 
domination in refrigeration and laundry products. 
Cookin2 Products: 
TEK Corporation (particularly its Defy brand) dominates here with 38% of the market for 
electric free-standing stoves, followed by Barlows at 23% and Univa at 11%.26 However, 
TEK's share of this market has slipped considerably since 1989, when it had 43% of the 
market, as opposed to Barlows 16%. The future preferences for such products expressed by 
such buyers, however, remains dominated by TEK at 25% to Barlows 17%. 
Refri2eration: 
Imported products (mainly Italian) fare much better here, with 48% of the urban black 
market for single-door fridges, followed by Barlows at 27%, KIC at 10%, and TEK at 8%. 
For double-door fridges, imports also dominate at 33% of this market, with Barlow second 
(22%), KIC third (20%), and TEK fourth (18%). In terms of general future preference, 
however, Barlows dominates with 30%, followed by TEK at 20% and KIC at 10%. Despite 
this, TEK has gained ground from other competitors in refrigeration products in the last four 
years. 
Laundry: 
In the case of laundry products, imports again dominate with 37% of the urban black 
market, followed by Barlows at 18%, Hoover at 13%, and TEK, KIC, and Phillips at 6-9% 
each. 
By Firm: 
Amongst local manufacturers, the overall market is dominated by TEK and Barlows, 
followed by KIC. This dominance is more balanced for Barlows, however, since it appears 
to have a firm footing in all three major product areas. TEK, on the other hand, is 
overwhelmingly dominant in cooking products, but trails in refrigeration and laundry. KIC 
is a firm third overall, with second-place in refrigeration products, in which it is growing 
strongly. Smaller brands such as Univa, Hoover, and Phillips remain niche brands in 
particular product categories, such as Hoover's plurality in laundry products. 
Given this situation and the similarity in employment levels (TEK and Barlows each employ 
about 2 000, whilst KIC and Hoover employs 1 000), it seems that the local white goods 
market is essentially a competitive oligopoly. That it is in fact intensely competitive is 
probably due to a combination of the retail sector's diversity and competitiveness and the 
24 
This limitation is necessitated by lack of more complete infonnation, but is perhaps mitigated by the 
fact that this is the principal potential domestic market. 
25 It should be bonie in mind, however, that this is an historical situation, since the figures used record 
household ownership levels rather than sales. 
26 It should be noted that these figures are based on ownership rather than actual sales. 
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role of imported products, which, although not especially preferred by retailers,27 still serve 
to keep local manufacturers honest through low prices. 
b) Small Appliances 
The situation with respect to small appliances is confused by the recent merger of HAZ, 
Tedelex Small Appliance, and Lion Appliance into Amalgamated Appliance. However, 
information compiled and supplied by this company gives a much more reliable picture of 
market share than in the case of white goods. 
Cooking Products: 
In the case of frypans, AMAP brands dominate with nearly 97% of the market. It also 
dominates the fast-growing hotplate market with 40%, followed by Nu-World Industries 
(Ideal brand) with 31,5% and Estia with 17%. Jug kettles are dominated by AMAP brands 
with 69%, followed by Nu-World at 11,6% and a others with 5-8% shares. Finally, toasters 
are dominated by AMAP with 35%, followed by AIM at 12%, Nu-World at 11%, Phillips 
and Novex at 7-8%, and others sharing 25% of the market. 
Laundry Products: 
Dry irons (a small market) are dominated by Nu-World with 31%, followed by AMAP at 
29%, Phillips at 12%, and others with 3-8%. Steam irons are again dominated by AMAP 
with 47% of the market, followed by Nu-World at 27,5%, Phillips at 8,5% and others with 
between them 17%. 
By Firm: 
AMAP clearly dominates the small appliance market, although sometimes with only a 
plurality. This is logical given that it has integrated the production of the three most popular 
brand ranges but retained the brand-names, which are generally vital in the HED industry. It should not be concluded, however, that AMAP is heading for monopoly. Firstly, its 
market share has slipped considerably in the last two years, reflecting difficulties in 
integrating the three previous companies. Secondly, its dominance is often as the largest 
single supplier of a specific product amongst many others. Finally, by its own admission it 
is under severe threat from very cheap imports from the Far East.29 As is the case with 
white goods, internal competition seems relatively healthy, whilst imports seem to serve as a 
strong disincentive to complacency. 
c) Consumer Electronics 
Audio: 
The situation with respect to audio products is unclear, since by far the bulk of such goods 
are imported. In any case there appears to be healthy competition at retail level, usually 
based on Japanese brand-name preference and price. 
27 
See Seera; Mohanuried's ISP paper on HED retailing. 
28 Unlike those for white goods, these figures are for actual sales in financial year 1992. 
29 
Indeed, many of its own high-end products come from this source. 
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Video: 
In the case of televisions, there is a long saga, which will be told in Chapter Five. Initially, 
four manufacturers were licensed by the government. TEK, Barlows, Phillips, and Tedelex 
dominated the local television market with nearly identical shares for over twenty years. In 
1991 Tedelex led the urban black market with 25%, followed by TEK at 24%, National 
Panasonic at 17%, and Phillips at 15%. 
By Firm: 
All of this has changed radically. In the late 1980s and early 90s, new entrants like Triad, 
Rowa, and Etron responded to the abolition of the licensing system by producing low-cost 
monochrome televisions (usually Korean), later entering the colour market as well. This cut 
into the Big Four's share of the low-end, from which they began to withdraw. 
Subsequently a loophole in the tariff regulations, which allowed duty-free importation of 
SKD (semi-knocked down) kits,3° encouraged the emergence of a variety of 'screwdriver' 
assemblers who were able to sell TVs so cheaply that the established industry was hurt very 
badly. Industry sources estimate that the Big Four lost nearly 50% of their sales in 1991/2 
to the newcomers — and that in a recessionary period.3' 
In general, the domestic television industry seems to be quite competitive. This is not the 
problem with this branch, however, and Chapter Four will discuss in detail the more 
important external competitive situation. 
E. Institutional Structure 
1. Firm Activities and Ownership 
The major firms in the South African HED industry are essentially multi-divisional 
corporations. Each contains a trading arm, an import arm, and a manufacturing arm. BAC 
and TEK also have financial divisions which help to provide hire-purchase finance for their 
products. 
TEK, Tedelex, KIC, and Phillips are all involved in both white goods and consumer 
electronics manufacture and distribution by means of separate divisions. Barlows 
Appliance, KIC, Hoover, and Univa concentrate on domestic appliances only. AMAP and 
Nu-World industries are involved only in small appliances, whilst National Panasonic is 
involved in both audio and video consumer electronics. The remainder of the firms listed 
above are producers of televisions only. TEK also has an air-conditioning division, as does 
Barlow-linked firm National. 
Essentially a tube, chassis, and tuner already manufactured and requiring only a screwdriver and tester 
to assemble. 
31 . . . . , On the prompting of the Radio and Television Manufacturer s Association of South Afnca, however, 
Customs vigilance has apparently uncovered numerous taritr violations, leading to multi-million Rand 
fines against some of these firms. The SKD loophole was closed towards the end of 1992. 
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Ownership of these companies is uniformly dominated by major conglomerates or their 
industrial holding companies. TEK, for example, is 100% owned by SANKORP 
SANLAM's industrial arm. Barlows Appliance, National Panasonic, and National Air- 
conditioning were all 100% or majority Barlow-Rand-owned at the time of writing. Tedelex 
is 96% owned by Malbak, although the latter has recently made an offer to buy out minority 
shareholders. KIC was 100% owned by Picardi Appliances, which as we have seen sold 
majority shareholding to Altech subsidiary Powertech in 1992. Amalgamated Appliance is 
the only major firm with significant multiple ownership, with 50% of shares held by SA 
Breweries though Lion Match and 50% held by Tedelex. 
In general, then, the HED industry is heavily dominated by South Africa's industrial 
conglomerates. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) do not play a significant role in 
HED manufacture — but are active in component supply, subcontracting fabrication and 
assembly, and in appliance repair and re-manufacture (often informally). This domination 
by large firms is not an accident. It reflects a number of factors which taken together 
mitigate against effective participation by SMEs: 
• The HED industry's history (and perhaps future) as a strategic area of import- 
substitution and therefore manufacturing diversification have made it an attractive 
arena for strategic manufacturing investment. 
• The high capital-costs associated with mass production of complex engineering 
products, at least in the cases of white goods and small appliances, attracts large firms 
with significant financial resources. 
• Government licensing requirements and historical brand loyalties on the part of the 
white population have imposed a need for 'clout' to obtain overseas licensing and 
technology partners and to obtain favourable terms for component imports. This has 
required the size and sophistication of larger firms. 
• The licensing system imposed on the television branch by government in the 70s, 
stipulated conditions requiring extensive financial resources. 
• The HED retail market involves extensive use of extended credit terms as a competitive 
weapon, which requires financial means on the part of manufacturers and wholesalers. 
Chapters Five and Six will discuss the effect of conglomerate ownership of firms in this 
industry in more detail. Here it can be said that although some executives have expressed a 
feeling that an overly financial, end-of-quarter approach to assessment by principals is 
typical, this is not uniform. In some cases, such as AMAP, conglomerate ownership (in this 
case by SAB) has provided both financial breathing space and freedom to undertake 
essential restructuring of activities at manufacturing level. A great deal depends on the 
overall health of the conglomerate in question, and its 'culture'. 
2. Employers' Associations 
The Radio and Television Manufacturer's (RTMA) and Domestic Appliance 
Manufacturer's Associations (DAMSA) are the principal employer bodies in the industry. 
The South Africa Small Appliance Manufacturers' Association (SAMA) represents that 
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industry. All seem to be attuned mainly to information gathenng32 and lobbying activities. 
The RTMA in particular has been very active in negotiating with the BTIJBTF on tariffs 
affecting the television branch. DAMSA also has an active past in this respect, but has not 
had such a serpentine tariff history with which to contend. To my knowledge there have 
been no strategic research initiatives or activities undertaken by either organisation. Neither 
organisation attempts to analyse global developments in its industry and strategise in that 
light, although individual firms appear to be very well informed of global developments. 
Both the RTMA and DAMSA are affiliated to SEIFSA33and participate in wage negotiations 
conducted by the latter through the engineering industry industrial council. Several 
executives, however, have expressed a desire for an industry-specific negotiating forum 
which would take into account the specific situation of the HED industry, which is reliant on 
the domestic consumer market, unlike many powerful SEIFSA members who produce for 
the mining industry. A tri-partite forum incorporating employers, unions, and government 
similar to that recently founded for the motor industry finds great favour in the industry. 
3. Unions and the Workforc&4 
The HED industry is organised by a number of unions, including the National Union of 
Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA), the Metal and Engineering Worker's Association 
(MEWA), Yster en Staal, and the Radio and Television Worker's Association (RTWA). By 
far the majority of unionised employees, at least in the Witwatersrand area, are members of 
NUMSA. NUMSA representation is established at most major plants operated by Barlows, 
TEK, Tedelex, and Phillips. Cape factories such as Tedelex Atlantis and National 
Panasonic Parow, however, have a large proportion of non-unionised employees (50-60%), 
as well as relatively stronger representation by conservative organisations such as RTWA. 
Several plants visited in Natal also had significant numbers of MEWA members. 
As with most South African industries, unions seem to have played no especial role in the 
strategic development of the HED industry, as in Australia or New Zealand (see Chapter 
Five). The general atmosphere within the industry is indeed distinctly cool towards 
unionised workers. Although interviewees were careful to present a paternalistic picture of 
relations with their employees, most expressed feelings ranging from frustration to outright 
hostility when asked about the specific role of worker organisation in their plants. Many 
also expressed an open desire to minimise employment through technology to reduce the 
'hassle factor' of dealing with unions. 
Most plants visited utilised some sort of in-house system of worker representation such as 
works councils, training groups, 'green areas', and the like. For the most part, these 
seemed to be regarded as motivational 'talking shops' rather than genuine attempts at 
worker involvement. Managers were nearly universal in their estimation that their workers 
were not capable of genuine productive participation in their workplaces. This was 
understood as a function of educational levels. 
32 
Alas, not information publishing! " Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa. 
Chapters Five and Six will discuss the role of unions and worker organisation, both actual and potential, 
in more detail. 
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F. Linkages and Externalities 
So far we have considered the HED industry in quantitative and descriptive terms: how big 
it is, how much it produces, who its main players are, and how it is structured. Now we will 
turn to its qualitative linkages to the rest of the South African economy. 
1. Linkages To Other Sectors 
As a 'filiere', the HED industry is not particularly complicated: it draws on several other 
industries for essential inputs, including sheet metals, granulated plastics, chemicals, 
electronic components, and light engineering products such as motors, heating elements, 
cabling, switchgear, transformers, and the like. It is not a major consumer of such products 
in terms of the overall economy or manufacturing sector, but is like the motor industry in 
that it requires them on a continuous basis, in small- to medium batches. In this respect it is 
unlike the 'jobbing' part of the engineering sector. 
As will be argued in Chapters Five and Six, there are no problems with this fihiere which can 
be attributed to the nature of the HED industry as such. Rather, the problems facing South 
African HED manufacturers — high domestic raw materials and components prices, lack of 
adequately trained labour, lack of technological capacity, and weak demand — are identical 
to those faced by similar South African industries. In this respect the HED industry can 
best benefit from a coherent set of general industrial policies which addresses these 
economy-wide problems, rather than specific measures for the industry itself. 
a) Input Requirements 
Assuming an average materials component of 75% of ex-factory prices, the total materials 
requirement of the HED industry was roughly Rl,2bn in l992.' In the absence of aggregate 
industry statistics, the variety of products involved precludes an accurate estimation of the 
total import content of this. Assuming an unchanged proportion from the 1985 Census, 
when it was roughly 45%, the figure would be R540m. This leaves R660m locally- 
produced inputs. This in turn was about 0,5% of 1992's total domestic production of 
intermediate inputs of RI 3Obn. This is in line with the proportional output estimates 
presented above. 
A large proportion by value of inputs to the HED industry is thus imported, although this 
varies between branches. As a general rule, local content is higher the less complex and 
more 'materials-based' the product. Thus in television and washing machine production 
import content is high, but in the small appliance branch, which manufactures mainly simple 
kettles, irons, frypans, and the like, local purchases are dominant. The single most 
important import item36 is television picture tubes, which are produced profitably only on a 
very large scale (1 m+). Refrigerator compressors are another scale-intensjve component 
sourced from overseas, principally Southeast Asia. 
" This is a very conservative estimate, and excludes depreciation charges, which must be considered a 
cost to the economy when based on imported capital goods. 
See Chapter Four. 
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From early 1992, when import duties were abolished, the bulk of electronic componentry for 
television and audio manufacturing has been imported. In many other cases, such as power 
transformers and switchgear, many manufacturers are leaning towards importation because 
of cost. In the absence of a sudden transformation of the cost structures facing South 
African component manufacturers, this trend is likely to continue and would accelerate 
dramatically in the event of a widespread tariff liberalisation. As we shall see, the basic 
problem areas for the HED industry on the local material input side are 
1. The cost of raw materials, particularly steel and plastics. 
2. The cost, quality, and reliability of locally-produced components. 
3. The availability of quality capital goods and support services. 
As will be argued below, protection of uncompetitive upstream industries is a major barrier 
to competitiveness in the HED industry. Yet reliance on imported inputs would place 
manufacturers at risk of exchange rate fluctuations and reduce the amount of local value 
added. This quandary is most basic to the question of industrial policy towards this 
industry. 
b) Outputs 
The HED industry sells to furniture and department stores consisting of (i) large discount 
chains such as Dions and Pick n' Pay Hypermarkets, (ii) medium-sized speciality chains 
such as Morkels or the Rusfurn Group, and (ii) small independently-owned local shops. In 
general the HED industry does not sell directly to final consumers. 
The principal issue to be addressed in respect of the downstream side of the HED filiere is 
the relationship between HED manufacturing plants and the retail sector. HED plants do 
not sell directly to retailers, as is common in other countries, but generally sell all of their 
output to their holding company, which then markets the product through a specialised 
division. This structure seems often to result in a lack of effective linkages between 
marketing, product design, and industrial engineering functions within HED firms. As we 
have seen, it also tends to prevent otherwise willing factory managers from entering into 
production of 'no-name' products for sale directly ex-plant to cash discount chains. 
c) Other Firms and Small Businesses 
Anecdotal evidence from interviewees suggests that sub-contracting and out-work are fairly 
common in the industry. For example, at AMAP in New Germany (Natal), the majority of 
plastic and metal parts are manufactured in rough or billet form by small local suppliers and 
delivered every other day. They are then finished and assembled in the factory. Similarly, at 
National Panasonic's Parow TV factory, production of wooden and plastic cabinets has been 
farmed out to an ex-employee. TEK Electronics in East London similarly contracts 
cabinetry — unlike Tedelex' Atlantis factory, whose cabinet-makers were the only qualified 
production artisans in the plant. Unfortunately it is impossible to quantify this for the 
industry as a whole. 
Another common practice is the employment of casuals. AMAP in New Germany employs 
a large number of casual workers who are hired on a short-term basis to cope with peak 
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periods. Other firms appear to engage in this practice, as well, although again a specific 
quantification is not possible.37 
The value of repair and maintenance activities associated with HEDs is impossible to 
estimate for the economy as a whole, but probably employs several thousand people nation- 
wide. A significant and interesting factor in urban areas is the extent of refurbishment of 
white goods by backyard shops. This probably helps to depress sales of new products, but 
forms an integral part of the 'informal' economy in many areas. 
2. Technology Generation 
All of the South African firms visited in the course of research have major technology 
agreements with foreign finns, generally based in Europe or the USA. In most cases this 
involves the transfer of product designs and engineering processes to the South African firm. 
In some cases it involves the exchange of personnel; in others it involves the actual transfer 
of second-hand machinery and equipment; in yet others it involves major sourcing 
agreements centring on proprietary components such as integrated circuits (ICs), or offering 
discounts on bulk purchase of components. In all cases it involves the licensing of the all- 
important brand-name, discussed at the beginning of this chapter. 
No local firm was able to give figures for the number of employees involved in research and 
development (R&D), or the proportion of turnover or profits going to this purpose. Nearly 
all were agreed, however, that the amounts are very small, and that the South African HED 
industry is a fundamentally a technology consumer. In some cases (such as the television 
industry) this is not cause for concern, since it would be pointless to enter into competition 
with overseas firms whose main source of value added is their ability to design and 
introduce new products. South Africa lacks the skill and technological basis for this type of 
competition at present. 
Yet in other cases this technological dependence is a problem, for it prevents local firms 
from entering niche markets, particularly in the third world, with its own products, free from 
limitations on export or royalty obligations. But more importantly, it has discouraged the 
development of local production engineering capability. As Chapter Five will argue, this 
capacity has been fundamental to the success of some white goods firms elsewhere in the 
world, who have emerged from markets smaller than South Africa's to become major 
exporters precisely through their expertise at production engineering. 
3. Skills Generation 
Unfortunately, no comprehensive skills audit of the HED industry was possible within the 
context of the There is little evidenc.e of significant pre-employment skills 
requirements in the industry. Factories visited have a very low proportion of officially 
skilled workers or artisans — 1-2 per plant, usually electricians and/or turners and fitters. 
Unskilled workers are generally employed for fabrication, assembly, testing, and packaging 
" This issue was not easy to pursue do to the sensitivity of the issue to interviewees. 
38 And would be a logical next step in this research. 
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tasks, and are trained for firm-specific applications. Workers do not generally function on a 
team basis in which they would acquire a variety of skills. Instead, they tend to remain at 
specialised, repetitive tasks, 
This may result in acquisition of significant skills, as in the TV branch, where some workers 
learn to use a variety of electronic assembly and testing equipment.39 Most production 
workers are officially unskilled or semi-skilled, and it is likely that their tacit skills obtained 
on the job are the bedrock of the industry's skill structure. 
It should be noted that this emphasis on minimal and specialised skilling is not intrinsic to 
the HED industry. In several plants visited in New Zealand and Australia, management and 
unions were in varying stages of a process of skills-recognition and upgrading which sought 
to identify and categorise the skills used by workers in their tasks, and to encourage workers 
to develop and use a variety of skills within the framework of work teams. In general it was 
found that this process led not to a multiplication of machines workers could mind, but to a 
more holistic approach to skill, encompassing planning, organisation, monitoring, 
assessment, and maintenance as well as work more narrowly defined. This approach has 
been spectacularly successful in some cases. The pertinent issue is thus not the labour 
process associated with HED manufacture, but the management and work organisation 
practices develop and implemented in individual firms. We will return to this issue below. 
G. Key Problems In the HED Industry 
It is apparent from the foregoing that the HED manufacturing industry is not a powerhouse. 
In aggregate terms its contribution to manufacturing output, value added, employment, and 
capital stock has been relatively minor. It is generally very materials-intensive, and 
significantly import-intensive. It is not a technology generator, and does not appear to have 
developed or imparted significant skills. Its role in supplying a part of consumer demand for 
a significant group of products, however, has been more considerable. The issue to be 
considered in subsequent chapters is whether on balance this has been done efficiently and 
effectively, and whether it could be done better. 
In this final section of Chapter Two we wish to identify those specific problems faced by the 
HED industry which may prevent it from becoming more than it is now. 
1. Current Problems and Prospects 
a) Poor Profitability 
Historically, profits have been strong in some branches of the HED industry, such as 
television manufacture. Profitability has also been reasonable in the white goods and small 
appliances branches, although it has stagnated since the mid-i 980s. Profitability, of course, 
Certainly the government's hope that the TV branch, for its part, would become a major skills- 
generating area for the economy has not been at all successful. As we shall see, without local product 
design, it could not be otherwise. 
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must be considered in the light of inflated rates of effective protection,4° and in some cases 
particularly television — has only been possible as a result of this. 
(1) Net Profits 
Net profits in the broad industrial sectors including HED producers have been closely linked 
to fluctuations in domestic demand and the exchange rate. In the sector including white 
goods manufacturers, ISIC 3829 (non-electrical machinery), profits have tended to fall when 
the Rand is strong and to rise when it is weak.4' This sensitivity to the exchange rate is due, 
as we have seen, to increased importation and higher input costs when the Rand is strong. 
In ISIC 3823 (Radio, TV, and Communications), however, profits have tended to rise during 
upswings and fall sharply during downswings. Profits in ISIC 3833 (Small Appliances) are 
also pro-cyclical. This is because of the relatively high import duties in favour of the former 
and relatively low import penetration in the latter. 
(2) Profit Ratios 
Profit as a percentage of value added in these industrial sectors has been poorest in ISIC 
3829, where effective protection is lowest and imports strong during periods of a strong 
Rand. In ISIC 3833, profits as a percentage of value added have experienced a trend fall 
from over 25% in the early 80s to about 10% in the latter part of the decade. ISIC 3832, 
however, has seen very high average rates of profit as a percentage of value added — up to 
38%. As the BTI has pointed out, this is to be expected in a heavily protected industry with 
a limited number of entrants (BTI, 1989). Very high effective rates of protection (see below) 
enhance this effect. 
Profit as a percentage offixed capital stock has again been lowest in ISIC 3929, averaging 
under 10% with a period of losses during the mid-80s. They have been much higher in ISIC 
3833, between 10% and 40%, although the trend is downward. But they have been highest 
in ISIC 3832 — up to 55% — driven largely by a combination of heavy protection, limited 
market entry, and very low capital requirements. 
Profit as a percentage of turnover has followed a similar trend, reaching 14% in ISIC 3832 
in the early 1980s. It has remained in the 2-10% range for ISIC 3833 — the high volume, 
low margin small appliance industry — and under 5% for ISIC 3829. 
(3) Profitability 
HED industry profits were very poor during the period of this study, for reasons discussed in 
Chapter One. The result was very poor performance from the industry's major players. To 
take just a few examples: 
Tedelex reported a drop in turnover of 11% in the first half of 1992. Operating income 
fell by 63,7% from R22,5m to R8,3m during the same period. The group announced on 
8 October 1992 that it was to be dc-listed by 96% shareholder Malbak, having suffered 
an attributable loss of R19,5m on a turnover of R412,8m, which was itself down by 
40 
See Chapter Four. " 
Although this has been moderated by the coincidence of a weak Rand and weak economy. 
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18% from the previous year (Business Day, 27 March 1992; Cape limes, 9 October, 
1992). Tedelex' published financial statements also show that, whilst it made a net 
profit in 1990 and 1991, this was at a rate of 4,3% and 5% of turnover, respectively. 
Net profit represented a return of only 7% and 9% on capital employed in those years. 
• Picardi Appliances, which owned domestic refrigeration leader KIC, reported a 24% 
decline in operating profit in 1992. It abandoned the manufacture of televisions and 
audio products. Picapli sold KIC's manufacturing wing in that year (Argus, 22 
October, 1992). 
• One firm interviewed, with interests in white goods and consumer electronics, reported 
accumulated losses for 1992 almost triple that year's net operating income. This was 
its third straight year of net losses. 
The situation in 1992-93 was very bleak indeed. It should be noted that major HED firms 
suffered both as importers and as manufacturers, in contrast to earlier periods. In the early 
to mid-i 980s poor manufacturing profits were mitigated by higher margins on imported 
products (interview sources). 
b) Lack of Investment 
In the absence of comprehensive financial statements, investment details are scanty. In real 
terms, the value of fixed capital stock has risen most rapidly in ISIC 3829. It has also risen 
steadily in ISIC 3832, although substantial parastatal investment in telecommunications 
distorts this figure. Reasonably accurate figures for the net expansion of fixed capital stock 
are available only for the small appliance industry (CEAS, 1992). From 1980-1990, this 
industry's net investment declined at an annual average rate of 2,3%, compared to an 
average manufacturing investment growth of 2,0%. 
In common with other South African manufacturing industries (GeIb, 1990), overall rates of 
depreciation have risen since the early 1970s to between 12% and 20% p.a. in the early 
1990s. Information gleaned from interview sources reports shows that in white goods and 
consumer electronics there has indeed been significant disinvestment. Figures supplied by 
one firm showed its fixed capital stock declining by almost 13% in 1990, by over 10% in 
1991, and by 15,5% in 1992. Tedelex' financial statement for 1991 shows that its fixed 
capital stock declined by over 21% and 17% in 1990 and 1991, respectively. Interviewees 
admitted that there have been no major investments into productive activities in recent years 
and that none are planned. 
Clearly, for existing shareholders there is little point in investing in the HED industry under 
the current circumstances. Only an exceptionally long-term view, coupled with a powerful 
stomach and deep pockets, could prompt new investment. Several factors currently act as 
powerful disincentives: 
1. Low profitability and extremely poor returns on existing investment, limiting cash flow 
and expected returns. This is the basic short-term obstacle. 
2. Lack of certainty with regard to the tariff structure and the electrification process is a 
medium-term obstacle. This is particularly so in the television branch, where debate 
over the government's structural adjustment package of 1990/91 continues. Although 
the problem is less acute in the white goods branch, the prospect of tariff adjustment 
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and South Africa's status under the new General Agreement of Tariff and Trade is a 
strong disincentive. In the small appliance branch, increased competition from south 
Chinese plants has had a similar effect. And in all three branches, the unpredictability of the Board of Tariffs and Trade has and continues to act as a disincentive to medium- 
term investment planning. 
3. Uncertainty at the political situation effectively put all investment thinking on hold at 
the beginning of the 1 990s. Even the prospect of a new government dispensation did 
not change this, as most interviewees indicated that they would adopt a 'wait and see' 
attitude, seeking practical results before committing to new investment. 
c) Declining Employment Prospects 
According to the 1985 manufacturing census, the HED industry in 1993 employed 25% 
fewer persons than it did in the former year, when it employed over 20 000 persons. This is 
almost certainly due to the difficult market situation faced by these firms, and to their 
corresponding lack of investment in new production capacity. One firm interviewed has 
seen employment fall by an average of 10-12% per year over the last four years, and 
undertook further major retrenchments in 1993. 
As we have seen, however, there would seem to be little prospect for employment creation 
even if things should pick up. This is liable to be a disappointment to those who have hoped 
that electrification would result in employment growth in the HED industry. Indeed, firms 
almost universally agreed that a doubling of capacity with new investment would not 
involve significant job creation. New investment would almost certainly involve 
automation and be significantly labour-saving as compared to present techniques. 
This is borne out by research in New Zealand and Australia, where employment levels are 
extremely low compared to South African firms at similar output levels, as a result of 
advanced automation techniques employed to enhance competitiveness. For example, one 
New Zealand-based firm operating in Queensland employs 115 persons to produce 250 
refrigerators per day. This works out to approximately 3,7 person-hours per unit. At one of 
the major refrigeration plants in South Africa, one refrigerator requires 12,5 person-hours. 
Where unit labour productivity is comparable to overseas plants, as in the television branch, 
employment levels are so low as to render the effect of even major expansion of output 
relatively insignificant in macroeconomic terms. 
It seems clear that whatever its other attractions, the HED industry will not be a significant 
employment creator in itself— unless it either (1) becomes a major exporter, or (ii) embarks 
on a path of labour-intensive production which in all likelihood would require continuing 
protection to sustain. 
2. Structural Problems 
We have painted a fairly gloomy picture of the HED industry as (i) in serious short-term 
difficulty and (ii) unlikely to be a major engine of employment growth in the future even 
should times improve. To summarise and anticipate later chapters, let us consider three 
basic problems with the industry: 
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1. Problem One: it is internationally uncompetitive, cannot survive without relatively high 
rates of protection, and is therefore unable to export, 
2. Problem Two: its products are increasingly too expensive for the local mass market. 
3. Problem Three: its ability to survive continuously recessionary conditions and unstable 
in personal disposable incomes is in question. 
a) Lack of Competitiveness 
There are four main reasons for the relative uncompetitiveness and high cost of the South 
African HED industry: 
1. Firstly, world markets for HEDs are extraordinarily competitive, and the trend is 
towards larger firms and greater vertical integration (Chapter Three). South African 
HED exporters are unlikely to penetrate markets already served kv sophisticated 
world leaders in the industry who utilise — who generate — the latest production 
technology. Developed country markets for HEDs are essentially replacement markets, 
and competition is for market share. Exports or local sourcing of products to overseas 
principals would require a significant over-compensation of the current cost 
differentials between South African goods and overseas products, and a way to 
eliminate the effect of higher South African inflation rates. This will not happen unless 
domestic firms enjoy significant improvements in throughput and turnover based on an 
expanding domestic market. 
2. A second major reason for lack of cost competitiveness is that the HED industry does 
not enjoy economies of scale sufficient to achieve competitive unit costs. A good 
example from white goods is EFS stoves. A single plant in Italy is said to operate 
efficiently at 200 000 units per annum. This is twice the current South African market. 
As a result, local production overheads are up to five times higher than for comparable 
overseas plants (DAMSA, 1991). In the case of televisions, South African firms are 
nowhere near the minimum of 100 000 units p.a. per line — nor could they be, given a 
total domestic market of +1- 450 000 units per annum and numerous producers. 
3. Thirdly, local component and raw materials costs are signficantly higher, and quality 
significantly poorer; than for overseas competitors. This is due to problems which are 
essentially identical to that faced by the manufacturing industry more generally: 
protection afforded to producers of basic commodities such as sheet metal and 
polypropylene, market structures which allow producers to dictate prices, and domestic 
inflation. This serves as a major obstacle to competitiveness and affordability in an 
industry which is very materials-intensive. In many ways a turnaround of the HED 
industry must involve either a thriving component industry or liberalised imports of 
such items. Otherwise a basic prerequisite to competitiveness is lacking. 
4. Finally, it will be argued below that greater flexibility and automation in manufacturing 
processes could both help to overcome scale problems and to encourage exports. The 
South African NED industry inability or failure to adopt world-class manufacturing 
techniques has prevented if from escaping from the trap it has been in since mid- 
century.' mass-production methods in a small, varied market. But it should be borne in 
mind that even with product flexibility, sophisticated capital equipment must still 
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produce sufficient volumes to amortise its high cost. Local manufacturers do not see 
current market prospects as justifying such a risky venture. This implies that a general 
improvement in market prospects and industry turnover will be required as a 
precondition to encourage it to undertake needed restructuring and investment. 
In sum, to become internationally cost competitive and affordable to the mass domestic 
market, the HED industry needs to (i) reduce its input costs, (ii) increase its throughput, and 
(iii) invest in more advanced technology which will allow continued cost improvements and 
better quality. But none of this is seems likely to happen at present. 
b) A Supply-Side Answer? 
This leaves the third problem, domestic recession. As we have seen, the HED industry's 
short-term problem is consumers' inability to afford its products. By definition, this 
problem arises out of a combination of consumers who lack disposable income and 
producers who cannot reduce the real cost of their products to compensate. 
It could be argued that since the former problem cannot be solved directly, it is up to the 
HED manufacturing industry to solve the latter — and that increased investment and 
efficiency in a manufacturing industry such as this is what is needed to raise real incomes in 
any case. This is true. But it is pointless to take a 'progressive' supply-side approach and 
argue that lower product costs through technology and aggressive productivity 
improvements is the answer. Indeed, this is well recognised by management as a necessary 
part of the path to international competitiveness. The problem is that in a capitalist 
economy, owners of capital do not invest under conditions of severe recession, political 
uncertainty, and high risk. Resolution of these macroeconomic and socio-political problems 
is a prerequisite to meaningful restructuring of this consumer-oriented industry. 
3. Can the HED Industry Survive Significant Environmental 
Changes? 
a) Electrification and Mass Housing — a Panacaea? 
What would happen if everything suddenly turned around, as some hope will result from a 
demand-led recovery package? Could the HED industry become a source of demand led job 
growth, as many hope? Reasonably reliable projections of market prospects are difficult to 
obtain, but it would appear that the HED industry's own projections are not as sanguine as 
those of supporters of mass housing and electrification programmes. 
The problem is that more than just demand-led growth may be required to resuscitate the 
HED industry. For with the exception of the small appliance branch, the HED industry is at 
present operating at around 30% capacity (calculated on one shfl). It could easily double 
or even treble oUtput. Manufacturers believe that this is also true of component suppliers. 
Furthermore, minimal investments (example: R4m for a major local television plant) are 
needed to double present capacity (as opposed to output). Adding another shift would 
perhaps double even that. This implies is that in capacity terms the HED industry is well- 
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placed to handle any foreseeable increase in domestic demand, even that based on mass 
housing and electrification. Current projections are for 650 000 — 1 000 000 new hook- 
ups over the next five years (Cape limes, Tuesday March 23, 1993). This works out to a 
worst case of 130 000 and a best case of 200 000 new hook-ups per annum. In Chapter 
One we saw that the rate of appliance uptake in most cases (not all) exceeded the rate of 
electrification amongst urban black households. Yet when this is considered against the total 
annual market for each appliance, it emerges that the total increase in appliance sales to 
urban black households exceeded 50% of the annual market for the appliance concerned 
only in the case of hotplates, which, it will be remembered, are seen as a last-resort item for 
households who cannot afford an EFS stove. Chapter Four will consider this issue in detail, 
but here it can be said that whilst current scenarios of electrfication of urban black 
households indicate a rapid growth in the market for most HEDs, in no case is this greater 
than the excess capacity presently experienced in the industry 
It must be remembered that, unlike the power equipment sector, electrification does not 
necessarily lead to appliance take-up. Access to electricity must be coupled with sufficient 
disposable income to produce growth. Interviewees consider it unlikely that the more 
important macroeconomic factors discussed in Chapter One will change radically or rapidly 
even if such a programme is implemented as a matter of urgency by a new government. 
Although electrification will provide a major boost, as Chapter Four will show, the single 
most important factor shaping the fortunes of the HED industry will continue to be the 
general economic climate. Crucial to industry strategists are factors less susceptible to 
political manipulation, such as personal disposable income, inflation differentials between 
durables and non-durable consumer goods, interest rates, HP legislation, and indirect taxes. 
In industry models shown to me,42actual consumer need is at the bottom of the list. 
All of this points to a single major conclusion: electrification may be a necessary condition, 
but it is not sufficient to ensure that the HED industry will be able to invest in new 
production processes which will make it more competitive internationally. 
b) Tariff Reduction — the Bludgeon Approach? 
The HED industry is not internationally competitive. Its exports are minimal, whilst it 
enjoys moderate to high rates of protection from import competition. Ad valorem duties for 
small appliances and white goods imports range from 20-40%. Adding surcharges and 
correcting for tariffs on imported inputs gives an effective rate of protection of 35-50%. 
Average duties on most consumer electronics products are much higher. Duty on television 
receivers is at present 96%, whilst effective protection is over 500%. 
Could the HED industry survive a period of reduced protection designed to spur a 
restructuring of the industry?45 The almost universal opinion in the industry is that a 
42 But unfortunately not shared. 
See Chapter Four. 
These are effectively revenue-raising, since these products are not produced locally. ' 
Whether such a path would lead to such restructuring is discussed in Chapter Five. 
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minimum of 20-25% 'net protection'4' is needed to sustain their participation in the industry. 
With out this, they say, the industry will not survive. The question is whether or not such a 
rate of protection is acceptable to the South African economy and to the international 
community. 
One the one hand, the higher price of local HEDs represents consumer resources which 
cannot be spent elsewhere. It also limits sales, thus reducing throughput. To illustrate this 
point, consider a hypothetical product costing Ri 00 ex-factory. Retail mark-ups (which 
average about 30%) are on ex-factory prices plus excise duty. Thus on R100 worth of 
product subject to no excise duty, the price increase represented by a 30% duty is R39,40.47 
On a R100 product subject to 40% duty plus 35% excise duty, the price increase 
represented by both duties is R7 1,48 (the increase represented by the duty alone would be 
R46). Scrapping duties altogether would therefore save consumers money which would be 
used elsewhere in the economy. 
On the other hand, removing protective tariffs could cost the economy 15 000 jobs and 
roughly RI Sm worth of production workers' wages annually, plus the multiplier effects of 
local sourcing.48 Could continuing tariff protection preserve these jobs? Here it is 
worthwhile remembering that ad valorem duties cease to be effective under differential rates 
of inflation very quickly, unless the imported content of the South African product is 
especially high. For example, at 30% duty, a product costing R 100 in South Africa's 15% 
average inflation is overpriced even with duty in only two years. Lower wage inflation and 
stable prices of imported components and capital equipment can delay this, but ultimately 
the only way to maintain the effectiveness of a nominal duty is by currency depreciation, or 
continual increases in the rate of duty. 
Thus, although a 20-25% nominal rate of duty may be acceptable to trading partners, such a 
rate would have to increase rapidly if South Africa's inflation rate continues as at present. 
For example, with 5% offshore inflation, a real rate of protection of 20% would require a 
23% nominal rate this year, rising to 47,5% by 1996. Without offshore inflation, the rate 
would have to rise to nearly 65% — clearly unacceptable in the context of GATT. 
Chapters Five and Six will return to these issues in greater detail. 
4. Summary 
The answer to the question posed at the beginning of this section is yes — and no. On the 
one hand, the HED industry, as presently structured, is unlikely to find it difficult to meet 
the challenge of increased demand for its products. On the other hand, it seems clear that 
the industry will not survive a reduction in its trade régime without corresponding changes in 
the conditions which underlie its lack of competitiveness — a weak internal market, lack of 
investment incentives, technological backwardness, costly components and raw materials, 
46 
I.e., the difference between duties on imports of final products and on imported components. This 
measure is nominal and is not the same as effective rate of protection, discussed in Chapter Four. 
(R100+R30)xO,32 mark-up = R171,60; RlOOxO,32 mark-up = R132. 
48 
Chapter Four will consider this in more detail. 
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and so on. In either case, a great deal depends on the indusry:c willingness and capability 
to meet whatever challenge does arise. 
H. Conclusion: Macroeconomic vs. Strategic Analysis 
1. Summary 
Let us summarise the main points of this chapter: 
1. The HED industry is a mixture of wholesale and retail activities, and is driven by the 
imperative to maintain market share and brand-name and positioning in order to 
maintain brand premium. This may discourage it from aggressively pursuing low- 
income markets to an extent. Nevertheless, this limitation exists only in the context of 
inflexible manufacturing methods. 
2. The local HED industry is not especially big, either in the context of the overall 
economy or in the engineering sector. Its contribution to the economy in simple output 
terms has therefore not been remarkable. 
3. The HED industry has been profitable, but mainly in the context of high effective rates 
of protection. It is currently suffering significant losses. It has not been a major source 
of investment of employment growth in recent years, and is experiencing rapid decline 
in both respects at present. 
4. The HED industry is a costly producer and technology consumer, and is not in a 
position at present to expand effectively into export markets. Its primary growth 
stimulus will come from an expanding domestic market, assisted by mass housing and 
electrification policies. Yet this may not be enough to provide it with the basis for a 
thoroughgoing restructuring. 
5. The HED industry is in a good position to supply a growing local market, but at a 
premium to consumers. Yet it will require increasing protection until such time as it has 
undergone a process of restructuring which would allow it to compete more effectively 
with imports. 
2. Can The HED Industry Restructure Itself? 
These considerations would suggest that policies to raise personal disposable income and 
moderate inflation (fundamentally contradictory!) are essential. These might allow the HED 
industry to undertake a restructuring involving investment in new equipment and 
organisational practices, so that it can survive without today's high rates of protection. Yet 
the problem with this starting point it that it is but a short step to argue that the industry's 
problems are essentially macroeconomic, and that industry-specific policy is not required. 
The industry itself would seem to favour such an argument; their conclusion is that aside 
from protective tariffs and expansionary macroeconomic stimuli, they should be left to their 
own devices. 
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Clearly the relationship between the macroeconomy and private expenditure on household 
durable goods is crucial, and an important area for policy.49 Yet this should not lead us to 
focus only on these conditions, assuming that the 'black box' of the firm will necessarily 
adopt the most effective strategies to capitalise on boom and cope with bust. For there are a 
variety of options open to firms facing a stagnant market (for example). Firms can react 
'better' or 'worse' to adverse conditions; similarly, they can utilise opportunities presented 
by strong demand conditions or can simply earn higher profits and carry on as before. In 
either case, the strategic orientation of firms is the key to understanding the dynamics of 
industry health and competitiveness. In many ways, an assessment of this issue is 
subjective. Subsequent chapters will accordingly focus on this issue. 
' 
Indeed, household purchases of durable goods have long been used as an important indicator of cyclical 
macroeconomic trends. This is because durable goods are optional purchases for households, which can 
be delayed if disposable income is insufficient to cover expenditure on necessary goods and services. 
Consumer expenditure on durable goods thus varies more intensely in the course of the business cycle 
than expenditure on semi- or non-durable goods. Declining household expenditure on durable goods 
can foreshadow declining consumer confidence. 
Chapter Three: The International Context 
This chapter will examine the Southern Africa Customs Union's trade in HEDs and the 
general conditions in the world market for these goods.' There is of course no single global 
market for HEDs. Instead, there are two major product areas, each with its own 
characteristics, divided into smaller markets for individual products. These are in turn 
differentiated by geographical region. 
The global market for consumer electronics behaves very differently from that for domestic 
appliances.2 In general, the former is a fast-moving market marked by large proportions of 
traded output, rapid product development, global inter-regional trade, and domination by 
Japan and the Far East. On the other hand, the global domestic appliances market is marked 
by smaller proportions of traded output, less dynamism, significant intra-regional trade, and 
domination by US and European producers — although Far Eastern plants are now rapidly 
coming to dominate in some areas. 
A. Global Trade in HEDs 
1. Overall Trends 
Tables A-i and A-2 illustrate basic trends in global markets for HEDs over the last two and 
half decades. These are the salient points: 
a) Global Export Shares and Geographical Distribution' 
1. In current U.S. dollars, total world exports of domestic electrical machinery (SITC 725) 
increased by an average of nearly 13% per annum from 1970 to 1986. Exports of 
sound recorders and parts (SITC 891) increased by an annual average of nearly 19% 
during the same period. SITC 725's share of world exports increased only marginally 
from 0,46% to 0,51%, whilst SITC 891's share more than doubled from 0,53% to 
1,13%. This illustrates the increased importance of trade in consumer electronics. 
2. Although developed market economy (DME) exports of SITC 725 grew by an average 
of 11,2% p.a. from 1970-1986, DME share of global trade for these products declined 
from 94% to 78%. By contrast, developing country (DC) exports grew by a 
remarkable average of 30,7% p.a. over the same period, raising their share of world 
exports for these products from 2,5% to 20,7%. 
The Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) has been used as the unit of analysis following the 
practice of the only available comprehensive data source on trade, the UNCTAD Yearbook of 
International Trade. 
2 The consumer electronics market is also better covered by research and trade journals than the less 
glamorous domestic appliances market. 
All figures in relation to table A-l are in current US Dollars. 
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3. DME exports of SITC 891 grew by an average of 18,4% p.a. 1970-1986, but again its 
share of world exports in these products fell from more than 97% to less than 90%. By 
contrast, DC exports of these products grew by almost 29% p.a. over the period, taking 
its share for these products from 1,7% of the total to just under 10%. 
hnplication: Global trade in both categories of HEDs grew considerably 1970-1986. The 
developing countries' share of exports has grown much more rapidly than that of the 
developed market economies. 
b) Geographical Trade Shares and Distribution, 1978-1987' 
Table A-i: WORLD EXPORTS OF DOMESTIC ELECTRICAL 
MACHINERY (ISIC 725) AND SOUND RECORDERS AND 

















S1TC725 1420897 0,46 10000 10187295 0,51 10000 12,9 
SITC891 1649924 0,53 10000 22614493 1,13 10000 18,9 
















SITC 725 1332049 0,60 93,75 7939093 0,58 77,93 11,2 
SITC 891 1 606964 0,72 97,40 20311022 1,48 89,91 18,4 
















SITC 725 35 478 0,06 2,50 2 109 146 0,50 20,70 30,7 
S1TC 891 28 380 0,50 1,72 2 183 575 0,52 9,66 28,6 
Source: UNCTAD Handbook Of International Trade Statistics, 1989. All figures in current 
US Dollars. 
(1) Domestic Appliances (SIC 725) 
(a) Imports 
1. Imports of SIC 725 are dominated by Europe, whose share of global imports of these 
products increased from 53% to nearly 59% between 1978 and 1987. The Americas' 
Please note that the following data exclude Taiwan, which is regarded as a province of China by the UN. 
Taiwan's role would be very similar to that of South Korea. 
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share also grew over the period, from 19% to 24,5%. By contrast, Asia's share has 
fallen from 20% to 12,6%, reflecting greater self-sufficiency in these products. 
2. Afncas' share of global imports fell from nearly 5% to just over 2% over the period. 
SACU's global share also fell from 1,2% to 0,6% 1983-1987. 
3. The USA remained the top importer country of SIC 725. In general, European shares 
of global appliance imports grew over the period, with the exception of West Germany 
and Italy, the continent's main producers of such products. 
(b) Exports 
1. Exports of SIC 725 were dominated by Europe over the period, although they fell from 
71% of the world total to 64%. The Americas' export share fell from 11% to 7%. By 
contrast, Asia's export share increased from 17% to 28%. 
2. Africa's export share over the period was negligible, as was SACU's. 
3. West Germany, Italy and Japan remained the top three exporters of SIC 725 over the 
period. Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea gained significant export shares, whilst 
France, the USA, the UK, and the Netherlands lost share. Japan dominated exports 
briefly in the mid-80s, but fell back from 1985, shedding share to the Asian NICs, 
particularly South Korea. This was due to appreciation of the Yen over the SOs and 
resulting Japanese relocation of production to these countries. 
Implication: Global imports of domestic appliances have shifted more strongly towards 
Europe and the Americas, whilst exports have shifted towards (and within) Asia. 
Nevertheless, European exporters remained dominant in 1987. SACU plays no significant 
role in world exports, but ranks as a minor importer. 
(2) Television Receivers (SIC 761) 
(a) Imports 
1. Global imports of TVs were dominated by Europe, whose share of such imports rose 
from 50% to 52%. Asian import share also rose slightly, whilst the Americas' share 
fell. 
2. African television imports fell from 4,7% of the global total to under 3%. SACU's 
share was not available. 
3. The top importer of TVs remained the USA throughout the period. Hong Kong, West 
Germany, Italy, France and the UK all increased their share of imports. 
(b) Exports 
1. The Asian share of global television exports rose from 42% to nearly 51% over the 
period, whilst European share fell from 49% to just less than 42%. The Americas' 
share also fell slightly. 
2. African TV exports were negligible, as were those of the SAC U. 
3. The world's top exporter of TVs remained Japan, whose share rose from 32% in 1978 
to 46% by 1985. Subsequently its share fell dramatically, as production was moved 
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offshore to South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong. West Germany lost share, falling 
from 19% to under 12% over the period, but remained the third ranking exporter. The 
USA was the big loser, moving from third place (7%) to seventh (4%). 
Table A-2: Major Developing Country Exporters of HEDs, Ranked By 
Average 1985/6 Values 
WORLD TRADE SHARES IN DOMESTIC ELECTRICAL GOODS (SIC 725) 
Value % Cntry. % DC % World 
COUNTRY (US$ THOUSANDS) Exports Exports of Exports of 
Commodity Commodity 
WORLD 10,187,295 0.51 .. 100.00 
D'ED. MKT. ECON. 7,939,095 0.58 .. 77,93 
D'ING. MKT. ECON. 2,109,146 0.50 100.00 20.70 
Hong Kong 602,978 3.32 28.59 5.92 
Taiwan 559,023 1.59 26.50 5.49 
South Korea 447,075 1.38 21.20 4.39 
Singapore 194,613 0.86 9.23 1.91 
Yugoslavia 126,544 1.21 6.00 1.24 
Brazil 46,100 0.19 2.19 0.45 
Mexico 31,851 0.17 1.51 0.31 
Malaysia 27,863 0.19 1.32 0.27 
Kuwait 15,439 0.17 0.73 0.15 
India 12,399 0.14 0.59 0.12 
WORLD TRADE SHARES IN SOUND RECORDER S AND PARTS ( SIC 891) 
Value % Cntry. % DC % World 
(US$ THOUSANDS) Exports Exports of Exports of 
Commodity Commodity 
WORLD 22,614,502 1.13 .. 100.00 
D'ED.MKT.ECON. 20,311,306 1.48 .. 89.91 
D'ING. MKT. ECON. 2,183,575 0.52 100.00 9.66 
South Korea 1,058,744 3.26 48.49 4.68 
Taiwan 320,274 0,91 14.67 1.42 
Hong Kong 316,415 1.74 14.49 1.40 
Singapore 315,654 1.40 14.46 1.40 
Indonesia 44,330 0.27 2.03 0.20 
Malaysia 30 0.20 1.37 0.13 
Mexico 28,408 0.15 1.30 0.13 
Turkey 13,652 0.18 0.63 0.06 
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of International Trade Statistics, 1989. 
Implication: Global trade in televisions has been stable, but exports have tended to shift 
strongly to Asia and within it to the NICs. This is due again to Japanese offshore 
investment under the impact of a rising Yen. Western television exports have fallen strongly, 
particularly in the USA. More recently, there has been a substantial relocation of television 
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production to the NICs of Latin America, particularly Mexico, which have become conduits 
for Japanese products into the US. 
(3) Radio Receivers (SIC 762) 
(a) Imports 
1. Global imports of radios were stable over the period, with shares falling slightly for 
Europe, but rising for Asia and the Americas. 
2. Africa's share of global radio imports fell by more than half, from 2,6% to 1,1%. 
SACU's share of imports fell from 0,41% in 1983 to 0,34% in 1987. 
3. The top importer of radios remained the USA, followed by West Germany and the UK. 
Hong Kong's share rose dramatically, from 0,7% to 6%. 
(b) Exports 
1. Global exports remained dominated by Asia throughout the period, although its share 
fell from 75% to under 71%. The Americas' share rose strongly from 5,5% to 14%, 
whilst Europe's fell. The surge in American growth can be attributed to new assembly 
operations in Mexico and Brazil. 
2. African exports were negligible throughout the period, as were those of SACU. 
3. Global exports of radios were unsurprisingly overwhelmingly dominated by Japan in 
1978 at 55%, but its share had fallen to 28% by 1987. As with other products, the big 
winners were NICs such as South Korea (3,8% to 13,8%), Singapore (5% to 10,3%, 
Brazil (2,1% to 5,3%), Mexico (nil to 5,1%) and Malaysia (0,3% to 5,3%). 
Implication: Global imports of radios have remained fairly stable. Exports have remained 
dominated by Asian countries, but have shifted strongly within Asia to the NICs and within 
the Americas to the NICs of Central and South America. 
(4) Sound Recorders and Phonographs (SIC 763) 
(a) Imports 
1. Global imports of SIC 763 (which includes a variety of products from cassette players 
to CD players) remained static for all regions expect the Americas, whose share rose 
from 39,6% to 43%, and Africa, whose share was nearly quartered. 
2. SACU was a statistically minor importer. SACU import share rose to 0,56% in the 
boom year of 1983, but fell to 0,34% by 1987. 
3. The top importer of SIC 763 remained the USA, followed by West Germany and the 
UK. The USA's share rose from 34,7% to 38%, whilst those the latter countries fell. 
(b) Exports 
1. Global exports of SIC 763 were again dominated by Asia, whose share rose from 65% 
to 78,4% over the period. The share of Europe and the Americas fell correspondingly, 
by one-third to one-half. 
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2. Neither Africa nor SACU were measurable exporters of such products. 
3. The top exporter once again was Japan, whose share rose from 58% to 81% by 1984. 
As with other products, Japan's share then fell to 63,5%, whilst those of South Korea, 
Singapore, Hong Kong and West Germany rose. Losers included the USA, UK, the 
Netherlands, and Austria. 
Implication: Global imports of SIC 763 have remained fairly stable, but the trend is 
towards Europe and the Americas, as their production capacity has fallen and Asia's has 
risen. Africa has been unable to maintain its share of imports. Global exports follow a 
trend similar to other consumer electronics products, showing a marked domination by 
Japan, moderated in the late 80s by a shift to the Asian and Latin American NICs and West 
Germany. 
2. Trends, 1 980s-90s 
a) Consumer Electronics 
(1) Key Trends 
1. Growth in gloal consumer electronics trade has slowed considerably, and will continue 
to slow as consumer electronics products become standardised commodities. Growth 
rates have slowed from 40%-60% p.a. in the 70s and 80s to lO%-15% pa. by the late 
80s. 
2. Since the early 1970s, global export and import shares in consumer electronics products 
have shifted significantly. The essence of this shift has been a decline in exports and a 
rise in imports in Europe and the USA, with the opposite occuring in Asia. 
3. The consumer electronics industry has become even more competitive than it has 
traditionally been, and the basis of competition has changed. Athough global exports 
have been dominated by Asian countries led by Japan, increasingly, export production is 
diversifying to the NICs, mainly in Asia, but also in South America. This has been due 
to strong appreciation by the Japanese Yen in the late 1980s, which encouraged 
producers to concentrate investment in new capacity offshore. The key ingredients to 
attracting such investment have been exchange rate stability, labour cost and quiescence, 
and capacity to handle and maintain automated production processes. In this respect 
Japan is following in the footsteps of European and US producers, who began such a 
process in the 1950s. 
(2) Global Rankings 
As the chart following illustrates, the Japanese industry easily dominates the world 
consumer electronics market, with 45% of the total production of the top thirty producers 
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RANKINGS OF THIRTY MAJOR PRODUCERS 




















Australia 23 14 5 9 
Austria 17 18 20 20 
Belgium 15 19 8 8 
Brazil 9 10 10 9 
Canada 18 8 6 6 
Denmark 24 24 11 14 
Finland 20 22 15 15 
France 11 5 10 2 
Hong Kong 8 20 2 4 
India 12 9 18 11 
Indonesia 19 23 17 17 
Irish Rep. 29 28 3 16 
Israel 28 30 8 18 
Italy 13 6 9 3 
Japan 1 2 7 1 
Malaysia 16 27 4 7 
Netherlands 27 11 1 7 
Norway 30 26 2 12 
Phillipines 26 29 9 10 
Singapore 10 17 6 6 
SOUTH AFRICA 22 21 12 13 
South Korea 3 12 1 2 
Spain 14 7 13 8 
Sweden 25 16 4 10 
Switzerland 7 13 5 5 
Taiwan 5 15 3 3 
Thailand 21 25 19 19 
UK 6 4 14 4 
USA 2 1 7 1 
West Germany 4 3 16 5 
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($26,2bn) in 1 99Ø5 It is also the top-ranking net exporter, with 59,5% of the total. The 
USA, on the other hand, is the largest importer of consumer electronics, with $1 9,2bn worth 
of global consumption, or 3 0,7% of the total. (By contrast, the Japanese market comprises 
21,4% of total consumer electronics consumption.) 
The second largest producer of consumer electronics is South Korea, with $4,4bn output in 
1990, 7,6% of total. South Korea's share of consumption, however, is only 1,5% of total, 
making it the most export-intensive producer in the world. West Germany follows closely 
behind with 6,57% of total production and 8,5% of world consumption. The last of the top 
five producers is Taiwan, with 3,95% of production and 1% of consumption. Other major 
consumers are the UK (5,5% of consumption; France (4,9%), and Italy (4,5%). As we have 
seen, other developing market economies have made a strong showing in consumer 
electronics, including Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, and Turkey. 
South Africa is presently the world's twenty-second largest consumer of electronic goods, 
but its ninth largest importer (Electronics Industries Federation, 1992). In 1990 production 
of electronic products was 0,9% of GDP, whilst consumption was 3,4% of GDP. This gives 
a difference of 2,5% of GDP, making electronics imports a major factor in the balance of 
payments, The country's ranking in consumer electronics is given on the page opposite. 
Out of the top 30 consumer electronics markets in 1990, South Africa was the 22nd largest 
producer ($180m, 0,31% of total), and the 21st largest consumer ($353m, 0,56% of total). 
With $1 73m net imports in 1990, South Africa ranked as the 13th largest net consumer 
electronics importer. It supplied only 51% of its own consumer electronics needs, giving an 
import intensity of 0,49% — 13th out of the top thirty.6 
(3) Japan Consolidates its Dominance 
Throughout the I 970s and early SOs, consumer electronics production was spread between 
Japan, the United States, Europe, and the Far East. Giant Japanese firms began to dominate 
the global market in the early 70s, but European and United States firms remained strong in 
some home markets through historical brand loyalties. More recently, Far Eastern firms 
have exploited labour cost advantages and supportive state policies to enter the global 
market on a costs basis. 
Now, Japanese domination is on the verge of completion. Many domestic suppliers in 
North America and Europe are becoming de facto assemblers of Japanese 'technology 
partners', being absorbed by larger firms, or pulling out of the consumer electronics 
business altogether. The survivors of the present situation are likely to be three big 
Japanese firms — Matsushita (US$45hn sales in 1990), Sony, ($24bn) and Sharp — who 
along with Phillips ($3Ohn) account for the bulk of world production and innovation of 
consumer electronics products. The reasons for this change are several. 
All figures (in 1990 $US) from the Yearbook of World Electronics Data 1990, Elsevier Advanced 
Technology Inc., Oxford, 1991. I believe that these figures include home computers. 
6 In at least one area South Africa has become a world leader: pay TV, now a $1 Sbn industry in the US 
(Financial Mail, November 29, 1991). With more than 615 000 households serviced in 19916, pay-TV 
giant M-Net is currently one of the largest subscriber networks outside the US. The group sold R350m 
worth of decoders from 1986-91. M-Net is currently negotiating with French parastatal Thompson and 
various African countries about the possibility of expanding its operations to include exports. 
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P ThIRTY MAJOR WORLD MARKETS FOR CONSUMER ELECTRONICS, 1990 
All figures in US$ millions 
Source: Elsevier Advanced Technology, Oxford, 1990 
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1155 1,85% (1089) 4,20% -0,94 0,06 
80 0,13% (55) 0,21% -0,69 0,31 
0,03% 114 0,18% (99) 0,38% -0,87 0,13 
94 IS 0,03% 206 0,33% (191) 0,74% -0,93 0,07 
Total 58161 62569 (4408) 
Total Imports 
Total Exports 
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1. The world consumer electronics industry is presently without a functional leading-edge 
product. Since the 1 920s, the industry has produced a major innovation roughly every 
decade — the gramophone in the 20s, radio in the 30s, monochrome TV in the 50s, 
colour TV in the 60s, hi-fl in the 70s, and VCRs in the 80s. Since the peak of the VCR 
boom in the late 80s, which at one point accounted for 50% of world consumer 
electronics sales, there has been no new product to provide the impetus for renewed 
global growth. Instead, the only source of growth has been the refinement of existing 
functionalities (eg. the CD to replace the gramophone as the premiere player of recorded 
sound media) or products (eg. smaller video cameras). 
But this ceaseless innovation war is so technology-intensive — and expensive — that 
smaller firms are unable to compete. It is also an increasingly rapid process, with new 
product launches every few months. Most importantly, most European, North 
American, and Taiwanese and South Korean firms lack the supplier networks, cost 
advantages, R&D capacity and management approach to compete in such a rapidly 
changing environment. Consumer electronics is rapidly converging with computer 
technology, and firms without a productive and innovative edge in the former and strong 
links to the latter are unlikely to survive. Only the Japanese have strongly developed 
commercially-viable capacity in these respects. 
2. The only major new product on the horizon — high definition TV, or HDTV — is so 
technology-intensive that only a few major firms will be able to afford to enter this 
market profitably. At present only the Japanese industry is capable of this.' 
3. With the exception of Phillips, only the Japanese firms have firm historical bases in 
consumer electronics. Major US (such as RCA8 and Zenith) and European firms 
(mainly French parastatal Thompson) have roots in production for the military. As such 
they have had to learn the cost consciousness, marketing strategies, and global 
orientation of the Japanese, for whom it is deeply-imbedded. This is because the 
Japanese have learned by producing for a highly discriminating and competitive 
consumer market — their own. 
4. Labour cost is not as central to competitiveness in consumer electronics as it once was. 
Instead, low labour costs must be combined with access to technology and the capacity 
to put it into production. In this respect it appears that the Japanese are avoiding the 
errors of US firms in the 1950s and 60s, who freely shared product and production 
technology with Japanese firms. Imitative Far Eastern firms such as Daewoo, 
The HDTV saga is a good case in point for the dangers of the consumer electronics market. Japanese 
firms, who innovated FII)TV in the early l980s in alliance with the Japanese state broadcasting 
authority, developed their version using the then-most advanced analog technology. Their enormous 
commitment of research and resources has subsequently been bypassed by later innovators from the 
USA and Europe, who developed an HI)TV system using more refined digital technology. Early 
Japanese innovation thus proved a disadvantage. Political decisions regarding broadcast standards in 
the US and EEC markets, however, may be the deciding factor. Even so, it is likely that future H1)TV 
production will be on a joint basis with Japanese firms, who lead in terms of production technology. 
Now owned by the French parastatal Thompson. 
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Samsung, and Goldstar are increasingly unable to obtain Japanese technology9 — or to 
compete on a cost-basis against highly-automated Japanese firms and their Malaysian, 
Thai and Indonesian subsidiaries.'0 Their emphasis on automation has meant that 
labour costs in Japanese offshore plants are now no more than 5-10% of overall costs. 
(By comparison, in 1985 labour costs in South African firms averaged 22% of costs.") 
To survive the present shake-up of the industry, consumer electronics firms elsewhere will 
have to achieve four things. 
I. They must be prepared to spend at least 4% of turnover on R&D — which, in the case 
of Japanese firms, runs into the US$ billions. 
2. They must be able to design and pmduce their own proprietary semiconductor (IC) 
chips, which are the basis of both new product development and profitability. On the 
one hand, new products such as HDTV, digital audio tape (DAT) and 'fuzzy-logic' 
domestic appliances are as much computers as consumer electronics, and design- 
intensive application-specific chips make them possible. On the other, proprietary 
control over ICs is a major source of ongoing profits, as licensed producers are usually 
tied to their use, for which they pay a premium of 15-20% (interview sources). 
3. For the same reasons successful CE firms will have to have experience in computer 
design and production, or strong linkages to firms who do. The competitive success of 
firms such as Sharp and Toshiba has recently come more and more to be based on their 
ability to combine computer technologies, such as liquid-crystal displays used in laptop 
computers, with CE products. This might involve the use of previously-developed 
capacity in this area, such as Toshiba, or acquisition of experienced subsidiaries. 
Whichever path is chosen, close links amongst firms or divisions in all facets of product 
development and production are required to maintain the coherency of the competitive 
process 
4. Successful CE firms must be prepared to devote as much R&D to production 
technolo&v as to new product design, and to automate ruthlessly to bring down costs 
and increase flexibility. Since the greatest part of added value, in Schumpeterian 
fashion, comes from R&D activities, skill in putting new designs into production rapidly 
can mean the difference between a commercially successful firm and one which merely 
has a good product. Moreover, producers in the rest of the world who wish to produce 
under license to the Japanese must have similar capacities to cope with the flow of new 
products. 
5. The successful CE firm must have an integrative approach to management, linking 
technical, productive, and marketing operations in a systemic fashion, combined with a 
global and long-term view of their futures. The rapidly-changing nature of the CE 
The Japanese are generally unwilling to sell or license their proprietary technology to smaller firms in 
the way US firms did in the 50s, and 60s. Only larger finns with potential to influence the acceptance 
of international standards required for a new technology like 1-IDTV are considered as technology 
partners. 
South Korean finns are said to be gradually moving out of consumer electronics altogether, reducing 
investment by 1% in 1990. 
From 1985 manufacturing census. 
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market means that firms must be able to anticipate and react quickly to changes in order 
to survive. 
(4) Implications 
In sum, the global consumer electronics mdustry is marked by rapid and complex 
technological change, shortened product life-cycles, increasing capital intensity and strategic 
global positioning by both major and minor players. Domestic production of consumer 
electronics for most countries will soon be reduced either to assembly of components 
produced elsewhere or where market size just/Ies it, local production by subsidiaries of 
Japanese or possibly other Asian firms.'2 At present, it is practically unthinkable for 
smaller consumer electronics industries to enter even niche markets as independent 
producers: for even this will require activities on a far greater scale than most local firms 
can contemplate. 
b) Domestic Appliances 
(1) Key Trends 
As we have seen, global exports of domestic appliances grew at an average annual rate of 
12,9% from 1970-1986 (UNCTAD, 1989). This was significantly less rapid than for 
consumer electronics, which experienced average annual growth approaching 20%. Exports 
from the developed market economies grew 11,2% p.a. in the same period, whilst exports 
from the developing countries grew at 30,7% p.a. There has thus been a major shift in the 
geographical production of domestic appliances. In 1985-6, the DME countries produced 
78% of world exports of these goods, whilst the developing countries produced 21% Major 
developing country exporters at that time included Hong Kong, with 28,5% of the 
developing country total, Taiwan (26,5%) and South Korea (2 1,2%). 
The European white goods market was worth an estimated $1 5bn in 1990. It is dominated 
geographically by Italy, with 34% of total output, followed by West Germany (27,5%), the 
UK (11,1%), Spain (8,3%), France (7,9%), Scandinavia (6,2%) and the Benelux countries 
(1,7%). This conceals domination of the European market by Swedish super-conglomerate 
Electrolux, however. The latter leads in terms of total revenues, followed by Bosch- 
Siemens, Whirlpool, Miéle, AEG, Thompson EM, and General Electric. 
A major shake-up has been underway in recent years in the depressed European white goods 
market, with repercussions for South African white goods producers. This has been marked 
by a spate of acquisitions by large firms, who have bought out smaller but well-established 
competitors. This has been led by Electrolux, which controls 22% of the European market 
and 15% of the US market (Financial Times, December 15, 1991), as well as such major 
brand names as Kelvinator, Zanussi, Tappan, Thorn, and Frigidaire, as well as by General 
Domestic Appliances, which combines British company GEC and US General Electric with 
12 
Anglo American is reportedly talking to Korean chaibol Daewoo about the possibility of setting up 
production of the latter's audio and TV products. 
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Thompson of France and Fagor of Spain. The impetus for this process can be found in 
three factors: 
Essentially saturated, the European white goods market has grown at only 3% p.a in 
recent years (Advertising Age, March 5, 1991). Hundreds of firms have been bought 
out, closed, or retrenched workers in the face of slack demand. Expansion through 
acquisition or merger has three benefits, in that it allows companies (i) to expand market 
share through access to regional brand-dominated markets; (ii) to expand into Eastern 
Europe; and (iii). to source low-end products and components (Financial Times, June 
16, 1992). 
The European white goods market is heavily fragmented: only 1/5 of products are sold 
in more than two countries (Financial Times, February 6, 1992). There are, for 
example, 2 300 different fridgcs and 560 microwaves sold in Europe at present. Prices 
of similar products diverge by as much as 35% between countries. This makes it all but 
impossible for producers to effectively achieve potential scale economies and to expand 
market share. It is estimated that streamlined designs could cut costs by 10%. Pan- 
European marketing is an essential step in this direction. 
Companies from North America and Japan are attempting to capture strategic market 
share in Europe (Financial Times, June 24, 1992). European producers are wary of the 
technological prowess of these firms and are attempting to develop a response capability 
through increased scale and refined automation techniques. 
Indicative of the challenge is the merger of Whirlpool, the US' largest white goods producer 
(30% of US market), and Phillips, at 12% of the market second largest European brand" 
after Electrolux (Financial Times, November 1, 1991; Advertising Age, March 5, 1990). 
Whirlpool bought Phillips in 1989 in order to achieve a presence in the EEC market, since 
the US market is saturated. Whirlpool and Phillips (under the name Whirlpool 
International) will also share production and product technology, especially in electronics. 
US firms have for some time been forced to compete by cost reduction, both in design and 
manufacturing. This has led to increased automation and cellularisation, which Whirlpool 
will bring to Phillips on a greater scale. In turn, Phillips will teach Whirlpool about rapid 
changeover — necessitated by the small size and diversity of European national markets. 
A major complementary initiative has been undertaken by European retailers, who have 
begun to organise on a pan-EEC basis to encourage manufacturers to do the same. One of 
these, Euronics, has convinced Whirlpool to launch a pan-EEC range of appliances — a 
path also pursued by Electrolux. In return, Euronics has committed itself to a 40% yearly 
increase in sales of Whirlpool/Phillips products. Retailers want to be able to buy in bulk, 
and to improve cross-border customer service, especially of portable consumer electronics. 
A major obstacle to such initiatives, however, is the local prejudices of consumers who have 
grown used to specific designs. To cope with this, Electrolux has begun to market both 
local speciality products and pan-European products (Electrolux and Zanussi) in each 
market, to capture maximum market share. 
As distinct from company. 
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(2) New Producis 
Development of new 'fuzzy-logic' microchip controls, magnetic induction heating processes, 
and process technologies may reverse the trend towards developing country production and 
export of these goods. The most important changes in domestic appliances in the recent 
period have been in energy conservation and in control technology. Energy conservation in 
appliances became important post-i 973, when energy costs rose significantly (Januzzi and 
Schipper, 1991). Since then, the electricity-intensity of all major appliances has fallen by an 
average of 25% (see page opposite). This trend has continued into developing countries, 
where energy imports became critical in the same period. Also critical has been the role of 
energy-consumption regulations in the US (since 1990), especially California (since 1979). 
This process has been market-driven, not technological; it is estimated that many appliances 
could used even 50% less electricity than at present should consumers demand it. On the 
other hand, CFC-reduction regulations in fridge manufacture have generally been state 
initiatives. 
Control technology is being influenced by the use of 'fuzzy-logic' circuits which monitor 
and adjust variables associated with appliance function, mainly with washing machines, 
refrigerators, and cooking apparatus. For example, fuzzy control of washing machines 
involve feedback monitoring of water temperature, soap content, rinse periods, and so on. 
Such controls contribute to energy efficiency, but also to reduced noise levels and longer 
product life. Linked to this is advances in 'intelligent' appliances which cooperate, such as 
alarm clocks which turn on the kettle and run the bath (Economist, December 8, 1991). 
(3) Implications 
The principal implication which arises from the foregoing is that the new white goods 
majors will emerge with vast marketing, research and development, and production 
capabilities. To compete with them would require a sound basis in an allied industry, which 
most South African firms lack. A more practical approach would involve strategic 
alliances with one or more of the emerging giants to obtain access to their strengths. This 
could allow exports to Europe as well as access to the kinds of process and product 
technology which are essential to flexible, quality production. 
B. Southern Africa's External Trade in HEDs 
1. The Regulatory Environment of South African Trade in HEDs 
In most respects South Africa's trade régime for HEDs is uncomplicated: a set of ad 
valorem duties accompanied by variable surcharges, and in some cases excise duties 
(applied to domestic products as well). In combination this tariff structure can be very 
complicated, as in the case of televisions, to be discussed in Chapter Five. Formula duties 
are applied in some cases, usually in the form of an either/or option of a percentage of FOB 
value of a fixed amount per unit. There are also special rates of duty for Most Favoured 
Nation trading partners in the case of consumer electronics. 
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The type of tariff protection afforded to the HED industry is central to its very existence, 
and helps to explain its structure. Indeed, the development of this industry in South Africa 
has been made possible by protective duties against imports from established producers. 
This has encouraged local production of these goods, but in some cases has also allowed a 
proliferation of producers who exist only because of very high rates of protection. Apart 
from the higher cost this system imposes on the final consumer, this situation has had the 
effect of preventing potentially efficient producers from achieving turnover sufficient to 
achieve economies of scale in production. 
The Table at the end of this chapter lists imports of HEDs for 1988-1991 in detail. This 
chart also includes the various tariffs applicable to such imports in those years, and an 
estimation of the value of such duties were they charged at their full rate. That this happens 
in practice is by no means the case, as various exemptions are available and, in the 
industry's opinion, Customs is extremely slack in policing the system. 
a) Average Duties 
Average duties for HEDs in aggregate rose from 63% to 68% from 1988-1991. Average 
duties for HED parts rose from 23% to just over 30% over the period. 
Average duties for consumer electronics imports are much higher than for white goods or 
small appliances. Consumer electronics imports attract a nominal duty of over 90% — 
much of it accounted for by the 40% surcharge applied to imports of radios and other audio 
equipment and the nearly 100% duty on televisions. This is to be compared to average 
nominal duties of +I 30% for white goods and small appliances. 
Average duties on imported parts for HEDs vary considerably, ranging from free for TV 
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attract duties of just less than 30%. Average nominal duties on consumer electronics parts, 
however, are significantly lower — as low as 23% in 1988. 
A significant factor in the tariff structure is the import surcharge. The surcharge has been 
used both to raise revenue and limit imports, but has become a permanent feature of the 
trade régime in the case of consumer electronics products. Surcharges vary from 5% for 
most small appliances, to 15-25% for some white goods, and 40-45% for many consumer 
electronics products. Surcharges on parts are generally lower, but usually match those on 
final products if applied (such as washing machines). In some cases it has been explicitly 
recognised that local production would cease were surcharges to be withdrawn, as in the 
case of televisions (BTI, 1991). This has sometimes resulted in an amalgamation of the ad 
valorem and surcharge into single ad valorem duty. 
2. Trade Volumes, Shares, and Distribution 
Combined SACU imports of HEDs identifiable in the Trade Statistics for 1991 were 
R529,6m. As a percentage of total imports of manufactures, HEDs are in the 2-3% range, 
making them at present a relativley minor drain on the balance of payments. This must be 
considered in the context of very high effective rates of protection in some cases, however 
(see Chapters Four and Five). 
a) Trade Balance and import Penetration 
The balance of HED trade is difficult to quantify due to the unavailability of reliable and 
comprehensive statistics, particularly for exports, over a long time period. In most cases the 
trade balance in particular product lines is strongly negative, with exports in no case 
exceeding 30% of imports. In fact, the trade account for ISIC 3832, which includes (but is 
not limited to) consumer electronics products, has deteriorated considerably over the last 
two decades, reaching a deficit of Rl,8bn in 1990 (IDC, 1992). The trade balance for ISIC 
3833 (small appliances) has also deteriorated, and stands in the R200m range. It has not 
proved possible to provide an accurate trade balance for white goods. 
Impots as a percentage of domestic demand have tended to rise since 1972, particularly for 
radio and television and small appliances. Using CSS figures it was possible to compare 
physical units imported and produced for certain items over the period 1988 to 1991, as 
portrayed in Table B-i. 
Table B-i: Production and Importation of Selected HEDs 
FRIDCES AND FREEZERS 
YEAR LOCAL IMPORTS TOTAL LOCAL IMPORTS 
1988 226,708 44,746 271,454 83.52% 16.48% 
1989 338,211 24,051 362,262 93.36% 6.64% 
1990 352,920 37,033 389,953 90.50% 9.50% 
1991 355,435 46,240 401,675 88.49% 11.51% 
WASHING M ACHINES 
YEAR LOCAL IMPORTS TOTAL LOCAL IMPORTS 
1988 51,681 110,795 162,476 31.81% 68.19% 
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1989 68,022 53,710 121,732 55.88% 44.12% 
1990 109,312 105,978 215,290 50.77% 49.23% 
1991 86,891 99,192 186,083 46.69% 53.31% 
ELECTRIC STOVES 
YEAR LOCAL IMPORTS TOTAL LOCAL IMPORTS 
1988 174,036 161,383 335,419 51.89% 48.11% 
989 177,904 75,787 253,691 70.13% 29.87% 
990 161,094 97,773 258,867 62.23% 37.77% 
.991 156,606 129,612 286,218 54.72% 45.28% 
TELEVISIONS, COLOUR 
YEAR LOCAL IMPORTS TOTAL LOCAL IMPORTS 
1988 206,000 19,578 225,578 91.32% 8.68% 
1989 219,000 74,173 293,173 74.70% 25.30% 
1990 205,000 96,559 301,559 67.98% 32.02% 
1991 285,000 90,502 375,502 75.90% 24.10% 
TE LEVISIONS, MONOCHRO ME 
YEAR LOCAL IMPORTS TOTAL LOCAL IMPORTS 
1988 145,000 4,936 149,936 96.7 1% 3.29% 
1989 125,000 5,292 130,292 95.94% 4.06% 
1990 168,000 64,979 232,979 72.11% 27.89% 
1991 201,000 112,240 313,240 64,17% 35.83% 
Source: CSS Statistical News Releases, various; annual and monthly trade statistics, 1989- 
92. All figures are in units. 
(1) White Goods 
• The import share of the local market for fridges and freezers fell from 16,5% in 1988 to 
11,51% in 1991 (a fall of 30%). 
• The import share of washing machines fell from 68% to 54% (a 20% fall) in the same 
period. 
The share of electric stove imports fell from 48% to 45% (a 6,2% fall). 
In each case the import share in 1991 rose slightly compared to the previous year. The trend 
fall in import penetration over the period 1988-91 is consistent with the general decline in 
the HED market over that period. 
(2) Consumer Electronics 
• By contrast to white goods and small appliances, the import share of televisions rose 
sharply over the period on the basis of expanded imports of low-cost sets. The import 
share of colour TVs rose particularly fast, from 8,7% in 1988 to 24% in 1991 (a 250% 
rise), whilst that of monochrome TVs rose from 3,3% to 35,83% over the period (a 
10 18% rise) — almost entirely in 1990. This was due to a sudden influx of very low- 
priced sets from the far East imported by cash discounters (interview sources). 
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(3) Analysis 
In general, imports to the local market are high-end products: more sophisticated televisions, 
VCRs, video cameras, CD players, and certain white goods. The local manufacturing sector 
has traditionally concentrated on supplying the middle and bottom of the market, with the 
emphasis on the former. 
Unit imports fell during 1988-90 primarily because of credit restrictions, import surcharges, 
and weak demand. Thus, lifting of credit limits and some surcharges in 1990 had the effect 
of increasing imports that year and the following. Also significant has been a phased-in 
relaxation of ordinary duties on certain 1'V imports, which sparked off the massive rise in 
monochrome imports during 1990. 
It is notable, however, that the lifting of credit restrictions seems to have had the effect of 
also increasing the import share of every item except colour TVs in the 1989-1990 period. 
The import share of fridges and freezers increased 12,7%; of washers 8,28%; of electric 
stoves 19,9%; and of monochrome TVs 28,5%. This implies that increased spending on 
HEDs during upswings may be significantly import intensive, as is indicated by the analysis of the 1983-85 period below. 
Figures B-2, B-3 and B-4 illustrate in a general way the relationship between private 
consumption expenditure and trade deficits in the broad industrial classification levels 
incorporating HEDs: 
-- 1S1C3829 —4--- 1S1C3832 -- SIC 3833 -- Pt Cons. Exp. 
• Figure B-2 shows indices of PCE and imports of HEDs over the period 1972-1990. It 
shows that historically these two variables have tended to move strongly in tandem, 
although they began to diverge somewhat from 1986 onwards. Although production in 
HED sectors seems to follow suit, a lag is discernable. This implies (i) that increased 
consumption of HEDs is matched by equally increased importation, rather than by 
increased local supply; and (ii) a tendency for imports to respond more quickly than 
Figure B-2 
Indices of PCE and Trade Deficits 
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local production to economic fluctuations. Given industry concerns about lack of 
sufficient market volumes, this inability to capitalise on upswings is of concern. 
Figure B-3 
INDICES OF TRADE DEFICIT/PCE 
1972 = 1 
1•00; 
1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 
+4 ISIC 3829 - ISC 3832 -— SIC 3833 TOTAL 
• Figure B-3 shows four composite indices generated by dividing the index for trade 
deficits in HED sectors by the index for PCE in each sector. This shows whether trade 
deficits are rising more or less rapidly than PCE in each sector. Figure B-3 shows that 
(i) trade deficits have risen much more rapidly than PCE in electronics (ISIC 3823); (ii) 
the same trend is evident in small appliances to 1978 and again from 1982 to 1987; (iii) 
trade deficits have risen more slowly than PCE in ISIC 3829, but have begun to exceed 
the latter in recent years.'4 Taken together, this implies that import penetration of the 
local market has tended to rise even in the face of stagnating PCE. 
• Figure B-4 consolidates this data and shows that whilst the indices for imports, exports 
and PCE have tended to rise over time, that for production lagged considerably behind 
until 1983, when it also began to rise. 
• The fact that unit import shares have tended to fall whilst trade deficits have risen 
suggests that (i) the depreciation of the Rand has more than compensated for a decrease 
in relative unit imports, and/or (ii) export values have risen more slowly than import 
costs. This is indeed suggested by the graphs, which show that trade deficits have risen 
most strongly in those areas where exports are negligible, such as consumer electronics 
and small appliances. 
Although the inclusion of a number of non-HED products in this sector makes it difficult to draw a 
conclusion from this. 
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-).(- PVT. CONS. EXP. -- EXPORTS -- IMPORTS -- PRODUCTION 
(4) Grey Market Imports 
The issue of grey market imports — direct imports by unlicensed distributors — is closely 
linked to that of the tariff structure. High tarrifs encourage illegal importation of products 
which can be sold easily, particularly for cash. Typically such products are unsupported by 
warranties or service, although many manufacturers provide such service anyway so as not 
to compromise brand 
name. This is obvously 
a costly process for 
them. 
Most industry 
interviewees felt that Ri 400 
the existing tariff Ri 200 
structure encouraged RI 000 
grey market imports, R800 
but understandably R600 
favoured better 
enforcement rather than R400 
lower tariffs. It is R200 
impossible to quantify RO 
illegal grey market _______________________________ 
imports, but I Con EI.ctro4 
interviewees claim it to 
be a significant factor 
in consumer electronics, attributing to it much of the poor performance of recent years. 
Figure B-4 
PCE, Imports, Exports, and Production 
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Figure B-5 
Imports of HEDs, 1988-1 991 
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Figure B-6 b) Structure of 
Imports of White Goods, 1988-91 Impoits" 
Rm, 1990 F.O.B. Prices Combined imports of 
HEDs identifiable in the 
Trade Statistics for 
1991 were R545,5m. 
Of this 61,2% 
(R333,5m) was for 
imports of consumer 
electronics; 16,4% 
(R89,5m) for small 
appliances; and 22,4% 
(R122,3m) for white 
____________________________________ goods. 
Over the last four years 
the composition of 
imports of HEDs has 
changed steadily from 62% for domestic appliances and 38% for consumer electronics to 
48% and 52%, respectively. Imports of audio equipment are consistently the largest of the 
major categories, at R205m for 1991. Next comes TV at Ri 21 ,8m; white goods at R 1 09m; 
and small appliances at R93,9m. 
Of audio equipment, the largest import group in 1991 was radios (including portables and 
radio-tape) and music centres, at R85,2m (41,5% of audio), followed by car audio at 
R46, im (22,5%); then hi-hi equipment at R73,7m (36%). Major individual import items 
are music centres at R54,3m, car radios at R43,4m, loudspeakers at R38,9m and amplifiers 
at R18,2m. 
In video equipment, 
VCRs were the single 
largest import item in 
1991, at R57,4m, 47% 
of total video equipment 
imports. Imports of 
CTV were R50,8m 
(42%), and of MTV 
R13,7m (11%), 
reflecting both the higher 
cost of CTV and the 
greater dominance of 
local production of 
MTV. 
In white goods, the 
Based on CSS, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991. All import figures are in cuffent Rands, fob. 
I El R.Mgssto4fl DitIi*aihir Wuhsn I 
Figure B-7 
Imports of Cons. Electronics, 1988-91 
Rm, 1990 FOB. Prices 
AUDIO EQUIPMENT COLQUR TELEVISIONS 
MONOCHROME TELEV1SIC ViDEO MACHINES 
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largest import item in 1991 was washing machines at R60,7m, 55% of total white goods 
imports. Next came high-end refrigerators at R25,6m (23%), followed by dishwashers at 
________________________________________________ R12m (10%). These are 
items which are not 
produced in great 
quantity locally. 
In small appliances, the 
largest import item is 
microwave ovens, at 
R41,2m in 1991, 44% of 
total small appliance 
imports. Next came 
electric radiators at 
R13,4m (14%), followed 
by hotplates at R12,4m 
(13%), hair dryers at 
Rl0,6m (11%), and 
electric irons at R8,7m 
_____________________________ (9%). 
Imports of parts for 
HEDs are also significant, totalling Ri 97 348 676 in 1991. Imports of parts for consumer 
electronics in 1991 were by far the largest single item at R197 348 676, 89% of total parts 
imports. Imports of parts for small appliances stood at RiO 010 339 (4,56%), whilst those 
for white goods were R13 979 281 (6%). 
The largest single imported part category in 1991 was R174,4m for TV parts — 78,84% of 
the total for HEDs __________________________________________________ 
parts imports. The 
largest single item in 
the TV group was 
colour picture tubes at 
R88,5m. Also R300 
significant was other 
TV parts at R41,7m. 
c) Structure of 
Exports 
Figures on total 
exports of HEDs are 
difficult to obtain, and 
at the time of research 





Imports of Small Appliances, 1988-91 
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Figure B-9 
Imports of HED Parts, 1988-91 
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years prior to 1988 due to secrecy asociated with trade sanctions. Trade statistics on certain 
HEDs and related goods'6are available, however, and are p.resented in Table B-2. They 
show that in 1991 total exports of HEDs, related goods, and parts stood at R66,9m, whilst 
total imports were 1 ,O7bn." Exports were thus 6,25% of imports. Exports of domestic 
appliances and parts comprised 71% of the total. Those of hi-fl and VCRs were 16,4%, and 
those of televisions 12,6%. 
(1) Domestic Appliances 
Within domestic appliances, refrigerators stood out at 46% of domestic appliance exports 
and 33% of HED exports overall. Next was stoves and small appliances at 26% of 
domestic appliances exports and 18,4% of HED exports. Export (re-export) of dishwashers 
stood at 19% of the domestic appliances total and 13,6% of all HED exports. This suggests 
the level of re-export included in other export figures: dishwashers are not produced locally. 
Wrde Goods Sloves, Smel Apps. Auo, VCR TeeOns 
Within consumer electronics, exports of hi-fl, radio and VCRs and parts stood at 16,4% of 
HED exports, whilst those of televisions and parts were 12,6%. Exports of TV parts alone 
16 For example, industrial refrigeration equipment in included in the export figures for refrigerators. I 
have adjusted the import figures used in the following calculations to account for this, but the figures 
can at best be regarded as potentially indicative. 
Current prices. This figure is approximately 40% higher than the figure for HED imports given above. 
Figure B-1O 
Exports of HEDs, 1989-1991 
Rm, 1990 Prices 
(2) Consumer Electronics 
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were over 9% of HED exports — again illustrating the role of re-export in the export 
figures. 
Table B-2: STRUCTURE OF HED EXPORTS, 1988-1991 




REFRIGERATORS 17753534 20397913 18929399 20240680 32,9% 46,4% 
DISHWASI-IERS 5 684 772 7 710 436 5 668 062 8 365 895 13,6% 19,2% 
WASHERS 705 810 1 232 272 1 545 119 1 531 196 2,5% 3,5% 
DRYERS 894 139 3 743 512 3 124 244 2 209 448 3,6% 5,1% 
STOVES & SMALLS 6375 307 9583722 9776386 11 313 088 18,4% 25,9% 
TOTALDA 31413562 42667856 39043210 43660308 71,0% 100,0% 
HI-Fl 1 859 248 1 840 532 4 120 745 5 228 645 8,5% 51,8% 
VCRs 2460743 2212258 1 768 331 1 262 392 2,1% 12,5% 
RADIOS 559 465 1 307 804 3 706 753 2 660 338 4,3% 26,4% 
PARTS 217363 276924 457990 933981 1,5% 9,3% 
TOTALAUDIO& 
VCR 
5096818 5637517 10053819 10085355 16,4% 100,0% 
TELEVISIONS 1 387 480 1 669 492 1 403 353 1 994 760 3,2% 25,7% 
TVPARTS 1390974 2232506 4352445 5755545 9,4% 74,3% 
TOTAL TV 2 778 454 3 901 998 5 755 798 7 750 306 12,6% 100,0% 
TOTAL EXPORTS 39 288 834 52 207 371 54 852 827 61 495 969 100,0% -- 
Source: Trade Statistics for calendar years 1989 and 1990, and Monthly Bulletin Of Trade 
Statistics, January 1992. All figures in 1990 Rands. Figures are inflated due to inclusion of 
some industrial machinery of a similar type. 
3. Trade Trends, 1981-1991 
a) 1981_198718 
The chart following this page presents SACU's 1981-87 shares of global imports and 
exports, by value, of selected HEDs. It also shows SACU's import coverage (the value of 
imports matched by exports of the same product). Finally, it shows the share of total SACU 
imports or exports represented by trade in the product in question. 
This section is based primarily on UNCTAD trade data contained in UNCTAD, 1987 and 1989. South 
African trade data for much of this period is patchy and hard to obtain. Available Customs and Excise 
data corroborates the UNCTAD data used. 
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(1) Domestic Appliances 
(a) Domestic Cooking and Heating Apparati (SIC 6973) 
SACU's imports of SIC 6973 fluctuated considerably as a share of world imports of such 
products. In 1981 they 
stood at only 0,54%. 
By 1983, however, 
they had risen to 8,5% 
of world imports — a 
1 474% increase! 
SACU import share 
stood at 7% in 1984, 
just under 5% in 1985, 
but fell to 0,32% in 
1987. The 1983-85 
jump was enough to 
place SACU in the top 
ten importers of such 
products 
internationally. 
SACU exports of SIC 
6973, on the other 
hand, have remained 
stable at just 0,1 %-0,2% of world exports. Export cover has stood at 20-30%, except 
during the 83-85 period, when it dropped to 2-3% of imports. Most exports of such 
products are re-exports to the rest of Africa (interview sources). 
As might be expected, SIC 6973 import share in the SACU total was minor until 1983, 
when it jumped to 0,78% of total imports. It then moderated to 0,59%. Exports of 6973 as 
a percentage of SACU exports, although tiny, also rose slightly during the 83-85 period. 
(b) Domestic Refrigerators (SIC 77521) 
SACU imports of SIC 77521 tended to fall, from 1,5% of the world total in 1981 to 0,14% 
in 1987. Export share also fell, however, from 0,1% to 0,04%. Export cover has been poor, 
ranging from 2% to 31% (1987). Again, exports are largely r-exports to Africa. Imports 
as a percentage of SACU total imports fluctuated at around 0,1%, whilst the export share 
ranged from 0,05% to 0,1%, making domestic refrigerators SACU's top HED export. 
Export cover, however, was poor until 1987, when it jumped to almost 31% on the basis of 
a rise in exports unmatched by rise in imports. 
(c) Household Laundry Equipment (SIC 7751) 
SACU imports of SIC 7751 (both washers and dyers) fell from 1,5% of world imports in 
1981 to 0,75% in 1987. Exports also fell, but have been so small as to be statistically 
almost unmeasurable. Export cover has thus been very poor — never more than 2%. SIC 
7751 shares of SACU imports and exports were miniscule through the mid- 1980s. 
Figure B-li 
Exports of Appliances, 1988-1991 
1990 Prices 
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(2) Consumer Electronics 
(a) Colour Televisions (SIC 7611) 
SACU share of global CTV imports rose slightly throuhout the 1980s, from 0,03% in 1981 
to 0,17% in 1987. Imports as a percentage of SACU imports were also minor. Exports 
have been negligible as a share of world and SACU exports. Export cover has been very 
poor. 
(b) Television Picture Tubes (SIC 7761) 
Significantly, SACU share of global imports is most significant for consumer electronics 
components such as 
Figure B-12 TV tubes. In 1983 
SACU's share was 
Exports of Televisions and Parts 1,25%, rising to 
Rm, 1990 Rands almost 2% in 1984, 
subsequently 
dropping to 0,63% by 
1987. SACU export 
shares were negligible 
(mostly replacement 
vison Part parts re-exported to 
_________I Africa). As a share of 
SACU total imports, 
TV tubes varied from 
0,1% to 0,15%. 
Export share and 
cover was also 
__________________________________________________________ miniscule. 
(c) VCRs (SIC 76381) 
SACU import share of VCRs also rose dramatically from 1981 to 1983-84, then dropped 
back by 1987. VCRS reached more than half a percentage point of SACU imports during 
the 83-84 period. SACU exports were negligible in relation to world exports and SACU 
total exports, but export cover fluctuated considerably, jumping to almost 30% during 1985. 
This was due to a sharp drop in imports rather than a rise in exports. 
(d) Portable Radios (SIC 7622) 
SACU share of global imports of portable radios fell over the 1980s from 1,26% to 0,15%. 
Share of global exports has been negligible. As a proportion of SACU imports and exports, 
portable radios have also declined. Export cover is practically non-existent. 
(e) Phonographs (SIC 7631) 
SACU import and export trends for these products were practically identical to that of 
portable radios throughout the 1 980s. 
(f) Microphones, Loudspeakers, and Amplifiers (SIC 762) 
SACU shares of global imports of hi-fl and related equipment declined from a high of 
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of SACU imports. Export shares were tiny, as were export shares, with the exception of 
1985, again due to a rapid fall from 1983-84. 
(3) Anal psis 
In most cases SACU shares of global trade were negligible during the 1 980s. In some cases, 
however, such as cooking and heating equipment, VCRS, and TV tubes, SACU shares were 
more significant. SACU exports were insignificant globally, but were stronger in cooking 
and heating equipment and refrigerators than in other products. In no case were SACU 
shares of total global imports greater than 1%. Export cover has also been poor, although 
as might be expected it has improved in periods of domestic recession (such as 1985 
onwards). 
Table B-3: Production, Import and Export GrowthYear on Year Change, 
1981-1991 
From the foregoing it can oe seen that SAC1. 
subject to considerable fluctuation, particularly 
imports and exports of HEDs have been 
during the 1983-85 period. This can be 
FRIDGES AND FRIDGE/FREEZER COMBINATIONS 
Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Production %Change -9,73% -46,71% -2,25% 97,70% -15,12% -12,95% 
Imports % Change -- -35,40% 68,93% -2,37% -70,67% -7 1,35% 
Exports %Change -- -10,14% -48,57% -7,36% 28,45% -88,17% 
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Production %Change 2,17% 13,40% 54,88% 1,93% -2,47% 
Imports %Change 13,95% -- -- -- -- 
Exports %Change 811,63% -- -- -- -- 
WASHING MACHINES____ ____ 
Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Production % Change -17,02% -14,10% -7,46% 6,45% -18,18% 10,72% 
Imports % Change -- -64,86% -7,15% 28,84% -124,58% 49,71% 
Exports %Change -- -375,0% -6,67% -59,57% 41,25% -788% 
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Production %Change -26,14% 17,03% 31,62% 60,70% -20,51% 
Imports % Change 12,08% -- -- -- -- 
Exports %Change -12,50% -- -- -- -- 
ELECTRIC STOVES 
Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Production % Change 52,66% -35,44% -4,41% -3,08% -20,11% -2,59% 
Imports %Change -- -18,63% 16536% -25,91% -28,18% -93,76% 
Exports %Change -- 32,56% -18,58% 5,52% -8,41% -23,56% 
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Production % Change -0,79% 19,26% 2,22% -9,45% -2,79% 
Imports % Change 24,03% -- -- -- -- 
Exports % Change 5,70% -- -- -- -. 
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explained by the relationship between domestic production, imports, exports and external 
and external macroeconomic fluctuations. 
Table B-3 shows the year-on-year change in production, importation, and exportation of 
selected HEDs. From it emerges a general picture with the following features: 
• Imports rose much more strongly than production in the 1983-1984 upturn. In the case 
of refrigerators, imports rose by almost 70% in 1983, whilst production fell. Production 
only rose strongly the following year. Imports also fell more strongly than production in 
the recession years of 1985-86. Imports also fluctuated wildly in the case of washing 
machines and EFS stoves, whilst production showed a distinct lag. This suggests a 
much slower reaction time for domestic producers vis-a-vis imports. Should this trend 
continue, increased demand due to mass housing and/or electrification programmes 
may lead to imports on afar greater scale than suggested in Chapter Four 
• In the case of EFS stoves, production continued to decline after the massive 1983 import 
increase of 1653%, suggesting that over-imports in a brief upturn period reduced sales 
of domestically-produced products for several years. 
• Exports tended to fall strongly during the upturn and to rise again during downswings. 
This is to be expected, but the magnitude of the shifts suggests that export performance 
may have been due more to attempts to reduce stocks and maintain throughput than to 
genuine competitiveness. This is supported by interview sources who admit that 
exports did not become viable until the General Export Incentive Scheme was 
introduced in the early l990s. 
b) 1989-1991" 
Exports and imports of specific items for 1988-1991 are listed on the chart following this 
page. A detailed breakdown of imports of HEDs is included in the Appendix to this chapter. 
Overall, South Africa's imports of HEDs fell in real terms from Rl,2bn in 1988 to just 
under R700m in 1991 (1990 Rands). Imports thus fell a total of 32%, for an annual average 
of -11%. 
Export growth in most categories, however, has been strong, even in real terms. Overall, 
real exports grew by 56,5%, for an annual average of almost 17%. Much of this growth in 
exports is probably to be explained by the impact of domestic recession and export 
incentives. 
(1) Domestic Appliances 
In real terms, imports of all major domestic appliances fell over the period. Exports grew 
significantly in all products, but from very low bases. It is notable that export growth by 
value were strongest in products in which the South African industry is particularly weak, 
such as dishwashers (47%), washing machines (33%), and dryers (91%). 
' This section is based on Customs and Excise data for 1988-1991, as contained in annual and quarterly 
trade statistics. 
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(2) Consumer Electronics 
Imports stagnated or fell in every category except televisions, which experienced an average 
import growth of 50,5% p.a. Exports of parts for consumer electronics products grew 
especially strongly — an unlikely scenario. 
(3) Ana!sis 
Total exports of HEDs and related equipment grew 56,5%% over the period 1988-91, at an 
average rate of 16,7%% p.a.; whilst imports fell by 32%. Import cover increased in all 
products except televisions, which saw this index drop by 45%. Most export increases, 
however, were from a very low base in rand terms. Where exports were already 
considerable, as in refrigerators, growth has been less spectacular: 14% 1988-91, at an 
average annual rate of under 5%. 
Exports seem to have grown for a combination of reasons: 
• As the local market has stagnated, local firms have sought to unload excess capacity 
and existing stock through export at — or below — cost. 
• GElS payments have stimulated exports, particularly of M-Net type decoders, which are 
presently exported to Europe by several television manufacturers. These firms 
consistently affirm that exports would not occur or be profitable without these subsidies. 
• Structural adjustment programmes for the television industry, which penalise net foreign 
exchange usage, have encouraged spurious re-export of parts and kits to obtain both 
GElS subsidies and reduced excise duties. At least one recent entrant to the television 
market is suspected of exporting sets to Malawi and re-importing them under a 
preferential trade agreement, gaining in both directions. 
4. Prospects 
a) Exports 
In spite of limited export success, the South African HED industry is unlikely to become a 
major exporter in the near Jlture. Indeed, although a great deal of emphasis has been 
placed on the need to attain international competitiveness, it is unlikely that even price 
competitiveness will allow exports into the global HED market. 
1. Firstly, South Africa is geographically isolated from major growth markets for these 
goods, which are in Asia and potentially in Eastern Europe. This is not a significant 
barrier in the small appliance or audio market, but bulky low-value products such as 
televisions and white goods suffer significant transport disadvantages with distance. As 
the data presented in first part of this chapter shows, most trade in white goods in 
particular is intra-regional, dominated by Europe. To break into this market would 
require a major improvement in costs, quality, and performance. This is not impossible, 
but may not be a priority, given the prospect of mass housing and electrification 
programmes. 
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2. Secondly, global HED markets are by and large replacement markets well-served by 
existing manufacturers, many of whom hold restrictive agreements with South African 
firms. Again, to penetrate these markets, South African firms would have to become 
exceptionally low-cost producers of relatively sophisticated goods, a process which 
would be partly at cross-purposes to the needs of the domestic market. But more 
importantly, they would have to compete head-on with major, established firms who 
hold key brand names and technology licenses which restrict South African exports. 
Even highly competitive firms with in-house product technology such as New Zealand's 
Fisher & Paykel have found it difficult to make inroads into the European market for 
this reason (interview sources). 
3. Thirdly, the trend in global markets for both consumer electronics and white goods, as 
we have seen, is for either increasing amalgamation of firms into larger units (white 
goods) or increasing concentration of production (consumer electronics). The centrality of brand name, R&D commitment, and marketing and supplier networks in such 
markets means that small peripheral manufacturers such as South Africa :c HED 
industry may be better off negotiate sourcing agreements with such firms, at least for 
the short run. 
4. Fourthly, the technological backwardness of the South African HED industry does not 
augur well for its success in global markets whose main competitive point is rapid 
product development and associated manufacturing flexibility. South African firms 
have and can learn much from manufacturing for the fragmented domestic market, 
which demands flexibility. Given this and the need to meet basic needs in the near 
future, an orientation towards the domestic market may serve as a good springboard into 
exports later. 
5. Finally, in the absence of a near-miraculous economic turnaround, the much-vaunted 
African market is unlikely to present a significant export opportunity. 
South African HED firms would certainly benefit from exports, and may have already. 
Nevertheless, for the foreseeable future exports will probably be a by-product of successful 
production in and for the domestic market rather than a conscious strategy to go global. 
A good case in point is New Zealand's Fisher and Paykel. This firm was founded in 1934, 
and for most of its existence has serviced the tiny domestic New Zealand market, utilising a 
combination of high tariffs and restrictive marketing agreements with retailers. Exports 
began in earnest in the 1970s, but became a serious issue in the late l980s when the 
Conservative government swept away import duties practically overnight. This forced F&P 
to expand its exports dramatically. This was not easy — in spite of a free trade agreement 
even the adjacent Australian market remained impenetrable given brand loyalties and 
marketing structures. F&P's strategy to achieve export success has been (i) to concentrate 
heavily on reorganisation of its manufacturing processes, both organisationally and through 
in-house deselopment of flexible automation technologies; (ii) to develop equity links with 
European white goods manufacturers in order to gain access to niches within the continent's 
380m market; and (iii) to move production offshore by setting up a plant in Brisbane. The 
point made very strongly by F&P is that these steps were only possible given its prior 
investment in major in-house capability in product and process design — and its unusually 
well-developed organisational practices, centred on a progressive works agreement with the 
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New Zealand Engineer's Union and others. In both respects, South African firms have far 
to go, as Chapter Five will argue. 
b) Tariff Protection 
The opinion in the local industry is that a minimum of 25% nominal net protection is needed 
to sustain production of most domestic appliances for the foreseeable future (interview 
sources; DAMSA 1991). It is claimed that this is due to the higher overheads resulting from 
a small local market and high local input costs. 
It is hard to say what the future environment of international trade will be for the HED 
industry, as GATT may yet reclassify South Africa as a developing country, allowing a 
measure of infant-industry protection. The HED industry can hardly qualify as an infant 
industry, however; and ultimately the question of a future tariff structure must be considered 
in the light of both the potential costs and benefits of liberalisation and the possibilities of 
restructuring behind tariffs. These issues will be considered in Chapter Four and Chapter 
Five, respectively. 
C. Summary and Conclusion 
The main points arising from this chapter are as follows: 
1. Global Trends 
1. Global HED import shares have shifted towards Europe and the Americas, whilst export 
shares have shifted towards the Pacific Basin, and within it away from Japan and 
towards the NICs. 
2. Global markets for HEDs are dominated by large multinationals who are getting larger, 
both through acquisition and merger (white goods) and through concentration of market 
share (consumer electronics). 
3. Global markets for HEDs are basically saturated, and growth is through competition for 
market share, both through aggressive production rationalisation and new products. 
This requires significant R&D and marketing resources. 
4. The best approach for smaller-country HED firms may be to form strategic alliances 
with such firms to obtain access to their strengths in market access, product design, and 
production technology. This is the only practical route for firms who lack the in-house 
capacities of successful niche marketers such as Fisher and Paykel. 
2. South Africa's Trade in HEDs 
1. South Africa is a minor player in world markets for HEDs, although our overall share 
of trade in consumer electronics is significant. 
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2. hnports of HEDs have fluctuated considerably and are presently decreasing, but have 
tended to be the main source of supply during periods of upswing such as 1983-84. 
This may suggest (i) rigidity in local production and an inability to react quickly; (ii) the 
impact of exchange rate fluctuations, which hurt domestic producers by cheapening 
imports and raising the cost of imported components; and/or (iii) dumping. 
3. South African exports of HEDs have been negligible, but have increased recently for a 
number of reasons, most of which do not suggest increased competitiveness. 
4. The tariff structure with respect to HEDs is generally straightforward. Average nominal 
tariffs for white goods and small appliances are about 30%, whilst those for consumer 
electronics are in the 90% range. Duties on parts are also about 30% for domestic 
appliances, but in the 20%-30% for consumer electronics — implying significantly 
higher effective rates of protection. Surcharges play an important role in protection in 
some cases. 
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Source: UNCTAD Yearooks of International Trade, 1987 and 1989 
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IMPORTS 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Africa 4,7 4,3 5,3 3,1 4,3 2,1 1,9 1,6 1,5 2,7 
Americas 31,2 24,1 27,5 33,7 29,5 32,0 39,0 39,7 36,8 29,6 
Asia 12,4 16,5 18,2 20,9 20,0 19,9 16,6 16,7 12,5 14,3 
Europe 47 53,6 47,6 40,5 44,5 44,5 40,8 40,6 47,9 52,1 
Dceana 2,0 1,5 1,3 1,7 1,7 1,6 1,8 1,4 1,3 1,4 
SACU - — - - -- - — — - - 
EXPORTS 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
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5,2 
0,1 
7,3 Americas 8,1 7,3 10,7 10,0 8,3 6,5 6,7 6,2 
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Radio Broadcast Receivers (SIC 762) 
IMPORTS 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Africa 2,6 2,7 5,8 4,2 4,1 1,6 1,5 1,0 1,0 1,1 
mericas 43,6 38,8 34,2 42,7 42,0 46,3 54,6 56,2 46,3 44,9 
Asia 11,8 13,3 16,5 14,0 14,7 16,4 13,5 11,8 14,3 15,4 
Europe 40 42,9 44 36,8 3&6 339 28,1 28 36 36,8 
Oceana 1,9 2,2 23 23 2,5 L9 23 2,1 L7 L7 
SACU — — — — — 0,41% 0,56% 0,26% 0,25% 0,34% 
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Sound iC1t'1\ "'''"F,"I-'"'-"''-'.') 
IMPORTS 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Africa 3,7 2,1 2,9 3,8 2,3 2,0 1,8 0,9 0,8 1,0 
mericas 39,6 34,7 31,6 35,1 33,3 36,9 49,1 57,3 52,6 43,1 
Asia 12,8 14,5 16,7 14,5 13,8 14,5 12,9 9,7 8,8 11,4 
Europe 4L7 46,2 46,4 43 47,3 42,5 32,6 29,9 35,7 42,4 
Oceana 2,3 2,5 2,3 2,9 3,3 4,1 3,6 2,2 2,1 2,0 
SACU 0,41% 0,56% 0,26% 0,25% 0,34% 
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SACIJ - - - 
Rank 78 Top Ten Impoiters 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
1 USA 34,7 29,0 24,8 28,1 26.8 32,3 43,9 52,7 48,2 38,3 
2 Gemiany (W.) 113 11,9 12,0 10,2 9,9 10,4 8,5 7,0 7,6 93 
5 UK 5,7 7,6 8,3 10,8 14,5 12,7 7,0 7,1 6,3 7,2 
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4 Netherlands 5,8 4,8 4.2 3,0 3,1 3,3 2,9 2,8 3,4 3,5 
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Source: UNCTAD Yearbooks of International Trade, 1987, 1989 
Notes: I All figures in thousands of current US Dollars 
2. World Total refers to total global imports or exports of that commodity. "SACU 
Imports/Exports" refers to SACU imports/exports of that commodity. "Total SACU 
Imports and Exports" refers to Merchandise only (i.e excluding gold). 
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R78 R4 Ri30 R64 R9 R8 R9 
SACUShare 
TotalSACUExports 








- 0,0013% j 0,0015% 
-- -- 
-- -- 
Ru 016245 R9634863 
S1C7631 Share 0,0007% 0,0000% 0,0013% 
ExportsImports 0,75% 0,10% 2,74% 1,29% 0,73% 0,72% 0,60% 
LMicrophones, Loudspeakers and Amplifiers 
!MPORTS 
1981 
WorldTotal — R2288 928 
(SIC 7642) 
1982 1983 







cACUlmports R36 025 R2i 159 R18 247 R24 OIl R7784 R6987 Ri5 372 
SACUShare 1,57% 1,11% 1,00% 1,24% 0,38% 0,28% 0,47% 
TotalSACUlmports R21 077408 Ri6 97! 399 Ri4527697 Ri4 955 789 RiO 319 196 -- -- 
-- -- SIC7642Share 0,1709% 0,1247% 0,1256% 0,1605% 0,0754% 
EXPORTS 1981 1982 - 1983 
RI 588 429 
1984 - 
Ri 705 309 
1985 1986 1987 
WorldTotal 
SACU Exports 
R2 iii 493 Ri 549 182 1729385 R2 152 151 R2 574 08! 
R153 Ri89 RI 065 Ri 159 RI 193 R36 R53 
SACU Share 0,0072% 0,0122% 0,0670% 0,0680% 0,0690% 0,0017% I 0,0021% 
-- -- - - 
-- -- 
Total SACU Exports Ri! 016 245 R9 634 863 R9 649 145 R9 427795 R9 372 122 
SIC 7642 Share 0,0014% 0,0020% O,OiiO% 0,0123% 0,0127% 
xports/Imports 0,42% 0,89% 5,84% 4,83% 15,33% 0,52% 0,34% 
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EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF HEDs AND RELATED EQUIPMENT I 
SOURCE TRADE STATISTICS FOR CALENDAR YEARS 1989 AND 1990, AND 
MONTHLY BULLETIN OF TRADE STATISTICS, JANUARY 1992. ALL FIGURES IN 
CURRENT PRICES 
NOTE FIGURES ARE INFLATED DUE TO INCLUSION OF INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY OF A SIMILAR TYPE 
PPI 74.2 88.9 100.0 108.9 
DOMESTIC APPLIANCES 
1988 1989 1990 1991 %GROVITH 
1988-91 REFRIGERATORS 
exports 13 173 122 18 133 745 18929399 22042 101 67,33% 
l990Rands 17753534 20397913 18929399 20240680 14,01% 
Avg. Growth P.A. 14,89% -7,20% 6,93% 4,87% 
imports 107510365 117601371 101681706 124063367 15,40% 
l99ORands 144892675 132285007 101681706 113924120 -21,37% 
Avg. Growth P.A. -8,70% -23,13% 12,04% -6,60% 
X/M% 12,25% 15,42% 18,62% 17,77% 45,00% 
Avg. Growth P.A. 25,85% 20,73% .4,56% 14,00% 
DISHWASHERS 





47,16% l99ORands 5684772 7710436 
Avg. Growth P.A. 35,63% -26,49% 47,60% 18,91% 
imports 152 565 356 167 212 559 211 335 146 178 946 304 17,29% 
1990 Rands - 205 613 687 188 090 618 211 335 146 164 321 675 .20,08% 








Avg. Growth PA. 48,27%L -34,57% 89,83% 34,51% 
WASHING MACHINES 
523 711 exports 1 095 490 1 545 119 1667472 218,40% 
1990 Rands 705 810 1 232 272 1545 119 1531196 116,94% 
Avg. Growth P.A. ip_ 56271 595 25,39% 36541883: 6537663 -0,90% 33,03% 165855228 173% 
60473 120 -20,26% 1990 Rinds 75 837 729 41104480 65 376 631 
Avg. Growth P.A. 
X/M% 









exports 663 451 3 327 982 3 124 244 2 406 089 262,66% 
1990 Rands 894 139 3743512 3 124 244 2209448 147,10% 
Avg. Growth PA. 
imports 77 166 330 
318,67%-16,54% 
80373 828 102 131 816 
.29,28% 
46365 189 -39,92% 
1990 Rands 103997749 90409255 102131816 42575931 -59,06% 
Avg. Growth P.A. -13,07% 12,97% -58,31% -19,47% 
X/M% 0,86% 4,14%: 3,06% 5,19% 503,59% 
Avg. Growth PA. 381,60% I -26,12% 69,64% 141,71% 
STOVES AND SMALLS 
exports 4730478 8519929 9776386 12319953 160,44% 
1990 Rands 
Avg. Growth PA. 
6375307 9583722 9776386 11313088 
50,33% 2,01% 15,72%T 22,68% 
imports 196 171 153 124 181 777 121 319 410 132 106 578 -32,66% 
1990 Rands 264 381 608 139 687 038 121 319 410 121 309 989 -54,12% 
Av&. Growth P.A. - -47,16% -1345% -0,01% -20,11% 
X/M% 












Avg. Growth P.A. 
- 1 379562 
— 1 859 248 
— 1 63623J 4120745 








imports 120 485 856 105 891 884 L 131 007 552 135 917 060 12,81% 
l99ORands — 162379860 119113480 131007552 124809054 -23,14% 








Avg. Growth P.A. 34,95% 103,56% 33,19% 57,23% 
VRs 
exports — 1 825871 1 966 697 1 768 331 
- 
- 1 374745 -24,71% 
l99ORands 2460743 2212258 1768331 1262392 -48,70% 
Avg. Growth P.A. -10,10% -20,07% -28,61% -19,59% 
88 588 467 39462028 54723 776 57379694 -35,23% 
1990 Rands 119391465 44389233 54723776 52690261 -55,87% 











Avg Growth P.A. -35,16% - -. -2j_ 
- 
26,93% 
HI-Fl AND VIDEO PART 
exports 161 283 246 185 457 990 1 017 105 530,63% 
l99ORands 217363 276924 457990 933981 329,69% 
Avg. Growth P.A. 
imports 
l99ORands 

























RADIOS OF ALL TYPES 
exports 415 123 1162 638 3 706 753 2 897 108 597,89% 
l99ORands 559465 - 1307804 3706753 2660! 375,51% 
Ave. Growth . P.A 133,76% 183,43% -28,23% J 96,32% 
imports 145276932 76923251 117952132 139172692J -4,20% 
1990 Bands 195 791 013 86527841 117 952 132 127 798 615 -34,73% 
Avg. Growth P.A. 











Avg. Growth P.A. 
1 029 510 1 484 178 1 403 353 
1669492 1403353 
20,33% -15,94% 







imports 16 850 545 49454891 56779 107 64499489 282,77% 
1990 Rands 22709629 55629799 56779107 59228181 160,81% 













1 032 103 
1 390 974 






Avg. Growth P.A. 
99085421 
60,50% 94,96% 






Avg. Growth P.A. 
133 538 303 134 413 786 101 767 830 
0,66% -24,29% 




X/M% 1,04% 1,66% 4,28% 5,66% 443,77% 




46412353 54852827 — --- - 
52207371 54852827 
- - 32,43% 
66969110 --- 






Avg. Growth P.A. 
TOTAL IMPORTS — - 1 073 223 790 
32,88% 5,07% 





1990 Bands — 
Avg. Growth P.A. 
X/M% 
1 446 393 248 
2,72% 










Avgpwth P.A. 82 2,01% - - 23,48% 36,09% 
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I EXPORTS OF CONSUMER DURABLES I 
SOURCE: TRADE STATISTICS FOR CALENDAR YEARS 1989 AND 1990, 
AND MONTHLY BULLETIN OF TRADE STATISTICS, JANUARY 1992 
NOTE: FIGURES ARE INFLATED DUE TO INCLUSION OF INDUSTRIAL MAClINER 
OF A SIMILAR TYPE 
PPI 74.2 88.9 100.0 108.9 
ITEM 1988 1989 1990 1991 
REFRIGERATORS 
AND PARTS 
CURRENT 13173122 18133745 18929399 22042101 
1990 
% CHANGE 
17753534 20397913 18929399 
-7,2% 
20240680 
6,9% -- 14,9% 
DISHWASHERS 
ANDPARTS 
CURRENT 4218101 6854578 5668062 9110460 
1990 5684772 7710436 5668062 8365895 




CURRENT 523 711 1 095 490 1 545 119 1 667 472 
1990 705 810 1 232 272 1 545 119 1 531 196 
% CHANGE — 74,6% 25,4% -0,9% 
DRYERS AND 
PARTS 
CURRENT 663 451 3 327 982 3 124 244 2 406 089 
1990 894 139 3 743 512 3 124 244 2209448 
% CHANGE -- 318,7% -16,5% -29,3% 
TOTALWG CURRENT 18578385 29411795 29266824 35226122 
1990 25 038 255 33 084 134 29266 824 32347 219 




CURRENT 4 730 478 8 519 929 9 776 386 12 319 953 
1990 6375307 9583722 9776386 11313088 
% CHANGE -- 50,3% 2,0% 15,7% 
HI-Fl CURRENT 1 379 562 1 636 233 4 120 745 5 693 994 
1990 1 859 248 1 840 532 4 120 745 5 228 645 
% CHANGE -- -1,0% 123,9% 26,9% 
VCRS CURRENT 1 825 871 1 966 697 1 768 331 1 374 745 
1990 2460743 2212258 1768331 1262392 




CURRENT 161 283 246 185 457 990 1 017 105 
1990 217 363 276 924 457 990 933 981 
% CHANGE -- 27,4% 65,4% 103,9% 
RADIOS OF 
ALL TYPES 
CURRENT 415 123 1162638 3 706 753 2 897 108 
1990 559 465 1 307 804 3 706 753 2 660 338 
% CHANGE -- 133,8% 183,4% -28,2% 
TOTAL AUDIO 
ANDVCR 
CURRENT 3 781 839 5 011 753 10053 819 10982952 
1990 5096818 5637517 10053819 10085355 




1 029 510 
1 387 480 
1 484 178 
1 669 492 
1 403 353 2 172 294 
1 403 353 1 994 760 
-- 20,3% -15,9% 42,1% 
TELEVISION 
PARTS 
CURRENT 1 032 103 1 984 698 4 352 445 6 267 789 
1990 1 390 974 2 232 506 4 352 445 5 755 545 
% CHANGE -- 60,5% 95,0% 32,2% 
TOTAL TV CURRENT 2 061 613 3 468 876 5 755 798 8 440 083 
1990 2778 454 3 901 998 5 755 798 7 750 306 
% CHANGE -- 40,4% 47,5% 34,7% 
TOTALEXPORTS CURRENT 29152315 46412353 54852827 66969110 
1990 39 288 834 52 207 371 54 852 827 61 495 969 
%CHANGE -- 32,9% 5,1% 12,1% 
Chapter Four: Household Electrical Durables, 
Electrification, and the Macroeconomy 
A. Electrification and The Macroeconomy 
1. Introduction 
One of the most important arguments advanced by supporters of redistributive economics in 
a future South Africa is that two birds may be killed by one stone thereby: redistribution will 
be good not only for those disadvantaged by apartheid, but for the economy as well. 
Redistribution, it is claimed, will lead to a demand-led recovery based on the domestic 
manufacture of goods for the local market. This will not only stimulate growth, but will 
assist a structural transformation of the South African economy away from production and 
export of primary products, towards manufactures. 
Mass housing and electrification programmes have been put forward as a major component 
of such a process (for e.g., Theron, 1991; Berrisford and Bluff, 1991; Roohani, 1987; 
Gervais, 1987; ANC, 1991). It has been expected that such programmes will stimulate a 
range of industries, from power and transmission equipment to building materials. One such 
industry is the HED industry, for the obvious reason that it is well-placed to supply the 
increased demand for HEDs which will accompany urbanisation, better housing, and 
electrification. 
A prevailing assumption within ANC and COSATU circles has been that employment in the 
HED industry will grow as a result of electrification. What has been lacking are 
microeconomic foundations on which to base such projections. Indeed, there are few 
reliable projections of electrification's impact on the HED industry, and the economy more 
generally. 
This chapter seeks to help fill this gap by combining information on the South African HED 
industry, assembled from a variety of sources, with estimations of electrification's impact on 
HED sales developed by the author. The basic method has been to construct a set of 
projections which combine market data, foreign exchange usage, production cost structures, 
and value added analysis with details of HED sales to the urban black market during 1989- 
1991. This provides an estimation of the potential impact of further electrification on 
several key macroeconomic magnitudes, including the following: 
The total and marginal impact of electrification of urban black households on market 
size, domestic production and value added (of final products and first-round 
intermediates), and import requirements of both finished goods and intermediate inputs. 
These projections are presented below for the first year of electrification, and for a five- 
year period. They are based on two hypothetical cases of electrification, one of 
650 000 houses over five years, the other of 2 000 000. They are counterposed to 
comparable figures for fiscal year 1991-1992. 
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• An assessment of the net benefit to the South African economy of producing these 
goods locally under current conditions, compared to a series of counterfactuals in which 
they were imported at free or reduced rates of duty. 
• An assessment of the Domestic Resource Cost1 to the South African economy of local 
production of these goods over the electrification period. 
a) A Cautionary Note 
Information of the type presented below has been eagerly sought by participants in the 
debate on electrification and redistribution. In particular, those in favour of such 
programmes are eager to show their supposed macroeconomic benefits. Before proceeding, 
however, it is absolutely essential that these projections be regarded with caution, for the 
following reasons: 
• They are based on data gathered from a variety of sources, some of which were 
documents prepared by the HED industry, some government statistics, and some private 
consultancy reports. I have found these sources to be conflicting, and have had to use 
my judgement as to which to regard as the most accurate. 
• Some of the sources used were prepared by the HED industry in presentations to the 
government in favour of continued protection. I have attempted to verify independently 
their estimates of domestic value added and forex requirements, but have had to trust 
them in most cases. 
• These figures are from 1989 and may have changed considerably since then. 
• The projections concern ex-factory sales and CIF import values only, and thus do not 
include retail mark-ups, value added in retail, etc. In other words, these are not retail 
prices, but "wholesale". This seemed like a more sensible way to compare imports and 
local manufactures. 
• The projections are not total projections for the entire economy, They are projections 
of the impact of electrification of urban black households only. Where figures for the 
marginal and total market resulting from electrification are presented, they are based on 
FY 1991's actual market plus the additional sales imputed to electrification only. This 
applies pan passu to all figures subsequently derived, such as value added, 
intermediate input requirements, and imports. Thus excluded are (i) the effects of 
changes in personal disposable income and private consumption expenditure, (ii) 
relative price changes to the products in question, (iii) sales growth to other 'population 
groups', and (iv) electrification of rural areas. 
• The projections assume unchanged microeconomic variables over the period, such as 
rates of value added, import content of domestic products, import shares of the 
domestic market, and so on. This is of course unrealistic. Yet assuming that they 
remain the same has the advantage of indicating potential areas for policy to address: 
for example, increasing domestic value added, local content, equalising tariffs, and so 
on. 
• The projections cover only selected products for which information was available. 
Thus excluded are all small appliances, including microwaves, and a panoply of 
consumer electronics, including the all-important audio portion. The items covered, 
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however, are those either most heavily demanded by urban black households or 
problematic from a manufacturing standpoint. Audio products, for example, are not a 
viable area for South African manufacture (see Chapter Five) and including them would 
have been stating the obvious, although the import projections would have been very 
useful. Televisions, on the other hand, may not be a viable domestic product, but there 
is considerable debate about this and the projections may help to make a decision. 
Small appliances will almost certainly be a positive factor in all respects as imports are 
small. Including them would have made the aggregate figures better, but would not 
have been as illuminating from the perspective of industrial policy (data on them was 
also not available). 
The early 1994 exchange rate of US$1 = R$3,40 has been used throughout. 
B. Electrification, HED Take-up, and Economic Cost 
1. Rates of Electrification and HED Uptake 
Table One (following this page) lists the number of electrified urban black households, as 
well as those owning selected HEDs, in 1989 and 1991. It shows the total increase in 
electrified urban black households and households owning the product, as well as the 
average yearly increase. It also shows the increase in HED ownership as a percentage of the 
increase in the number of electrified urban black households. Finally, it shows the average 
yearly increase as a percentage of the total South African market for that product in FY 
1991. 
a) Analysis 
All products were taken up by electrified urban black households more rapidly than the 
rate of electrification, with the exception of EFS stoves, chest freezers, and washing 
machines. In the case of tumble dryers and VCRS the rate of increase was dramatic, 
although from a very low base. This suggests that factors other than electrification, 
such as urbanisation, income shifts, and increasing home ownership are also significant 
influences on the rate of appliance uptake. 
• In the case of hotplates, refrigerators, televisions, and VCRs, average annual uptake 
was a very significant proportion of the FY 1991 market for those products. This is 
probably to be explained by their practicality or popularity in urban areas and the 
unavailability of substitutes. 
• The slow rate of uptake of EFS stoves and washing machines may be explained by the 
factors discussed in Chapter One. In particular, the high relative cost of EFS stoves 
and the ready availability of alternative cooking methods has slowed penetration very 
considerably. The high cost of washing machines and the easy substitutability of 
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2. Projected Electrification and HED Uptake 
Table Two shows two scenarios of electrification and HED uptake. One scenario assumes 
130 000 newly electrified households pa. over five years; the other assumes 400 000 p.a. 
Column One shows the first year's projected increase in electrified urban black households 
over 1991's total. It then assumes that that year's rate of HED uptake increases by the same 
factor. Column Two lists the percentage by which projected uptake of each product exceeds 
FY 1991's actual increase. Column Three shows the percentage by which the projected rate 
of uptake of each product exceeds (or lags behind) the rate of increase in electrified urban 
black households. Column Five shows the projected unit increase as a percentage of the FY 
1991 market volume for each product (Column Four), whilst Column Six gives a projected 
unit market volume for the first year of electrification. 
Table Three shows the impact of the data presented in Table Two on marginal and total 
market values. 
Columns 1-3 of Table 3a show FY 1991 unit sales, the average percentage of those sales 
provided by imports, and the remainder produced locally. Column 4r gives an average ex- 
factory price for the product, whilst Column 5 gives the resulting total ex-factory sales. 
Column 6 lists the total unit imports for FY 1991, whilst Columns 7 and 8 list average CIF 
import prices and the total CIF import value, respectively. Column 9 gives the FY 1991 
"total economic cost" of the market for those products — in the sense of resources forgone 
through domestic production or imports, excluding retail sales margins. Note that Column 9 
does not represent retail market values. 
Tables 3b and 3c list projected additional unit sales, domestic unit production, and unit 
imports based on the electrification scenarios developed in Table 2. Using the ex-factory 
prices and CIF import values from Table 3a, projections for additional total ex-factory sales 
value, CIF import value, and total "additional economic cost" are listed in Columns 4, 7 and 
8, respectively. Column 9 gives the projected "total economic cost" for each scenario, which 
is simply FY 1991's market values from Column 9 of Table 3a plus the additional values 
given in Column 8 of Tables 3a and b. 
a) Analysis 
(1) Table Two 
• As in Table One, in most cases the rate of HED uptake (Column 3) exceeds that of 
electrification, with the exception of EFS stoves, chest freezers, and washing machines. 
In all cases the projected increase in HED uptake is a very significant percentage of the 
FY 1991 market total (Column 5). A more rapid rate of electrification doubles or more 
than doubles the annual South African market for refrigerators, televisions, and VCRS. 
Potential market growth is also significant for EFS stoves and hotplates. 
• Projected market growth over 1991 is not significantly over 100% except in the cases of 
refrigerators, tumble dryers and televisions under the Best Case scenario. In the cases 
of cooking and other laundry products it is significant, but not unduly challenging — 
certainly no more so than the large fluctuations in sales experienced after 1983 and 
1990. This implies that the South African HED industry should be able to handle the 
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Table Two: Electrification and Appliance Takeup: 
Scenarios of Impact on Market Unit Volumes, First Year 
Table 2a: Worst Case: 650 000 Newly Electrified Homes over Five Years 
(130 000 Newly Electrified Homes Per Year 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Projected % Change % of Electri- 1991/2 1 as % Projected New 
Unit Increase from 91 fication Rate Market of 4 Unit Sales 
Electrified Hsds. 130 000 12,2% 100,0% 90015 144,4% 130 000 
EFS Stoves 26457 4,9% 39,9% 108 200 24,5% 134 657 
Built-in Oven 5 098 12,2% 100,0% 41 900 12,2% 46998 
cççgHob 2549 12,2% l00% 43000 5,9% 45549 
Hotplates 82 161 19,7% 161,2% 288 000 28,5% 370 161 
Refrigerators 207 842 19,5% 159,6% 218 000 95,3% 425 842 
Chest Freezers 25 0,0% 0,2% 87 900 0,0% 87 925 
Automatic Washers 13468 10,1% 82,7% 81 700 16,5% 95 168 
Twin-tub Washers (6595) -14,8% -121,6% 57 200 -11,5% 50605 
TumbleDriers 27185 122,3% 1002,2% 37400 72,7% 64585 
Televisions 325 425 25,4% 208,2% 475 000 68,5% 800 425 
VCRs 170905 96,1% 787,5% 107402 159,1% 278307 
Table 2b: Best Case: 2 000000 New ly Electrifie d Homes over Five Years 
(400000 Ne wly Elect rifled Homes Per Yea r) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Projected % Change % of Electri- 199 1/2 1 as % Projected New 
Unit Increase from 91 fication Rate Market of 4 Unit Sales 
Electhfied Hsds. 400 000 37,56% 100,0% 90015 444,4% 400 000 
EFS Stoves 81 405 15,00% 
- 
39,9% 108 200 75,2% 189 605 
Built-in Oven 15 686 37,56% 100,0% 41 900 37,4% 57 586 
Cooking Hob 7 843 37,56% 100,0% 43000 18,2% 50843 
Hotplates 252 803 60,54% 161,2% 288 000 87,8% 540 803 
Refrigerators 639 515 59,96% 159,6% 218 000 293,4% 857 515 
Chest Freezers 77 0,06% 0,2% 87 900 0,1% 87 977 
123 140 Automatic Washers 41 440 31,08% 82,7% 81 700 50,7% 
Twin-tub Washers (20 294 -45,67% -12 1,6% 57 200 -35,5% 36 906 
Tumble Driers 83 645 376,44% 1002,2% 37 400 223,7% 121 045 
Televisions 1 001 307 78,22% 208,2% 475 000 210,8% 1 476 307 
VCRs 525 861 295,83% 787,5% 107 402 489,6% 633 263 
Notes: 
1. Column 1 has been derived by first calculating the percentage increase in electrified households 
relative to 1991 implied by a rate of 130 000 or 400000 new hook-ups per year, and multiplying this 
by the factor relating electrification and take-up rates for each appliance derived in Column 7 of Table 
2. The projected annual increase in take-up of each appliance is then calculated by multiplying this 
result by 1991's stock of each appliance in urban black households. For example, the increase in 
EFS stoves is (12.2% x 39.9%) x 542 880. This is consistent with the linear relationshiop described 
in Note 4 of Table 1 and in the text, and the restrictive assumptions underlying it. 
3. Column 5, 'las a% of 4', is analogous to Column 9 in Table 1. 
4. Column 6, 'New Msrket Total', is the projected size of the South African market for that 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































., z C C (I, H > C') H m 0 -c a C- m 0 H 
HOUSEHOLD ELECTRICAL DURABLES NDUSTRIES 125 
projected increase in sales consequent on electrification quite easiiy, given current 
underutilisation of capacity. 
(2) Table Three 
• In value terms particularly strong growth can be expected in refrigerators and 
televisions. The annual value of the South African television market could easily top 
R950 000. It should be borne in mind, however, that this figure could be significantly 
lower if duties were relaxed and cheaper imports allowed to enter the market. 
• In terms of local manufacturing per se, the main issue will probably not be the need to 
find sources of new investment in new capacity, but firms' ability to avoid bottlenecks 
in materials, components, labour and organisation. However, the more basic issue will 
probably be local manufacturers' ability to maintain market share versus imports. As 
we have seen, there appears to be a distinct tendency for imports to rise very rapidly in 
an upturn, as in 1983-84, and for local production to lag considerably. Means must be 
devised to avoid a re-occurrence by encouraging local manufacturers to take a longer- 
term view of the electrification and housing process. Another matter to consider is the 
industry's ability to increase local supply whilst maintaining quality and competitive 
prices. 
3. Projected Local vs. Import Content of Sales, FY 1991 and For 
the Electrification Scenarios 
Table 4 gives a base-line for FY 1991 against which to compare the impact of 
electrification, and is the basic form of most of the Tables to follow. All estimations of value 
added, component costs, CIF import values, import and local content, and derived values are 
based strictly on DAMSA (1991) and interview sources. Per-product figures for each of 
these magnitudes have simply been multiplied as appropriate by total unit sales, imports, 
and/or domestic production for FY 1991. 
Columns 0-5 of Table 4 are all identical to the corresponding columns in Table 3, and list 
total unit sales of each product for FY 1991, the corresponding "total economic cost" figure 
for each product for that year, average percentage unit imports in the total market, and the 
value of ex-factory sales and CIF imports. 
Column 5 of Table 4 introduces an estimation of domestic value added in manufacturing the 
product in question during FY 1991 — in other words, the proportion of the ex-factory 
selling price which represents value added by the final manufacturer. Column 6 estimates 
the total cost of inputs required for that production process. Columns 7 and 8 estimate the 
values of imported and domestically-supplied inputs. Column 9 estimates value added 
arising from local production of inputs for each product, whilst Column 10 does the same 
for the import content of locally-produced inputs ("import leakage"). 
Column 11 adds Columns 7 and 10 to give an estimate of the total import content of 
domestic production of each appliance for FY 1991. Column 12 does the same for domestic 
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Column 13 adds total CIF imports and total imported inputs required for domestic 
production of final products to give a total import bill for supplying the market for each 
appliance in FY 1991. Column 14, on the other hand, simply takes the total domestic 
production of each appliance in that year and multiplies it by the average CIF import price 
for that product, to give an estimation of the gross foreign exchange savings achieved by 
local production. 
Column 15 goes out on a bit of a limb and attempts to calculate the "net" forex benefit or 
cost to the economy of supplying the market in FY 1991, by subtracting total imports (final 
and components) from total value added and adding this to the value of imports saved. 
Column 16, on the other hand, calculates the difference between total value added for each 
product and the import content of that product, in both the final assembly stage and in 
component manufacture. 
Columns 17, 18 and 19 calculate the ratios between forex used in the production of local 
inputs, final products, and in both added together. In other words, these are measures of the 
foreign exchange used to add one Rand of domestic value added in each stage of appliance 
manufacture. For example, in producing televisions, South African manufacturers use an 
average R 10,26 worth of foreign exchange to add one Rand of value. Aggregate figures for 
all the products listed are provided at the bottom of these columns, in order that the ratio for 
each product may be compared with it. 
Finally, at the bottom of each column the total figure for all the products listed is compared 
to the "total economic cost" figure in Column 1 in order to give a sense of the proportion of 
each magnitude in relation to the total resources expended on that product economy-wide in 
FY 1991. For example, the value of imported inputs required to produce these appliances 
domestically in FY 1991 was approximately 34% of the total value of ex-factory sales and 
CIF imports. 
a) Analysis 
What is important about the FY 1991 model is not the absolute value of the figures, but 
their relations to one another. 
• For example, according to this method total CIF imports of final products represented 
only 7,4% of the total economic cost of the market for these appliances in FY 1991. 
But imported inputs required for domestic production fOr that market represented 
almost 36% of the total cost. Overall, imported products and inputs cost over 40% of 
the value of the wholesale market for these products. 
• Similarly, as a percentage of the total economic cost of the products listed, more value 
was added domestically in the production of inputs (10,2%) than in production of final 
products (8,54%), whilst domestic value added accounted for only 18,7%. 
• Not surprisingly, when the value of imports saved is excluded from the equation, many 
products turn out to be forex losers. Although following DAMSA's (1991) 
methodology, it would appear that forex to a value of 60,2% of the total economic cost 
of the market for these products was "saved" by import substitution (Column 14), in 
fact only manufacturers of EF stoves and tumble dryers added more value than they 
spent in forex in FY 1991. 
128 INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY PROJECT 
• The forex/value added relationship in the case of televisions is extraordinary, and 
distorts the averages and totals significantly. 
4. Projected Additional Local Value Added and Import Values: First 
year of Electrification 
Table 5 lists the projected additional local value added, intermediate input purchases, and 
aggregate import requirements arising from the two electrification scenarios developed in 
Tables 2-4 in just one year of electrification. In all respects the logic of this Table follows 
that of Table 4: it simply compares the additional value of each variable which is projected 
to result from electrification (and other uncontrolled factors!) to the figures for FY 1991. It 
does this by multiplying the additional unit sales, ex-factory production, and imports derived 
in Tables 3a and b by the values for value added, inputs, CIF import prices, etc. found in the 
Appendix. The logic behind each column and the methods used to derive it is thus exactly 
the same as for Table 4. It is just "marginal" instead of "absolute". 
For example, additional imports of EF stoves are projected to total Ri 608 787 in the first 
year of an electrification programme services 130 000 new houses each year (Column 3) — 
not the total imports of such appliances by any means, but the extra cost of importing such 
stoves to satisfy the market growth coming from electrification and other relevant factors. 
The same logic holds for the other columns. 
Table 6, on the other hand, is simply the additional values derived in Table 5 added to the 
FY 1991 values derived in Table 4 to give a market projection based on the existing FY 
19921 market plus the additional effects of electrification — and nothing else. For example, 
all other things being held equal — this cannot be stressed enough! — the total cost of CIF 
imports of EFS stoves during the first year of an electrification programme of 400 000 
homes per year would be Rl 1 529 573 (Table 6b, Column 3). 
a) Two things to bear in mind 
In Tables 4, 5, 6 and subsequent Tables, Columns 5 and 9 have been derived by 
multiplying projected unit sales of locally-produced products to the urban black market 
by product-specific rates of value added in manufacture and wholesale operations 
only As noted above, the figure thus excludes value added arising from retail 
operations. On the other hand, these value added figures are not corrected to reflect the 
Effective Rate of Protection enjoyed by each product (see below) and are thus 
'apparent' rather than 'actual' value added. 
• Because these estimations of domestic value added are macroeconomic and not firm- 
based figures, 1 have not regarded overheads per unit as part of value added for the 
final product, as does DAMSA (1991). Instead, overhead costs are distributed to the 
imputed values of intermediate local and imported inputs according to a factor 
reflecting the proportion of foreign-denominated assets in the overall value of fixed 
assets, based on interview sources. The reason for this is simple. Although from the 
perspective of a firm, it is "adding value" when it imputes overhead charges to a 
product — value which it bought in the form of capital goods, etc. — from the 
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perspective of the economy value is only added through production, not through the 
"destruction" of capital (depreciation). Most importantly, the high import content in 
capital goods used to manufacture some appliances means that to do other than to 
exclude overheads from value added would result in imported materials being accounted 
as local content. 
b) Analysis 
• In both projections of additional sales due to electrification, (Tables 5a and 5b) 
additional CIF imports as a percentage of total additional sales account for just less 
than 8% of the market total, whereas additional sales of local products account for 
nearly 93% of total market sales. 
• Very large additional imports by value would occur in televisions and refrigerators 
(Tables 5a and Sb, Column 3). As observed previously, electrification will add 
significant value to local sales of televisions and refrigerators 
• Overall, projected additional annual imports would be roughly R52m under the worst 
scenario but as much as Rl 50m under the better scenario. Overall projected sales of 
locally-produced HEDs range from R629m to Ri ,9bn. This is nearly 25% of the total 
value of the HED retail market in FY 1991 (See Chapter Two). 
• Under the best case, although projected additional domestic sales are nearly 93% of 
additional sales value arising from electrification, domestic value added in the 
production of final products is only 8% of this. Additional local production of 
intermediate inputs raises the additional domestic value added as a result of 
electrification to 17,4% of the additional market value. 
• Again under the best case, imports of additional intermediate inputs amount to nearly 
40% of additional sales value. The overall additional import requirement of local 
production as a percentage of additional sales is over 72%. In other words, most of the 
value of additional appliance sales will go to pay for imports. 
• Imports saved by local production amount to over 188% of the projected additional 
sales value, but subtracting imports of intermediate inputs from extra domestic value 
added (Column 16) leaves a very strongly negative figure — from Ri 80m to R554,3m. 
This represents nearly 27% of the projected wholesale market value. This is almost 
entirely accounted for by the net import content of television production (Ri 79 — 
R549m). The net benefit of local production of EFS stoves and tumble-dryers is 
insignificant in relation to overall additional and total market values — and to the total 
deficit on local production. 
• The ratio of foreign exchange used in production to domestic value added is less than 
1:1 only in the case of EF stoves and tumble-dryers. In the case of televisions, the ratio 
is almost 12:1. 
• In total, the ratio of additional overall import content of additional local sales to 
additional domestic value added to is roughly 1:4. Its ratio to overall additional import 
requirements is roughly 2,5:1. Additional imports of final products are only 1/5 of 
overall additional imports, whilst the import content of additional local production is 
4/5 of the latter. This would seem to indicate that overall, the process of 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































134 INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY PROJECT 
electrification will by strongly import-intensive, mainly due to the high import 
content of local products. We can estimate that the overall 'local content' of additional 
HED sales due to electrification might be in the region of 30%, compared to a total 
import requirement of 70%. Thus, the 'local' value of additional sales in the Best Case 
scenario might be in the region of R580m (compared to nominal sales of local products 
of Rl,9bn), whilst the import value could be as high as R827m (compared to overall 
additional imports of RR1,Sbn). 
• However, none of these figures have been corrected for the value-added enhancing 
effect of protective tar[fs. As will be seen below, the effective rate of protection of 
most 1-LEDs is quite high — generally over 55%. This implies that the 'true' 
relationship between domestic value added and import content is distorted considerably. 
5. Scenarios for Appliance Take-Up Over a Five-Year Electrification 
Programme 
Table 7 presents three scenarios of appliance take-up by urban black households over a five- 
year period: one at 130 000 households per year, one at 400 00 households per year, and one 
at the 1989-91 rate, 90 015 households per year. In each case, Table 7 presents the previous 
year's ownership levels of each appliance (PY value), the increase in each year (Change), 
the New Total for each year, the percentage change from the previous year, and the 
percentage which this change represents as a proportion of the electrification rate. 
Table 7 is largely-self explanatory, and is presented mainly to show how subsequent five- 
year projections have been derived. But it should be noted that the projections for appliance 
take-up have been calculated by multiplying the rate of take-up for each appliance in 1989- 
91 by the rate of electrification, which, at a constant sum per annum, of course diminishes. 
This means that the rate of appliance take-up also diminishes over time. This method is not 
perfect, but provides an approximation of appliance take-up which holds all other factors 
equal. 
6. Projected Five-Year Market Totals Compared to a Counterfactual 
of the 1989-91 Rate of Electrification 
Table 8 presents the results of multiplying the five-year figures for appliance take-up in 
Table 7 by the core cost data in the Appendix exactly as was done in Tables 1-3. It presents 
the additional cost to the economy of the electrification scenarios (Tables 8a 1 and 2) and the 
total cost to the economy over the five year period, including the counterfactual for the 
1989-91 rate of electrification. (Tables 8b 1-3). This table establishes the aggregate data 
used as the basis for Tables 9 and 10. 
Table 9 repeats this exercise, this time using the format employed in tables 4-6 to obtain the 
value-added and import data, this time for the five-year scenarios of additional cost. Table 
10 presents aggregated date for the total cost of the electrification programme. 
HOUSEHOLD ELECTRICAL DURABLES INDUSTRIES 135 
Table Seven: Scenarios of Electrification and Appliance 
Take-Up by Urban Black Households Over Five Years 
Table 7a: Worst Case: 650 000 Newly Electrified Homes over Five Years 
(130 000 Newly Electrified Homes Per Year) 
yl y2 y3 y4 yS r TOTAL 
ELECTRIFICATION 
PYValue 1064880 — 1194880 1324880 -— 1454880 1584880 -- 
Change - 130000 130000 -- 130000 130000 130000 650000 
NewTotal 1194880 1324880 1454880 1584880 1714880 1714880 
Change from PY 
of Electrification Rate 




100,00% 100,00% 100,00% -- 
FS Stoves 
594064 617334 639354 -- PYValue 542880 
hange 26457 23270 22020 20935 117409 
nwValue 569337 594064 617334 639354 660289 660289 
Change from PY 
of Electrification Rate 
uilt-in Oven 
PY Value 
4,87% 4,34% 3,92% 3,57% 3,27% -- 
39,92% 39,92% 39,92% 39,92% 39,92% -- 
41 760 46 858 51956 57 054 62 152 -- 
hange 5098 5098 5098 5098 5098 25 490 
ew Value 4 51 956 57054 - 62 152 67250 67250 
Change fromPY 12,21% 10,88% 9,81% 8,94% 8,20% -- 
% of Electrification Rate 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% -- 
,oking Hob 
YValue 20880 23429 25978 28527 31076 -- 
hange 2549 2549 2549 2549 2549 12745 
ewValue 23429 25978 28527 31076 33625 33625 
%ChangefromPY 12,21% 10,889 9,81% 8,94% 8,20% -- 
%of Electrification Rate 100,00% 100,009 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% -- 
otplates 







92887 97963 102878 463518 
680276 778240 881 118 881 118 
-- %ChangefromPY 
of Electrification Rate 
ofrigerators 
trY Value 
19,67% 17,539 15,81% 140% 13,22% 
161,16% 
1 066 560 
207 842 
161,16% 16116% 161,16% 161,16% -- 
1 274 402 
221 325 
1495728 
1 495 728 1 730002 1 976 759 -- 
234 275 246 757 258 825 1169024 hange 
1730002 1976759 2235584 2235584 ewValue 1274402 
Change from PY 




% Change from PY 
%of Electrification Rate 
•itomatic Washers 
YValue 
19,49% 17,37% 15,66% 14,26% 13,09% -- 
159,63% 159,63% 159,63% 159,63% 159,63% 
-- 
133320 133345 133368 133388 133406 -- 
25 22 20 18 17 103 
133 345 133 368 133 388 133 406 133 423 133 423 
0,02% 0,02% 0,02% 0,01% 0,01% -- 
0,15% 0,15% 0,15% 0,15% 0,15% -- 
133320 146788 160003 172995 185786 -- 
hange 13468 13215 12992 12791 12610 65076 
NowValue 
Change fromPY 
of Electrification Rate 
Twin-tub Washers 
146788 160003 172995 185786 198396 198396 











82,75% 82,75% -- 
28 922 25 780 PY Value 44 440 -- 
(257l) (21 231 








Change from PY 





-121,57% -121,57% -121,57% 
22 220 49405 103 272 204 824 388 239 -- 
27185 53867 101 552 183415 319 142 685 161 Change 
New Value 
"5 Change from trY 






%of Electrification Rate 
49405 103 272 206824 388 239 707 381 707 381 
122,34% 109,03% 98,33% 89,55% 82,209 -- 
1002,16% 1002,16% 1002,16% 1002,16% 1002,16% -- 
1280160 1605585 1969329 2371 701 2812987 -- 










208.23% 2O8,23% -- 
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Table 7b: Best Case: 2 000 000 Newly Electrified Homes over Five Years 
(400 000 Newly Electrified Homes Per Year) 
yl y2 y3 y'I y5 TOTAL 
2 664 880 -- 
400000 2000000 
'ilECTRIFICATION 
PY Value I 064 880 1 464 880 1 864 880 2 264 880 
Change 400000 400000 400000 400000 
New Total 1 464 880 1 864 880 2 264 880 2 664 880 3064 880 3 064 880 
% Change from PY 3756% 27,31% 21,45% 17,66% 15,01% -- 






542880 624285 692335 751 616 804607 
48212 hange 81405 68050 59281 52991 
New Value 624 285 692 335 751 616 804 607 852 819 852 819 
% Change from PY 
% of Electrification Rate 
•iilt-in Oven 
PYValue 
15,00% 10,90% 8,56% 7,05% 5,99% -- 
39,92% 39,92% 39,92% 39,92% 39,92% -- 
41760 57446 73133 88819 104505 -- 
hange 15686 15686 15686 15686 15686 78431 
ew Value 57446 73 133 88819 104505 120 191 120 191 
,ChefromPY 
of Electrification Rate 
okingHob 
V Value 
37,56% j% 21,45% 
100,00% 
17,66% jj_% 




44 409 52 253 
7 843 
--—— -—-- - 
-- 
39 216 
20 880 28 723 
hange 7 843 7 843 7 843 7 843 
ew Value 28 723 36566 44 409 52 253 60096 60096 
% Change from PY 
of Electrification Rate 
9tplates 
PYValue 
37,56% 27,31% 21,45% 17,66% 15,01% -- 
100,00% 1(8)00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% -- 
-- 
1 655 049 
2072649 
417600 670403 965426 1299153 1668927 
Change 252 803 295 023 333 726 369 775 403 722 
NewValue 670403 965426 1299153 1668927 2072649 
%ChangefromPY 60,54% _44,L% 28.4 24,19% -- 
% of Electrification Rate 161,16% 161,16% 161,16% 161,16% 161,16% -- 
Refrigerators 
PYValue 1066560 1706075 2449713 3288458 4215529 -- 
Change 639515 743638 838745 927071 1010044 4159013 
NewValue 1706075 2449713 3288458 4215529 5225573 5225573 
-- 
-- 
% Change from PY 











159,639t 159,63% 159,63% 
133454 133498 133535 -- 
44 36 31 246 
ewValue 133397 133454 133498 133535 133566 133566 
VChangefromPY 
8 of Electrification Rate 
utomatic Washers 
Y Value 
O,6% 0. (5( 
0,l5% 0,l5% 
-- 
252 275 289 l4 -- 




214 248 133 320 
Thange 41440 39488 38027 
'lew Value 174760 214 248 252 275 289 143 325 057 325 057 
8 Change from PY 31,08% 22,60% 17,75% 14,61% t2,42% -- 
of Electrification Rate 82,75% 82,75% 82,75% 82.75% 82,75% -- 
[win-tub Washers 
'YValue 44440 24146 16131 11924 9364 -- 
lange (20 294) (8016) (4206) (2 56O)J (1 709) (36 785) 
trw Value 
(Change fromPY 
8 of Electrification Rate 
rumble Driers 
V Value 






-121,57% -l2l,57% -- 
22220 105 865 395 566 I 245 855 3450915 -- 
3,ange 
tew Value 










2 205 060 
3450915 
176,99% 
5 191 045 
8641 960 
150,43% 
8 619 740 
8641960 
-- 
of Electrification Rate 1002.16% 1002.16% 1002.16% 1002.16%] 1002.16% -- 
rievisions 
'Y Value 1280160 2281467 3578692 5 177 061 7080949 
'hange 1001 307 I 297 226 1598368 1903888 2213 183 
1ew Value ecg 
8, of Electri 






- 28% 3t,26%-- 
208,23% 208,23%] -- 
PY 
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Table 7C: Counterfactual: Electrification at 1989-1991 Rate 
(90 015 Newly Electrified Homes Per Year) 
'SiECTRIFICATION 
PYValue 
yl y2 y3 y4 y5 TOTAL 
1064880 1154 895 1244910 1334925 1424940 -- 
Change 
wTota1 
Change from PY 
of Electrification Rate 
FS Stoves 
90015 90015 90015 90015 90015 450075 
1154895 1244910 1334925 1424940 1514955 1514955 
8,45% 7,79% 7,23% 741 )1 
100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% -- 
YValue 542880 561 199 578661 595363 611390 -- 
hange 18319 17461 16703 16026 15418 83927 
ewyalue 561 199 578661 595363 611390 626807 626807 
Change frumPY 
of Electrification Rate 
tiIt-in Oven 
Y Value 
3,37% 3,11% 2,89% 2,69% 2.52% -- 
39,92% 39,92% 39,92% 39,92% 39,92% -- 















% Change from PY J2h 6,74% 6,32% -- ' of Electrification Rate 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% -- 
Cooking lob 
PYyatue 20880 22645 24410 26175 27940 -- 
Change 1 765 1 765 1 765 1 765 1 765 8 825 
NewValue 22645 24410 26175 27940 29705 29705 
% Change from PY ° of Electrification Rate 
flotplates 
PYValue 
8,45% 7,79% 7,23% 6,74% 6,32% -- 
100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100.00% -- 
417600 474490 534092 596330 661 135 -- 
Change 56890 59602 62238 64805 67 309 310 844 
New Value 474490 534092 596330 661 135 728444 728444 
°,ChangefromPY 13,62% l2.5% 1' lO,!7% iQ,J!! -- 
% of Electrification Rate 161,16% t6l,l6% 161,16% l6l,l6% 161,16% -- 
Refrigerators 
PYValae 1066560 1210475 1361078 1518174 1681587 -- 
Change 143915 150603 157096 163413 169568 784594 
Ni-wValue 1210475 1361078 1518174 1681587 1851 154 1851 154 
Change fromPY 
of Electrification Rate 
hest Freezers 
PYValue 
13,49% 12,44% 11,54% 10,76% 10.08% -- 
159,63% 159,63% 159,63% 159,63% 159,63% 
-- 
133354 133368 133382 133320 133337 -- 
IS 14 13 75 Change 17 16 
NewValue 133337 133354 133368 133382 133395 133395 
%ChangefromPY 0,01% Q,' Q,Q% 
-- 
-______ 
%ofElectrificationRate 0,15% 0,15% 0,15% 0,15% 0,15% 
Automatic Washers - 
133320 
- 
142646 151 846 
—- 4 
PYValue 160931 169911 -- 
Change 9 326 9 200 9 085 8 980 8 882 45 473 
NewValue 142646 151 846 160931 169911 178793 178793 
% Change from PY 
% of Electrification Rate 
win-tub Washers 
V Value 
6,99% 6,45% 5,98% 5,58% 5,23% -- 
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a) Analysis 
• The net cost to the economy of electrification over a five-year period, will be 
substantial. Again, the main culprit is televisions, although refrigerators also share the 
blame. 
• The total import bill arising from electrification's impact on sales of imported HEDs 
and components is approximately R5,lbn in the worst case and R12,lbn in the best 
case. This is to be compared to the 1989-9 1 counterfactual figure of R4,3bn. This is a 
very substantial amount and may be much higher if local production is unable to 
maintain its share of the local market in any upswing. 
• In both scenarios local production will cost a substantial amount, due mainly to the high 
import content of local products such as refrigerators and televisions. As we have seen, 
forex requirements for direct imports account for only about 1/5 of the total projected 
import bill, whilst indirect imports for local manufacture represent 4/5. 
• Compared to the 1989-91 counterfactual figure of R663m, direct imports under the 
worst case scenario will cost R772m and under the best case nearly R 1 ,8bn over five 
years. 
• Imports of components, on the other hand, could cost from R3,9bn to R9,3bn over the 
period. The net cost of television production alone could cost from R5,Sbn to R6,5bn. 
• Total value added over the period could range from R 1 ,9bn to R4,9bn. 
• There will be an estimated R 1 O,Sbn to R26,6bn in sales of locally-produced HEDs over 
the five years, compared to the counterfactual of R8,9bn. The value of additional sales 
due to electrification thus ranges from R4,3bn to R20,4bn over five years. 
• After taking domestic value added into account, this leaves a net cost to the economy of 
R2,4bn to R5,3bn over five years. The net foreign exchange requirements of local 
production alone will be between Rl,8bn and R3,9bn. The additional cost of 
electrification adds from R 1 -4bn to the forex cost of local production. 
• The single largest element in the net forex requirements of both scenarios is imports of 
parts for the domestic manufacture of television sets. This could amount to between 
R2,4bn and R5,7bn over five years. 
• Table 12 summarises this data, in aggregate and for each product. 
C. Assessment 
1. Gross Costs and Benefits of Electrification 
It is evident that the South African economy will have to pay a great cost for both the 
importation and production of HEDs domestically. Gross foreign exchange requirements for 
the HEDs studied here could range from RSbn to R 1 2bn over five years of electrification. 
Thus, in the best case scenario, local value in total HED sales over five years may be as 
high as R24bn. The additional local value generated by electrification could range from 
R275m to R3,3bn; additional imported value from R753m to R7,7bn. Unfortunately, 
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R275m to R3,3bn; additional imported value from R753m to R7,7bn. Unfortunately, 
therefore, the primary beneficiaries of electrification in the HED industry may be outside 
South Africa. 
If imports saved are taken into account, however, local production is less 'costly' in 
aggregate than full importation, even in the case of televisions. Nevertheless, it should be 
borne in mind that the calculation of net benefit used in the preceding charts does not take 
into account the elasticity of demand for HEDs or the impact of reduced prices on sales of 
other goods. Thus, a net cost figure could be either higher or lower depending on the 
increase in the rate of HED uptake due to falling product prices, or the impact on domestic 
value added and forex usage of increased sales of other consumer goods. In other words, the 
increase in net cost to the economy of, sa full importation of televisions may be more than 
balanced out by other factors, or may be worsened by increased unit imports. Exports, 
which are only significant for refrigerators (see Chapter Three), further complicate the 
situation. 
It is also evident that electrification will have a major impact on the fortunes of the HED 
industry. Large increases in domestic sales values can be expected. The impact of the 
electrification process on the industry's broader fortunes will depend to a great extent on the 
dynamics of local production and external trade in HEDs in the event of an electrification- 
induced upswing. As discussed above, a tendency exists for imports to rise very rapidly in 
upturns, and for local production volumes to lag, followed by a weak tendency towards 
increased exports (possibly in order to unload excess stock). It is absolutely essential from 
a domestic manufacturing and value added and foreign exchange perspective, therefore, 
that the electr/ication process be made as transparent as possible, so that manufacturers 
can justify and plan for a gearing up of manufacturing capacity for any upsurge in 
demand. This must involve both evident commitment on the part of government, plenty of 
advance notice of its intentions, and policies designed to encourage local supply. Otherwise, 
manufacturers will be reluctant to invest, and bottlenecks will hamper effective utilisation of 
existing capacity. 
2. Domestic Supply — An Efficient Use of Resources? 
Gross forex usage and domestic value added are only half the story, however. We must also 
ask whether the resources used to produce HEDs domestically could be put to better use. In 
fact this question is very difficult to answer, as not all alternatives are known and the 
transfer of resources from one use to another is itself costly. Here I will only provide an 
indication of the cost to the domestic economy of producing HEDs locally, so that 
subsequent research may compare other potential uses. 
What is critical from an economic perspective is the relationship between domestic value 
added and the import content of domestic production, not just the total import bill. For 
example, foreign exchange savings could be effected by transferring resources used in the 
production of specific HEDs to other sectors which could perhaps use them more efficiently. 
The same goes for increased domestic value added. This is true of all domestically- 
produced intermediate inputs, labour, capital, and foreign exchange. 
Table 10 shows the ratio of forex used to value added in local production of selected 
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1:1; although ratios for final product manufacture are higher, those for intermediate input 
manufacture are lower. In the case of all other products, however, the ratio is higher. 
Clearly, from this perspective, the rationale for domestic supply must be examined more 
carefully, even if macroeconomic figures suggest small net forex usage or even a positive 
contribution. 
A further consideration arises, however, when we realise that in cases of significant nominal 
rates of protection, domestic value added is inflated relative to what it would be if products 
traded at world prices. It is thus necessary to disentangle the impact of protection on 
domestic value added from the macroeconomic projections presented here. 
To do this two concepts will be employed. The following section presents estimates of the 
Effective Rates of Protection (ERP) and Domestic Resource Costs (DRC) of five South 
African HED products. 
3. Effective Rates of Protection and Domestic Resource Costs' 
a) Definitions and Applications 
(1) Effective Rate of Protection 
'Effective rate of protection' is a measure of the extent to which tariffs applied to a product 
enhance domestic value added, as opposed to the sale price of the final product. ERP seeks 
to account for the fact that imported components reduce the amount of domestic value added 
(or 'local content') reflected in a product's price. If all components were locally 
manufactured (including capital equipment), aggregate domestic value added would be 
equal to selling price, as everyone's domestic inputs would be someone else's domestic 
output. Import content thus introduces a difference between sale price and domestic value 
added. 
The variables used to calculate ERP are the CIF values of imported products and 
components (including depreciation of imported capital goods), and the duties levied on 
them. This achieves ERP's purpose of correcting for the fact that protection of the final 
product artificially inflates local value added by allowing domestic sale prices to rise above 
world prices. 'Actual' domestic value added (i.e. less any amount above that given by the 
world price) is thus the CIF import value less the CIF values of imported components. In 
cases of positive protection, this will be less than the value added identified through 
empirical investigation. 




Where t = tariffs on final product, t1 = tariffs on import content, and S — M = domestic 
value added, defined as the CIF import price of the final product less the CIF prices of 
imported components. 
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ERP thus expresses the value of net duties payable as a percentage of 'actual' domestic 
value added. This gives the percentage by which 'actual' domestic value added may be 
increased by protection, in theory at least. Net duties payable is the difference between the 
value of the duties on the final product and those on the imported content. Where rates of 
duty on final products and imported components are equal, they cancel each other out and 
by definition ERP equals nominal tariff. But where duties on the final product and imported 
components differ, the ERP may be higher or lower than the nominal rate. 
In calculating ERP it is vital to take into account all duties paid on imported content, 
including the portion of unit depreciation charged to imported capital goods. In practice this 
is a very significant factor influencing ERP, since overheads are a significant proportion of 
cost and capital goods generally carry only a surcharge in South Africa. Interviewees were 
generally very vague about or did not know the proportion of manufacturing capital stock, 
by value, which was imported. Most information pointed to a roughly 50-50% ratio, 
however, and this has been used as a guide. Subsequent research and discussion may be 
able to clarify this significant point, It is worth noting that imported content in overheads is 
only part of the story; the size of unit overheads due to small production volumes also plays 
an important role. 
(2) ERP of Selected South African HEDs 
The ERP data presented in the chart below tells us the following: 
• Although in most cases tariff rates on final products and imported components are 
equal, those on imported capital equipment are much lower, and have the effect of 
raising ERP significantly, to an average of 5 5-60%. This could be reduced 
considerably by reducing the proportion of overheads in local production costs, 
however. As we will see in Chapter Five, this is a major problem for local producers. 
• In the case of EFS stoves and hotplates, nominal duty is 45% but ERP is 57% and 
60%, respectively. Cooking hobs and ovens are also heavily protected in this respect. 
• Tariffs on imported parts are lower than for the final product in the case of 
refrigerators, raising ERP to nearly 58%. ERP on chest freezers is close to 56%. 
• At 21 - 25%, ERP on washing machines and tumble-dryers is lower than for most white 
goods, due to the small mass of domestic value added and large proportion of imported 
inputs. 
• At 571%, the ERP for televisions is almost six times the nominal rate due to the large 
proportion of imported components and the very low mass of domestic value added. 
When considered in the light of the heavy net macroeconomic cost of imported 
television components, this raises serious questions about the economic rationale of 
continued television production in South Africa. 
(3) Domestic Resource Cost 
'Domestic resource cost' is a measure of the domestic resources which must be used to save 
one unit of foreign exchange through import substitution. Like ERP, DRC is an attempt to 
assess the 'real' significance of domestic value added. 
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Domestic Resource Cost: 
Selected HEDs 
4 5 6 7 
DRC Nominal Effective ERP 






as % of 
Nominal 
EFS Stove R5,35 45% 57,3% 127,4% 
Hotplate R5,45 45% 60,2% 133,8% 
Eye-level Oven R5,30 45% 55,9% 124,1% 
Cooking Hob R5,43 45% 59,8% 132,8% 
Small Refrigerator R5,37 40% 57,8% 144,5% 
Chest Freezer R5,28 40% 55,3% 138,2% 
Automatic Washer R4,27 25% 25,7% 102,8% 
Twin Tub Washer R4,20 25% 23,5% 94,1% 
Tumble Dryer R4,14 20% 21,8% 109,2% 
Television R22,82 86% 57 1,1% 662,9% 
Notes: 
1. Underlying data based on DAMSA, 1991, and interview sources. 
2. For basis of calculations, see Main ERPIDRC Table. 
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The DRC per unit of foreign exchange saved is derived by dividing net foreign exchange 
savings achieved by local supply by 'apparent' domestic value added. Net foreign exchange 
savings is defmed as the difference between the CIF value of the imported product less the 
CIF values of any imported components used in local production. In this case, however, 
domestic value added is defined as the difference between actual sale price and the 'cost of 
sales', mainly materials and depreciation. l'his is ascertained empirically' and includes 
value added in all stages of manufacture and sale. Note that this method reverses ERP's 
effect of eliminating the portion of value added made possible only by protected domestic 
prices of final products. Because protection allows domestic producers to charge higher 
than world prices for their products, use of domestic resources reflected in the price of a 
domestically-produced unit are higher than they would be if the latter were sold at world 
prices. They are, in fact, higher by the percentage given by ERP, by definition of the latter. 
DRC can thus be defined as: 
VA 
S—M 
Where VA = apparent domestic value added, S the CIF price of an imported pr6duct, and 
M = the CIF prices of imported components used in domestic production, or by 
e=(1+ERP) 
Where e = the official exchange rate. 
The latter method of deriving DRC can be seen more clearly by recognising that since the 
concept measures the amount of domestic resources which must be used to save one unit of 
foreign exchange, the additional resources used under protection are given by the effective 
rate of protection of domestic value added. 
Thus understood, it can be seen that the main use of DRC is to compare it to the official 
exchange rate, e. If DRC is higher than e, then theoretically it is costing the economy more 
domestic resources to substitute for the product than to import it, and vice versa. 
(4) Limitations of DRC 
The principal limitation of DRC is that, like the concept of comparative advantage to which 
it is related,' it is static and limited to direct production: 
• Firstly, it fails to take into account the dynamic process of 'creating' comparative 
advantage through improvement — learning by doing. DRC is effectively a snapshot of 
a process, and only multiple snaps and other forms of analysis can tell where the 
process is headed. 
• Secondly, it fails to take into account positive (and negative) externalities associated 
with domestic production, and thus misses technological learning, firm experience, the 
convenience of local supply, and so on. These can be particularly important in the case 
of HEDs, since locally-based producers may be in a better position to respond quickly 
and effectively to market changes and to provide customer service — as retailer 
interviewees consistently argued. 
• A final problem arises when attempting to compare products whose attributes may be 
differentiated (partially) by local taste. For example, on balance South African EFS 
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• A final problem arises when attempting to compare products whose attributes may be 
differentiated (partially) by local taste. For example, on balance South African EFS 
stoves cost 3 6,4% more per US dollar of foreign exchange saved than it would cost to 
import them duty-free. A stove is not a stove, however, since South African customers 
have design preferences which foreign producers do not fulfil because of the small size 
of the South African market, but local producers do. The price premium for local 
stoves is therefore not necessarily 'bad' from the economic perspective of want 
satisfaction. 
(5) DRC of Selected South African HEDs 
The DRC analysis in the chart above tells us the following: 
• At +1- R5, the DRC of white goods production is significantly higher than the exchange 
rate used for comparison of US$1 = R3,40. Theoretically, this implies that the 
opportunity cost of local production is significantly higher than importation, even 
though the figures presented in the analyses above may appear reasonable in aggregate. 
• The DRC of washing machines and tumble dryers is less than that for other white 
goods. This is due to their lower ERP. 
• The DRC of television is extremely high — over R22. This suggests that the 
opportunity cost of television production far outweighs any benefit in terms of imports 
saved. The resources used to save these imports could clearly be used for other 
purposes. 
Several implications flow from these considerations: 
• Resources currently used to produce certain items, particularly televisions, could 
possibly be better used to produce other products. To say this for certain, however, 
one must also consider externalities associated with local production. As Chapter Five 
will argue, however, for the most part these externalities seem to be meagre, except in 
the sense that local suppliers are somewhat more responsive to local needs than imports 
and that employment is generated by local manufacture. Dynamic technological and 
learning externalities are not clearly evident. 
• Equalising tariff rates on final products and imported parts could significantly alter 
DRC in some cases, particularly refrigeration products and televisions. In the case of 
cooking products, excessive DRC is due to high rates of recovery of foreign- 
denominated overhead costs. 
• In the case of cooking products, high nominal tariffs on both imports and imported 
parts balance each other out. These seem to serve no useful purpose, as manufacturers 
are penalised by the latter, although the proportion of imported parts in cooking 
products is relatively low. 
D. Summary and Conclusion 
The main points to be drawn from this chapter are as follows: 
1. Electrification of urban black households will have a major impact on the market for 
HEDs, raising market values, domestic value added, and import values significantly, 
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1. Electrification of urban black households will have a major impact on the market for 
HEDs, raising market values, domestic value added, and import values significantly, 
depending on the rate of electrification. In most cases, however, it should not exceed 
the capacities of the domestic industry to supply. The primary issue to be addressed is 
not necessarily investment in new capacity as such, but how to avoid the tendency 
towards excessive imports during boom periods. Policies to encourage local market 
share are needed if potentially devastating import bills are to be avoided. Such policies 
can start with transparency and consistency in electrification and housing policy, which 
will encourage long-term investment in local supply by HED manufacturers. Policy 
must also address the possibility of bottlenecks in the supply of variable inputs such as 
materials, components, and labour. In addition, the significant boost provided by 
electrification may present a vital opportunity to encourage investment in more 
advanced manufacturing techniques (see Chapter Five). 
2. The foreign exchange cost of the electrification process will be considerable, although 
this is moderated by increased domestic value added and other externalities such as new 
investment. The most significant component of forex cost will be imported intermediate 
inputs, particularly for televisions. 
3. Effective rates of protection are high for most HEDs, and are grossly inflated for 
televisions. Domestic resource costs are also higher than desirable, although this may 
be mitigated by externalities. Again, in the case of televisions DRC is extremely high. 
4. In general, if the current tariff situation remains unchanged local value will constitute 
approximately 18% of additional retail sales, whilst imported value will constitute the 
remaining 72%. This may be altered significantly, however, if tariffs are reduced 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter Five: The Manufacture of Household 
Electrical Durables in South Africa 
A. Introduction 
This chapter examines the HED manufcturing industry in South Africa. It seeks to provide 
an overview of several of the key issues facing local HED manufacturers. The primary goal 
is to determine the global competitiveness of the South African HED industry, its ability to 
meet basic needs effectively, and its potential to contribute to growth in the broader 
economy. 
The South African HED industry is not presently competitive internationally, Its products 
are generally costlier and of lesser quality than those available from producers in the Far 
East, Europe, and North America. Its products and manufacturing processes, in particular, 
are outdated. This is not to say that great strides towards improved performance have not 
been made in some firms; rather, where progress has been made, it has been recent, 
incomplete, and hardware-oriented. The industry also suffers from high materials and 
components costs and a generally unfavourable industrial context. Perhaps most 
importantly, it has not yet begun to adopt the crucial organisational and work practice 
changes which have been shown to improve manufacturing performance significantly in 
firms globally. Nevertheless, certain parts of the industry might make the transition to 
competitiveness against imports, at least, given the right inducements and external 
conditions. 
1. Case Studies 
Case study material will be used to illustrate the points raised in the discussion. Case 
studies were conducted at two South African consumer electronics manufacturers, one small 
appliance manufacturer, and one white goods and consumer electronics manufacturer. 
Comparative case studies of one white goods plant in New Zealand and two white goods and 
one small appliance plant in Australia were also conducted in early 1993.' 
Case studies were conducted by means of plant visits, interviews, and documentary 
research. The quality of data obtained varies widely. Where possible, I have presented key 
indices of manufacturing performance. Where such information has not been available, I 
have concentrated on the qualitative picture. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, a universal condition of access to the firms visited was 
strict confidentiality. I have accordingly given the firms false names, and list interviewees 
by title only. Generally interviews were conducted with the managing director, financial 
The small number of firms visited locally is partly a function of the small size of the industry, but is 
also due to its general reticence to discuss manufacturing issues, discussed in the Introduction. 
Nevertheless, other sources tended to corroborate the information gathered at the firms visited. 
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director, marketing director or manager, engineering director and/or factory manager, and 
where possible with shopfloor workers. 
Table A-i: Case Study Firms 
FIRM PRODUCTS FACTORY LOCATIONS 
Company A white goods, consumer electronics Natal, Eastern Cape 
Company B consumer electronics, small apps. Western Cape, Tv!. 
Company C consumer electronics Western Cape, Tvl. 
Company D small appliances Transvaal 
Company NZ 1 white goods New Zealand, Queensland 
Company AUS 1 small appliances New South Wales urban 
Company AUS2 white goods New South Wales rural 
B. Television Manufacturing in South Africa 
This section covers the television manufacturing industry in South Africa. It does not cover 
the audio portion of the consumer electronics industry, as it is clear that all local production 
of such products is being phased out by local manufacturers because of the impossibility of 
competing with imports. The concluding Chapter will return briefly to this issue to discuss 
the implications for tariff structures of a withdrawal from this area. 
At the time of writing, major developments were underway in the South African television 
manufacturing industry, in the form of a proposed joint venture between the South Korean 
chaebol Daiwoo and Anglo-American to manufacture television tubes. Lack of access to 
information has prevented incorporation of this important but late-breaking development 
into this report. Nevertheless, the conclusion to this section will comment on the basis of 
available information. 
1. TVI Vital Signs 
a) Structural Characteristics 
(1) Market Structure And Barriers To Entry 
South African TV production was approximately 568 000 units in 1992. Sales of television 
now account for approximately 42% of the consumer electronics market by value. Of total 
1992 sales, 258 000 were MTV2, and 282 000 CTV The wholesale CTV market was worth 
R410m in that year, whilst the wholesale MTV market was worth R78m (BMI, 1992). 
South African firms supplied approximately 90% of MTVs and 80% of CTVs. The 
2 MTV: monochrome television. CTV: colour television. 
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overhang in the TV market — production in excess of supply — was approximately 
100 000 units in 1992. 
The South African TVI is still dominated by the four firms who originally founded it: 
Phillips SA, Tek Corporation, National Panasonic (NATPAN), and Tedelex Electronics. Of 
the four, Tek and NATPAN seem more healthy; there have been persistent rumours about 
Phillips' withdrawal from television production, whilst Tedelex has already closed its 
Atlantis factory. 
Until recently these four firms shared the market roughly equally. In recent years several 
other firms have entered the CTV and MTV markets at the low end. Firms such as Triad, 
Etron, and Rowa (the last with Taiwanese backing) have had a major impact on the four 
established producers, and have reduced each of the Big Four's share of the market by and 
estimated 20-25% (Factory Manager, Company B). Coupled with this has been the 
emergence of several 'screwdriver' assemblers of imported SKD kits in the so-called 
homelands, who took advantage of loopholes in trade legislation to undercut all of the 
established producers. It is felt in the rest of the industry that considerable grey-market 
imports occur, as well, further undermining the previously privileged position of the Big 
Four. 
The television industry is thus not over-concentrated, and seems to be subject to 
considerable competition. On the other hand, given the relatively small size of the South 
African market, one might also argue that there are too many producers for any one to 
achieve reasonable scale economies — an issue to which we will return. 
(2) Linkages To Other Sectors 
The TVI is linked mainly to the electronic and electrical components sector on the input side, 
and to the retail furniture trade on the other. At present nearly 80% of the bill of materials 
of a CTV is taken up by imported components, so that the bulk of the value added chain lies 
outside South Africa (BTI 1989; interview sources). As discussed in Chapters Two and 
Four, the local components sector is particularly weak and uncompetitive, and is generally 
unable to supply key value-adding components, such as tubes and quality tuners. In 
addition, most major television manufacturers are in fact assemblers of ready-made kits 
imported from technology partners overseas, which include many items produced in South 
Africa, including electronic components. The lifting of tariffs on a range of key components 
in February 1993 was accordingly regarded as a major boon by many interviewees — 
although some claimed to prefer local sourcing for logistical reasons. 
For these reasons, the value added contribution of the television 'filiere' is notably small, as 
we have seen in Chapter Four. 
The only other significant inputs to the TV! are cabinets, plastic parts, and packaging. The 
former two are either manufactured in-house or by specialised subcontractors — often 
former employees, as in the cases of Companies A and B. Company C represents the other 
case of in-house manufacture of cabinets by skilled artisans. Plastic components are 
generally subcontracted, as the production process is radically different and unsuitable for 
proximity to electronic assembly operations. 
For further information on the TV market and imports and exports, see Chapters Two and Three. 
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The TVI sells nearly all of its output to Southern African retailers, large and small. There 
are a variety of types of retailers handling these and other HEDs, either on cash, credit, or 
hire terms. The latter is an increasingly popular form of television usage in South Africa, 
and hire firms such as Teljoy now purchase a large proportion of the industry's output. 
Conditions governing credit sales in the retail furniture industry seem to play less of a role in 
the fortunes of the TV! than in the case of white goods; for this reason major cash discount 
chains are regarded as a key area of growth by the industry (Mohamed, 1992). 
(3) Ownership and Managerial Structures and Competitiveness 
The big four television manufacturing firms are part of larger industrial groupings: TEK 
Electronics under Tek Corporation and SANKORP; National Panasonic under Barlows 
Consumer Electric Products Group; and Tedelex under the Malbak umbrella. Only Phillips 
is foreign-owned. Recent entrants have generally been independents, and in one case was set 
up by former employees of the major firms. Rowa TV in Midrand is alone in its direct 
backing by Taiwanese capital. 
In two cases the manufacturing operation visited was a separate business entity to that of the 
head office, and at least notionally competed with other suppliers for the business of the 
parent. In another case the factory was managed directly from head office and the factory 
manager sat on the board of directors. Internal management structures at factory level 
seemed relatively standard, and consisted principally of manufacturing engineering staff and 
line supervisors, 
The role of ownership and managerial structures in determining the competitiveness of the 
TVI seems crucial. Head office-level interviewees generally expressed satisfaction with the 
support given by parent companies, although all admitted to feeling pressurised by a strict 
quarterly time horizon. Factory level management, however, often expressed reservations 
about the relationship between finance, marketing, and manufacturing operations. In one 
company in particular, where I was fortunate enough to spend some time alone with junior 
engineering staff, the view was expressed that the timing and substance of marketing 
directives ran very much counter to the logic and requirements of manufacturing efficiency. 
It was felt that a more interactive approach to product development and marketing was 
required to avoid frantic year-end attempts to engineer a production process to accommodate 
marketing's new product, developed at head office in Johannesburg and simply announced in 
a memorandum. 
This tendency towards functional disjuncture within the firms was clearly recognised by the 
factory manager of Company A. He was new to Company A, having worked previously for 
a technology partner, and felt that the factory should be permitted to operate independently, 
to explore opportunities for profitable use of excess capacity and export without direct 
reference to the head office. This view will be discussed further in the conclusion to this 
section. 
(4) Links To Government 
No links to state research institutions were identified, and supply to state institutions has 
never been a major aspect of the TVI's business. The principal relationship between the 
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TV! and government is through the BTT, and the constant process of adapting and 
amending the trade regulations. This will be discussed in detail below. 
b) Competitiveness 
(1) Cost Structures 
Local television prices are generally markedly higher that those in other economies. For 
example, a branded 20" (51cm) colour television (CTV) can be had in the US or UK for as 
little as R600; this is R100 less than the ex-factorypnce of a comparable South African set. 
Similarly, imported sets are much cheaper than comparable South African products: the 
FOB price of a typical unbranded Far Eastern 20" CTV is about R450; a comparable set 
produced by Company C's Western Cape plant can be profitably produced for no less than 
R700 — a 56% premium. Brand premium, it will be recalled, is about 25%, so South 
African firms cannot hope to compete with such imports on the strength of customer loyalty 
alone. 
A detailed cost comparison of a hypothetical South African 20" colour set is presented in 
Table B- i. It shows three scenarios comparing prices of South African sets with an average 
price for a set manufactured in Singapore. It can be seen that under current regulations, the 
South African set is just able to compete with the import, which currently attracts a 96% 
nominal tariff. Note that Company C's set is more expensive than the import (albeit the 
latter is a more sophisticated product). Note also that the amount of ad valorem excise duty 
paid by South African manufacturers is considerable — R180 — R225. 
Table B-i: Cost Comparison, 20" Colour Television 
UNDER CURRENT POLICY 
OMPANY A B C Singapore 
abour R20,94 R25,00 R25,00 Ri 9,20 
)verheads R90,48 R120,00 RIS0,00 R38,40 
which: fanable R8,37 — — — 
ixed R82,lI — — — 
vlaterials R602,3 1 R755,00 R800,00 R520,00 
which: ocaI R96,00 R205,00 R250,00 — 
mported R506,00 R550,00 R550,00 -- 
actoiy Profit R22,54 R27,00 R24,00 — 
x-factoiyIFOB R736,27 R927,00 R999,00 R577,60 
oyalty I R22,00 R22,00 R22,00 — 
xcise/Custorns Duties R225,00 RI 80,00 R209,00 R554,50 
Wholesale profit R398,60 R338,00 R300,00 R326,55 
rice to the Trade RI ,38I ,87 RI ,400,00 RI ,530,00 R1,458,65 
etai1 Price RI,796,43 RI,820,00 RI,989,00 R1,896,24 
Based on data supplied by interview sources: Financial Director and Managing Director, Company A; 
Engineering Director and Factory Manager, Company B; Factory Manager, Company C. 











BY 1996, UNDER POLICY FAVOURED BY INDUSTRY 
)verheads R90,48 R120,00 R150,00 R38,40 
which: fariable R8,37 — — — 
ixed R82,11 — — — 
'fateriaIs R602,3 I R755,00 R800,00 R520,00 
which: ,ocal R96,00 R205,00 R250,00 — 
rnported R506,00 R550,00 R550,00 — 
acto1y Profit R22,54 R27,00 R24,00 
x-factoryIFOB R71 3,73 R900,00 R999,00 R577,60 
toyalty I R22,0() R22,00 R22,00 — 
xcise/Customs Duties R0,00 R0,00 R0,00 R173,28 
Wholesale profit R398,60 R338,00 R300,00 R263,86 
'rice to the Trade RI,I 34,33 R1,260,00 RI ,32I ,00 R1,014,74 
tetail Price Rl,474,63 RI,638,00 RI,717,30 R1,3l9,16 
BY 19 96, UNDER PRE SENT POLICY 
OMPANY A B C Singapore 
'abour R20,94 R25,00 R25,00 R19,20 
)verheads R90,48 R120,00 R150,00 R38,40 
which: lariable R8,37 -- — — 
ixed R82,II -- -- — 
4ateriais R602,3 1 R755,00 R800,00 R520,00 
which: ocal R96,00 R205,00 R250,00 — 
rnported R506,00 R550,00 R550,00 — 
actory Profit R22,54 R27,00 R24,00 
x-factoryfFOB R7 13,73 R900,00 R999,00 R577,60 
toyalty I R22,00 R22,00 R22,00 — 
xcise/Customs Duties RI 42,75 RI 80,00 RI 99,80 R323,46 
Wholesale profit R398,60 R338,00 R300,00 R281,24 
'rice to the Trade RI ,277,08 R 1,440,00 RI ,520,80 Ri, 182,29 
etail Price RI,660,20 RI,872,00 RI,977,04 R1,536,98 
Source: own calculations based on interview sources 
The next scenario lists the policy favoured by many in the TV!, in which all excise duties 
were abolished and a flat ad valorem duty of 30% placed on imports. This would still 
render all three manufacturers overpriced relative to the import. Only a substantial 
reduction in wholesale profit could make the sets competitive. Note that an equalisation of 
overhead and labour costs would be insufficient to make Companies B and C competitive 
with the import. 
The final scenario alters the variables to simulate the 1996 tariff structure under the current 
SAP. The three South African firms are all badly overpriced relative to the import. 
Company A, again, could potentially survive if it were to reduce overhead costs and/or its 
wholesale margin. 
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The figures and formulas used in these calculations were current and accurate at the time of 
writing. Clearly, then, South African sets are not competitive with comparable imports. Of 
course, the situation may differ for other models, such as monochrome television (MTV), 
but more than likely for the worse, rather than better. No interviewees felt that the South 
African TVI had any products which could compete successfully against Far Eastern sets. 
(2) Productivity 
One reason for this price discrepancy is the relative productivity of South African versus 
overseas plants. None of the South African plants visited was able to estimate its capital 
productivity, and instead used various measures of labour productivity as a basic yardstick. 
In general, most plants visited were only beginning to take performance measures, or did not 
want to divulge them. 
Table B-2 lists selected performance measures gathered from three firms. In general, the 
physical labour productivity for Companies A and B is comparable to that of the 
Singaporean plant to which several interviewees referred, but according to interview 
sources, South African wages were approximately 20% higher. Unfortunately other 
performance indicators were not available for this plant, but it is clear from the lead times 
that South African plants are not as speedy as their Far Eastern competitors. Long lead 
times in South Africa were generally attributed to the time required to import kits from 
overseas. 
Table B-2: TV Productivity and Performance Measures 
Company A B C Singapore 
Hours per set 2,38 2,6 4 2,1 
Value (annual) R2l2 765 R309 528 R277 778 -- 
K/L ratio (R's per employee) R95 744 RI 6 666 R4 444 -- 
Output/capital ratio 3,6 18,5 62,5 -- 
Ratio direct/indirect 4,38 1,6 5,2 -- 
Workers/supervisor 32 -- -- -- 
Stock turns 4 4 4 -- 
Average Batch Size 1 000 1 000 5 000 -- 
Average WIP 500 units R22m R750 000 -- 
Key changeover/setup times 2 hours 1 day 3 days 1 day 
% factory space utilised 80% 50% 50% -- 
Lead times 6 months 5 months 3-4 months 1 week 
Throughput times 10 days 5 days 2 weeks -- 
Value added ratio 3,75% -- -- 
Defects as % of output 15% 20% 15% -- 
Plant size (units) 75 000 75 000 70 000 140 000 
Capacity utilisation 25% 30% 30% -- 
Source: Interview sources 
Most interviewees felt that productivity had been improving slowly, although Company C 
felt the opposite and cited labour problems as a major obstacle. However, on examination it 
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became clear that measured productivity improvements were in part due to a very rapid 
decline in the size of the workforce: in Company A, for example, the manufacturing 
workforce had fallen from 560 in April 1992 to 470 in early 1993, and was expected to fall 
by another 100-150 in the next few months. 
(3) Scale of Production 
As mentioned above, one of the TVI's main arguments for continued protection concerns its 
inability to achieve economies of scale relative to foreign plants. This issue must be 
considered carefully, for if it is groundless, then the basis for protection is considerably 
weakened. 
This is an issue which has vexed the industry and BTI for years. On the one hand, the 
industry argues that television production is subject to significant economies of scale and 
that restricted entry is a suitable policy for South African conditions. On the other hand, the 
BIT and prospective importers and entrants have seen the big four firms as rent-seekers and 
consistently argued for a freer market. 
Production runs in local plants average 70 000 units per line p.a. compared to 140 00 p.a. in 
foreign plants. The minimum efficient annual output for one line using locally available 
technology would be 100 000 units (interview sources). Given the fact that each local plant 
has two or more lines, the combined output of seven firms producing at optimal levels would 
be far in excess of the local market. From Table B-I, it can be seen that at present the best 
South African plant experiences per-unit overhead costs roughly 2,3 times those of 
Singaporean firms. That this disjuncture is not greater than it is, however, is an indication 
that manufacture at lower volumes is possible. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that South African firms do suffer a disadvantage in overhead costs 
versus foreign producers. It will also be noticed, however, that in none of the scenarios 
would overheads identical to those of their competitors solve the TVI's problem of price 
disadvantage. Excessive materials costs are at least as important, and are not subject to 
alteration through increased throughput because of proprietary technology restrictions which 
govern component pricing. 
Local manufacturers import components in kit form from overseas technology licensors, 
who charge an average premium of 15% compared to their internal transfer prices to their 
own plants. It is not possible to purchase directly from component manufacturers, as South 
African firms are tied to the use of proprietary integrated circuits (ICs) which must be 
purchased as part of the basic kit. In this respect even availability of significantly cheaper 
locally-produced components would not rectify the situation. To this is added the lower 
volumes at which South African manufacturers purchase imported components, which 
prevent them from receiving discounts comparable to those enjoyed by some overseas 
competitors. 
Nor will the problem of overhead costs be solved by new investment in up-to-date 
production technology. The benchmark Far Eastern plants are highly automated and 
flexible, and require large production runs in order to cover the cost of this investment. For 
South African firms to follow this route, overhead costs would further increase unless major 
export outlets could be found. 
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Finally, the minimum industry output required to support local manufacture of the principal 
component, the picture tubes, is closer to im units p.a. — far beyond the Southern African 
market. In this respect, the recent Daewoo-Anglo proposal for a South African television 
tube plant must be regarded with scepticism — unless, of course, it was to be heavily 
protected. 
More central to the overhead cost disadvantage facing local firms, perhaps, is the size of the 
wholesale profit margin: a case can be made that existing producers have compensated for 
limited volumes by increasing margins, in turn made possible by protection, entry 
restrictions and aggressive brand marketing. Table B- 1 suggests that in some cases South 
African manufacturers enjoy wholesale profit margins 50% higher than their overseas 
competitors. The large and costly corporate structures which must be supported by local 
television pricing may also play an important role. 
Seen in this light, the argument for restricted entry may turn out to be an argument for 
protecting excessive profit levels. In this case the test of the argument should be to allow 
new entrants to test the waters. If this results in a shake-out of the industry, this may be a 
desirable outcome. 
(4) Product Quality 
Product quality at retail level is not seen as a problem within the South African industry. 
Retail interviewees felt comfortable with South African products. The number of defects 
which must be resolved at plant level (15-20% of output), however, are unacceptably high. 
Company B reported 80 minutes a day spent correcting faults, but could not quantify the 
resulting impact on cost. All sources, however, stressed that South African televisions were 
less sophisticated than their overseas counterparts, and that quality might not be as 
consistent were this not the case. It must be remembered, too, that relatively little of a 
'South African' television is actually South African — by far the greatest part of the 
product by value and physical volume is imported. The essential South African contribution 
is assembly. 
(5) Product Research, Design, And Development 
No company reported significant research and development (R&D) efforts. All employed 
industrial engineers who worked on layout, flow, value engineering, etc., but none reported 
any product development beyond cosmetic alterations or recombinations of existing 
components. In general, the combination of technology dependence and limited skills 
precluded any meaningful R&D. No company was able to quantify the proportion of R&D 
spending in turnover, or profit. 
This is clearly a function of the nature of the South African TV!. Although the TVI was 
founded partly to encourage technological progress and skills acquisition, it was also 
required by law to conclude agreements with foreign technology licensors who, it was hoped, 
would impart skills to their South African partners. This has not happened; instead, as we 
have seen, firms are locked into the purchase of the proprietary ICs needed for brand-name 
models. Local firms have been unable to break away from dependence on overseas designs, 
and do not seem interested in doing so. Company B reported that their foreign partners 
simply scaled down popular models and provided the designs to their South African 
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partners, who had only to engineer the production layout. This was seen as a satisfactory 
arrangement by the South Africans. 
Perhaps it is inevitable that this should be so in a global context of very rapid product 
changes and high R&D overheads associated therewith. As we saw in Chapter Three, the 
hallmark of competition in the contemporary consumer electronics industry is the ability to 
design and bring to the market new products on a nearly continuous basis. Competitive 
advantage resides primarily in this. Such capacity is simply beyond the capacity of an 
industry lacking the design skills, strategic orientation, and inter-firm linkages with 
component suppliers of the Far Eastern consumer electronics giants. 
The only viable future for a television industry which lacked a strong local market and/or 
components sector, therefore, would be design and production of proprietary products 
marketed globally under an independent brand name. To achieve this, however, would 
require massive investments in technological capacity and production volumes sufficient to 
cover these costs. Given the number and nature of the established producers of televisions 
globally, such a path is not practical for the South African TVI. 
(6) Strategic Focus 
(a) Domestic Market 
The strategic orientation of South African television manufacturers is shaped by the 
marketing and corporate orientation of their parent companies. In general, their goal is to 
maintain brand premium and share through product quality and cost competitiveness versus 
other local firms. This approach does not result in low-priced, mass-oriented products, but 
is oriented towards the middle to upper end of the market. Recently, however, the emergence of smaller cut-price assemblers of SKD kits has forced more established manufacturers to 
consider moving into this market as well. 
This is not a popular option with the established firms, as it would force them to be 
competitive against a product which has little local content and a very low relative price. 
Successful manufacture of such products could only be achieved were the components to be 
imported in SKD form, with correspondingly less domestic value added — hence less 
opportunity for profit — and higher foreign exchange requirements. This would require 
much larger volumes to be as profitable as the present set-up. Against such a move, it is 
argued that maintaining brand premium through product identification and quality is the key 
to profit, which is based on customer loyalty and brand preferences; and that customer 
association of low-priced products with established brands could undermine the latter. 
There is no obvious reason, however, why television p/am's as opposed to firms could 
not sell such products directly to cash discount chains, as is the practice of the newcomers. 
This would bypass the marketing and administrative costs associated with a large corporate 
structure. Customers of branded products would not be affected by such a strategy. This 
was suggested by the factory manager of Company A, who felt that such a step would 
increase throughput and help to spread overhead costs over a greater variety of products 
without compromising brand image. Only corporate attachment to the brand strategy and 
limited independence at the factory level stood in the way. The technological adjustments 
associated with multi-product assembly (as opposed to fabrication) were not regarded as 
insurmountable with commitment. 
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(b) Exports 
Beyond the rhetorical level, there is little interest in television exports in most firms, for 
obvious reasons. Present exports are almost entirely to African countries, and mainly to 
expatriate or state purchasers. No company interviewed had achieved any success in 
television exports to any major market. Exports of related products are also seemingly not 
seriously considered, with the significant exception of Company A, which has recently 
sought export channels in Europe for a low-priced VCR which would be assembled locally 
out of imported Korean kits.5 
Companies A and B, however, have had success in exporting M-Net-type decoders to 
European pay-TV firms. This success was based on their ability to offer flexible volumes 
and limited production runs, which larger Far Eastern plants would not consider. It was 
admitted in both cases, however, that these exports would not be at all profitable were it not 
for GElS export incentives and the connections of M-Net itself. 
c) Manufacturing Philosophy And Practice 
(1) Factory Layout 
Of the three firms visited, two permitted factory tours. In both plants it was possible to 
speak to the engineering director directly. Both plants had nearly identical layouts. A 
receiving area delivers components to a store area, which in both cases seemed fairly well- 
stocked. As can be seen from Table B-2, at least three month's worth of inventory was 
carried in both cases. 
The manufacturing process begins with the assembly of the chassis (a printed circuit board 
with a variety of components) using sophisticated auto-insertion machinery. These 
machines, which were generally bought second-hand from technology partners, picked 
components from bins and placed them into the PCB, which was sent though a solder bath. 
In both plants the capacity of the auto-insertion machines was far in excess of the assembly 
line, but machines were kept running for production into stock because changeovers took 
considerable time. This resulted in trolleys full of chassis waited for assembly into the set. 
The next stage was assembly of the set on a moving assembly line fed by baskets of 
components. Separate lines were generally used for CTV and MTV This started with the 
insertion of several more components onto the chassis, followed by the tuner. The set then 
went through another solder bath, and was hooked up to the tube. Then came a series of 
tests and settings, followed by assembly into the cabinet and other external features. Then 
came more tests and settings, followed by a period of 'soaking' on overhead racks, in which 
sets were left to run a test pattern to settle components and show any faults. From there the 
sets were packaged and sent to shipping. 
In both plants numerous defective sets were seen on racks awaiting rectification, which 
appeared to employ 15-20 full-time technicians in both plants. Aside from the chassis, work 
in progress levels were limited since sets move down the line singly. 
Tellingly, exchange rate fluctuations killed this deal. 
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Neither plants used any cellular layouts, since the costs involved in duplicating equipment 
for each cell were prohibitive. Layout was strictly functional and linear, not U-shaped. 
In general, the key dynamics in television assembly are (i) the speed at which assemblers can 
assemble, and (ii) the relationship between efficient production volumes at various stages of 
the manufacturing process. Optimally, plants using auto-insertion equipment should run 
enough lines to take up the output of the latter working at full pace. As it stands, neither 
plant using such equipment can sell enough output to do this. As a result, there is a 
significant disjuncture between the auto-insertion process and assembly. 
(2) Production Scheduling 
Production in both plants is for stock based on forecasts supplied by head office. Neither 
plant works on a just-in-time basis, except to the extent that sets go down each line singly. 
Ample stock of components was evident at each work station, as no kanban system is used 
in either plant. 
Component deliveries were taken into stock, as local components suppliers were not trusted 
to deliver timeously. The exception was cabinets, which were supplied frequently to both 
plants (Plant A 's requirements in this respect were served by a former employee around the 
corner). Delivery of kits, of course, were in three months' batches since they were shipped 
from overseas. 
(3) Work Organisation 
In both plants, auto-insertion machines are run by trained technicians who monitor, set and 
'operate' the machines. It appeared that programming and maintenance is done by the 
operators, except for major repairs which require imported technicians. 
In the assembly line area work is organised along classical flow lines. Each worker is seated 
at a work-station with components available overhead, and repeat a single assigned 
assembly or setting task continuously. No work teams or multiple skilling methods are used, 
although TV Plant A claims commitment to developing a multi-skilling approach. A similar 
system applies to the testing areas. 
Neither plant uses suggestion schemes or green areas, although both hold periodic meetings 
to discuss production problems, quality, and so on. Supervision is by a separate group of 
employees, as is final quality testing. Every set, however, is tested for performance; testing 
is not random or statistical. 
(4) Skills, Training, and Labour Relations 
Because of the assembly nature of television manufacture in South Africa, skill levels are 
generally low. Both plants employ unskilled workers who are trained in-house to work at a 
specific assembly station. Auto-insertion machines are monitored by one or more qualified 
technicians. Generally one qualified electrician is employed in the plant to maintain and 
repair equipment. Understandably, no shortages of workers were reported at either plant. 
Training is generally once-off, on-the-job, and in-house. Neither plant had any specific 
skills or education requirements for new employees, beyond literacy and numeracy. Neither 
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plant could describe the average educational background of it workers. It appeared that 
most assembly workers picked up skills in soldering and operating test equipment, but were 
not required to know anything about electronics or wiring — they simply took colour-coded 
components and placed or soldered them into place on preassigned parts of the chassis. 
Ongoing training programmes are used at TV Plant A to instil a sense of quality, although 
the training is mainly conceptual, not practical. 
Company B's factory manager claimed to have a fairly good relationship with production 
workers. The plant was organised by the Radio and Television Workers Association of 
South Africa, which appeared to be a quiet and conservative union. The plant was not 
organised by NUMSA and had not struck in the 1992 SEIFSA dispute. 
Labour relations at Company C were also opaque, but the engineering director spoke freely 
of the unsuitability of his 'African' employees relative to the 'coloured' workers at Western 
Cape plants. (Here his younger production manager strongly disagreed with him, perhaps 
sensing the researcher's discomfort with the exchange). The plant was not organised by any 
union, although a NUMSA ballot had been held and lost by the union in 1991. 
Management at neither plant regarded unions as particularly useful or important from the 
perspective of manufacturing performance, and generally dismissed the idea of a co- 
operative approach to production with a well, it might work overseas, but here, with these 
people...' attitude. In both plants, however, management expressed concern that poor labour 
quality and lack of skilling was a significant barrier to competitiveness, and that further 
training was required to overcome this. The concept of 'training' present ins such attitudes 
was not clearly specified — it was essentially a general catch-call for improving workers. 
Neither plant's management seemed to regard a labour-as-resource approach as feasible 
because of low skill levels. 
All of the assembly workers in both plants were women, hired for their alleged 'nimbleness'. 
TV Plant A employed mostly African-language speakers, whilst TV Plant B employed so- 
called 'coloureds'. TV Plant B also employed a few white women. Auto-insertion 
technicians were mostly white and foreign, with the exception of TV Plant A, which had one 
or two so-called 'coloured' technicians. All of the management personnel contacted or met 
were white males. 
d) Ability To Meet Basic Needs 
(1) Employment 
TV Plant A employed 383 workers, 320 of whom were direct, the rest indirect. TV Plant B 
employed 586 workers, 160 indirect and 426 direct. Both plants were at approximately 1/3 
of capacity, but foresaw only a 25% increase in employment should there be a more to full 
capacity. A doubling of capacity would require far less than double the number of workers — approximately only 60% more. 
The employment potential of the TV! can been seen in two ways. With existing technology, 
labour requirements would grow with output growth, although much less than 
proportionately to the latter. With a newer, more flexible technology, however, labour 
requirements would probably fail. Considering that between them plants A and B account 
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for nearly 40% of the already-overstocked South African television market, it is evident that 
even a doubling of that market is unlikely to have any significant impact on unemployment. 
(2) Product Affordability and Appropriateness 
At present South African televisions remain significantly overpriced relative to the South 
African market. A branded 20" CTV costs around Ri 200 to Ri 500, nearly an average 
metalworker's monthly wage. An unbranded import, however, even with duty, costs from 
R600 — R800. Unbranded sets could probably be profitably imported and sold for even 
less, if prices elsewhere are an indication — from R250 — R400. South African sets, 
moreover, are of generally siightly less quality and offer fewer features that many imports 
which could be sold for half the price. 
The South African TVI's products are thus not easily affordable to the majority of South 
Africans. That the latter continue to buy televisions in increasing numbers, however, is an 
indication of the importance attached to this basic communication device. Higher television 
prices are undoubtedly costing the economy significantly in terms of foregone expenditure 
on other items, many of which perhaps could be viably produced here. 
e) Other Considerations 
(1) Age, Condition, and Sources of Equipment 
Capital equipment in all three plants was on average 10 years old. Its quality and 
effectiveness was rated highly by management, but it was recognised that it was generally 
inferior to that available elsewhere. Auto-insertion machinery had been imported as hand- 
me-downs from technology partners; other equipment was readily available locally. 
The pertinent issue, however, is not the status of existing equipment, but the cost of its 
replacement, which is generally 3-4 times the historical value. Moreover, replacement with 
existing equipment would not make sense, as to be competitive production technology would 
have to be updated to substantially different methods. 
(2) Investment Plans 
None of the firms visited had any plans to invest in significant additions to capacity or to 
upgrade their existing capacity, with the exception of TV Plant B, which was considering 
buying another auto-insertion machine to handle decoder exports should their contract be 
renewed. In every case it was felt that there was no justification for expansion in the present 
climate, and that any new investment would have to be based on a guarantee of future policy 
stability from government. 
It should be noted that all three plants valued their assets in historical terms, and that 
replacement values were significantly higher than the figures given. 
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(3) Environmental and Safety Issues 
No significant environmental issues specific to the TV! were identified. All plants had 
achieved SABS and ISO 9000 quality and safety ratings for their products. Industrial safety 
and health conditions appeared to be good television manufacture is generally a clean and 
fairly quiet process. 
1) Three Case Studies 
The folloving case studies illustrate the points made in this section. 
Company A 
TV Plant A is the manufacturing arm of the consumer electronics manufacturing division of 
a consumer products group owned by a major financial institution. In theory, it operates 
independently from the rest of its division. It manufactures televisions, M-Net decoders, and 
a variety of similar products. 
The plant produced R180m worth of goods in 1992, using R60m worth of inputs. It holds 
roughly 30% of the television market. In that year it produced 80 000 CTV, 55 000 MTV 
100 000 M-Nct decoders for the Local market, and 80 000 decoders for export. It also 
assembled 20 000 VCRs and a quantity of video door phones. In addition the plant 
produced 10 000 electricity prepayment meters under contract to another firm. 30 000 
television chassis had recently been exported to Brazil on the basis of competitive shipping 
costs versus the far East. Exports of decoders — made profitable by GEtS — had helped 
the plant survive the slump in television sales by soaking up significant overhead costs. 
Such exports, however, were expected to end soon as the contract was unlikely to be 
renewed. 
TV Plant A employs 426 production workers, 108 management, 16 engineers, and 6 quality 
control staff. Its investment in plant and equipment total RI 5m, giving a cost per job of 
R26 987, the highest of the three plants visited. Indeed, its facility was the largest of the 
three, comprising several separate factories on one large site. 
The average ox-factory cost of a television from this plant was R725, making it 
uncompetitive versus imports. The plant operated at 50% capacity in 1992/93, producing 
on average 73 units per day, although television production was at only 25% capacity. 
Production is for stock, based on corporate forecasts, and dictated by the need to order kits 
ahead of time. Labour productivity is nearly comparable to Far Eastern plants — 2,38 
labour hours per set — but its materials costs, which arc 90% of ex-factory price, were 
limited by the need to buy proprietary components from its technology partner, who adds 
18% to the ex-factory price of these items. 
15% of output is defective, and 20 full-time fault finders arc employed. Quality control is 
by ex-post statistical sampling. Average lead time is six months, again due to the wait 
period for imported kits. 2,5% of the average throughput time of 10 days is spent adding 
value. Average batch size of 1000 (2 — 3 000 for the auto-insertion section) is dictated by 
the changeover time of 2 hours. Average WIP is 500 units, and 30 days' worth of stock is 
kept on hand, although the goal is ten. Stock thus turns 12 times annually, making it the 
best of the three plants. 
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The equipment used in this plant is generally newer than for other plants, and 13 auto- 
insertion machines are used. The average age of equipment is about 10 years, and it had 
been obtained from technology partners. 
The interesting feature of TV Plant A is its management's strategic focus. The factory 
manager for this plant had apparently been 'poached' from a technology partner, and had 
worked in a number of European plants. His approach to television manufacturing was 
strikingly different to the South African managers interviewed in other plants. At present 
his plant was doing outside contract work which accounted for 5 5-60% of output, selling the 
remainder to the parent company. His philosophy was that the plant should be considered 
and run as an independent actor, selling to any buyer on a competitive cost and quality basis, 
including the corporate owner. This approach had already borne fruit: the plant was 
negotiating directly with a variety of export targets independently of head office. He did not 
say so directly, but I sensed that there were problems in achieving this level of independence 
from head office. Other interviewees in the plant indeed spoke with candour of problems 
arising from head office insensitivity to manufacturing realities. 
The factory manager's feeling was that the local television industr had over-invested in 
capacity in the I 970s in anticipation of a boom which never matcrialised, and that this had 
dissuaded them from making further investments which could increase manufacturing 
flexibility. This was seen as the only wa to solve the problem of low television volumes 
and unstable production of decoders. To this end the factory manager had reorganised the 
production facility into several sub-units, each of which had its own management group and 
was accounted separately. This helped to identify more accurately the overhead costs per 
unit, which varied according to the sub-unit in question. It was hoped that this would result 
in the creation of proflt centres' within the factory which could be developed into 
independent sub-factories manufacturing groups of related products. The key to this 
approach — which had already achieved success, as evinced by the variety of products 
produced — was to attain manufacturing flexibility so as to allow for rapid changeovers to 
a variety of products on the same line or cell. This would help to spread overhead cost 
recovery over a larger number of products, thus reducing the pressure on the television 
section to recover it all. This could help to reduce television costs, although the problem of 
high component costs would remain. 
It was recognised that it might also be necessary to move into production of unbranded low- 
cost sets to increase volumes, although this was an unpopular and risky option for reasons 
discussed above. A more reasonable approach. according to the factory manager, would be 
to concentrate on niche marketing of middle to upper end branded products of a reasonably 
high quality, produced in small batches. It was realised that this approach would require 
significant investment in organisation development, training, and multi-skilling. Such steps 
have already begun, although it is too earls to tell whether they would be effective. TV 
plant A is easily the most advanced and successful of the three plants visited, and may 'vell 
be able to achieve this goal. 
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Company B 
TV Plant B is the manufacturing arm of a major consumer electronics subsidiary of one of 
the country's top industrial conglomerates. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of the consumer 
electronics group. It specialises in the production of branded televisions and M-Net 
decoders. 
TV Plant B produced R130m worth of televisions in 1992, 2/3 of them CTV Average 
output was about 200 sets per day. This company held about 20-25% of the television 
market, although share has fallen in response to competition from the 'screwdriver' 
assemblers and grey market imports. It also produced 100 000 pay-TV decoders for export 
to Europe and 50 000 for the local market last year. 
The plant employs 420 people, 260 of them in direct production activities. Fixed capital 
invested totals R7m, giving a figure for capital invested per employee of R16 666. The 
relatively high figure is due to large investments in two auto-insertion machines, purchased 
from a technology partner. 
The average ex-factory price of a television from this plant is about R900. A directly 
comparable imported set would cost approximately R896 CIF, whilst the unbranded sets 
which are cutting into its market share come in at R480 — R600. 
Labour productivity at the plant averages 3 sets per person per da compared to 7-8 at 
comparable Far Eastern plants visited by the factory manager. 20% of physical output is 
defective, and there are 7 full-time fault-finders employed. Production is for stock, and the 
minimum batch size is 400 — 1,5 -2 day's output. Lead times are 5 months for television, 
due to long delays in getting imported kits, and 3 months for decoders. Manufacturing 
throughput time is usually 5 days. This means that actual time spent adding value to 
materials is 6.5% of throughput time. Stock turns 4 times per year on average. 
No major changes to technique, technology, or process had been initiated in recent years, but 
productivity had risen due to the reduction in the number of employees, by contrast, fixed 
overhead per unit had risen due to reduced volumes. 
The factory manager and engineering director of the plant felt that the TVI would not 
survive the present SAP, due to their inability to reduce costs because of high overheads, 
high component costs, and inability to match productivity at Far Eastern plants. They saw 
the best solution as a return to licensing of producers to limit participation in the market, 
and a 20% effective duty on imports — i.e. once duties on net forex usage were taken into 
account. They did not see automation as an answer because of lack of throughput. 
Company C 
TV Plant C is the manufacturing facility of a large multi-product consumer goods firm. It 
assembles televisions and some audio products, although its audio operations arc consist of 
placement of pre-manufactured chassis into plastic cabinets designed for the local market. 
The plant produced R250m worth of goods last year. with 60% of this accounted by TVs. 
Average daily output of TVs is presently about 416 units. Its MD estimates that it held 20- 
25% of the TV market until this year. when 'grey' imports and sales by kit' assemblers 
such as Triad and Giant cut its share to 12-15%, as in the case of Company B 
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The plant employs 1 000 people, 780 of whom are involved in production or related 
activities. Total investment in plant and equipment is about R4m. Capital per employee is 
thus only R4 000, far below the average for manufacturing industry and a fraction of that 
figure for the other two firms studied. This is because the plant is essentially a hig1Iy 
labour-intensive assembler of imported parts and used little equipment. For example, it was 
the only plant visited not to use auto-insertion machinery — requiring 100 extra employees 
to perform this time-consuming task, adding several hours of labour per set. The plant was 
in fact designed to be labour intensive to suit apartheid relocation incentives. 
As in the case of the two previous case studies, the average ex-factory cost of a 20" colour 
set at this plant is R700, but sets are sold to the trade at just under RI 000 once wholesale 
mark-up is included. By comparison, the same set could be imported net of duties at an 
FOB cost of R450. The reasons for this are not hard to identify. 
Whereas at a typical Far Eastern plant it takes on average 2,25 hours to produce a TV TV 
Plant C takes over 4 hours. 15% of physical output is defective in one way or another, and 
nearly 50% of the 580 production workers in the TV section are involved in rework. 
Production for stock is the norm, since changeover takes nearly 3 days and the minimum 
batch size target is 5 000 units — half a month's output. Lead times range from 3-4 
months, and material throughput times are on the order of two weeks. Given the hours 
needed to produce a set, this implies that only 0.05% of throughput time is spent adding 
value. Since input costs are on average 75% of the value of a set, this implies a significant 
cost in inventories. Stock presently turns 4 times per year, and the average value of work in 
progress is about R750 000. Company C is thus significantly less productive than its South 
African competitors. 
Given these figures, according to the MD, the plant cannot be expected to survive beyond 
the next three years of the current SAP for the industry. His reasons for this are as follows. 
Firstly, labour productivity and quality are much worse than comparable overseas plants.' 
Absenteeism is 11%, compared to 0,5% at Far Eastern plants he has visited. Compared to 
local plants, too, his plant is badly inefficient. It does not use auto-insertion machinery for 
basic chassis preparation, which means that more than 100 extra employees are required 
compared to TV. Plants A and B. Secondly, production at less than efficient scale, which he 
estimates to be closer to 30 000 units per month, raises costs by 40%. Thirdly, although 
locally sourced inputs are only 5% of the total, their price and quality are much worse than 
imported products. This has attributed to the poor state of the local component industry. 
(The cost-raising effect of sub-optimal scale production at some component plants was 
estimated at 300%.) Finally, capital equipment is on a par with overseas firms, but is 
ageing and unlikely to be replaccd. There are potential improvements to be had from the 
installation of auto-insertion equipment for printed circuit boards, but the decentralisation 
incentives referred to above precluded using them as they would decrease employment.7 
Subsequently the capital cost has become too high to justify the investment. 
One also sense that there have been tensions beteen management and labour recently, which ma 
account br his emphasis on labour problems. 
With the same process. a doubling of output would cost R4in and increase labour requirements by 30%. 
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Although some strides have been made through reducing the number of lines in the factory 
and increased multi-product runs, engineer exchanges with component suppliers, and in- 
house R&D efforts (all sets are now designed locally, at least cosmetically), the plant 
remains hopelessly inefficient. The MD sees no ftiture for TV production and estimates that 
10 years technological and educational catch-up efforts are needed Investment in more 
efficient automated technology is not seen as an option since the local market is too small to 
support the number of producers (TV Plant C plant could supply the entire country with its 
present capacity, which is only 50% utihsed), and such technology is already in use at 
overseas plants who already enjoy such volumes. Exports are not seen as a viable 
alternative since local component supply is so poor and costly. Export of assembled parts — which can be brought in at little less than the final product — is not a viable export 
strategy. 
TV Plant C closed down towards the end of the Industrial Strategy Pro ect. 
2. The Television Industry: A Case Study in Trade and Industrial 
Policy Gone Wrong 
a) Background 
The South African television industry is unique in the HED industr in that it has been the 
object of almost continuous public attention since its inception, both from the government 
and the broader public. This has had two practical implications. Firstly, the greater 
availability of documentary sources, which are scarce for the white goods and small 
appliances branches, has made it possible to provide a much more detailed study of this 
branch. Secondly, it provides an opportunity to look at the practice of South African 
industrial policy — really trade policy — towards what has been regarded as a strategic 
consumer durables industry. 
(1) A Strategic Industri'? 
As noted in the introduction, the South African television industry (henceforth TVI) has its 
origins in a decision by the government to begin television broadcasts in the earl l970s. 
Until recently the state-controlled South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) has 
been the only legal broadcaster in South Africa. From the beginning the TV!, too, has been 
under strict government control: it was regarded as a strategic industry. The initial 
conditions stipulated for the TVI were thus exacting: 
• Manufacturers had to be approved by the Minister for Economic Affairs. 
• Each manufacturer had to register with the Minister a technology agreement concluded 
with an established foreign producer. This was intended to ensure that local televisions 
would be of high quality, and that technology would be transferred to the South African 
finn. 
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• All receivers had to comply with safety and quality standards set by the SABS. In 
practice the quality specifications tended to inhibit low-cost sets from being 
manufactured by smaller firms. 
• Only 61 cm monochrome and 45 to 50 or 67 cm colour sets could be manufactured 
(later expanded to include 31 cm portables). This limitation was introduced to achieve 
maximum scale economies and encourage eventual local production of picture tubes 
(interview sources). 
• Personnel training facilities were required to be established. 
• Manufacturers had to utilise locally-made components and co-operate actively with 
local component manufacturers to maximise local content. 
One reason given for such pervasive control was the need to ensure system standardisation. 
The second reason, however, was perhaps a bit far-fetched: it was hoped that the TV! would 
serve as a training ground for technically-skilled labour for a growing domestic electronics 
sector, seen as strategically vital. Subsequent experience has shown that this was a vain 
hope: the South African TV! has remained a technology-dependent assembler of imported 
parts, requiring and imparting few specialist skills. 
Of all government conditions imposed on the TVI, the most significant was that which 
limited the number of manufacturers within the Southern African Customs Union to six 
(later eight), "in the interests of stability' This intervention has had lasting effects, giving 
the initial participants enormous advantages. This arrangement could arguably be justified 
at the time by the smallness of the South African market and the need to encourage domestic 
investment in the industry. But it also helped to create a persistent culture and practice of 
'lobbyism' in the TV!, in which considerable energy and resourcefulness has been devoted to 
debating, contesting, and evading government trade and fiscal regulations. The recent entry 
of low-price producers of SKD kits, however, has changed the situation considerably, 
forcing older manufacturers to reassess their traditional brand-oriented strategies. 
(2) Initial Tar jff Protection 
As part of the government's plan, a study of tariff protection for the TV! was initiated by the 
Board of Trade and Industries in 1971. At that time the BT! recommended the following: (i) 
an ad valorem duty of 100% or R500 each less the FOB price on TV receivers, either 
assembled or unassembled — essentially blanket protection; (ii) an ad valorem duty of 
100% or R250 each on picture tubes (with a 5% preference given to imports from the UK). 
This was to encourage local manufacture of tubes — obviously a measure introduced 
without much investigation into its feasibility; and (iii) provision for full rebate of these 
duties at the discretion of the Secretary for !ndustries. 
Although the TV! was to be protected heavily, the high duty on picture tubes undermined 
this considerably.8 Nevertheless, these proposals were implemented in early 1972. The BTI 
8 Picture tubes remain the most serious obstacle to a viable TVI in South Africa. The tube typically 
represents over 80% of the bill of materials for a television. The bill of materials is typically 70-80% of 
ex-factory cost. Clearly then, inability to produce this part locally essentially precludes sufficient 
domestic value added to make the industry viable. 
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stated explicitly at the time, however, that the duties were "exceedingly high and.. .intended 
simply to prevent imports of television sets temporarily': until local manufacturers had had 
a chance to equip themselves. As such, they were to be 'subject to review at short notice" 
Anticipating subsequent events, the BTI also (stipulated that 'ho claim could be made for 
any assistance for a local television industry established on the basis of these duties" This 
has not stopped the TVI from trying. 
b) The TV! in 1984 
To review the effectiveness of its policy towards the TV!, the BTI conducted a study of the 
industry in 1984 (BTI, 1984). This was generally highly critical of the industry. Its 
principal conclusions are presented in this section in order to develop an overall picture of 
the TV! and to provide a comparison to more recent events. 
(1) Participating Firms 
Table B-3: Market Breakdown, 1984 
MODEL SCREEN 
WIDTH 






cm 10 000 542 .37 940 000 
51 cm 50000 R.466 .23 300 000 
)ther 10000 R.362 U4 480 000 
75 720 000 
'IONOCHR OME 
31cm 120000 R.135 U6200000 
)thcr 20 000 R.200 R4 000 000 
20 200 000 
FOTALS 300 000 R320' R95 920 000 
Source: BTI, 1984 
As anticipated, the local television market was overwhelmingly dominated by local products. 
The BTI had modified its original limitation on entry in the late 1 970s to allow up to eight 
television manufacturing finns. Through mergers and closures, however, by 1984 the TVI 
had shaken out to four players: the National Panasonic Division of Barlows Manufacturing 
Company; SA Phillips (Pty.) Ltd.; Television and Electrical Holdings, Ltd. (Tedelex); and 
TEK Corporation (Pty) Ltd. Each firm held roughly 20-25% of the market. 
Weighted average. 
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(2) Market Size 
Physical production capacity, however, was estimated to be 500 000 units p.a., with an 
average utilisation rate 
of only 52%. 
Table B-4: Television Receivers Sold, 1976-1984 
YEAR NUMBER YEAR NUMBER 
1974-6 450000 1981 293000 
1977 292 000 1982 341 000 
1978 183000 1983 295000 
1979 156000 1984 310000 
1980 293 000 -- -- 
Source: South African Radio and Television Manufacturer's 
Association. CSS, 1984. 
significantly more than the entire Southern African market. Plant capacity was determined 
by the capacity of core processes, such as printed-circuit board (PCB) insertion machinery, 
and by the number of lines installed. In practice, plant capacity has probably been 
understated: all three plants visited during research had ample space for extra lines, whilst 
those in operation only ran one shift. This results in relatively high overhead charges per 
unit, as we have seen. 
Table B-5: Cost Breakdown 
ITEM RANDS % of PRICE 
Components and Materials: 198 62% 
SouthAfrican 34 (17%) 11% 
Imported 164 (83%) 51% 
Overhead and Duties, of which: 
— Fixed overhead costs 16 5% 
— Levies and duties 10 3% 
Value added, of which: !!4 
— Labour costs 26 8% 
— Factory profit 70 22% 
Ex-factory price 320 100% 
Plus excise duty 100 31% 
Plus marketing and distribution 25% 
Retail price 500 156% 
Source: BTI, 1984 
Production by current values stood at R132,8m in 1982 and R103,8m in 1983. This was 
significantly higher than annual average domestic sales of R96m, again reflecting a tendency 
to over-produce relative to the market. This yearly average was composed as shown in 
Unit sales fluctuated considerably between 1974 and 1984, around a mean of 260 000. 
As noted above, this 
problem of over- 
capacity was to 
become a major feature 




installed the minimum 
technologically feasible 
capacity, which taken 
together was 
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Table B-5. It can be seen that the dominant market by volume and value was for CTV Ex- 
factory prices fell after 1984 in current terms, but subsequently rose again to fluctuate 
around the R300 — R350 range. In real terms, however, ex-factory prices fell steadily. 
(3) Cost Breakdown & Principal Statistics 
South African televisions were significantly more expensive than imported sets in 1984. 
The BTI estimated that the cost of a hypothetical South African television receiver in 1984 
was composed as in Table B-6. 
ITEM TOTAL % OF SALES 
Ex-factory Sales R95,9m 
Total Intermediate Inputs R59,4m 61,9% 
Of which: 
Local Inputs RlO,2m 10,6% 
Imported Inputs R49.2m 51,3% 
Value Added R36,6m 38,2% 
Of which: 
Profit R21,Om 21,9% 
Labour Remuneration R7,8m 8,1% 
Note that on average 
imported materials 
comprised 83% of materials 
cost and 51% of ex-factory 
cost. Value added in the 
manufacturing process was 
less than the value these 
imported materials. 
Extrapolating from this 
hypothetical example to the 
total market of 300 000 sets 
in 1984, the principal 
statistics for the TVI were 
approximately as depicted in 
table B-6. 
Of total intermediate inputs 
inputs represented 82,8%. This used, 'local' inputs represented 17,2%, whilst imported 
figure does not fully represent the cost of imported inputs, however, since the import content 
of 'local' inputs and depreciation charges is not taken into account. Note that on the basis of 
1600 full-time employees, each job in the TV! cost the economy R30 750 in foreign 
exchange usage. This was balanced by R22 875 in value added per employee. 
(4) Investment 
Total investment in 
the TVI in 1984 
was broken down as 
depicted in Table B- 
7. 
The percentage of 
fixed investment in 





Table B-6: Principal Statistics 
Source: BTI, 1984 
Table B-7: Investment in the TV!, 1984 
ITEM AMOUNT % OF TOTAL 
Total Fixed Investment R1O,7m 14Vo 
Land and Buildings R7,4m (69%) 9,7% 
Plant and Equipment Rl,9m (17,8%) 2,5 — 
Other R1,4m(13%) 1,8% 
Working Capital R65,2m 85,7% 
Stocks R41,2m (63%) 54% 
Debtors R24,Om (37%) 3 1,5% 
Total Investment R75,9m 100% 
to the Source: BTI, 1984 
average. The proportion of plant and equipment in fixed investment, at 17,8%, was also 
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TYPE NUMBER % 
Skilled production workers 96 6% 
Semi-skilled 448 28% 
Unskilled 560 35% 
Management 496 31% 
very low. On the other hand, 
the figure for working capital 
was high, reflecting the fact 
that major 1'VI finns were 
and are primarily trading 
companies. 
From this picture the BTI 
drew the conclusion — as we 
have — that the TV! earned 
its profits on trade rather than 
on manufacture. It attributed 
this to limitations on market entry and high tariff protection. Indeed, the factory managers 
of Companies A, B, and C all argued that their role was as a supplier of product to a 
wholesale division whose profitability depended on maintaining brand premium. Any cost 
reductions were therefore passed on to the wholesale division, whose minimum prices to the 
trade were effectively set by the tariff rate. They pointed out that average profit attributable 
to factory operations is in the region of 2-3%. 
(5) Employment 
Together the four manufacturers employed only 1 600 persons in 1984, broken down as in 
Table B-8. Given the emphasis placed on the development of a skilled workforce in the 
industry, the total of only 96 skilled workers was a matter of significant concern. 
(6) Economic Ratios 
From the foregoing, various statistics can be presented (Table B-9): 
• The ratio of value added to fixed capital was extremely high in comparison to the 
Table B-9 
Profit as a percentage of total capital employed 2 7,7% 
Profit as a percentage of total fixed investment 196,0% 
Profit as a percentage of VA'° 5 7,3% 
Fixed capital per employee R6 687,50 
VA per employee R22 875,00 
Output per employee R59 93 7,50 
VA/Fixed capital 3,42 
Output/Fixed capital 8,96 
VA/Intermediate inputs 0,62 
Output/Intermediate inputs 1,61 
VA/all inputs 0,47 
Output/all inputs 1,23 
I0 Value added. 
Table B-8: Skill Composition Of The TV 
Manufacturing Industry, 1984 
Source: BTI, 1984 
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manufacturing average, yet the ratio of profit to value added was similar to the 
manufacturing average. This implied that pmfits were being earned predominantly on 
working capital, rather than on manufacturing as such. This could be attributed both 
to the high proportion of materials cost in product cost, and the protected nature of the 
industry. 
The intensity of labour usage was lower than in manufacturing more generally, whilst 
labour productivity was higher. The use of intermediate inputs and their productivity 
was similar to the manufacturing average, as was multifactor productivity. 
(7) Competitive Position 
South African sets were from 70-90% more expensive than imported sets in 1984. 
Table B-1O: Price Comparison 
IA lB Ic ID IE IF IG IH 
Colour 
67 cm 70 000 300 340 542 202 67% 242 80% 
51cm 50000 230 260 466 206 90% 236 103% 
other 40000 200 220 362 142 71% 162 81% 
M onochro me 
31 cm 120 000 72 80 135 55 64% 63 88% 
other 20000 108 120 200 88 74% 92 85% 
A = South African unit sales; B = Avg. FOB cost of imported set; C = Avg. CIF cost of 
imported set; D = Avg. ex-factory price of local set; E = Avg. price disadvantage of local 
set vs. CIF import; E = Disadvantage as % of CIF; E Avg. price disadvantage of local 
set vs. FOB import; E = Disadvantage as % of FOB. Source: BTI, 1984. 
From Table B- 10 it can be seen that the ex-factory cost of every South African set was in no 
case less than 80% higher than the FOB price of an import. CIF costs offered a little 
protection, but nowhere near enough to make local sets competitive without heavy 
protection. The weighted average FOB cost of an imported set without duties was R 192. 
By contrast, the weighted average cost of a South African-made set was R320, giving an 
average price disadvantage of R128. Based on the average R320 ex-factory price, domestic 
value added was approximately R36,6m in 1984. However, if South African sets had been 
sold at the average F.O.B price of R192, value added would have been negative (-R0,8m). 
This implies that any vaIue added' arising from local production existed only because of 
protection. The situation has not changed; indeed, as we have seen in Chapter Four, the 
effective rate of protection of South African televisions is in excess of 5 70%. The domestic 
resource cost of producing one Rand of value added in the TV! is over R20. 
The reasons for lack of competitiveness on the part of the TV! in 1984 were not hard to see — and remain essentially unchanged: 
• Because of low unit labour costs overseas, the cost of a fully assembled imported set is 
only slightly higher than that of an unassembled imported kit (duties excluded). As a 
result, the TVI is unable to add value without protection (see below). 
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• Manufacturers could not obtain components more cheaply locally given the weakness of 
local suppliers (see below). Until recently high duties have been payable on some 
essential generic components, as well, forcing local television manufacturers to 
purchase locally. These duties were lifted in early 1992, however. 
• Although labour costs and productivity were and are comparable to overseas plants, 
overhead costs are high. Fixed overheads are roughly double that in foreign plants. 
• Technological dependence on foreign partners, the need to retain established brand 
names, and inability to recover R&D costs has meant that local firms have been unable 
to develop locally-designed products which could liberate them from dependence on 
high-priced imported kits (see below). 
From the perspective of local manufacturers, then, the only effective solution to lack of 
competitiveness has been to argue for continuing protection. 
(8) Overall Contribution to the Economy 
Table B-li: Net Contribution of TV Industry, 1984 
ITEM 
Value added (direct and indirect) 
mported inputs 






(9) Assessment and Proposals for the TV Industry in 1984 
To summarise, the TV receiver manufacturing industry in 1984 was characterised by the 
following features: 
The cost-raising impact of the industry is determined by multiplying the weighted average landed cost of 
an imported TV set, without duties (RI 92) by the average number of sets sold (300 000) to give a figure 
for the total landed cost to the economy if all sets were imported duty-free (R57,6rn). This was then 
subtracted from the figure for total ex-factory sales (R95,9m - R57,6m = R38,3m). This figure, of 
course, does not include the opportunity cost to the economy of resources used to manufacture and 
purchase TV sets locally, or a comparable calculation for nominally 'local' inputs with a high import 
content. 
The net contribution of the TV! to the South African economy was strongly negative in 
1984. Indeed, local manufacturing of televisions cost the economy 1,2 times more foreign 
exchange than was gained in added value, which in turn only existed because of protection 
and barriers to 
entry. Note again 
___________________________ ____________ _______________ that each job in 
the TV! cost the 




balanced by value 
added per 
employee of R26 250. On balance, however, the cost to the economy per job in the TVJ 
was R30 625. This was far in excess of the average manufacturing worker c annual 
earnings at the time. For this reason the argument that the TV! should be protected to 
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• Fixed capital assets in the form of plant and machinery were a very small proportion of 
total assets. The bulk of assets were in the form of working capital and buildings, 
reflecting the predominant role of distribution and trading activities in the industry. 
Productive assets were thus very low in proportion to value added, whilst the ratio of 
capital remuneration to value added was similar to the manufacturing average. This 
situation was only possible given restrictions on entry into the industry, both by foreign 
firms and prospective local manufacturers; were there to be greater competition, profits 
as a percentage of value added could be expected to fall more in line with the small size 
of actual productive assets. 
• Although the industry was reasonably productive in its use of inputs, imports of 
materials and the cost-raising influence of protective tariffs meant that the industry was 
a significant cost to the South African economy. All of this had to be considered in the 
light of a very high level of effective protection. 
• The technological contribution of the TV! was minimal, since it was based mainly on 
assembly if imported parts. It could hardly be regarded as a training ground for a 
sophisticated electronics sector, as the government had initially hoped (an upon which 
many of the 'ground rules' for the industry had been based). 
The BTI's 1984 report unsurprisingly found that the TV! resulted in a net cost to the South 
African economy of local manufacturing activities, and doubted that the TVI could ever 
contribute positively. 
It felt, however, that the TV! should be given a chance to try. To this end, it recommended 
that the TV! move away from assembly of imported kits towards increased use of locally- 
produced components. To stipulate a minimum local content, however, as in the case of 
automobiles, would serve no purpose, since the single most costly component, the picture 
tube, could not feasibly be manufactured locally. Nevertheless, the BTI felt that there were 
some imported components which could be. Thus, as an alternative to continued tariff 
protection, the Board proposed that manufacturers be encouraged, by means of rebates of 
excise duties, to source more components locally. The Board felt, however, that such an 
approach would only work if the unit cost of locally manufactured components could be 
lowered through significant component exports. This could be encouraged by rebating 
excise duties on completed sets to the value of local components used by the manufacturer, 
as well as the value of any components exported.'2 The BTI thus recommended the 
following: 
An experimental period in which the TV! be allowed to reform itself. This would 
involve a 12-month period of 100% duty plus the 35% excise duty, without the R500 
less FOB alternative (which worked out higher for many sets), followed by a second 12 
months at a 60% duty plus the 35% excise duty. This was to be accompanied by 
provision for rebate of the excise duty equal to the amount of value added in the 
manufacture of components and materials either used in locally made sets or sold for 
export. Thus, although both local and imported sets would be subject to the excise 
duty, local manufacturers had the opportunity to reduce their excise rate through 
12 
Protective duties on imported components would not be desirable because the latter were also used by 
other local electronics industries, an issue which has caused continual problems in the search for an 
adequate trade regime for the TV industry until today. 
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increased net local content. Logically, the Board also recommended a reduction of 
duties on picture tubes to free, since there was no chance of local production. The duty 
on TV cabinets was to be reduced to 25%, in line with radio cabinets and similar 
furniture. It was assumed that loss in state revenue consequent on the reduction of 
duties would be balanced by increased sales of TVs, still subject to a 35% excise duty. 
With regard to the restrictions on entry, the BTI felt that the assembly nature of the 
South African TVI meant that there were, in fact, no significant economies of scale. 
Capital investment in productive facilities was quite low. New entrants would reduce 
prices and thus net profits to the existing manufacturers, but it was assumed that 
increased sales overall should maintain individual volumes and prevent an increase in 
unit costs to each manufacturer. It was also assumed that new entrants would face a 
significant barrier to entry in the form of existing product differentiation and brand 
loyalty. There was therefore no basis for licensing of manufacturers, for SABS quality 
standards (which had the effect of restricting entry) of for quantitative import controls 
or manufacturing quotas. 
The BTI made clear in its conclusions that the TVI was being given a second chance, and 
that its recommendations were virtually an 'experiment'. Should this experiment fail, the 
BTI would not hesitate to recommend the abandonment of local TV production. 
c) The TV! 1986-1989 
(1) The Standardised Chassis Scheme 
The BTI's 1984 recommendations were accepted, but only implemented after a two-year 
delay. In May 1987 the customs duty had fallen to 60% ad valorem on imported TV sets 
and monitors of a value not exceeding R800. The additional 35% contra customs duty was 
retained, as were quantitative import controls — against the BTI's recommendations. 
In a report of December 1986, the BTI recommended a new development strategy for the 
TVI (BTI, 1986). Once again, this was designed to solve the problem of dependence on 
imported components. This scheme involved the following: 
• The ad valorem duty on television receiving sets of a value not exceeding R800 each 
was reduced from 100% to 60%. The 35% contra excise duty and quantitative import 
controls were retained. 
• Schedule 6 of Section 75 of the Customs and Excise Act was amended to allow a 
maximum 7% rebate on the value of components used in TV manufacture, plus a rebate 
of the duty equal to the value of exported components. A full 28% rebate on 
components would be granted, however, if TV sets were manufactured according to "a 
programme approved by the Director-General of Trade and Industry". 
The programme in question was set up to design and develop a standardised monochrome 
television chassis. Participating manufacturers had to contribute R5 for each TV set they 
cleared for customs and excise purposes. These funds would be administered by the 
Industrial Development Corporation, and used to finance the chassis project. The rationale 
behind this effort was the belief that only a locally-designed TV set, using local components, 
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could improve the poor performance of the TVI, by localising the component manufacturing 
part of the value added chain. l'his was so for several reasons: 
Firstly, it was clear that local manufcturers were significantly constrained by the 
foreign technology agreements which the government-stipulated industry ground rules 
had required of them. Most manufacturers could not buy local components even if they 
had been cheaper, and could not export freely outside of Southern Africa. Yet no single 
manufacturer had the resources (or was willing to commit them even if available) to 
design and develop a South African set which would free them of these constraints. 
The standardised chassis plan was meant to harness the capabilities of individual firms 
and extemalise the risks and some of the costs associated with such a major endeavour. 
• Moreover, a locally-designed set could be constructed to maximise the use of locally 
available components. 
• Finally, if a South African chassis were standardised and manufactured by all local 
producers, component manufacturers would enjoy greater throughput than if each 
assembler used different chassis. Heretofore they had been asked to supply a variety of 
manufacturers using foreign designs, specif,'ing different components. 
Unsurprisingly considering the 28% duty rebate, most of the major manufacturers 
committed themselves to the standardised chassis scheme. The scheme never got off the 
ground, however. Subsequently the project was abandoned, for several reasons: 
• The specification produced by the Technical Committee was effectively a product 
specification. This meant that it worked on the basis of a target cost structure, which in 
turn assumed use of the most cost-effective components. These turned out to be 
unavailable locally. Net import requirements were actually expected to rise. 
• A standardised chassis designed to utilise presently available local components would in 
effect 'lock' the components industry into producing items which were increasingly 
regarded as out-of-date, leading to technological stagnation. Assimilation of newer 
digital components might thereby be prevented. 
• The scheme was based on a monochrome design. This would only cover approximately 
50% of the South African market in unit terms, and only about 35% in value terms. A 
similar project for a standardised colour chassis was regarded as technologically too 
advanced for local industry. 
There were other problems with the scheme, as well, leading the BTI to note with chagrin 
that "the provisions for granting a rebate of excise duty have been instrumental only in 
increasing sales volumes of television receivers by way of modest price reductions. The 
industry has been placed on a substantially improved financial footing as a result of this 
measure" (BTI, 1989: 9). 
From a policy perspective, the main problems with the scheme and its associated trade 
regulations were the following: 
• Although seven manufacturers had agreed to participate in the scheme, most were 
bound by license and technology agreements, and had not increased their exports or 
local sourcing significantly. The 28% duty rebate was merely a windfall; the only 
reciprocal performance on the part of the manufacturers was their participation in the 
design and development of the standardised chassis. 
190 INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY PROJECT 
• The administration of the 7% duty rebate on components used on TV manufacture was a full-time job for BTI staff, Moreover, numerous problems were encountered with the 
adequacy and accuracy of supporting information supplied by manufacturers. 
• Average rebate claims had been in the order of 3,5% only. This implied that there had 
been little progress in encouraging use of local components. 
• The 60% ad valorem duty on imported TV sets under R800 was intended to include 
semi knocked down (SKD) kits, which are essentially unassembled complete televisions. 
In practice, however, it was found that manufacturers simply imported different parts of 
SKD kits on different invoices and paid the duties applicable to CKD components and 
spare parts. This defeated the purpose of the development programme for the industry 
entirely. 
• The maintenance of quantitative import controls had rendered the reduction from 100% 
to 60% duty ineffective in encouraging more competitive pricing. 
The two-year delay in the implementation of the BTI's 1984 recommendations meant that 
the TV! had had even more time than envisaged to prepare for tariff reduction and expanded 
local sourcing of components. The BTI was unequivocal in its displeasure with the 
industry's response to this opportunity: 
(A)t a meeting held with representatives of the industry in May 1988, it became clearly 
apparent that nothing had changed or was about to change in future, and that decisions for 
the ensuing years need to be taken now (BTI, 1989: 4). 
(2) Little Progress to 1988 
By 1988, the TV! had achieved little by way of improvement in the conditions which had 
drawn such criticism from the BTI in 1984 and 1986. The technological contribution of the 
industry was still minimal due to its assembly nature. Moreover, the cost of imported 
materials and technology needed to sustain this type of industry still far outweighed any 
benefit. Local content as a percentage of the ex-factory price of a completed set was on 
average only 34%. The industry's overall net contribution to the South African economy 
remained heavily negative. The net cost to the economy of the industry had actually 
increased from R49m to R200m from 1984 to 1987. The net cost per job had therefore 
risen to R125 000 pa. This rate of increase was far in excess of inflation, representing a 
real increase in net cost. The cost-raising effect of protection had also increased in real 
terms. Every Rand of foreign exchange saved now cost approximately R7,37 — just less 
than double the 1984 figure.'3 This DRC-type figure was probably an understatement, 
moreover, since it did not include depreciation of imported capital equipment. The effective 
rate of protection as calculated by the BTI was 270%, compared to their target of 30%. 
Again, this was probably an understatement. 
The Board's maximum acceptable level, by contrast, was RO,30 increased cost per RI of foreign 
exchange savings. 
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d) The 1989 Structural Adjustment Programme 
The 1989 programme stipulated the following 
with regard to local content: 
Clearly, the TVI at the end of the 1980s remained unable to make a positive net contribution 
to the Southern African economy because of its heavy dependence on imported components. 
In its nearly 20 years of existence, the industiy had not gone beyond the kit-assembly stage. 
Local component sourcing was as weak as ever. As had been feared initially, the industry 
existed only on the basis of protection. It was recognised, moreover, that one of the key 
constraints facing the TVI was its dependence on imported components which could not be 
obtained at a cost which would make local production viable. On the basis of this, in 1989 
the BTI decided yet again to take further steps to encourage reduced protection, greater local 
content, reduced dependence on foreign technology, and an export orientation. 
To achieve these laudable (if general) goals, the BTI recommended a new development 
strategy in early 1989. This revised strategy emphasised the value of the net imported 
portion of a locally manufactured TV set for the purposes of calculating a punitive excise 
duty, in combination with a gradual reduction of the duty payable on TV sets from 60% to 
35%, according to the schedule in Table B-12. The BTI also recommended (i) the 
discontinuance of the 35% contra customs duty and import control; (ii) the scrapping of the 
standardised chassis programme, with the 
return of all funds paid in to participating 
________________________ _______ manufacturers; and (iii) encouragement of 
_______________________ _______ exports by means of a duty rebate equal to the 
value of exports of completed sets or 
components. 
Table B-12 







_______________________ _______ • The BTI would henceforth attempt to 
_______________________ _______ distinguish between value added in genuine 
manufacturing operations and value arising 
from handling, packaging or distributional activities. 
• An attempt was to be made to make the protective duty payable approximately equal to 
the price disadvantage of a local set. This would be achieved by setting a guide price 
for each size and type of TV set. A complex formula was developed to determine this 
Value for Excise Duty Purposes (VEDP). 
• A modification of the excise duty payable was to be introduced, to be calculated on the 
basis of these target prices and net foreign exchange usage. A manufacturer meeting 
the foreign exchange targets would pay no excise duty. The excise duty payable on the 
imported content of each set would be increased, whilst the allowable foreign exchange 
usage would be decreased as in Table B-13: 
Table B-13 
Year 1: 35% excise duty with maximum 60% net foreign exchange usage. 
Year 2: 50% excise duty with maximum 50% net foreign exchange usage. 
Year 3: 75% excise duty with maximum 40% net foreign exchange usage. 
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• Net foreign exchange usage per set would be calculated as the value of all components, 
materials, and kits used to manufacture sets locally, plus any parts not certified as 
'local' by the Director-General, plus remittances in the form of license fees, technical 
assistance fees, etc., less any export earnings on completed sets or components (this 
incentive was to apply in conjunction with normal export incentives). 
• Provision was made for a rebate of excise duty based on local content achieved, and for 
full rebate of excise duty and duties on imported components for manufacturers of 
monochrome sets at a value for duty purposes under RhO. This was to encourage 
availability of a cheap TV for lower income consumers. The Board proposed to 
monitor retail prices of such sets to ensure that this goal was adhered to in practice. 
To administer this programme, the BTI set stringent reporting requirements for the TV!, 
covering a wide variety of critical information on foreign exchange usage, component 
imports, TV exports, etc.14 These proposals were put into effect from April 1989. 
Significantly, the Board hinted that such a development strategy might be applicable to the 
entire electrical HEDs sector. 
The BTI's recommendations were accepted in broad terms by the government, and after 
negotiations with the TV!, were implemented from July (instead of April, as originally 
planned) 1989. 
(1) Changes to the SAP Post-1989 
Unsurprisingly, the 1989 SAP was not popular with the TV!. !t was felt that the programme 
ignored the TVI's inability to increase local content due to the weakness of the local 
component sector. The general feeling was that the TVI should be allowed to import 
components freely in order to build a strong local market based on price reductions. 
The BTI (now the Board of Tariffs and Trade, or BTI') quickly agreed to amend the SAP in 
response to such concerns. !n a major step, it agreed to allow full rebate of duty on 
approved imported components (BTI, 1991 a). This was intended to avoid double-charging 
manufacturers who otherwise would face normal duty on the components as well as the 
punitive ad valorem excise duty on net forex usage. !n an unforeseen side-effect, however, 
several new 'screwdriver' firms took advantage of this duty rebate by importing and 
assembling SKD (semi knocked-down) monochrome and some colour kits, selling them at 
very low prices through cash discount chains under no-name brands. This led to a sudden 
drop in market share for the major manufacturers of branded products. The TV! again 
pressed the BT! which agreed to institute a major amendment. The amended SAP (BTI, 
l991b) included the following changes: 
• The gradually increasing ad valorem excise duty was scrapped and replaced by a flat 
35% duty. This duty would be subject to a rebate for local content to be determined by 
a complex formula based on the VEDP and a local content factor. 
• Under the amended SAP the combination of the 35% ad valorem customs duty and the 
rebate factor produced a net rate of nominal protection of 20-25%, depending on the 
degree of local content achieved. This was clearly too low for industry survival. In fact 
' I tried to obtain this information froni the BTI and from finns, but was unsuccessful. 
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a 40% surcharge, implemented several years previously for balance of payments 
purposes, had come to serve as a protective duty. Perhaps to salve its conscience at this 
breach of intent, the BTI accordingly recommended that the surcharge be withdrawn 
and combined with the current customs duty of 50% to form a flat duty of 90%. This 
duty would in turn be reduced by 10% pa. , to a rate of 50% ad valorem. By this time, 
the combination of the customs duty, a 3% ad valorem excise duty, a 3% contra 
customs duty,'and the rebatable 35% ad valorem excise duty would result in a net 
nominal tariff of approximately 30%, which was the BTI's original intention. 
This recommendation was accepted in December 1991 and the new flat duty of 90% (plus 
6% fiscal duties) was implemented in July 1992. 
e) Assessment of Policy Towards the TVI 
At present, the TV! is in year two of its 
amended SAP. The duty structure is intended to Table B- 14 
change as in Table B-14. ______________________ _______ 
By 1996, the net nominal rate of duty for the 
TVI will be approximately 30%, based on the 
BTT's estimate of the relationship between the 
ad valorem customs duty, the ad valorem _______________________ _______ 
excise duty, and the rebate factor. Several ________________________ ________ 
questions arise here: (i) can the TV! survive ___________________________ ________ 
this? (ii) what will be the effective rate of 
protection when the SAP reaches its penultimate stage? (iii) will this be acceptable to the 
economy and to South Africa's trading partners — especially under GATT? 












(1) Can the TV! Survive the BTT's SAP? 
Interviewees were by no means unanimous about the prospects of the TV! under the 
amended SAP. Most felt that the industry will not survive the programme, and faces closure 
within three years should it not be suspended,16 On the other hand, some argued at the same 
time that the industry could live with a net nominal duty of 30%, which is what the BIT 
expects by 1996. What is the problem, then? 
Firstly, the problem of high overhead costs is not addressed by the SAP. Only 
increased throughput could solve this, and this is doubtful (see below). Reduced 
product prices could assist here, as price elasticity for television is high;'7 but even 
increased throughput is unlikely to put local manufacturers on a competitive basis as 
long as component costs remain high. 
Secondly, the SAP seeks to penalise forex usage by a punitive ad valorem excise duty; 
the TVI wishes to comply. Yet the local component industry cannot supply an effective 
Both imposed previously for revenue purposes. 
16 
The sole exception was a factory manager recently brought in from a European technology partner, who 
had strikingly different view, to be discussed below. " 
Interviews, Manager, Special Projects, Electronics Division, Company A. 
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local alternative. Combined with this is the need to purchase proprietary ICs, which 
often only come in kit form." The BTT's target of a net 30% tariff may thus be 
unattainable because local content cannot be increased without raising price, 
compromising quality, and abandoning brand premiums. 
Finally, as long as television manufacturers have no choice but to import kits, duty or 
no, the small price differential between the latter and assembled sets will continue to 
make it impossible to add value without pmtection. Although the industry might be 
able to survive until 1996, a net duty of 30% will erode rapidly under current inflation 
differentials between South Africa and its trading partners. This problem is mitigated 
somewhat by high import content, which is subject to lower offshore inflation rates. 
Ultimatel)ç nominal ad valorem tariff rates will have to increase in order to maintain the 
net 30% protection. 
It would appear that the TV! is 'structurally' unviable as long as it lacks three basic 
elements: (i) local design capacity to free firms from dependence on proprietary components, 
allowing them to purchase locally, (ii) an effective local components sector to supply them, 
and (iii) an expanding local or export market to reduce overhead costs. 
(2) Effective Rates Of Protection Under the SAP 
As we have seen in Chapter Four, the effective rate of protection for the TV! is presently in 
excess of 500%. This is based on the duty rate 82,15%, which is the BTT"s estimate of the 
effective rate once the duty formula is applied (BIT, 1991 b). Even under the most 
generous interpretation, a duty rate of 50% — the BTT's nominal goal — would result in an 
ERP of over 350%, and a domestic resource cost of Ri 3,41 to each Rand of imports 
replaced (see Chapter Four). 
(3) Accepfabilitw Of The SAP' 
Of major concern to the TV! at present is the attitude of GAIT to South Africa's 
manufacturing industries. A nominal tariff of 50% would probably not be acceptable even if South Africa is reclassified as a Developing Country under GAIT's Uruguay Round. 
Even if it is, such heavy protection of a major traded consumer item will not be acceptable, 
especially given the undistinguished history of the TVI and its low employment levels and 
high DRC and ERP. 
The final version of GAIT, signed in December 1993, does not appear to be at all propitious 
for the South African television industry (or indeed for the HED industry in general). 
GAIT's sweeping provisions on tariff reduction for manufactured goods, coupled with its 
clampdown on 'infant industry' and export subsidies and greatly strengthened procedures 
for action by trading partners through the new World Trade Organisation, mean that South 
Africa will come under great pressure to harmonise its tariff system with that of other GAIT 
signatories. This implies two things. Firstly, it is unlikely that the levels of protection 
presently envisaged for the TV! will be acceptable. They are simply too high, and will have 
Interview, Factory Manager and Engineering Director, Electronics Division, Company A. 
19 The final text of GATF became available two weeks prior to the final revision of this report (January 
1994). 
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to remain so should South Africa's inflation rate remain higher than that of its trading 
partners. Secondly, as South Africa comes under pressure to correct its tariff structure, it 
may become necessary to select industries which are worth the political and diplomatic cost 
of pushing for developing country exceptions. Given the TVI's poor track record and 
present situation, it is likely to be a prime candidate for jettisoning in such a process. 
This is probably desirable from a domestic point of view, as well. We have seen in Chapter 
Four that the cost of local production of televisions could be enormous over the course of a 
five-year electrification programme. The cost of imported parts for televisions alone 
accounts for over 70% of projected forex requirements. Although the projections envisage a 
slight overall benefit in terms of import replacement, this does not take into account other 
factors such as the expansion of the market in response to lower prices, movement of 
manufacturing assets into other activities, and so on. 
On balance, it is unlikely that the demise of the TV! would be a great loss to the South 
African economy. Although nearly 6 000 workers stand to lose employment, this must be 
weighed against the tremendous cost to the economy of components imports and higher 
prices. The actual number of factory production workers facing job loss is more like 3 000. 
Such a cost seems set to be permanent, as well — as there is little prospect of a change in 
the pattern of factors which inhibit viability. 
3. Summary and Conclusion 
a) Basic Strengths and Weaknesses 
The South African TV receiver manufacturing industry was founded in the early 1970s in 
order to supply the impending local market and to serve as the basis for a wider electronics 
industry. It was to supply skilled labour, expertise, and a market for electronics 
components. Extremely high rates of effective protection and restricted entry were allowed 
to encourage the industry to develop. 
Two decades later, the industry remains essentially unchanged. Its net contribution to the 
economy is heavily negative; its products are uncompetitive with imports; and it is still a net 
importer of components. It has also failed to serve as the basis for a wider electronics 
industry, for the simple reason that assembly of imported components is a simple procedure 
which generates few skills and requires little local input. Firms which have gone beyond 
simple assembly face significantly higher costs than importers arid the fly-by-night firms 
which have taken advantage of loopholes in the BTI 's 1989 programme to assemble 
imported semi-knocked-down (SKD) kits at low cost, selling them as locally 
'manufactured' 20 
To summarise, the TVI's problems can be stated as follows: 
• Domestic value cannot be added without protection. Its net contribution to the economy 
is strongly negative, and it cannot survive without significant protection. In short, the 
20 
This loophole looks set to close. 
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real site of value added is in component manufacture -- which is located primarily 
offshore. 
Components costs will remain high. There are insufficient economies of scale to 
produce major components such as CTV picture tubes locally.2' The Southern African 
CTV market is currently about 350 000 units. As a result the industry must import such 
higher value-added components, sourcing only simple items such as cabinets and certain 
electronic items locally. Moreover, most local components remain significantly more 
expensive than imports, and of lower quality. Licensing agreements with foreign 
technology partners which the government encouraged in the early 1 970s have led to a 
situation in which component suppliers are faced with a proliferation of items required 
by the local market. This has further prevented them from achieving competitive 
volumes in specific components. A related problem is that component suppliers charge 
a 15-18% premium on proprietary parts required for branded units. The local industry 
lacks the skilled personnel and R&D infrastructure to move into manufacture of original 
equipment, which might liberate it from this problem. 
• Overhead costs are higher than those for comparable plants overseas due to lower 
volumes. As we have seen, however, his may be a secondary problem, and may be due 
primarily to the high marketing and administrative costs associated with the corporate 
structures involved, as well as attempts to increase margins to compensate for low 
volumes. 
• Major existing firms are oriented towards production of branded products, and cannot 
compete with low-cost manufacturers who have sprung up recently. The latter are 
probably aiming for a more realistic market, however, and may be serving an important 
purpose by posing this problem for the major finns, 
• Manufacturers have not seriously moved in the direction of skills-based flexibility, 
which is the main prerequisite to flexibility in production — which might allow a more 
viable TVI. 
In general, the TV! has served until recently as a source of abnormal profits for a few 
manufacturer/distributors. The net cost to the economy over the next five years of television 
supply as presently constituted would be enormous. This must be taken seriously when 
looking at policy for the industry's future. 
b) Assessment of Past Policy 
The BTI's approach to the TV! has been to use the threat of lower tariffs to force the TV! to 
increase its use of local components. This was to increase 'real' local value added in order 
to reduce its net drain on the economy. The initial attempts of the early 80s, which involved 
rebates on the use of local components, were not successful. Neither was the misguided 
attempt to develop a standardised monochrome chassis. The 1989 structural adjustment 
programme, which seeks to penalise net foreign exchange usage and encourage more 
competitive pricing, has succeeded mainly in forcing less efficient producers to close down, 
and in flooding the market with cheap imported sets and kits. In addition, the current 
2! interview sources. 
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recession has hurt manufacturers' financial performance, leading to a situation of terminal- 
threat to the industry. 
In retrospect it can be seen that the BTI's approach has been misguided: 
Firstly, the initial ground rules and conditions for the industry were extremely 
protective, and investment plans were based on them. This did more to shape 
subsequent development than anything else. Moreover, these rules explicitly tied local 
manufacturers to the foreign technology partners who now charge them a large 
premium to buy the proprietary components needed for the branded products the local 
TV! produces. Under these conditions, it was unrealistic of the BT! to expect 
manufacturers to develop into competitive finns. Waiting 10 years to re-examine the 
situation only made matters worse. 
It is evident that the problem of low local content cannot be solved by changing 
market signals only. It makes no sense to penalise local manufacturers for not using 
local components which are either more expensive and of a lower quality or not 
available at all and then to criticise them for not exporting. A more reasonable 
approach would be to examine the capacities of the local industry and to identify 
whether or not the qualitative conditions exist for successful component manufacture, 
and to base decisions for the TVI on this, In other words, any industrial policy 
towards the TVI should start with the beginning of the value added chain, not its end. 
The TV! is not uncompetitive in what it does — assemble televisions — but it cannot 
be price competitive as long as the components it assembles remain expensive. 
• The BTJ has never addressed the possibility of looking at the TV! within the context of 
a group of products which could be manufactured inflexible plants, thus reducing the 
overhead recovery burden on televisions. There has been a tendency to see television 
manufacture as a separate industry, when in fact it is a specific product within the 
electronics industry. 
• Finally, BTI policy towards the TV! has been so unstable and unpredictable that 
manufacturers hesitate to invest for fear of subsequent changes. 
c) Issues For policy 
In retrospect, it can be seen that the problem of production volumes in the TV! is only a 
mediate problem. The proximate problem is overhead recovery. It is true that it is not 
possible to recover overheads on television manufacture alone, since the market is not big 
enough. But this is taking the wrong approach. The problem is not the product, its market, 
or volume. The problem is overhead recovery in a factory. 
The basic processes used to produce TVs are adaptable to a variety of electronic products. 
If a variety of products could be produced on them, overhead recovery could be spread 
across a greater number of units. This in turn would solve the basic factory problem and 
obviate the product problem. The basic policy goal, then, does not necessarily need to be an 
increase in market size or volume for TVs. It should rather be to facilitate the attainment 
offlexibility sufficient to allow production of a variety of products on a small batch basis, 
at a competitive cost. This would require: 
• Training of workers in flexible, multiple skills. 
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• Reduction in change-over times on automated equipment such as auto-insertion 
machines to allow maximum flexibility. 
• Access to competent, motivated, innovative factory management. 
• Integration of production engineering, operations management, and basic product 
marketing functions at factory level, to allow maximum effective product 
diversification. 
• Treating the factory as the basic unit of business instead of the wholesaling division. 
This present opposite philosophy is a product of the brand orientation of the companies 
in question. This is not to say that branded, quality products should be abandoned, only 
that factories should be free to produce whatever they can sell. Manufacturing should 
be treated as the source of value added, not the 'rent' deriving from owning a brand 
name. Only the former is a developable source of competitiveness in the long run. 
• Commitment of financial and management resources by upper management to the 
process of flexibility achievement and product diversification. 
• This would leave only the problem of inability to obtain components at lower cost 
directly from OEM manufacturers. At present the mark-up by technology partners- 
cum-middlemen is about 15-18%. It may be possible for some manufacturers to 
manufacture competitively with this burden if they: (i) reduce their overhead costs in the 
flexible, multi-product manner suggested; (ii) reduce their administrative and overhead 
costs by marketing directly from factory level where possible; and (iii) moving into low- 
price, high volume products for sale to the growing cash retail market — which may 
allow purchase of discount generic components directly from source. 
The question of whether the TVL might be able to achieve these goals is essentially a 
subjective one. Given its history, it seems highly unlikely that the TV! could, in fact, 
become a competitive industry along these lines. 
C. Small Appliance Manufacture in South Africa 
1. Introduction 
a) Background 
The South African small appliance industry (SAL) is a small industry, as we have seen in 
Chapter Two. It is relatively healthy compared to the white goods and television industries, 
mainly because its products are relatively inexpensive and often lack close substitutes. The 
industry has come under increasing competition, however, from Hong Kong-based plants in 
the 'New" south of China who are increasingly able to export to South Africa in spite of 
average nominal tariffs of 30%. 
Unfortunately, like the white goods industry (WGI) the small appliance industry (SAl) is not 
well served by existing research and is rarely mentioned in published sources. It has not 
been subject to much attention from the BTT. Nor does it have an industry association 
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which could be used as a basis for information gathering. As a result, the following section 
is based primarily on interviews conducted at one South African firm and one Australian 
firm. 
2. Small Appliance Industry Vital Signs 
a) Structural Characteristics 
(1) Market Structure And Barriers To Entry 
The South African small appliances industry is dominated by Amalgamated Appliance 
Producers (AMAP), which controls 60% of the domestic market. AMAP brands dominate 
in such key items as frypans, hotplates, jug kettles, steam irons, and toasters. This is 
because the firm is an amalgamation of the country's most popular brand names in small 
appliances: Lion, HAZ, and Tedelex. The three groups merged in 1992 under the joint 
control of Lion Match (controlled by South African Breweries) and Tedelex. The rationale 
for the merger was familiar and laudable: it would allow the three companies to achieve 
economies of scale in manufacture and distribution which would allow it to compete with 
lower priced imports from the Far East. The merger, however, involved several plant 
closures, retrenchments, and relocation of most manufacturing activities to New Germany, 
Natal. 
The only other major South African producer of small appliances is Nu-World Industries, 
who produce Ideal brand appliances, which generally hold 10-30% of market share, 
depending on the product, mostly in lower-priced items. 
Like the TVI and WG!, firms such as AMAP and Nu-Worid are both producers and 
importers of small appliances and based supply decisions on relative costs rather than on 
manufacturing aspirations. At present, the AMAP manufacturing philosophy is one of 
break even — the goal is for sales to the parent firm to meet production costs at a price 
allowing acceptable wholesale margins but no plant-levels surplus. 
(2) Linkages To Other Sectors 
Unlike the TVI and the WGI, who concentrate mainly on large retail outlets, the SAl 
supplies its lower-cost products to shops ranging from cash discount chains, such as Dions 
and the hypermarket chains, to local supermarkets and cafes. There has been a distinct 
tendency in this industry, as in the TV! and WGI, towards lower stock levels by these 
retailers. There is little reported dialogue with retailers on product specifications except on 
high-end imported items. 
The principal inputs to the SA! come from the local metals, plastics, and switchgear 
industries. A certain proportion is imported, although duties on raw materials discourage 
this. Prepared steel or aluminium billet is used for iron heels for irons; cold-rolled sheet 
metal is used for toasters and the like; powdered polypropylene is used for injection 
moulding of plastic parts such as kettles and iron tops; and switchgear is used throughout. 
In most cases parts are fabricated in the factory from basic materials, although the South 
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African case study plant also bought in many parts from local subcontractors. Components 
such as kettle and hotplate elements generally come from local suppliers in the Natal and 
Western Cape regions who also service the white goods industry. 
(3) Ownership and Managerial Structures And Linkages 
As we have seen, AMAP is owned by two of the country's largest consumer goods 
conglomerates, SAB and Tedelex. Both appear to have given AMAP a free hand to conduct 
its business as it sees fit. Management interviewed expressed satisfaction with the role 
played by these parent companies, stressing that they were essentially free to pursue 
opportunities for trade as they saw fit. 
It is likely that SAB's influence has helped AMAP to make the transition to the relatively 
progressive manufacturing company that it appears to be. SAB has made extensive use of 
management practices such as 'green areas', quality circles, flexible workteams, cellular 
layouts, and similar practices, which are also widely used in AMAP's manufacturing facility 
in New Germany, Natal. 
This shift is significant, since the previous owner of the plant had not made use of these 
techniques; they were still relatively new when I visited the plant but were running well. 
According to the factory manager, SAB had provided consulting assistance in developing 
these practices and provided ongoing support for AMAP as needed. 
(4) Links To Government 
No significant state links of any kind beyond normal tariff and trade representations were 
identified, but a potentially significant process was underway as research was being 
conducted. Early in 1992, ESKOM put out a call for tenders to supply 100 000 irons, 
kettles, and toasters as part of its electrification programmes in urban black areas. It was 
intended that these appliances be provided as part of the hook-up process and would be 
charged to the consumer's account at a minimal fee. The SAl is thus seen by ESKOM as a 
potential ally in the drive to encourage electricity use in order to provide economic 
justification for mass electrification programmes. 
This may be a significant process for all involved. Indeed, it is not new to South Africa. 
Municipality-supplied appliances have played a role in electrification of Durban and Cape 
Town (Theron, 1992), and ESKOM agents have been active for some time in encouraging 
residents of newly-electrified areas to purchase such appliances. 
Unfortunately the situation had not been clarified at the time of writing, but several 
interviewees mentioned that tenders had been submitted for the contract, which would 
provide a major opportunity for the firm winning the contract. It was also unclear whether 
foreign firms were invited to tender, or whether any stipulations with regard to 
manufacturing requirements had been made. This will be an important process to watch, as 
the concluding chapter will discuss further; it may provide an indication of some of the 
opportunities and pitfalls which future industrial policy will have to address. 
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b) Competitiveness 
(1) Cost Structures 
first column under each 
heading lists the 
percentage of each items 
contribution to average 
ex-factory price; the 
second is the Rand 
equivalent of that cost. It 
can be seen that on 
average products coming 
from the south Chinese 
plants now entering the 
South African market are 
25% cheaper than local 
products. 
(a) Overheads 
The major price 
differential is in materials 
and overhead costs. 
Overheads in the Chinese 
plants are on average 
only a tiny fraction of 
those faced by South 
African plants. Unlike 
television assembly, the 
SAT does enjoy 
significant economies of 
scale because of its 
reliance on fabrication processes and 'lumpy' capital equipment. 
(b) Input Costs and Local Supply 
Table C-i also shows that materials and component Costs are significantly higher than for 
the Chinese plants, with the exception of irons, which use a large proportion of relatively 
cheap South African aluminium. 
Nevertheless, as in the television industry, component supply and materials costs have been 
a major obstacle to competitiveness in the SAl. Unlike the TVI, however, which imports the 
bulk of its inputs and thus represents a net drain to the economy, the SAl purchases most of 
its inputs locally. Considering that this has been a prime goal of industry policy towards the 
TVI over the years, the SAl's experience in this regard is illuminating. 
The South African firm visited uses over 300 local suppliers, and only 20% of inputs by 
value were imported. Nevertheless, this was regarded as one of the prime obstacles to 
Table C-i lists some comparative ex-factory cost data for selected small appliances. The 
Table C-i: Costing Comparison: South African and 
South Chinese Small Appliance Firms 
Source: Interview sources 
I South Africa I China 
[lastic Kettle 
Price 100% R40,00 100% R30,00 
Materials 84,0% R33,60 88,4% R26,52 
Labour 5,0% R2,00 10,0% R3,00 
Overheads 16,0% R6,40 1,6% R0,48 
Hotplate 
Price 100% R67,00 100% R50,25 
Materials 80,0% R53,60 86,6% R43,52 
Labour 6,0% R4,02 12,0% R6,03 
Overheads 14,0% R9,38 1,4% R0,70 
Automatic Iron 
Price 100% R24,50 100% Ri8,38 
Materials 55,0% R13,48 78,8% Ri4,47 
Labour 12,5% R3,06 24,5% R4,50 
Overheads 32,5% R7,96 3,3% R0,60 
Steam Iron 
Price 100% R45,00 100% R33,75 
Materials 61,0% R27,45 75,2% R25,38 
Labour 11,0% R4,95 22,0% R7,43 
Overheads 28,0% R12,60 2,8% R0,95 
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competitiveness by the firm. The problem is that local suppliers are simply too expensive 
and unreliable: 
• Raw materials prices are nearly double those of imported products. For example, the 
firm studied used 300 tonnes of polypropylene per year, almost all sourced locally. Yet 
the local product was on average 46% more expensive than that available to 
competitors. Rubber could be sourced locally at R4 000 per tonne compared to R2 000 
per tonne to competitors. 
• The average price premium paid for local components is almost exactly equal to the rate 
of duty applicable to those items — 25%. This is due both to duties on the components 
and on the raw materials used to make them. For example, materials are 50% of costs 
for manufacturers of cooking elements; in turn, the prices paid for these materials are 
15% higher than those paid by overseas firms. This is a significant disadvantage. For 
example, the materials cost in a South African hotptate element is R9,80, whilst that 
faced by one UK firm familiar to the factory manager of the plant visited was R7,80. 
• Tooling costs, which are critical to manufacturers of all HEDs, were cited as being 
significantly more expensive locally. Interestingly for industrial policy, it was argued 
that the Phase Six programme for the motor industry had led to a shortage of 
toolmakers, thus making it difficult to set up production of new models competitively. 
Nevertheless, the firm interviewed sought to develop close links to local suppliers, mainly by 
entering long-term contracts with fewer of them, sharing engineering personnel and cost 
data, and refraining from encouraging aggressive price competition between them. It was 
recognised that a local components industry was a key to long-term competitive success, 
whatever the short-term costs. 
(2) Productivity 
Table C-2 lists various measures of productivity and performance for the South African and 
Australian firms visited. It is striking that basic performance measures are very similar for 
both plants: throughput and changeover times; stock turns; defcct rates; supervision and 
R&D levels. This suggests that at the level of what plants do — convert inputs into quality 
output — the South African plant is as productive in physical terms as its Australian 
counterpart. The difference evidently lies in the following: 
• Higher South African materials costs, as described above. 
• The vastly longer time taken by South African suppliers to deliver orders, and the 
radical impact this has on lead times. 
• The amount of stock carried as a result of this supply problem, coupled with the higher 
principal and interest costs faced by the South African plant. 
Note also that the South African plant uses considerably more capital per worker, but 
achieves a higher output per worker by value: paradoxically, the South African plant is more 
capital-intensive. This is largely a function of the lower capacity utilisation levels of the 
South African plant, and higher wages paid to Australian workers. 
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It is apparent from this 
comparison that South 
African firms need not be 
less competitive than their 
overseas counterparts. Yet 
even if they achieve this, 
they remain uncompetitive 
because of the external 
context they face in South 
Africa. This implies that 
industrial policy towards 
such firms may be most 
valuably applied at the 
______________________ ___________ _______________ macro and sectoral level - 
mainly by reducing input 
____________________ __________ ______________ costs and improving supply 
____________________ ___________ ______________ networks and efficiency. 
The South African plant visited produces 30 different products, each in varying quantities. 
Unit output is drastically lower than south Chinese plants: the South African plant produces 
about 40 000 toasters per year, whereas a comparable Chinese plant produces in excess of 
im. This results in overhead costs which are on average ten times higher for South African 
firms. 
Unlike a simple assembly operation, such as the TV!, small appliance production is a fully- 
fledged engineering operation involving fabrication as well as assembly. With fabrication 
goes expensive machinery, including presses, lathes, NC machine tools, plastic injection 
moulding machines, and so forth. This in turn implies that unit overhead recovery depends 
entirely on production volume. Given inflexible equipment requiring relatively long 
changeover times — such as hydraulic presses and injection moulders — the small South 
African market implies higher overheads, a familiar story. 
The South African firm visited faced this problem. Its capital equipment is 'lumpy' in 
physical and value terms. It was able to achieve very rapid changeover times in its assembly 
operations, but was constrained by the need to run efficient batches on its metalworking and 
plastic moulding equipment. Thus, although the South African factory manager claimed 
that his firm operates on an internal just-in-time basis and can switch products at will, in 
reality, this is only partly true. It is impossible that this firm could achieve the true one- 
batch performance of New Zealand's Fisher & Paykel, for example, which depends heavily 
on automated materials handling and scheduling procedures as well as sophisticated CNC- 
controlled fabrication machinery capable of continuous variation in output. It is true that 
22 
See below. 
Table C-2: Competitive Comparison: South 
African and Australian Small 
Appliance Firms 
Source: Interview sources 
Australia South Africa 
verage batch size 2 000 "1 " 
(ey changeover times 10-20 mins. 30 minutes 
ead times 1 day 16-18 weeks 
Throughput times 2 days 2 days 
WIP levels 2-3 000 units 11 000 units 
Stock turns 4,25 5 
Defects as a % of output 6% 5% 
)utputlKratio 2,8:1 0,32:1 
JL ratio R32 188 R55 555 
)utput/employee R36 945 p.a. Rl33 333 p.a. 
mp1oyees per supervisor 93 100 
R&Das%ofturnover 1.5% 1% 
(3) Scale of Production 
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his cellular assembly operations can achieve this, but it is unlikely that the fabrication and 
logistical functions could follow suit. 
As in the case of the TVI, however, the solution to this problem can really only lie in 
adopting production methods that are flexible enough to allow many products to be run in a 
short period without long changeovers. In the South African market context, this means 
flexible programmable CNC-type machinery and the organisational techniques needed to 
operate them. The South African firm visited showed that the organisational changes could 
work. The problem is the high cost and low utilisation levels of the hardware. 
Of course, an expanded market would also help to solve the problem, but this is not subject 
to the direct agency of the manufacturer. Flexible automation systems also require 
throughput; the point is that it need not be throughput of one specific product. 
(4) Product Quality 
South African small appliances appear to be of a similar quality to imports. They are not 
strictly comparable, however, as local firms tend to dominate the lower end of the market 
(eg. non-steam irons), whilst imports dominate the higher end (such as food processors, 
coffee makers, and so on). I saw no appreciable difference in the quality of the products at 
the South African firm visited compared to the Australian firm. 
(5) Product Research, Design, And Development 
For the most part, small appliances are quite basic in design. Products manufactured locally 
tend to be simple but effective, whilst more sophisticated products are left to importers. 
With the exception of one hotplate design, the local firm visited did not undertake any 
significant R&D, but adapted designs obtained from its technology partners to South 
African conditions, which speci1' durability, simplicity, and ease of repair. These activities 
involved approximately 1% of turnover (a proportion unlikely to be maintained, however, if 
turnover increased). A great deal of effort had also gone into value engineering at the South 
African plant; management had had great success in reducing the numbers of parts in certain 
products, redesigning the factory layout, and conserving space. 
By contrast, the Australian firm undertook considerable R&D, and regularly launched its 
own ranges of products. It employed 30 full-time R&D personnel — 3,75% of its 
workforce — and spent 1,5% of its turnover on the activity. But it should be noted that this 
firm was positioned at the upper end of the Australian market, and concentrated on high- 
quality, differentiated products; new product introduction was part of its competitive 
strategy. The low-price end of the market had been given over to Southeast Asian firms, as 
it had proved impossible to compete with them given higher Australian labour, materials, 
and overhead costs. 
(6) Strategic Focus 
As mentioned above, the South African firm visited is oriented towards the low-end of the 
small appliance market. It is also an importer into the higher end of the market, with such 
activities contributing 20% of turnover. This firm's basic business orientation is to aim for 
cost competitiveness versus low-end imports, but to settle for cross subsidisation of local 
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production by import margins when necessary. It seeks to achieve sufficient throughput at 
its plant to break even on manufacturing costs and earn a margin at the wholesale level 
through brand leadership. 
Its long-term strategy is to maintain and build its brand positioning in order to be able to 
take advantage of opportunities presented by electrification. Interviewees saw this process 
as basic to industry survival, but expressed concern that the low nominal protection it 
enjoyed did not put it in a good position versus imports. In common with others throughout 
the HED industry, its manufacturing director considered a 30% net tariff to be the minimum 
needed for long-term survival. 
Interviewees at this firm also expressed commitment to developing its manufacturing 
operations into a flexible, multi-product system which could handle a large variety of 
products. They saw this as both a necessity in the small South African market and a logical 
step given the firm's experience in multi-product manufacture. Steps have already been 
taken in this direction, as will be seen below. 
Interviewees at this firm did not see exports as an opportunity at present, as high input costs 
and stiff competition from the Chinese industry made it all but impossible. It had had some 
export experience in Africa, which was the destination of 2% of output, and the United 
Kingdom, which took 3%. The latter exports were based on reasonable price 
competitiveness against UK products and a long-term contract to supply a chain of retail 
stores specialising in low-priced products. Exchange rate fluctuations were expected to end 
these exports soon in spite of GELS support, of which full advantage was taken. 
c) Manufacturing Philosophy And Practice 
(1) Factory Layout 
The South African firm studied had made a partial transition to a cellular layout, based on 
flexible assembly workteams who concentrated on a product or family of products. The 
major limitation to this process, as we have seen, is the need to achieve economies of scale 
in metal fabrication, plastic injection moulding, and similar processes requiring large 
investment in machinery. The production cells receive materials and components either from 
the machine shop or injection shop or directly onto the shop floor from receiving, where 
shipments of plastic components and packaging arrive daily. Assembled products are 
packaged on the shopfloor and sent to shipping by trolley. 
The factory is not particularly large, but manages to produce 30 different products at a time. 
To do this it has utilised space quite effectively, although routing of WIP is somewhat 
circuitous. This is necessitated by the location of the press and injection machinery. 
('2) Production Scheduling 
Although the production cells are flexible and could switch between products in a matter of 
minutes, they are not yet able to manufacture on a true I-batch basis. This is mainly a 
problem of logistics, as the plant lacks the necessary information infrastructure and 
materials handling technology to operate a fully-flexible multi-product system. Kanban 
cards are used to pull components and WIP through the system, although much inventory 
206 INDUSTRJAL STRATEGY PROJECT 
was visible. In general the plant tries to operate on a pull basis, but this is essentially 
notional, as overall it operates on a 17-month forecast. 
Just-in-time deliveries have been tried and continue in the case of plastics and packaging, 
but the logistical problems associated with 300 suppliers of 2 000 different parts proved to 
be too much to handle. Suppliers also proved to be unreliable, both in terms of timing and 
product quality, which upset production scheduling. At present about 2 weeks' worth of 
stock is carried. 
(3) Work Organisation 
As part of the attempt to achieve sustainable flexibility for the smaller South African 
market, management at the firm visited had introduced quality circles, green areas, team 
bonus schemes, and multiskilling programmes linked to work teams. This was seen as 
essential for the functioning of the multi-product cellular system. 
The most pressing organisational (and overall) problem at this plant was identified by 
interviewees as management c inability to handle the logistical demands of a lean, flexible 
multi-product system. Labour quality was regarded as high, but inexperience and lack of 
resources made it difficult to devise a scheduling system which would achieve true multi- 
product production. It should be noted, however, that this plant did not use the sort of 
sophisticated, computerised, and automated materials flow system used at the New Zealand 
white goods plant visited — which could not run its 'every product, every day' system 
without it by any stretch of the imagination. Nevertheless, this does point to key problems: 
lack of adequate management capacity and slow diffusion of computer-based manufacturing 
systems essential to full flexibility. 
(4) Skills, Training, And Labour Relations 
Labour quality at the firm visited was seen by management to be high, as is borne out by 
comparative physical productivity. Although labour productivity was twice that of south 
Chinese plants, wage rates were about 5 times higher, resulting in significantly higher unit 
labour costs.2' 
No specific entry skills requirements were cited for the assembly workers who made up the 
bulk of the workforce. It was felt that only basic literacy and numeracy were required for 
new entrants, who are trained on the job. Skills were preferred for operators of machine 
tools and plastic injection moulding equipment, but were not strictly necessary. The only 
qualified artisans employed were electricians and fitters and turners who maintained the 
equipment. Teamworking and problem-solving skills, however, were at a premium, and the 
factory manager appeared to have adopted a policy of 'ethnic' team compatibility by 
employing only Indian women to work in assembly cells. 
Labour relations seemed calm at the NUMSA-organised plant, which did not strike during 
that union's wrangle with SEIFSA in 1992. This may have been due, however, to 
23 I would like to have been able to corroborate these figures with tabular figures showing inter-country 
comparisons. Unfortunately, I was unable to track down accurate South African wage rates at the five- 
digit level for use in such comparisons. 
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management's practice of hiring temporary workers to handle peak periods — and the 
corresponding threat of an imminent retrenchment. 
Subcontracting was also used liberally at the plant. Subcontractors were generally ex- 
employees who had been set up as suppliers of basic components using equipment bought on 
terms from the firm. Such arrangements were often created by the plant specifically in order 
to maintain a flexible supply capacity without having to commit to keeping employees or 
equipment on the rolls. It was claimed, for example, that any die-casting bottlenecks which 
might emerge in the case of sudden market growth would be solved by setting up 
subcontractors to do the work off site. 
Temporary work and de facto temporary-isation through subcontracting are significant 
threats to worker security. It is notable that this firm — the most progressive in terms of 
manufacturing philosophy — was also the one to make most extensive use of these 
practices. 
d) Ability To Meet Basic Needs 
(1) Employment 
The employment growth potential of the SAl is practically nil. The plant studied supplied 
the lion's share of the South African market for a number of products, but employed only 
300 direct production workers at 80% capacity and was planning to do with less. Moreover, 
investment in new plant would almost certainly take the form of more automated equipment, 
improving productivity and requiring fewer workers. A doubling or even tripling of output — more than sufficient to supply any conceivable increase in demand — would result in no 
more than 500-600 jobs at the most. Only an export-oriented industry along the lines of the 
South China model could be expected to create significant employment. 
(2) Product Affordability and Appropriateness 
SAl products appear to be reasonably priced compared to those available elsewhere 
considering the rate of protection. Most basic products such as irons, kettles, toasters, and 
hotplates can be had for R30 — R120, depending on the type and features. The local 
industry also appears to have targeted the low-price end of the market quite successfully, 
and brand name and premium is not as important as in the WGI or TV!, though still a 
considerable force. 
e) Other Considerations 
(1) Age, Condition, and Sources of Equipment 
Equipment at the plant visited was generally obtained from technology partners or locally. It 
was on average 5-7 years old, and regarded as up-to-date. The major sourcing problem with 
equipment was with tool and die requirements for plastic injection moulding machines, 
which were expensive because of a shortage of produces locally. 
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(2) Investment Plans 
The firm had no specific plans to invest in further capacity as this time. Such a step would 
require a significant and sustainable turnaround in the economy. 
(3) Environmental and Safety Issues 
No environmental issues specific to the industry were identified. Thc plant visited appeared 
to be clean and safe, although it was not possible to investigate this in detail. 
Restructuring in Action: An Australian Case Study 
During the course of the Industrial Strategy Project the author visited several manufacturing 
firms in Australia and New Zealand. These were all firms which had achieved some 
measure of success in industrial restructuring. largely in cc-operation with organised labour. 
The small appliance plant visited is located in Sydney. New South Wales. It is a licensed 
technology partner of a major United States firm, and supplies 55-60% of the Australian 
market for its products.24 Its 1992 turnover was approximately A$ 1 70m. Its holds roughly 
A$60m in plant and equipment (at replacement value), giving an output/capital ratio of 2,8. 
At the time of research, it operated at nearly full capacity on a three-shift, seven day basis, 
employing 697 production workers. These workers produced irons. frvpans. toasters, and a 
variety of other products, including lawnmowers and sheep-shearing equipment, in which the 
firm is a world leader.25 Notably, its workforce is composed predominantly of recent Asian 
immigrants to Australia. 
The firm has few domestic competitors, but, like the South African small appliance industry 
faces a significant threat from low-priced imports from Southeast Asia. As noted earlier, 
this has prompted it to alter its strategic orientation. Under the previously highly-protective 
tariff régime, it offered a full range of consumer products. Now, facing significant import 
competition at the low end of the market, it concentrates on middle- to upper-end products, 
with a variety of branded items based on a standardised base range. These arc higher value- 
added products -- which helps to compensate for the reduced overall volumes resulting from 
a withdrawal from the lownd market. 
This strategy seems to have worked, although the path has been difficult. The firm is 
presently profitable after recent losses. Although it suffers the disadvantages of less than 
optimal scale and higher materials prices — 10-15% above the world average — the firm 
has managed to maintain market share. This is due to the strength of brand loyalty to its 
quality products. 
At the time of studs', the firm was in the process of a major restructuring initiative, 
implemented jointly by management and the major union at the firm, the Automotive, Metal 
and Engineering Workers' Union (AMEU). There is an illustrative story behind this. 
24 Which market share makes it unlike South African white goods or television manufacturers, who 
compose a competitive oligopoly, but quite like the South African small appliance market, which is also 
dominated by a single finn. 
25 I am unable to quote unit output figures by agreement with the finn in question. 
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Under the twin pressures of reduced protection and increased competition from Southeast 
Asia, the firm had suffered serious losses in the late I 980s. After an ownership change in 
1986, the new management decided to move its brand focus more firmly to its present 
middle- to upper-market status. This called for a major reorganisation of its manufacturing 
operations. To this end the new management team had identified qualit), cleanliness26 and 
middle management in the plant as key areas for change. 
To facilitate rapid restructuring, the new management team consciously sought to utilise 
worker knowledge of the plant and its problems and potential. The success of this exercise 
led to an expanded emphasis on work autonomy, which was reinforced by consultants who 
were brought in to assist in the restructuring process. 
In 1987 the new management approached the AMEU and proposed a move to a team-based 
production system, which was accepted by the union. This was to be called Value Added 
Management, but was essentially a quality circle-based, Total Quality Management 
philosophy. Union involvement and consultation was to become a key to the plant's 
reorganisation. 
The first steps taken were to expand suggestion schemes (which are not quite yet on the 
kaizen model), use pilot areas to develop and test new work methods, and clean up the plant and make it more comfortable to work in. These led to immediate productivity gains.2 The 
next step was to analyse the experience of the pilot areas and generalise it throughout the 
plant. This involved three processes: (i) setting up more quality circles to form the basis for 
self-managed flexible work teams, (ii) instituting a quasi-just-in-time kanban materials pull 
system, and (iii) instituting quality control at source instead of by ex post sample. 
Significantly, investment in new hardware was not seen as a priority, and existing machinery 
was reorganised on a cellular basis where possible. One aspect of the success of this system 
was a drastic reduction in supervision and management tasks. 230 managers, supervisors, 
and quality control personnel were reassigned or took early retirement, and were reportedly 
not missed at all.28 The number of shopfloor foremen was reduced from 60 to 7 at the same 
time—an 88%drop. 
At the same time, a kanban-pull just in time system was implemented with respect to some 
suppliers, vho now deliver 2-3 times daily. This was accompanied by a 45% reduction in 
the number of suppliers with corresponding increases in the length of supply contracts. 
The principal results of this process have been major improvements in the plant's 
productivity and overall manufacturing performance. For example: 
• Average batch sizes were reduced from 13 000 units to 2 000 
• Changeover times were improvqd 
26 Some windows had reportedly not been opened in many years and were cnisted shut with grime. This 
had produced much resentment amongst employees which was not discovered until the management 
change. 
27 
Which were apparently noticed, hut not recorded. 
28 
Whilst visiting the plant, I saw an entire floor of oflices vacated by these managers, in the process of 
being converted into training facilities for shopfloor workers. 
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• Throughput times dropped from two weeks to two days 
• Stock levels were reduced from 10 000 units to two week's supply 
• Physical labour productivity improved dramatically. 
This has led in turn to an ability to respond more rapidly to market shifts, save on inventory 
costs, and improve quality. 
The interviewees at this plant, who included a union representative and the chief financial 
officer, were in general agreement as to the ingredients for success in the restructuring 
process: 
• Worker training in literacy and numeracy in order to cope with increased responsibility 
for quality control and self-management. 
• Training for multiple skills in order to make team-based production feasible. 
• Active co-operation and co-management of the process with the union. This is seen as 
critical, because the plant's restructuring package involved a reduction in the number of 
formal skill levels and the adoption of a point system in which workers could move up a 
general skill-wage scale rather than between fixed job descriptions. This in turn required a new industry award for this plant. But most importantly, active union co-operation is 
seen as essential in gaining support amongst the workforce for the restructuring 
programme. The increased emphasis on self-supervision and lean production makes this 
critical.29 
The basic problem faced by this firm was to bring itself out of a situation of poor profit 
performance, falling tariff protection, and increased import competition us,ng the resources 
at hand. Since funds were not available to throw into a major investment programme in 
new equipment, this meant an emphasis on the workforce and reorganisation of the plant. 
The effort has been quite successful, and the firm is now back in the black. 
This firm can teach South African producers of small appliances (and other goods) a great 
deal: 
• It has avoided costly expenditure on capital equipment and has first concentrated on 
reorganising its existing plant. This has proceeded on the basis of a reorganisation of 
work first, the machinery. 
• It has done without relatively high input costs, at a time of recession, with duties 
falling and imports rising. Its restructuring programme was essentially a survival 
measure involving an abandonment of part of its traditional market focus in order to 
concentrate on area which it could serve successfully. 
29 
Indeed, management feared the election of a Conservative lideral government under John I lewson, as it 
was thought likely to destroy the gains made at the plant by undennining the very industrial legislation 
which had been used to legitimise and formalise the restructuring process. Every management 
interviewee I met in Australia and New Zealand felt this way, and in some cases had actively opposed 
conservative government industrial reguiations. 
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• It has sought a partnership with its workforce through the major union in order to gain 
support for its restructuring programme Its restructuring process was negotiated, not 
dictated. 
• It has been successful in restructuring even with a relatively unskilled workforcc, most of 
whom originally tacked literacy skills in English It achieved this by co-operating 
actively with the AMEU in developing literacy programmes. 
• It has attacked the waste and high overheads associated with bloated middle 
management, over-supervision and formal quality control and turned over all three tasks 
to the workforce This has not only saved money but has created a situation of relatively 
greater mutual dependency within the firm 
3. Summary and Conclusion 
a) Basic Strengths and Weaknesses 
This principal conclusions of this section can be summarised as follows: 
1. The South African small appliance industry is ver small, and is effectively comprised of just two manufacturing firms. Its products arc not competitive globally, but are 
closer to competitiveness than the television industry. 
2. When the cost-raising impact of tariffs on its inputs are considered, it is evident that the 
industry is not actually protectcd' at all. Average duties on finished goods are 25-30%, 
as are duties on most components and raw materials, which comprise 50-80% of ex- 
factory cost. 
3. The small appliance firm studied for this report is competitive with a comparable 
Australian plant studied in terms of its ability to convert physical inputs into physical 
outputs, but is uncompetitive in terms of its overall cost structure and lead time. This is 
due to three factors: (i) higher input costs (ii) unreliable suppliers and the need to 
maintain large stocks and (iii) high overheads due to inability to achieve economies on 
inflexible machinery. 
4. The South African small appliance firm studied is headed in the right direction in its use 
of flexible work cells and just-in-time principles in order to manufacture a variety of 
products for a mass market. It major task is to achieve greater flexibility by investment 
in more flexible fabrication equipment, in order to allow it to overcome the problem of 
high overheads by spreading them across more products. This would be preferable to 
the alternative of flexibility in fabrication through increased subcontracting, which 
seems to be the case, at least potentially. 
5. As long as the South African economy remains in deep recession, however, the 
subcontracting option will be hard to resist, and will undermine long-term 
competitiveness. 
6. The firm studied has yet to make a definite commitment to a restructuring partnership 
with its workforce. Labour relations are essentially paternal, and little progress has yet 
been made in harnessing workers' tacit skills in order to move towards a fuller use of 
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this resource. Although skills levels are low, the Australian case study suggests that 
formal skills are not as important as the development of a sense of quality- 
responsibility. This can only be achieved and sustained when workers are in fact 
responsible for the products of their labour. 
b) Issues for Policy 
The South African small appliance industry can be restructured successfully. It already 
possesses sufficient capacity to serve the South African market, and would do so profitably 
under a restructuring programme similar to that followed by the Australian firm studied. 
The key issues to be addressed by policy are (1) the cost of inputs, including duties, and the 
efficiency of suppliers; (ii) the quality and capability of management; (iii) the role of labour 
in restructuring; and (iv) incentives for it to invest in a flexible future. 
D. White Goods Manufacture in South Africa 
This section looks at the manufacture of white goods in South Africa. Of necessity, it is 
based almost entirely on research conducted at one South African firm, one firm in New 
Zealand, and two in Australia. This approach was necessitated by the lack of available 
material on the South African industry and the unwillingness of other South African firms to 
participate in the Industrial Strategy Project. 
1. Introduction 
a) Background 
Of the three branches of the HED industry examined in this report, the South African white 
goods industry (henceforth WGI) is in many ways the most vulnerable to economic 
fluctuation. Whereas the small appliance industry supplies low-priced products usually 
bought for cash, and the output of the television industry has no direct substitutes, the WGI 
supplies products typically bought on hire-purchase, and for which other products or human 
labour are ready substitutes. Thus, as argued in Chapter One, sales of washing machines 
and EFS stoves to urban black households have been limited partially due to the availability 
of female labour on the one hand and coal or wood stoves on the other. 
AT the time of writing, the WGI was facing critical conditions, as the recession which began 
in 1989 seriously affected sales (see Chapter One) and factory utilisation is at an all-time 
low. Although South African white goods are not as uncompetitive internationally as 
televisions, they are nonetheless not presently exportable. In many ways the industry is 
structurally similar to the small appliance industry: key problems turn on high component 
costs, high overheads, and lack of flexibility. 
A crucial question facing the South African WGI, though, is its choice of market 
orientation: will it continue to manufacture and market branded products for a relatively 
high-income group, or will it attempt to develop sturdy, low-cost products for a mass market — the People's Fridge? Associated with this is the question of manufacturing technique: like 
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the small appliance industry, the WGI must attain greater flexibility in order to be able to 
serve what is in fact several markets in one. 
b) Policy Context 
State policy initiatives towards the WGI have been scant compared to the television 
industry. Like the 1'VI, trade policy towards the WOl has been designed to encourage local 
component manufacture to increase domestic value added, but has succeeded mainly in 
raising input costs and undermining protection for final product manufacturers. Although a 
major BTT study of the industry was reportedly initiated several years ago, it was not 
completed and the data gathered is not available for scrutiny. In general, state policy 
towards the industry has been trade policy. Details of the trade regime can be found in 
Chapter Three. 
2. White Goods Vital Signs 
a) Structural Characteristics 
(1) Market Structure And Barriers To Entry 
The South African WGI is comprised of several large firms: Barlows Appliance, a 
subsidiary of Barlows Manufacturing Company; Tek Corp., a subsidiary of SANKORP; 
KIC, Ltd., now a subsidiary of Altron company Powertech; and several smaller firms, 
including Hoover, Univa and Phillips. Many brands of white goods are also imported, 
mainly by these firms. The industry is highly competitive and pursues aggressive sales 
strategies in the retail sector. It does not have a strong employers' association, as we have 
seen, and does not engage in co-operative ventures as far as I could ascertain. 
(2) Linkages To Other Sectors 
The structure of the white goods 'filiere' is almost identical to that of the SAl, as are the 
issues it raises. One significant exception is the major role played by hire-purchase 
agreements in the retail market for white goods. Most white goods sales to low-income 
purchasers are on some form of credit, whether it be lay-bye, hire-purchase, or overdraft. 
For this reason, the WGI is particularly sensitive to fluctuations in interest rates, 
expectations, and state interventions in the retail credit system. 
Another issue relating to the retail furniture trade is the role of retail buying power in 
shaping the development of the WGI. Retailers presently have a choice of several South 
African manufacturers of white goods, and play one off the other in order to obtain 
favourable terms. This usually involves extended credit facilities, so that the manufacturer 
effectively carries the interest cost of stock held at retail level; terms of up to twelve months 
are not uncommon. More than one interviewee pointed out that any moves towards industry 
rationalisation would mostly likely be opposed by the retail industry if the latter were to 
result in a significant reversal of the wholesale power structure. To this no retailer would 
admit, but the logic is compelling. 
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From the perspective of basic needs delivery, the fundamental question is by what means 
eager potential consumers of white goods can be made effective consumers in a context of 
severe recession. Both consumers and the industry have an interest in interventions which 
can help to 'kick-start' the market for white goods and other HEDs. In particular, policy 
proposals for this industry will have to address the externalities associated with credit 
conditions determined by the institutional structure of the retail and wholesale market. For 
example, the reluctance of major banking groups to commit themselves to financing hire- 
purchase schemes is understandable, but an obstacle both to consumer satisfaction and to 
WGI recovery. The final section and the concluding chapter will return to this issue. 
(3) Ownership and Managerial Structures And Linkages 
The major white goods manufacturers are owned by industrial or financial conglomerates. 
Like their kindred companies the consumer electronics firms, they are part of a pyramidal 
structure which is mostly responsible for returning a quarterly profit to the head office. 
Manufacturing plants are in turn part of white goods divisions which are also active 
importers, and much of the large influx of imports during the upswings identified in Chapter 
Three can be attributed to these firms' pursuit of short term profit at the expense of their 
manufacturing operations. 
Most interviewees expressed satisfaction with the conduct of relations between head office 
and manufacturing level, but some did not. In particular, some felt that the corporate 
structure of the white goods industry tended to inhibit manufacturing innovation in much the 
same way as the TVI (owned by the same firms). According to them, the basic problem is 
and has been 'domination of the industry by accountants' as opposed to manufacturers. 
This is closely linked with an historical attachment to brand name as the source of value 
added, as opposed to manufacturing. As discussed in the case of televisions, this approach 
has its roots in the historical origins of the WGI as an import substitution industry for the 
white population. The consequences of this will be discussed below. 
(4) Links To Government 
As with the other HED branches, the WGI has no specific links to government, outside of 
the normal trade negotiation merry-go-round. Towards the end of the ISP, however, white 
goods manufacturers joined with ESKOM and representatives from popular political and 
labour organisations to discuss the role the WGI could play in the electrification process. 
This process should be monitored carefully; the concluding chapter will make specific 
recommendations in this respect. 
b) Competitiveness 
(1) Cost Structures 
Tables D- 1 to D-3 below present comparative cost data for the South African WGI taken 
from a DAMSA document based on research conducted in the late I 980s. They are the 
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most detailed figures available to compare the relative cost structures of South African 
white goods compared to a composite average of representative overseas firms.3° 
Table D-l presents comparisons of South African products versus comparable importer 
products. It lists a direct cost comparison between each element of the wholesale cost, as 
well as the difference between the two. 
Table D-2 presents cost differentials for production overheads, components, and raw 
materials. Chart 2a shows South African and overseas overhead costs per unit and average 
unit volumes in thousands. Charts 2b and 2c list the extra cost to South African 
manufacturers of the components and raw materials used in a variety of key products, when 
compared to those paid by overseas firms. The cumulative cost disadvantage per unit is 
also shown. 
Table D-3 lists the Rand equivalent of the foreign exchange costs and benefits associated 
with several key products, including shipping. Chart 3a lists the estimated cost of direct 
purchases, shipping, and imported parts in components used, giving a total forex cost per 
unit. Chart 3b adds the average value added per unit to the foreign exchange saved by not 
importing that unit, and subtracts from the result the 'cost-raising impact' of extra cost to 
the consumer caused by tariffs. By combining these, a theoretical value for the 'net 
contribution' of each unit is derived. 
The following points are of particular importance: 
(a) Overhead Costs 
It can be seen immediately that South African producers suffer a major disadvantage in 
terms of overhead costs, based primarily on very low production volumes relative to 
overseas plants. This does not mean that the problem with the South African white goods 
industry is volume. High overheads are rather the symptom of a manufacturing process 
designed for mass production in a society which does not have a mass market. To say that 
volume is the problem misses the point: optimal volume is a function of market orientation 
and technology. The New Zealand plant visited can produce one unit of a refrigerator model 
a day and be profitable — because it is technologically designed to do so. Arguments for 
further protection because of high overhead costs beg the question: what will be done about 
the causes of the volume problem during the protected period? 
(b) Materials and Component Costs 
Materials and component price premiums to local manufacturers are listed in Charts 2b and 
2c. Their relationship to overall price disadvantage is best seen in Charts 2c, 3a, and 3b. In 
nearly every product, excess material costs are the largest single factor contributing to 
price disadvantage versus imports. 
(c) Profit Levels 
Factory profit is significantly higher for South African manufacturers. As observed in the 
section on the TV!, this is an attempt to make up for smaller volumes, made possible by 
significant protective duties. 
° 
This data is based on a very different exchange rate to the one now ruling, but has presented as is as the 
main point is the relative, not absolute, value of overhead costs, components, etc. 
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Cost Data On White Goods 
Source: DAMSA documents, interviews. 
Table D-1: Local vs. Import Costings for Selected Products 
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HOUSEHOLD ELECTRICAL DURABLES INDUSTRIES 217 
Table D-2: Cost Differentials for Selected Products 
Chart 2a: Production Overhel Differenti's 
SA 0/heads 0/S 0/heads SA Volume 0/S Volume 
LAUNDRY 
Automatic Washing Machine R116,00 R23,00 71 787 
Twin Tub Washer R89,00 R18,00 68 -— 350 — 
Tumble Drier R71,00 R14,00 89 787 
COOKING 
Freestanding Stoves R140,00 R36,00 165 638 
Eyvel Ovens R136,00 R2 62 500 -- 
Cooking Robs jO R9,00 70 500 
PEFRIGERATION 
Electric Fridges R134,00 R36,00 231 851 
Chest Freezers 
Chart 2b: Component Costs Di 
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Table D-3: Foreign Exchange Impact of Selected Products 
Chart 3a: First-round Forex Costs of Local Manufacture 
Direct Shipping Import Total 
Purchases Leakage 
LAUNDRY 
Automatic Washing Machine R157,00 R20,00 R26,00 R203,00 
Twin Tub Washer R146,00 R19,00 R36,00 R201,00 
Tumble Drier R16,00 R3,00 R15,00 R34,00 
COOKiNG 
Freestanding Stoves R17,00 R2,00 R40,00 R59,00 
Eye Level Ovens R178,00 R22,00 R29,00 R229,00 
Cooking Hobs R31,00 R3,00 R24,00 R58,00 
REFRIGERATION 
Electric Fridges R69,00 R7,00 R51,00 R127,00 
Chest Freezers R71,00 R8,00 R19,00 R98,00 










Automatic Washing Machine R182,00 R262,00 (R255,00) R189,00 
Twin Tub Washer R137,00 R124,00 (R123,00) R138,00 
Tumble Drier R104,00 R193,00 (R93,00) R204,00 
COOKiNG 
Freestanding Stoves R218,00 R346,00 (R208,00) R356,00 
Eye Level Ovens R233,00 R358,00 (R338,00) R253,00 
Cooking Hobs R70,00 R107,00 (R83,00) R94,00 
REFRIGERATION 
Electric Fridges R207,00 R292,00 (R175,00) R324,00 
Chest Freezers R139,00 R212,00 (R94,00) R257,00 
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(d) Net Contribution 
On a one-to one basis, South African products are uncompetitive with imports even with 
duties in place. Nevertheless, if their value added, import savings, and cost-raising impact is 
taken into account, all white goods products provide a reasonable net contribution to the 
economy. 
The WGI does suffer significant cost disadvantages which make it uncompetitive 
internationally. The question is whether they can be solved, and whether the solutions are to 
be found inside manufacturing firms or in the external enviromnent. 
(2) Productivitp and Performance Measures 
Productivity measures were only recently introduced at the South African plant visited, 
whose current estimates are for 12,5 labour hours per unit of output. Production there is by 
forecast, in batches of 50-200 at the assembly stage, with a minimum of 600 in the press 
shop. The latter is determined by changeover times. These had been reduced from 55 
minutes to 40 minutes, but 25 is the goal. Average WIP is 10 days' worth. Finished goods 
stocks of 20 days are held on average. Lead times are from one week to 3-4 months, 
depending on the accuracy of forecasts and component orders; throughput times are 10 days 
on average. Of this, approximately 8 hours is spent adding value to materials. Stock turns 
are very high due to the recession, and very little is presently kept on hand. The 
capital/labour ratio is R2 1 428 per employee; the output/capital ratio is 5:1; output per 
employee is R92 857. 
(3) Scale of Production 
The plant visited was producing about 100 units per day at the time, although plant capacity 
is 200 units. By comparison, the smallest plant visited in Australia produced 280 units per 
day at its present 70% capacity. From the cost comparisons presented above it is clear that 
South African firms do suffer a disadvantage because of smaller volumes. 
(4) Product Quality 
It is difficult to compare the quality of South African products to that of overseas firms. On 
the surface, appliances such as those produced by the New Zealand firm visited and 
discussed below are far superior to any South African product, as are most appliances 
available in Europe or North America. The question is: quality for what? The white goods 
industry internationally faces a stagnant, mainly replacement market in the so-called first 
world. In this context, product differentiation is a key competitive strategy in some markets 
(mainly North America) arid usually manifests itself in a 'bells-and whistles' approach: load 
the machine with features of often dubious utility. South African firms, on the other hand, 
lack the design skills and manufacturing flexibility to produce such products, and generally 
turn out simple but effective products which perform their basic function no worse than the 
bells-and-whistle products. In some areas, South African products are of high quality: KIC 
refrigeration products, for example. There have been complaints from retailers in recent 
months about the deterioration of local white goods quality however, which seems to be 
corroborated by interview sources. This is manifested in the use of inferior steel, shoddy 
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wiring, defective components, and poor manufacturing. These problems are probably 
specific to a period in which the WGI is under extreme pressure. 
(5) Product Research, Design, And Development 
Local white goods firms freely admit to being technologically dependent on overseas 
partners who supply them with basic designs which they then adapt to South African 
conditions and preferences. Certainly the local industry has no internationally-leading edge 
products. Only cooking products are primarily South African-designed due to local 
preferences for particular features not worth tooling up for larger finns. 
This technological dependence is not seen as a problem by the local industiy, since product 
design is not a proximate cause of its recent misfortunes. Instead, product development 
interviewees argued that their basic research target is the manufacturing process, in order to 
reduce parts requirements, improve quality, and generally improve manufacturability and 
value for money. In this sense the local industry is essentially an adapter of foreign 
technology. Should it wish to become an exporter of original equipment — not likely but 
not without precedent in a small economy — it will clearly have to develop product design 
skills, which today are closely linked to production engineering skills in any case. 
On this note, industrial engineers at the plant visited complained about a tendency also seen 
at Company A's television factory: for marketing personnel to dictate product launches 
without reference to manufacturing realities, such as the current layout of plant, the 
implications for WIP and logistics, and so on. This indicates that a stronger emphasis on 
simultaneous engineering would be beneficial to the industry. As has been found elsewhere, 
it is critical to design and launch new products as a manufacturing exercise, not just as a 
marketing exercise. It might be more advantageous for marketing divisions to approach 
manufacturing plants as customers rather than as directors; this would force them to take 
cognisance of the limitations of their plants and/or to see the manufacturing process as more 
of an independent source of value added and profit. 
(6) Strategic Focus 
As discussed in the Introduction, today's South African white goods producers evolved 
many of their current characteristics in the process of import substitution for the white 
middle-income market. I would argue that this has had fundamental and lasting effects on 
the industry: 
• White goods manufacturing has historically been based on a mass-production model, 
suited to the needs of an urbanising white population who were mainly first-time 
buyers. This encouraged investment in dedicated production machinery and 
standardised models. Local products came to be geared towards the growing market of 
middle-income whites, whilst the smaller upper-income white market was served by 
imports of sophisticated products from technology partners. Lower-income black 
consumers were not directly served by local firms as they lacked income; furthermore, 
under apartheid they were presumed to be essentially rural dwellers who had little need 
of such products. 
• Because of white goods firms' origins as wholesalers, and continuing import activities, 
strategy was driven by the need to maintain wholesale margins, not manufacturing 
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competitiveness as such. Manufacturing philosophy was one of 'break even'; value 
added was seen to arise primarily in the market as 'brand premium'. The factory 
manager of the South African firm visited, for example, was of the opinion that the 
'real money' was to be made a retail level. 
• The finite size of the target market meant that once a situation of relative saturation had 
been reached, firms were unable to expand production to achieve internationally 
competitive economies of scale. Instead, they came to rely on continued tariff 
protection against import competition. Unlike firms in comparably-sized markets," 
these firms did not move seriously into exports in an attempt to increase throughput. 
This placed an upper limit on revenue and profitability and discouraged innovative 
investment and marketing strategies. 
By the mid-i 970s South African white goods producers were accustomed to production for a small, saturated market and lacked the cost competitiveness to survive without protection. 
This is not to say that they were structurally 'locked' into this: comparative experience has 
shown that it is possible for small-country white goods firms to break out of this orientation. 
Instead, resources and imagination which elsewhere had been applied to innovative product 
and process engineering for export were rather devoted to maintaining the protective trade 
régime. 
Today this 'marketing' orientation is being questioned by firms who realise that the only 
growth market in the country is the urban(ising) black market. This poses a dilemma for 
such firms: do they move into this market with lower-priced, more basic products, or do they 
attempt to bring the market to them via marketing campaigns based on status and the 
branded image? The danger is that, as in the TV!, a move into low-priced, basic products 
can backfire in one of two ways: it can lead to a loss of status for the brand name under 
which the new range was launched, or it could eat into the market share of the main brand 
itself. Interviewees at the firm visited argued that it was better to avoid either risk and seek 
to bring down the cost of branded products through applied engineering at manufacturing 
level. 
c) Manufacturing Philosophy And Practice 
(1) Factory Layout 
The South African white goods plant visited was a classic assembly line operation. Lines 
for each product were strung throughout the complex, intersecting with functional areas 
such as the press shop, galvanising or enamelling shop, and so on. Units moved from 
station to station on motorised tracks, overhead lifts, or roller tracks. Large areas were set 
aside for component stocks and defective output. The distance travelled by individual units 
was enormous in some cases. No cells, group technology areas, or flexible manufacturing 
systems were in use. However, various self-contained sub-areas were devoted to production 
of components such as wire oven racks. The factory manager and engineering directors 
both claimed that there had been much experimentation with layout in recent months, 
" 
Eg. Fisher and Paykel in New Zealand. 
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intended to reduce average throughput times. The major bottleneck in this plant remained 
the press shop; assembly operations were claimed to be as good as anywhere else. 
The manufacturing facilities of this company, one of the largest and oldest white goods firms 
in the country, are old, dirty, dark, cluttered — and insufferably hot. The plant itself was 
originally a foundry, and drippings from those days still dot the floor. This stands in stark 
contrast to the plant of the New Zealand firm visited, which was clean, orderly, and air- 
conditioned. Such differences may seem peripheral, but the environment-related 
productivity improvements experienced by the Australian small appliance manufacturer 
discussed in the previous section suggest otherwise. 
(2) Production Scheduling 
A kanban-type uT system is used in the South African plant, and uT deliveries are 
encouraged of suppliers. As we have seen, however, average stock and WIP levels are fairly 
high, indicating a less-than-optimal operation of the system. 
(3) Work Organisation 
No real automation is used in the South African plant, and processes which are fully 
automated in the New Zealand and Australian plants are performed by hand: fabrication of 
metal parts, enamelling, and so on. As we have seen, the basic work process is a traditional, 
hierarchical artisan-in-the-press-shop, operative-on-the-assembly-line system. No quality 
circles, suggestion schemes, teamworking or multiskilling are employed. Quality control is 
putatively carried out at source, by statistical process control methods. 
(4) Skills, Training, And Labour Relations 
There are 727 direct and 70 indirect workers in the plant, for a direct:indirect ratio of 9,4:1. 
Most workers are semi-skilled operatives and are trained on the job, although the firm does 
reportedly run a training facility shared by the entire industry. None of the interviewees at 
the plant referred to it when asked about training. 
Significant shortages of skilled tool-setters and electronic technicians were experienced by 
the firm. Many immigrants were employed in technical and management positions. 
Management regarded labour rates as too high internationally, but as can be seen from Table 
D- 1 they are not significantly higher compared to overhead and materials costs. In general, 
the plant staff felt that better-educated, more flexible workers were needed to cope with the 
imperatives of production in a small market. 
Labour relations in the plant appeared to be essentially paternalistic, and the plant is not 
organised by a major union. Consultation with the workforce appears to be strictly top- 
down — with green areas meetings run kv supervisors. 
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d) Ability To Meet Basic Needs 
(1) Employment 
As is the case with the television and small appliance industries, the white goods industry is 
unlikely to be a major source of employment growth in national terms. The plant studied, 
for example, is presently operating at 50% capacity or less, and can expand to nearly full 
capacity without additional workers. An expansion by a factor of three would result in only 
an additional 200 jobs with current technology, whilst any move towards a more competitive 
technology would almost certainly reduce employment. According to interview sources at 
the New Zealand plant, there is no currently-available labour-intensive production process 
which could produce competitively at more than starvation wages. It must therefore be 
recognised that any prospective job growth in this industry is likely to be in associated 
services: parts, maintenance, and retailing. 
e) Other Considerations 
(1) Age, Condition, and Sources of Equipment 
Capital equipment at the South African plant is mainly Japanese and European, and on 
average 10-15 years old. It is presently valued at RiOm, but would probably cost R65m to 
replace. It is well maintained, but maintenance costs run into the millions each year. It is 
claimed to perform well for the purposes for which it was designed, but is clearly antiquated 
compared to a modem facility such as the New Zealand plant. The factory manager 
acknowledged that the enamelling process in particular was badly outdated, as were many of 
the manual machine tools. 
(2) Investment Plans 
The South African company had no immediate plans to invest either in new capacity or in 
upgrading of current facilities due to the severity of the recession and uncertainty as to the 
political and economic future of the country. 
(3) Environmental and Safely Issues 
The same firm claimed full compliance with South African regulations concerning HFC and 
CFC emissions. No other specific environmental issues were identified. As mentioned 
previously, the plant was a highly unpleasant working environment, but interviewees claimed 
that it met stipulated standards. 
1) Foreign Case Studies 
Three white goods plants were visited in Australia and New Zealand in February-March 
1993. The purpose of these visits was initially to gather cost, productivity and performance 
data to use to compare to the South African firm studied. During subsequent research it 
became clear that a more important task would be to examine the process and results Of 
plant-level restructuring in both countries in order to gain insights into the sorts of policies 
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which might favour a similar process in South Africa. (En any case the firms were reluctant 
to disclose the data sought.) 
The New Zealand Company and its Australian Subsidiary 
The New Zealand finn visited also was sole owner of one of the Australian plants studied. 
Both were based on exactly the same production processes and utilised similar methods of 
work organisation. The New Zealand plant went through the restructuring process from 
scratch, however, whereas the Australian subsidiary was set up as a grcenficlds clone of the 
latter. For this reasons I will concentrate on the New Zealand plant but refer to its twin 
when appropriate. 
The firm in question is an old established New Zealand white goods company with a wide 
variety of engineering and electronics manufacturing and distributing interests besides its 
white goods plants, which are located throughout New Zealand. The firm is a public 
company with a variety of shareholders. including several European firms. Members of the 
original founding family still retain an interest, however, and one of them is currently 
managing director. Its annual turnover is in excess of NZ$5 OOm on an asset base of 
NZ$400m. Exports currently account for 30% of turnover. 
The Refrigeration Plant 
The refrigeration plant visited is located on the North Island in a predominantly Maori area, 
and employs mainly Maori and Polynesian workers. It was established in the early 1970s 
and from the start has been based (like its Australian counterpart) on a computer-co- 
ordinated flexible manufacturing system which is fully capable of producing 'every model 
every day'. Indeed, each refrigerator on the production line is different from the next; there 
are no batches and no minimum model runs. All ancillary processes such as painting, 
galvanising, and enamelling are done by automated processes. 
The plant's production process begins with a computcriscd production schedule which is 
drawn up for the day on the basis of orders received from various sources. This schedule is 
fed into a materials management system which automatically alerts each operator as to 
which model is coming next. The operator then uses a prepared packet of parts for that 
model automatically assembled ahead of time on the basis of the computer plan. 
The first stage of the actual manufactu ring process involves unpacking of prepainted32 rolled 
steel sheet, which is then placed onto a NC punch-press which forms the sheet to the size 
required by the next model on the line. Once the basic box is formed, it proceeds down a 
manually-propelled line for assembly. All parts except for the motor/compressor assembly 
require neither welding nor screws for asscmblv the punch press folds a lip into the metal 
which is simply fitted into a corresponding lip and hammered in with a rubber hammer. All 
stages of the manufacturing process involve little more than snapping predesigned parts into 
place. In general. the process is clean, quiet, and rapid. 
The key element in this plant's success for our purposes is the link made between 
manufcturing flexibility, skills acquisition, and niche marketing. Like the South African 
firm visited, this company began early in this century as an assembler of parts imported 
from the USA and UK. It was heavily protected for the first 20 ears of its life by tariff 
32 
Pioneered by this lirm. 
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barriers erected and maintained by successive Labour governments, which obscured the fact 
that its products were not internationally competitive. It also set up a series of sole 
franchise agreements with retailers which effectively prevented any other products from 
getting into shops. The company's subsequent transition from assembler to a manufacturer 
is of interest. After having assembled imported kits for over 20 years. management realised 
that it would never be able to export or compete against a rapidly rising tide of imports 
unless it began to design and manufacture its own products. Most importantly, the products 
it was assembling in the early 1960s were designed for mass production runs in a large 
market, and were thus inappropriate for New Zealand's tiny (3m) population or for small, 
specialised export markets. 
Instead of aiming for price oriented markets, the company made a strategic decision to aim 
for quality-conscious, differentiated markets. This effort was ultimately highly successflul, 
and the firm is now strongly export oriented and able to sell its products globally from a tiny 
market base. How has it managed this? The main elements of its success have been: 
• Home-grown flexible automation tcchnology in which it is a world leader and exporter. 
Currently the refrigeration plant is capable of producing over 1 400 product variations 
on a single line. This 'batchless' system was necessitated by its small home market and 
niche export emphasis. In addition, special materials technologies were developed which 
allowed the firm to concentrate on manufacture and less on preparation of materials, 
such as enamelling and painting. 
• Product design for niche markets, which has involved creating and supporting a large 
R&D effort which produces new models which arc unavailable elsewhere. A striking 
example is a variable speed washer which has seen massive export growth in recent 
months. From a manufacturing standpoint, this has meant focusing on design for 
manufacturability as a means to overcome scale problems in New Zealand's small 
domestic market and increase speed and flexibility. 
• Incorporation of electronics into products and manufacturing processes, such as the 
production scheduling system and the variable speed washer. 
• Aggressive international marketing. Exports from the plant are more than 60% of output 
by value and 40% in unit terms, mainly to the Australian market, but also to other 
destinations. 
• Assimilation of work organisation practices which maxirnise productivity and worker 
input into the ongoing innovation process. Associated with this was a progressive 
attitude towards worker and union involvement in decision making and management 
issues generally. 
Skills Restructuring 
It is this last item which is of most interest. The company began a major process of internal 
skills restructuring in 1987, when Muldoon's Labour government was defeated, ushering in 
an era of Conservative industrial relations policies intended to undermine the role of unions. 
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On the other side, labour in the plant was represented by a variety of unions who were all 
covered by national awards which often bore no relation to the plant in question. besides the 
fact that the national award system was under threat from the government, the plethora of 
plant-level agreements often resulted in situations where some unions struck whilst others 
did not. From the union perspective, this undermined worker solidarity and threatened the 
good relations they had with management. Finally, government legislation passed in 1987 
had made it difficult to organise on a craft basis, but easier to organise on an industry basis. 
As a result of an 8-day strike in 1988, management and the unions, led by the New Zealand 
Engineers' Union, began to negotiate a new enterprise agreement which would rationalise 
existing agreements and define the work practices and pay scales within the company 
independently of the national awards (Meade, 1990). A key aspect of the eventual 
agreement, reached in 1990, was a linking of wages with jointly-defined skill levels, 
abolishing the old system of seniority and job descriptions. In this system, workers could 
move through a series of broad skill bands within their work area (eg. production, 
shipping), and within this band accumulate points toward further skill recognition. This 
they did by learning new tasks, which were rewarded on the basis of a recognised time taken 
to master it. In this way workers had an incentive to increase their skill level, take an 
interest in aspect of the plant not directly concerning them, and become flexibly skilled at the 
same time. Once this system was underway, it was possible to form autonomous work 
groups and teams. 
For its part, management at the plant had to accept union participation in most management 
structures and worker participation in decision-making regarding the operation of the plant 
(not its overall strategy). Management also had to agrec to full disclosure of financial and 
other information about the firm which could be used to reach informed decisions. 
The results have been impressive: the plant has increased its productivity and cost 
competitiveness considerably since 1990, and has become a major exporter of white goods 
to the Australian market. Moreover, since the company-level agreement was reached, the 
government has passed a bill providing for national recognition of the type of industry skill 
structures defined at this company. 
Part of the company's drive into exports involved the creation of a subsidiary company in 
Australia which would produce laundry products using the same manufacturing methods as 
the New Zealand plant. This plant's share of the of the Australian market went from 0% to 
15% in little more than two years. It now produces A$40m p.a. of refrigeration equipment, 
with a daily output of 250 units per day, utilising only 115 production workers (by contrast, 
the New Zealand plant produces 700-800 units per day with 300 workers). This plant has 
become very competitive with existing manufacturers in Australia, and looks set to grow 
even further. 
Ingredients for Success? 
The competitive success of this firm is based on the folloing elements. inter a/ia: 
Relatively strong protection until reccntl coupled with exclusive franchise agreements 
with retailers within New Zealand for mans' years, gave this firm nearly unrivalled 
dominance of the local market, from hich it could generate sufficient cash flow to 
innovate so aggressively. 
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• Management willingness to take risks. This is evident in its decision to move into 
production for export in the 1960s, its willingness to buck the trend in 1987-88 and 
refused to undermine its unions; its willingness to shape a new skills-based enterprise 
agreement, and its aggressive marketing of products for export This fur-sighteness is a 
crucial element of this company's success. The option of sitting on its laurels in the 
domestic market has certainly always been present. 
• A strong technological basis in both products and process design. Developing the 
capacity to generate and manufacture its own products required a heavy investment in 
R&D (which the company will not disclose) and access to skilled researchers and 
engineers. It was fortunate to be located in a country where such skills are in abundance, 
but also must be given credit for putting them into practice innovatively 
• Close co-operative relations with its labour force. It is hard to imagine such a 
management attitude in South Africa. Yet this must be one of the most important 
elements of sticcess. 
• A union which was willing to co-operate in restructuring. Again, it is difficult to imagine 
such a scenario in South Africa — at least o this extent. 
• Educated workers possessing basic literacy and numeracy skills, as well as a firm grasp of the overall functioning of the firm and its market. 
• Above all, a favourable social and political context The previous two points are really 
just way of saying this. As one artisan put it to me: "Don't bother to try this stuff unless 
you've got the preconditions in place. Yo&ve got to trust each other a bit and be 
prepared to compromise and look at it from the point of view of the firm. Without those 
preconditions you'll mess it up cos' these structures can be used to sabotage things as 
well". 
What Can the South African Industry Learn From This? 
It is tempting to say that South African firms 'should' model themselves after firms such as 
this one. But the previous comment must be taken seriously. The social and political 
context in which firms such as this one operate is radically different from our own. South 
African firms — and unions — must travel a long roar.! before they can seriously hope to 
succeed as high technology niche exporters. 
Nevertheless, there are instructive lessons here. As analysts have often argued, 
organisational restructuring is a preferable starting point for firms moving into flexible 
manufacturing. The experience of this firm and of the Australian small appliance firm 
discussed above show that significant gains can be made without resorting to major 
investment in equipment and plant. These gains can be both direct, in the form of higher 
productivity, and indirect, in the sense that a groundwork is laid for further restructuring 
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Manufacturer 
Interviews were also conducted at a refrigeration plant in rural New South Wales belonging 
to Australia's largest manufacturer of white goods. This plant had been a munitions factory 
during World War two, and was sold to the country's largest appliance manufacturer 
afterwards, It is a sprawling complex covering almost 1 000 acres and housing several 
separate factories. The plant employs 1 300 workers, 1 000 of whom were direct fictory 
operatives. It produces 160 000 units per year, roughly 60-65% of Australia's total 
appliance market. 
The main lessons to be learnt from this plant are the effectiveness of direct investment by 
foreign firms in prompting restructuring, and the dangers of responding through investment 
in hardware. The firm in question has had a commanding share of Australia's white goods 
market for some time, and had traditionally been a brand leader earning high premium. 
Management at the plant has been slowly introducing new production methods such as J IT 
with success for some time, but was jolted into more rapid action when the New Zealand 
firm opened its subsidiary in Queensland in 1990. As ve have seen this led to a very rapid 
shift in market share, mainly at the Australian firm's expense. 
In response, the firm decided to invest in a nearly fully-automated Computer Integrated 
Manufacturing (C1M) facility to produce a new line of fridges. Its rationale for doing so 
was to achieve the kind of flexibility which characterises the New Zealand subsidiary. 
According to a union representative who took mc through the plant, however, the firm lost a 
great deal of money in setting up and debugging this facility, and nearly went bankrupt. 
Further discussion revealed that the firm had not undertaken any training or organisational 
restructuring — setting up teams, training workers to engage in maintenance, instilling 
initiative and quality consciousness — prior to investing in the CIM facility. Most 
importantly, it had not addressed the issue of skill demarcation and flexibility, and found it 
nearly impossible to staff the CIM line adequately as a result. 
This anecdote reaffirms the point made above: it is far better to start small and restructure 
work practices, redefine skill to include flexibility, and build in incentives for further skill jsthan to jump straight into a major investment such as IM. 
3. Summary and Conclusion 
a) Basic Points and Issues for Policy 
To summarise the points made in this section: 
1. White goods manufacturing in South Africa has historically been based on a mass- 
production model, suited to the needs of an urbanising white population who were 
mainly first-time buyers. This encouraged investment in dedicated production 
machinery and standardised models for mass production. This approach is no longer 
suitable in conditions of market fragmentation between low-, middle-, and high-income 
buyers. 
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2. South African white goods producers suffer a major disadvantage in terms of overhead 
costs, based primarily on very low production volumes relative to overseas plants. This 
does not mean that the problem with the South African white goods industry is volume. 
High overheads are rather the symptom of a manufacturing process designed for mass 
production in a society which does not have a mass market for the kind of products for 
which it is designed. 
3. The WGI does suffer significant cost disadvantages which make it uncompetitive 
internationally. The question is whether they can be solved, and whether the solutions 
are to be found inside manufacturing firms or in the external environment. 
4. In nearly every product category, excess material costs are the largest single factor 
contributing to the price disadvantage of South African white goods versus imports. 
5. Partly as a result, South African white goods are uncompetitive with imports even with 
duties. Nevertheless, if their value added, import savings, and cost-raising impact is 
taken into account, most white goods products provide a reasonable net contribution to 
the economy. 
6. White goods firms' strategy is driven largely by the need to maintain wholesale 
margins, not manufacturing competitiveness as such. Manufacturing philosophy is one 
of 'break even'; value added is seen to arise primarily in the market as 'brand 
premium'. 
7. The experience of the New Zealand firm visited suggests that it is possible to achieve 
export competitiveness on the basis of flexible production technology and a consultative 
approach to management, coupled with access to sufficient technological expertise to 
design and develop original products and processes. This may be a tall order for South 
African firms, however. 
E. Conclusion 
This lengthy chapter has surveyed the principal components of the South African HED 
industry from the perspective of case studies. This is not an optimal way to undertake such 
as task, but as explained in the Introduction, circumstances left little choice. 
Three questions remain at the end of this process. Firstly, how generalisable are these 
conclusions? Secondly, given the comments throughout the chapter about the need for 
industrial restructuring, what are the chances that these firms will be able to achieve it? 
Thirdly, what industrial policy should South Africa adopt towards these industries? 
The third question will be addressed in the next and final chapter. The first two will be 
addressed briefly here. 
Unfortunately it was impossible to conduct anything like a 'survey' of South African HED 
manufacturers. However, there are very few of them in any case. In the case of the 
television and small .appliance industries, all of the major firms were in fact covered. Those 
white goods plants that were not visited were adjudged to be very similar to the firm visited 
by that firm and others familiar with the industry. I have every confidence that these 
conclusions are reasonable statements of the situation in the industry generally — and would 
welcome response from it. 
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The question of whether South African HED manufacturers can restructure themselves is 
largely subjective. There is no reason to suspect that they cannot — just as there is no 
reason to assume that they would, even if market signals were 'right'. I saw nothing in the 
course of research that would suggest that these firms could not achieve competitiveness 
given the right conditions, incentives, and support. 
Chapter Six: Policy Proposals 
A. A General Assessment of the South African HED 
Industry 
Before going on to make specific policy recommendations for the HED industry, let us first 
review the situation. First the external context: what opportunities are open to it, and what 
are the principal constraints it faces? Then the internal situation of the industry: what are 
the HED industry's principal strengths and weaknesses? 
1. Core Opportunities 
1. The present poor state of the HED industry is due to a number of factors which do not 
appear to be intrinsic to the products it produces or the technologies and techniques 
used to produce them. There is no reasons, in other words, why South African cannot 
be competitive producers of HEDs, Instead, it should be recognised that the HED 
industry: 
• is entirely dependent on consumers' discretionary incomes, which have been under 
severe strain since the early 1980s; 
• has a history of heavily protected import substitution which has shaped its structure and 
practices strongly; 
• is structurally oriented towards the needs of middle-income whites. 
2. South Africa is a potentially low-cost producer of the basic raw materials required by 
the HED industry: metals and plastics. At present exploitative institutional structures, 
protective trade policies, and possibly high capital costs detennine the high cost 
structures of these markets. As a principle these materials should be beneficiated 
locally and used by downstream manufacturing industries. 
3. South Africa has a relatively highly developed light engineering sector oriented towards 
the mining and agricultural sectors and to an extent the defence establishment. This 
industry is invaluable to further development of the manufacturing sector for several 
reasons: 
• Firsily, with appropriate reorientation, the light engineering sector has the potential 
precision to supply components and capital equipment to the manufacturing sector more 
broadly. This will intensify the employment-creating and forex-saving aspects of 
manufacturing development and help to avoid the television scenario of import-and- 
assemble with very low domestic value added. 
• Secondly, exports of speciality goods on a small-batch or flexible basis can be 
developed if a sound local market can be used as a springboard. Downstream 
consumers of such products who themselves require inputs in small quantities, such as 
the HED industry, may serve as a good training ground for future exports. 
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• Thirdly, significant production technology diffusion and learning effects can emanate 
from the light engineering sector. Since the mining and defence sectors are in long-term 
decline, alternative outlets for the light engineering sector are a priority. For this reason 
metals- and plastics-based downstream industries such as the HED industry should be 
encouraged if at all possible, particularly when they demand products similar to mining 
and defence goods. 
4. South Africa does not require a high-tech HED industry. Instead, it requires an 
industry which is capable of flexibly producing low-cost, reliable goods appropriate to 
a developing country with a massive backlog in housing and urban amenities. This 
does not mean, however, that production techniques should not be of a world standard, 
as they very likely must be to be competitive against imports; nor does it mean that the 
HED industry should not produce high-end products if it can do so profitably. It only 
means that there is no need for the industry to battle to find sufficient volumes because 
of an attachment to brand-name marketing strategies and the dictates of foreign 
technology partners. 
5. South and Southern Africa is a potentially huge market with nearly unlimited need for 
the products of the HED industry. Moreover, it is almost certain the a future 
government will undertake large-scale housing and electrification programmes which 
will spur market growth considerably. 
6. The industry is owned by large, well-financed conglomerates which could readily afford 
to re-equip the industry were this warranted by market conditions. 
2. Major Constraints 
The South African HED industry is unlikely to become a major exporter in the near 
future for reasons discussed above. Global markets for all three types of product are 
highly competitive and regional, and demand quality, low cost, and rapid response from 
suppliers. To enter these markets as independent actors is some way off at best, 
although subcontract sourcing for larger firms may be a possibility 
2. The South African economy is in the midst of its worst recession since the War. It 
remains to be seen whether this is, in fact, a recession, or whether South Africa is 
entering a period of secular economic stagnation. If so, the disposable income needed 
to finance an expansion of the HED industry max' not be forthcoming. Moreover, 
political uncertainty will make it difficult for capital owners to justiFy investment in the 
South African market for some time to come. 
3. The input supply chain of the industry is a substantial barrier to competitiveness in final 
product manufacture. It is regarded as slow, inefficient, and costly. This applies 
equally to manufacturers of raw materials. This problem is pervasive, and circular: a 
healthy component industry requires a healthy final product industry, and vice versa. 
Breaking this cycle may require either a period of free importation of inputs to establish 
healthy assembly operations, or a concentration on exports of components under 
contract to offshore assemblers, Asian-style. 
4. State policy towards the HED industry has been inconsistent and contradictory. In 
particular, tariff policy has attempted to encourage both final product assembly and 
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component manufacture simultaneously. This results in low net tariffs for final product 
assemblers, and reduced volumes for component suppliers - no one is served well. 
Unless there is a major revamp of tariff policy, the HED industry, like other 
manufacturing industries, will be unwilling to invest. 
5. Unpredictable inflation and exchange rates will continue to wreak havoc with export 
attempts and import-intensive manufacturers. This may be one of the most serious - 
and least controllable - barriers to competitiveness. 
3. Strengths 
1. The HED industry is here. This gives it better access to retailers, better understanding 
of local market conditions, and an ability to deliver in smaller quantities more 
frequently. It also facilitates service, which is a major concern locally. Location is also 
an advantage with respect to transport costs when supplying the domestic market. 
2. It has faced an historical imperative for flexible production and multi-product lines in 
the small local market. This may place local firms well to absorb flexible automation 
technology (although long lead-times from component suppliers, particularly for 
imported components will make progress in this area difficult). 
3. It has established brand names, and linkages to overseas technology partners. This is 
also a weakness in some ways, as I have argued, but at least it provides access to 
marketing channels, technology, and components. 
4. It has achieved some success in local design. Some original development in materials 
usage and production processes has occurred, driven mainly by costs imperatives in a 
tight market. 
5. In the cases of small appliance and white goods, local products are not so uncompetitive 
that they cannot conceivably become exportable. 
6. Physical labour productivity is on a par with plants elsewhere in the world in some 
cases, indicating that South African firms are able to manufacture efficiently; whether 
they can do so competitively in a context of high input costs, price inflation, and long 
lead times is another question. 
4. Weaknesses 
1. The ownership 'culture' of the major producers of HEDs is probably a significant 
constraint to a strategic reorientation of this industry. As we have seen, management 
frequently express the view that their primary task is to produce steady financial 
results. Planned development towards export-orientation through reduced 
manufacturing costs, as in the Japanese philosophy, does not seem to be part of current 
thinking. As long as the task of management at operational level is seen as producing 
quarterly profits, as opposed to manufacturing quality, low-cost products, the cart is 
before the horse, and in all likelihood significant reinvestment in manufacturing will be 
a by-product of a prior demand-led upturn in financial performance. 
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2. South Africa lacks the human resources base to move immediately into sophisticated 
manufacturing of complex products, either for local consumption or export. Labour 
productivity and lack of R&D capacity are fundamental constraints. The skills pipeline 
for industries producing complex electrical and electronic goods in a highly competitive 
world market is badly underdeveloped. This applies equally to management and 
engineering staff as to production workers. Skills shortages are pervasive, and less 
easily rectifiable at management level. 
3. The local HED industry is a technology consumer. Technological development in the 
industry is limited by the small size of the local market and by technology agreements 
with overseas license holders. l'his, and the restrictive nature of technology 
agreements, is a significant barrier to exports beyond the region. 
B. What Is Worth Saving and Why? 
There are no intrinsic barriers preventing South African HED firms from restructuring 
themselves to become more competitive and supply a growing local market. Indeed, I would 
argue that what such firms need in order to do the former is the latter. Until that happens, 
however, such firms are unlikely to take steps to restructure themselves for quite rational 
reasons in terms of capitalist economics. In the meantime, several basic conclusions can be 
stated: 
1. Consumer Electronics 
a) Audio 
The audio branch of the consumer electronics industry is unlikely ever to be in a position to 
compete with low-cost, mass-production suppliers from the Far East. Should foreign 
companies wish to invest here, they should be allowed to do so, but in the meantime the 
protection afforded audio products should be abolished. This is unlikely to affect many 
firms or employees, as most local assemblers seem to have read the writing on the wall some 
time ago. There is widespread agreement in the industry on this point. 
b) Television 
Some firms in the television branch may be able to compete at an effective rate of protection 
of 20-25%. However, this will translate into a continuously rising rate of nominal duty 
unless domestic inflation can be brought to heel. Given the fact that the major component 
by value of a television, the picture tube, cannot be produced locally, any firms which do 
survive at that level will be simple assemblers of imported parts, earning meagre profits only 
through protection. 
The argument that the industry is somehow strategic is fallacious. Technological 
advancement in this industry comes from research and design activities, not from 
manufacturing, and it is nearly inconceivable that South African firms could become 
competitive producers of original-design televisions. 
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Present levels of labour and capital employment do not justify continued protection of the 
television industry, which by its own admission cannot survive without it. As we have seen, 
the foreign exchange costs of imported television parts will be enormous over the course of a 
5-year electrification programme. Imports of televisions will also emerge as a significant 
source of forex drainage during such a process, but ever-falling costs in overseas 
manufacturing operations suggest that this is unlikely to be as much of a concern as it may 
have been when the industry was founded 20 years ago. The experience of the SKD 'pirates' 
also suggests that a mass market can possibly be served by ultra-cheap imports. For these 
reasons I would recommend the abolition of protective duties foe the television 
industry. 
It may turn out that some firms will be able to produce televisions successfully as part of a 
flexible, multi-product manufacturing process in which capital costs are spread over a 
variety of other goods, as well. If so, then so bit it but given the situation with respect to 
import component pricing, this is unlikely. Ultimately, value added in the electronics fihiere, 
television included, is located at the level of component manufacture. 
2. White Goods and Small Appliances 
Given their basis in the metals sector, potentially competitive costs, reasonably good 
management, and local preferences for specific designs, the white goods and small 
appliances branches will probably be able to survive in the long term. These kinds of 
products will be demanded strongly by households in the event of an upswing and/or 
electrification, and will represent a more serious net cost to the economy if completely 
imported than if they are manufactured under limited tariffs. The experience of small, 
flexible manufacturers such as the New Zealand firm visited suggest that it is possible to 
transform this industry into a competitive small-scale exporter given sufficient incentive, 
opportunity, and assistance. 
The focus of industrial policy towards the HED industry, therefore, should be two-fold: 
to accommodate the loss of the consumer electronics branch, and to facilitate the 
survival and restructuring of the white goods and small appliances branches. Before 
discussing the former issue, it is useful to make a few points about the latter. 
In the case of white goods, research has been hampered by a lack of access to South African 
firms. Nevertheless, given the enormous potential demand for these goods, both from new 
consumers and for replacement, and its nearness to competitiveness in certain key products, I would argue that there is no prima facie reason not to support guided restructuring of 
the white goods and small appliances branches under appropriate protective policies. 
Such policy should be essentially supportive, but interventionist where necessary to force the 
industry away from its traditional middle-class white markets, dependent as they are on 
European products and designs. 
One reason for arguing this is a recognition that the industry has been deformed by the 
structural conditions of apartheid capitalism. The following points are salient here: 
1. The potential for forex drainage and job loss under full import liberalisation must be 
weighed against the higher cost to the consumer of protection. This apparent trade-off 
must be considered, however, in the context of the white goods industry's historical role 
as an import-substitution pole under apartheid industrialisation. Given the effective 
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income profile of the South African consumer market up to now, the local white goods 
manufacturing branch has had little option but to concentrate on a now saturated and 
shrinking market of mainly white middle-income consumers. This has shaped its choice 
of products in a way which has made it dependent on inappropriate foreign-licensed 
designs, and encouraged a culture of 'brand-name' and 'quality' commitment in firms. 
Together these factors have mitigated against aggressive pursuit of low-income 
consumers through innovative local products. Thus, the local industry has been guided 
into attempting to serve a limited market which prefers foreign brands and designs, and 
which would certainly import cheaper foreign products at the first opportunity. This 
market orientation raises local costs and renders ongoing protection necessary, since 
there is a built-in relationship between protection and imports. It does not necessarily 
follow that import liberalisation would result in massive imports to the hitherto 
underdeveloped lower income market, however. Thus, although there appears to be a 
straight formula of High Cost = Lack Of Competitiveness = Vulnerability To Imports, 
the situation is historical, not intrinsic. 
2. The enormous potential market of rising-income blacks and newly electrified 
households is beginning to stir. The industry appears to recognise that its target market 
profile is changing accordingly, although commitment to strategic reorientation varies 
between firms. Should the white goods industry demonstrate a commitment to 
developing locally-designed low-cost goods appropriate to a South African mass 
market, the forex/high cost trade-off could be minimised or eliminated altogether. For a 
move in this direction would have two effects: 
• Firstly, although it may mean abandoning the higher-income market to imports, it will 
move the industry into an area where it can finally achieve its coveted economies of 
scale. This would help to lower the price of white goods for the South African mass 
market to import-competitive levels, perhaps eliminating the major long-term balance of 
payments threat and preventing job losses. There may also be potential exports of such 
goods to developing country markets. 
• Secondly, the lower cost of imported white goods to the middle- to upper-income 
market may free up discretionary income for other purposes, with beneficial 
macroeconomic effects. 
C. Policy Issues and Proposals 
This section presents specific recommendations for policy towards the television, small 
appliance, and white goods industries. It should be noted that most of these 
recommendations are in no way specific to these industries; on the contrary, they could be 
applied to any assembly, fabrication, or engineering operation. Nevertheless, they are 
important for these industries, for without significant restructuring to face the future, they 
will not survive. 
1. Priorities and Timing 
The key general issues to be addressed by policy towards the manufacturing branch of the 
white goods industry are therefore as follows: 
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1. Stimulating domestic demand. 
2. Restructuring the trade régime in a way which reflects the changing priorities of local 
manufacture. 
3. Encouraging industry rationalisation, if appropriate, to achieve economies of scale, 
finance, and R&D. 
4. Encouraging reorientation towards the local mass market with locally-designed 
products. 
5. Encouraging specific investment in flexible manufacturing capacity in order to lay the 
foundation for a potential export-orientation towards niche markets. 
These policy imperatives should be regarded as sequential. The short-term goal (1-2 
years) should be to develop steps to preserve the industry's viable branches. The medium- 
term goal should be to encourage restructuring and rationalisation (2-5 years). The long- 
term (5 years) should focus on trade liberalisation beyond the initial recommendations made 
below. 
2. Trade Policy 
a) Consumer Electronics 
A plan for rapid (say, 24 months) reduction of tariffs should be developed and negotiated 
with the industry, making clear from the outset that the objective is free trade. This will 
allow it to determine ahead of time how it would respond to increased import competition 
and give it time to dispose of existing stocks. However, such a trade policy for the branch 
must be consistent and unwavering, with respect to both industry and labour. 
b) White Goods And Small Appliances 
1. Up to now tinkering and vacillation with trade policy have served as significant 
disincentives to investment on the part of local firms. A firm and long-term approach 
to tariff policy must be taken in order to encourage investment in this industry. 
2. On the basis of an industry forum assessment of its strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and constraints in specific products, areas should be targeted for local 
production or abanionment to importation. 
3. A flat effective (i.e. when tariffs on inputs are considered) duty rate of 25% should be 
established for product areas (as defined above) to be retained by the industry. This 
rate should be subject to an effective 5% reduction every two years unless the 
industry forum can demonstrate to the relevant government agency why this 
should not be so. Specific products should be subject to less than 25% protection if 
possible. Products not to be manufactured locally should be subject to no duty. 
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3. Withdrawing From Consumer Electronics 
1. Unions and organisations from affected communities should be treated as equal partners 
in the process of withdrawal and involved in all relevant negotiations. 
2. Labour re-deployment should be facilitated through a combination of incentives for 
reassignment with existing employers or other firms. These incentives should be 
offered to both employers and employees. State assistance with retraining and 
relocation should be made available in this respect. 
3. Incentives in the form of tax grace periods, sunset-clause subsidies, or training should 
be devised to encourage former employees of this industry who wish to do so to set up 
businesses in related areas, such as repair, spare parts manufacture, or distribution. 
4. Incentives should be devised and offered for re-deployment of assets and capital for 
firms whose involvement in consumer electronics constitutes a significant proportion of 
turnover (say 30-50%). These incentives could take the form of bridging tax credits or 
sunset-clause subsidies or both. 
5. Companies whose assets lose their value as a result of government policy should be 
recompensed or allowed a tax credit to a degree based on the previous return on those 
assets over a fixed period (say five years) and the expected life of the asset, less 
projected depreciation. Similarly, unsold stocks remaining at the end of the period 
should be allowed a tax credit equal to any loss due to import competition. 
6. Existing manufacturers of consumer electronics should be required to maintain service 
facilities, networks, and spare parts for a reasonable period (say five years). 
7. Purely revenue-oriented excise duties on television sales should be abolished or reduced 
to a minimal level to enable retailers to re-source with minimal disruption. Provisions 
with respect to existing retail stocks should be applied as for the manufacturing 
industry. 
8. Foreign investment or buy-out of existing firms should be allowed without hindrance. 
Existing conditions of employment should be maintained in the latter case. 
9. Sate expenditure on these policies should be financed out of a limited-period excise duty 
on sales of imported products. 
4. Industry Forum 
1. A forum consisting of representatives from industry, labour, supplier, government, 
retailer and consumer bodies should be established to analyse and make 
recommendations on the development of the HED industry on an ongoing basis. 
2. This forum should be required by legislation to establish an information and research 
unit which will gather and analyse information on the industry, particularly its training 
and skills needs, externally-competitive situation, and global trends in export markets 
and product and production technology. Such a unit should be staffed by 
representatives from all participants on the industry forum, who should be guaranteed 
access to all information except that of a genuinely competitive nature. 
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3. This forum should also serve as a negotiating forum over wages, skills definition and 
acquisition, and conditions of employment in the HED industry. It is hoped that general 
metals industry skilling systems will be adopted which will support the principle of 
continuous skill acquisition. 
5. Product Mix and Design 
It is clear that the market for high-end HEDs and consumer electronics in South Africa is 
essentially a replacement market - significant though this may be after several years of 
recession and falling personal disposable income - although product changes could provide 
some additional demand. There is a potentially massive market, however, for less 
sophisticated and expensive products. Such products are characterised by a 'stripped-down' 
approach based on no-frills and maximum manufacturability. 
Some local HED firms feel that they already are well-placed to supply such a market, and 
claim to produce several products specifically for it. Others feel that existing product 
ranges will suffice, reckoning that low-income consumers will continue to purchase more 
expensive goods because of the status attached to them. On reflection the latter attitude 
does not hold water. We have seen that sales of stoves, in particular, are not keeping place 
with urbanisation and electrification. This is partly because of the availability of 
substitutes, but this, in turn, is only an attractive option because alternatives remain so 
expensive. 
Product mix must therefore be carefully thought out. Simple, easy-to-produce goods which 
serve basic needs are not only the greatest source of potential growth, but will be subject to 
great import demand if and when growth restarts in earnest. They will also help to break the 
dependence on restrictive technology agreements with overseas principals and lay the 
foundation for local R&D activities. This need not be a impractical populist 'people's 
stove' project; white goods are different from automobiles in that they do not cost as much 
and are not as subject to brand and model identification. Once you can afford a new car, 
generally you can afford to be somewhat choosy, for which manufacturers gladly cater; but 
being able to afford a new stove or fridge does not necessarily mean that you can afford to 
pay for bells and whistles on such a needed device. 
Local firms should be concentrating on supplying these needs. However, if exports are 
kept as a goal - which they should be - a focus on such goods should not be allowed to 
detract from the need to keep up with world technological developments in the 
industry. Indeed, in the long run increased value added will require the development of a 
technologically competent workforce, which can only be developed through experience with 
products which are more sophisticated than white metal boxes with a few mechanical and 
electrical parts in them. 
1. Accordingly, government and industry research bodies should be encouraged through 
tax credits and/or sunset subsidisation to develop local products for the mass market, 
and to undertake simultaneous research into developments in overseas products with the 
goal of incorporating their features where possible into local products. 
2. Tax credits on development and marketing costs of such products should be allowed to 
encourage these products to be put into production. 
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3. Public-assisted provision of basic appliances (see below) should seek to encourage 
development of low-cost basic goods and local design capacity. 
4. It may be necessary to subsidise the cost of retooling for major manufacturers to 
encourage the production of energy-efficient appliances. 
6. Sectoral Restructuring 
a) Market Structure 
The first and most basic step to strengthen this sector is to rationalise it in anticipation of 
increased competition from imports. This will almost certainly entail some closures or 
mergers. This is not against the grain of global developments in the HED industries. The 
trend in the European appliance industry, in particular, is towards larger firms, as the 
industry leaders buy into smaller regional firms in order to obtain their brand names. This 
gives the smaller firms access to scale economies in purchasing, marketing, finance, and 
administration, and to a certain extent in manufacturing. 
Certainly the initial situation in South Africa is very different. Nevertheless, the 
proliferation of manufacturers in certain areas, made possible because of high rates of 
protection, has led to a situation where protection is required since each firm lacks the scale 
to compete. The solution involves allowing competitive forces - especially from imports - to 
push the sector towards an 'appropriate' size and composition. The problem is that 
reducing protection in order to encourage rationalisation will also hurt potentially more 
competitive firms just when they will need to be gearing up for increased competition from 
imports. 
This implies that rationalisation should take place prior to reduction of protection, or at 
least concurrently. This is a Catch-22 situation: the threat of reduced protection is a potent 
means to encourage restructuring, but restructuring is itself a prior condition of a successful 
move away from protectionism. To solve this problem, an interventionist, 'picking winners' 
approach to restructuring may be necessary. Such an approach will involve several steps, 
undertaken jointly by the industry forum and government: 
1. Based on projections of market growth dynamics and export possibilities (and plans), 
an estimate of the minimum and maximum sustainable capacities for the HED industry 
at various levels of tarffprotection must be developed. The goal should be to develop 
an industry which is healthy at the lowest possible level of protection. 
2. Firms potentially able to form the core of a competitive HED industry must be 
identified on the basis of specified criteria, which might include inter a/ia: 
• The financial health and backing of the firm, as well as the track record of the parent 
company in supporting innovative manufacturing activities. 
• An assessment of the net foreign exchange cost/benefit of production for both the local 
market and for export, based on the product specifications submitted by the firm. 
• Its technological dynamism and capacity to assimilate new product and process 
technologies. 
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• It potential for employment maximisation. 
3. Once such a core is identified, it should be made clear to the mdustiy that 
amalgamation is a desired outcome. Subsequently targeted investment incentives or tax 
credits could be used to achieve this goal. In any case it should be a matter of 
government policy that no application for protection will be considered on the basis of 
inability to compete due to insufficient scale. 
4. Should it transpire that the domestic market can support an industry of only a few 
participants or even one, this should be assessed on the basis of potential international 
competition rather than merely domestic considerations. 
b) Investment Incentives 
Subsidies and/or tax credits for technological innovation, as well as for use of 
productivity consultants, are a vital component of any industrial strategy towards an 
engineering-based industry. If exposure to technological and organisational development 
in both products and process technology is seen to pay in the short-run, local managements 
will be much more likely to develop a commitment to their benefits in practice. 
Nevertheless, careful monitoring of such programmes, as in the case of the innovation 
support scheme for the electronics industry, must be maintained to ensure that actual results 
are achieved. 
1. The basic policy should be to create a recognised category for qualitative, rather 
than merely quantitative investment. Investment should be recognised to comprise 
the direct and indirect costs of training, organ isational enhancement, and reorganisation 
of production as well as formation of fixed capital. Investment tax credits, accelerated 
depreciation allowances, subsidised credit, and/or subsidies could be used to reward 
investment falling into recognised categories. 
2. The key to the success of such an investment incentive programme will be the 
ability of the government to assess intelligently the technologies available to the 
HED industry. For this reason, the industry forum should be charged with employing 
impartial researchers to assess such technologies and making regular reports to 
government on the categories of investment deserving of such support. 
3. Where possible, labour saving investments should be favoured, but not at the expense of cost-competitiveness. 
4. Government should sponsor personnel exchanges with overseas firms where 
possible through the industry forum. 
5. A tax rebate system should be devised whereby verifiable improvements in 
manufacturing productivity qualify for an effective reduction in the rate of 
corporate tax. These rebates should be reversible. 
6. Provision of financial incentives, including subsidised credit, should be made in 
cases where firms can demonstrate export potential based on new investment. 
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c) Foreign Investment 
Direct or equity foreign investment in the HED industry should be encouraged. DFI in 
particular would serve as a very sharp and immediate reminder to the local industry that it 
will need to attain and sustain an international standard even if it is to concentrate on local 
production. Such DFI could be encouraged before protective duties are reduced, and may 
serve as an inducement to domestic restructuring. Several South Korean, Australasian, and 
East European firms have expressed interest in the South African market, and it is likely 
that they would be willing to invest if there were a significant return to be had. Investment 
incentives, however, should treat foreign firms on the same basis as domestic firms. Where 
possible, equity investment involving technology transfer should be preferred. 
d) Technology Transfer 
1. Technology agreements with foreign firms should be subject to government examination 
and approval. 
2. This assessment procedure should be based on the principle of limited duration in which 
times actual transfer of technological capability should take place. 
3. Technology transfer agreements should be required to include provisions for training. 
4. Transfer of production technology should be encouraged over product technology. To 
this end foreign exchange availability should be unrestricted where required for 
importation of production systems, so long as training is involved. 
5. Transfer of product technology involving improved energy efficiency, however, should 
be encouraged in the same manner as production technology. 
6. Provision of financial incentives, including subsidised credit, should be made in cases 
where firms can demonstrate export potential based on technology acquisition. 
e) Ownership Structures 
At present the conglomerate-subsidiary form which dominates the HED industry provides 
mixed benefits. On the one hand, it provides the industry with the level of (potential) 
financial backing required to re-equip itself and survive poor market conditions. On the 
other hand, in some cases it imposes an essential conservatism on managements. 
1. Policy towards ownership structures depends on an ongoing assessment of firms' 
activities based on the criteria of competitiveness in manufacturing, not accountancy. 
Government or government-commissioned assessment of the development of the 
industry's competitiveness and technological dynamism should include consideration of 
the opportunities and constraints faced by individual finns. Where it appears that 
viable opportunities for improvement are being consistently passed, government 
intervention in the form of tax penalties should seek to force principals to treat 
subsidiaries as manufacturing firms. 
2. Where this is insufficient, Competition Board rulings could be used to sever promising 
subsidiaries from unsuitable owners in the public interest. In some cases it may be 
advisable to encourage manufacturing operations to establish themselves as 
independent operators. 
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1) The Supply Chain 
The goal of policy should be to encourage localisation of inputs, but only insofar as this 
can be done without significantly raising the costs of local manufacturers. In the case of 
the white goods and small appliances branches, this is facilitated by the potential 
competitiveness of their main suppliers of raw materials, and their relatively simple 
component requirements. 
1. Trade policy towards the component sector should involve a realistic assessment of 
which components can be sourced locally. Such ongoing assessment should be 
undertaken by the industry forum in conjunction with government. 
2. As a principle, local component costs should be considered unacceptable when they rise 
above the rate of protection for the final product. Rates of protection for such 
industries should be identical to those of the final product industry. 
3. Rebates of duties on imported components to encourage local sourcing should continue 
to be used as an interim measure. 
4. Viable components industries should be specifically targeted for a restructuring process 
similar to the one discussed above for the final producers. 
7. Labour, Training, and Skills 
1. Labour should be treated as an equal partner with employers in the context of the 
industry forum. 
2. A skills and training sub-committee of the industry forum should be established to 
make and update recommendations as to specific skills required by the industry to 
the relevant metals industry training board. 
3. Skills acquisition and qualitative development of labour resources should be 
treated as supportable investment by tax, credit, and subsidy policy. 
4. The industry forum should regard as its initial and ongoing priority the training 
and education of workers' representatives in the essential aspects of the industry. 
8. Export Assistance 
1. Export assistance should be made available on a sunset basis. The goal of such 
assistance should be to introduce domestic firms and foreign markets to one another. 
2. Assessment of export assistance should be based on the two-stage principle of 
learning and profitability. Initial learning should be regarded as worthy of support, 
but only if it leads to profitable exports. 
3. Ongoing export assistance should mainly take the form of marketing and trade 
assistance rather than subsidisation. 
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9. Demand Management 
This is the most important short-term area for policy. The fundamental goal of this set 
of policies should be to (i) encourage sustainable development of demand, and (ii) to avoid 
singling out the HED industry as a tool for demand management. 
a) Macroeconomic Management 
1. Domestic macroeconomic demand and money supply management should cease to 
single out the HED market in cases of overheating or inflation. Quantitative credit 
controls, increased mandatory deposits, and unpredictable interest rates damage the 
manufacturing industry more severely than any other in times of slowdown. General 
interest rate policy and competitive determination of interest rates should more properly 
be the tools used to manage demand and money supply. As a principle, lending 
conditions and procedures in the retail sector should be left to market determination and 
assessment. 
2. Tax deductions for interest costs and depreciation on investment in certain categories of 
basic household durables should be allowed to private income tax payers on the 
principle that they are part of the 'capital stock' of the home. 
b) Public Appliance Distribution 
1. All publicly-financed or supported schemes to encourage appliance use should strive to 
encourage energy efficiency, development of the local manufacturing industry, and 
serviceability. 
2. New state-sponsored housing schemes should include a requirement for provision of 
basic appliances, including stove or hotplate, refrigerator, iron, kettle, and toaster. 
3. ESKOM's current plans to supply basic small appliances with new hook-ups should be 
continued. This should take the form of vouchers for purchase of items from private 
retail outlets where possible, but otherwise through direct provision through state 
contract. 
4. Tenders for state contracts to supply household appliances should include requirements 
for manufacturing technique and reinvestment or proceeds for improved manufacturing 
capability. 
5. Tenders for state contracts should not be limited to local firms. 
6. Low-cost public finance schemes for the purchase of household appliances should be 
devised and administered by municipalities and could be financed through an industry 
levy, ESKOM, or both. Where possible these should operate through group credit 
schemes organised through community organisations. Stokvels should also be 
encouraged. 
7. Public communal washing facilities could be used to encourage use of washing 
machines. 
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c) Other 
1. The present Transvaal housing regulations, which require basic appliances to be 
provided with rental accommodation, should be extended to the rest of the country. 
This should be subject to sub-municipal assessment of local conditions, however. 
2. The industry forum should be encouraged to undertake non-specific advertising on 
behalf of the industry, to encourage consumers to switch from solid-fuel appliances. 
This could be financed from a levy on manufacturing finns. 
3. Electricity prices should encourage the design and demand for energy efficient 
appliances, as should product specification regulations and rebates to consumers. 
d) Credit 
1. The government, in conjunction with the industry forum, should create a publicly- 
guaranteed financial institution for the finance of household durables purchases by low- 
income households. These should operate through community organisations or 
municipal councils (see above). 
2. HP regulations should be streamlined, standardised, and regarded as long-term. Market 
forces should be left to determine interest rates, deposits, and lending levels at retail 
level. 
3. Major banking institutions should be encouraged to establish 'durables banks' along the 
lines of those operating in the auto industry. This would reduce retailers' balance sheet 
exposure to customer debt. 
4. Manufacturers or their parent companies should be encouraged to establish their own 
financial institutions to support household durables purchases. 
5. Public finance should not be used to subsidise poor financial administration by retailers, 
manufacturers, or banks. Nevertheless, subsidy-participation schemes for purchases by 
qualifying low-income households could be devised for use on a pre-purchase basis. 
e) Taxation, Excise Duties and State Revenue 
The basic principle of this set of policies should be to encourage the development of the 
manufacturing sector through public demand and to replace indirect taxation with 
taxation of healthy corporate sources. 
1. VAT on basic household durables should be reduced to encourage consumption. In the 
case of low-income financial or public provision schemes, it should be zero-rated. 
2. Excise duties on basic household durables should be abolished. 
3. Excise duties on non-essential products and a portion of customs revenue from import 
duties on household durables should be earmarked for use in financing aspects of 
investment and demand policy for the industry. 
4. Import surcharges should be used only for management of the balance of payments and 
not as a form of additional protection. 
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5. Levies or mandatory investments by the insurance giants could be used to finance 
public provision or finance schemes. 
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